Basic Tactics on VIP Protection
Background

Protection of United Nations personnel and facilities is one of the three core tasks for the FPUs. This main task can include protection of convoys, relocation or evacuation of staff and intervention where necessary for the protection of staff and in accordance with FPU capabilities. Close protection and VIP escorts for the benefit of the United Nations, international or national officials have been and are currently provided in several peacekeeping missions. It appeared that very often, the units were not prepared for this type of mission and were directly involved in operations without any previous experience or competence. FPU members directly tasked with VIP protection should act according to the UN Manual of Guidance on Protective Services and in close cooperation with UN security/UNDSS representatives. This manual is intended to be a resource for protection officers and to provide a standard terminology and doctrine for such deployments, to ensure a consistently high standard of protective services, including close protection operations, within the United Nations.

Aim

To understand and apply the basic techniques and tactics to be used during VIPs visits in support of UN close protection teams.

Learning outcomes

On completion of this module, the participants will be able to:

- Identify the different phases of a Close Protection Operation
- Define the role of a close protection team
- Demonstrate the techniques and tactics to be applied in support of close protection teams for general security purpose (Static and Mobile protection).

Training sequence

The material in this module is designed to be delivered over two hours classroom based theory lessons, followed by eleven and half hours of practice, which should include, at least one hour for assessment. This is on the assumption that the students have received no previous training in this subject.

Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum Session time</th>
<th>Lecture/Presentation</th>
<th>Question/Assessment</th>
<th>Session Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 hours</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
<td>30 mins</td>
<td>11 hours 30 mins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Options</td>
<td>Mission Specific</td>
<td>Optional film</td>
<td>Optional activity</td>
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</tbody>
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Methodology

This module contains a PowerPoint theory presentation to explain and show the various techniques. However, the majority of this module should be taught in a practical manner using the following format:

- Explanation by the instructor
- Demonstration by the instructor
- Imitation by the students (with instructor correcting where necessary)
- Practice by the students until the technique is perfected

At the end of the final stage, the instructor will be able to assess if the student is competent in the techniques and tactics having carried out continuous assessment throughout the preceding lessons.

The instructor should inform participants of the content, format and timing. Knowing what to expect, participants can improve their ability to focus on the subject and benefit better from the session.

- Basic tactics on VIP protection (two hours) = lesson 1
- Practice (11 hours and half of practical lessons) = lesson 2

The practice should be carried out over a number of days and the instructors should be aware that the physically demanding nature of deploying the FPU in VIP protection techniques must be carefully managed so that the students do not get fatigued as this is likely to lead to injury. The training will also focus on the drivers, as they play a crucial role during the escort of a VIP.

A number of the practical periods should be conducted in the form of exercises which should be carried out in as realistic situation as possible with the use of other officers acting at ‘Mob crowd’

When training a full FPU it is recommended that this module is taught to individual Platoons/sections. Then a common assessment is scheduled to check that the whole FPU executed the training in a similar manner.

Instructors are encouraged to add practical examples and mission specific information related to the specific deployment of participants, if known.

Instructor Profile

This module is best presented by an instructor who has practical experience in
Public Order Management/VIP protection in peacekeeping operations and who could share his/her experience with the group. They must be practiced and skilled to be able to demonstrate the technique correctly. If there is more than one instructor, at least one should have practical experience as VIP protection trainer in either domestic policing or a peacekeeping mission.

**Instructor Preparations**

**Required Readings**
- FPU Training Handbook
- Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
- Directives of Use of Force and SOPs
- UN Manual of Guidance on Protective Services

**General Preparations**

**Equipment:**
1. Computer and PowerPoint slides for lesson 1
2. Projector and Screen for lessons 1
3. Vehicles for the practical section of the training (lesson 2).

**Training Area:**
The initial lesson should be carried out in the classroom; however subsequent lessons will need a large open area where students can work as an FPU section and platoon. Once the 'open ground' tactics have been grasped by the students, the FPU will need to practice their tactics in a more urban situation. For this purpose, a public order village is ideal. If not available, the exercises will be carried out in town.
Lesson 1 – Basic tactics on VIP protection (theory)

Contents:

Slide 1

BASIC TACTICS ON VIP PROTECTION

PUBLIC ORDER MANAGEMENT

UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015

Slide 2

Contents

- Aim
- Learning outcomes
- Tactical considerations
- Basic knowledge on VIP protection
  - Direct protection
  - Mobile protection
  - Static protection
- Summary
Aim

To introduce the FPU to the basic techniques and tactics to be used during VIPs visits in support of UN close protection teams.

Learning outcomes

At the end of this module, the participants will be able to:
- Identify the different phases of a Close Protection Operation
- Define the role of a close protection team
- Demonstrate the techniques and tactics to be applied in support of close protection teams for general security purpose (Static and Mobile protection)
**Tactical considerations**

- Mission = support to close protection teams (static, mobile or direct protection)
- Environment = private house, building, open area...
- Equipment of the unit (types of vehicles, armored or not, conditions, rifles with telescopic sight…)
- Risk assessment and Use of Force
- Planning and coordination
- Training (drivers and unit)

Slide 5

It is important to understand how Close Protection Operations within the United Nations should be conducted and how FPUs can support the Protection teams. The goal is to minimize any exposure to threats through appropriate planning, situation awareness and reaction.

Planning has to be carried out according to the type of mission. The support of a FPU to a close protection team can be operated during static, mobile or direct protection. In any case, FPU members have to be familiar with this vocabulary and should be able to define clearly the operational principles of each situation and establish clear coordination mechanisms between the different security actors. Planning factors are developed below in slide 8.

It is important that all officers engaged in the component parts of the protection package are aware of the protection strategy and the risks giving rise to it. This enables managers, event planners, and participating units to ensure that:

- Effective coordination can take place
- Resources are allocated and deployed appropriately
- The command structure is defined and understood
- Effective communications are arranged
- All participants are briefed effectively

During the planning phase, it is important to take into consideration the equipment of the FPU. Operations where risks are confirmed must be carried out with the appropriate means and vehicles. Firearms and vehicles should also be in accordance with the Protection team expectations.

Wherever there is a need to support a Close protection team, the assessment, design and delivery of the operation must be achieved with the maximum efficiency and to the highest standards. Where threats are manifested, the officers will focus on
minimizing the impact on the Protectee by way of extraction from the threat environment. Where the only option to achieve this is to negate the threat, this must be done with minimal appropriate use of force and with the purpose of facilitating the successful extraction of the Protectee from the threat environment. When the use of firearms is unavoidable, this should be executed with the highest degree of speed, accuracy and discipline, in accordance with the Directives of Use of Force of the mission and the FPUs policy.

Close protection tactics and technics are based on roles, schemas, methodology, procedures that have to be known by all officers involved in operations. Training should be delivered to all FPUs before deployment. The role of the drivers has to be highlighted and should be the focus of the trainers.

**Definition**

- Close protection is a viable tool to mitigate risks to the security and dignity of United Nations officials. Close protection is defined as the deployment of a number of security trained officers to provide a ring of protection in close proximity to the recipient, together with a reconnaissance capability to locations to be visited.
- The United Nations Security Management System provides a mechanism by which the need for close protection arrangements can be assessed and delivered where deemed necessary

The primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members rests with the host country. Senior United Nations officials can face an increased risk of security incidents due to their potentially higher visibility and the fact that they are often required to issue statements which may make them a focus for hostile entities. Close protection is a viable tool to mitigate risks to the security and dignity of United Nations officials.

The deployment of close protection except in the case of the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and the deputy Secretary-General will be based upon a specific Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and for travel on official business only.
Objective

The aim of Protective Services is to:

- Preserve the life of the person being protected (the "Protectee") and
- Prevent or minimise the effect of an attack intended to cause physical harm or embarrassment

The Protection Officers will therefore not engage in any activity which will compromise their ability to achieve these aims or which could indeed contribute towards successful attacks against the Protectee.

Close protection operations

CP Operations may be separated into distinct Phases:

- **Planning Phase** — during which the Operational Plan is formalised, including input from the Advance Officers, Team Leader; rehearsals take place and the Team Leader coordinates with the Host Country;
- **Operational Phase** — the implementation of the Operational Plan;
- **Post Deployment Phase** — when after action reports for incident and post operational reviews are studied to extract any lessons learned and best practices

The Designated Official in the location to be visited or assigned to remains accountable for ensuring that the senior DSS personnel in the field, normally the Chief Security Adviser (CSA) produces the following documents;

- The Security Risk Assessment,
- The Concept of Security
- The Operational Plan

The Concept of Security is a broad overview of the security requirements for the operation, including arrival and departure protocols, during movement, at the
accommodation and office or event location, and medical support. It includes the
division of responsibility between the Host Country and United Nations, the chain of
command for the operation and the intended providers for each requirement. It also
outlines any additional assets not available in country which DSS must source.

The Operational Plan is a detailed schedule of the implementation of the Concept of
Security, with timings and contingencies for each phase of the operation and
emergency actions, communications schedules and contact details and linkage with
host country. The Plan is to be kept strictly confidential and would not normally be
shared beyond the Designated Official, CSA and implementing partners.

**Direct Protection Planning**

The planning cycle should involve consideration of the following:

- Communication and negotiation with the member state or host nation,
- Ensuring that the threat and risk to a Protectee are correctly identified by the
  member state or host nation,
- Utilising threat assessments and intelligence to inform the programme
  undertaken,
- Leveraging the necessary security measures appropriate to the threat and
  risks to the Protectee,
- Liaison between the Protectee and the member state or host nation to help in
  minimising the risk, and
- Briefing the Protectee on the threat and risk, and any change in the
  intelligence picture.

**Mobile Protection Planning**

Current threat levels and any relevant intelligence or circumstances that may affect
arrangements for the escort:

- The proposed number and type of vehicles in the convoy
- The standard of the drivers employed
- Departure and arrival times for the venue(s), and whether timings are critical
- Any special requirements, e.g. escort to within 1 mile of venue and then allow
  for unescorted covert arrival
- Details of any specific hospital to be used in relation to a Protectee ’s medical
  condition (if relevant)
- Suitable hospitals, places of safety and rest areas

The Team Leader will then assess the risk for the escort and consider:

- The number of motorcycles required and experience level of escorting officers
- The deployment of a marked Lead Car and/or Rear Car or four wheel drive
  vehicle
- Routes to be used between venues, including alternatives
- Timings
- Traffic conditions anticipated
• Known hazards that may affect the smooth running or security of the escort
• Any tactical considerations at the points of departure or arrival
• Anticipated weather conditions
• Public order issues
• Other environmental factors that may require further control measures
• Relevant reporting lines and codes that will be provided by the convoy to the Watch Officer or command element.

Static Protection Planning
Refer to slide 128

The Operational Phase may be further separated into three Phases described and commented in slide 9 and following.

Close protection operations

The Operational Phase may be further separated into three phases:

• **Direct Protection Phase** — where the Protectee receives close protection on foot, i.e. collection at the airport, upon movement towards the accompanying convoy and walking to subsequent venues;

• **Mobile Protection Phase** — where the Protectee travels by vehicle in a convoy;

• **Static Protection Phase** — where the Protectee is either at a venue, residence or temporary places of accommodation.

Slide 9
1- Direct protection

The aim of Direct Protection is to:

- Eliminate or reduce the opportunity for attack during movement by foot, by using individual skills, team skills and formations to place human barriers between the protected asset and a potential attacker or, the means by which an attack may be delivered and to effect immediate extraction should it be required to prevent additional attacks from taking place.

The Direct Protection phase specifically relates to movement of the Protection Officers by foot. Protection is provided to the Protectee by the direct intervention of the Officers rather than by the vehicle or physical security mitigating measures.

Direct Protection highlights individual skills as well as team skills. Moving in various foot formations will assist in mitigating the various types of threat and environments encountered. However all formations rely on the individual skills and professionalism of the Officers to work as a cohesive mitigation measure.

Threats to the Protectee during the Direct Protection phase have an increased impact. Without the mitigation of armoured vehicles, perimeter walls etc., attacks such as explosive devises or shots fired have fewer defensive mechanisms to penetrate before causing the Protectee harm.

Direct Protection is also where Protection Officers are most visible to the public. Their conduct must therefore be beyond reproach to the general public, and immediate, appropriate and proportionate to an attacker.

Movement by foot will be required in various circumstances including arrival and departures at airports or train stations, movement within specific venues, and during all embus and debus drills.
Direct protection is a custom made service which depends upon and is sensitive to the full spectrum of factors considered in the risk management process.

In its smallest deployment, a Close Protection Unit comprises:
• One PPO assigned to the Protectee (BG).
• At least three Protection Officers acting in the Personal Escort Team (in most of the formations developed below, the number of Protection officers is four)

These officers will require two vehicles, one for the Protectee and PPO and one for the PET. The drivers for these vehicles must be provided in addition to the Close Protection Unit in this configuration.

From this basic package, the operational command will determine what type and number of additional assets are required, particularly in the roles to be fulfilled by the Protection Support Team.

The choice of foot formation will depend on the threat, the number of officers assigned, and also the visual impact desired. Each formation has positive and negative aspects, however all formations should include a ‘layered’ defence of concentric rings with the PPO forming the most inner ring of security and Officers of the Personal Escort Team providing at least one additional layer of in depth security: Box, Diamond and V formations.

**Foot Formations**

- **Box** – good all round defence and good visual impact, but leads to gaps between officers
- **Diamond** – will filter crowds around the Protectee but can appear very aggressive
- **V** – will filter crowds around the Protectee but widens the individual arcs of responsibility for Officers
The position of each officer of the close Protection Unit is defined. The Body Guard (PPO) is assigned directly to the protectee (VIP). In the event of an attack or other serious incident, the immediate tactical response of the PPO will be to take control of and extract the Protectee from the area of danger. The PPO has the specific role of acting as bodyguard and should not be distracted from this duty by also having the responsibility for delivering orders and coordinating the actions of the Close Protection Unit. The Personal Protection Officer (PPO) assigned to the Protectee will remain with the Protectee at all times and acts as the last line of defence.

In the box formation, the 4 protection officers in the PET are taking position at the corner of an “imaginary” box and have their own area of responsibility. The Personal Escort Team (PET) provides a second layer of protection in close proximity to the Protectee. When operating on foot, these officers will maintain visual and verbal communication with the PPO at distances dictated by the environment. When conducting a vehicle move, these officers will travel in an additional vehicle to the convoy. In the event of incident on foot, the PET will respond to a threat where necessary and provide cover during the extraction of the Protectee. In vehicle moves where the Protectee Vehicle is immobilised and cannot self-extract, the PET will provide all round tactical defence of the Protectee Vehicle, and thereby the Protectee, whilst the threat and medical status are determined, and the extraction is planned.

The box formation offers to the protectee a clear view in front of him.
The position of each officer of the close Protection Unit is defined. In the diamond formation, the 4 protection officers in the PET are taking position at the corner of an “imaginary” lozenge and have their own area of responsibility. The Body Guard (PPO) is assigned directly of the protectee (VIP). The diamond formation looks more aggressive to the crowd.

The position of each officer of the close Protection Unit is defined. In the box formation, the 4 protection officers in the PET are taking position following the lines of an “imaginary” V and have their own area of responsibility. The Body Guard (PPO) is assigned directly of the protectee (VIP). The V formation is very often used when the team and the protectee is passing through a crowd.
Low Profile Formation

Two close protection officers formation

Slide 15

Slide 15 illustrates a low profile formation with two close protection officers. In some countries, police officers don't speak about close protection when the protection team is composed by less than three members.

Low Profile Formation

Three close protection officers formation

Slide 16

Slide 16 illustrates a low profile formation with three close protection officers. This schema is the most common system used by the French protection team.
Slide 17

Slide 17 illustrates a low profile formation with four close protection officers. In this case, one officer is fully dedicated to the Protectee and is in charge of his extraction and evacuation.

Direct protection

- The primary role of Protection Officers during an incident is to extract the Protectee to a safe haven
- Escape routes must be identified to each safe location and reconnaissance made to determine their suitability
- Foot formation may also be supported by a Quick Reaction Force, which is generally provided by police (FPUs) or military services from host countries and member states
- The preservation of the scene and the investigation of a firearms incident will be the responsibility of the authorities within whose jurisdiction the incident took place. The investigation phase can be supported by UN police (may act independently).

Slide 18

It is important to note that the host country has jurisdiction in the event of an attack and therefore assumes responsibility for any response. However, the protection package must fulfil their responsibility in removing the Protectee from the threat in accordance with relevant UN policies and procedures.

The primary role of Protection Officers during an incident is to extract the Protectee to a safe haven. Safe rooms, hardened rooms or exits leading back to the Protectee Vehicle must be located and reconnaissance made to determine their suitability. Escape routes must be identified to each safe location.

For extended movement on foot, rally points must be identified along the route such
that in the event of incident and the resulting confusion, the Protection Officers can extract the Protectee, re-organise at clearly understood locations and consolidate the team before moving on.

The close protection unit can be supported by a Quick Reaction Force or police officers in case of visit in a sensitive area or presenting risks of incidents. The positions of these support elements are described in the following slides from 19 to 22.

**Box Formation: support of FPU**

<table>
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<th>Slide 19</th>
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**Diamond Formation: support of FPU**

| Slide 20 |
“V” **Formation:** support of FPU

- 5 police officers
- 4 police officers

Slide 21

Slides 19 to 21 show the position of FPU members in case of support to foot formations.

**Any Formation:** support of FPU

- Police officers on both sides
- Choice between low profile or high visibility

Slide 22

Slide 22 shows FPU members moving on the sides of a foot formation. This tactic is principally used while escorting a delegation and when the public is positioned on both sides of the road.
Direct protection: communication

- DURING MOVEMENT BY FOOT
  - Change of directions, stops
- DURING DEEMBARING
  - Disembarking, entry in buildings
- DURING EMBARKING
  - Exit of buildings, embarking
- DURING MOVEMENT IN CONVOY
  - Motorcycles overtaking, suspect vehicles
- IN CASE OF AGGRESSION

Means: Radio, verbal, signs, eye contacts

Slide 23

The communication in close protection is crucial and present at all steps of direct protection, starting from the exit of the Protectee’s office or house till his return. Particular attention has to be paid during the phases of movement, by foot, while embarking or disembarking, or in case of aggression.

As during public order operation, all means are used to broadcast information, namely by radio, verbal, signs or eyes contacts. Communication should be discreet, except in case of attack, when it is necessary to catch immediately the attention of the whole protection team.

In this case, the officer who first faces any type of danger is in charge of announcing it.

Announce of danger

1/ Information

- NATURE
  - Weapons
  - Grenade
  - Knives/sharp objects
  - Projectiles

- DIRECTION
  - 12 H
  - 08 H
  - 06 H
  - 09 H

Slide 24

The announce aims to inform on:
• The nature of the danger
• The direction where it is coming from

In most of the countries, the direction is defined clockwise.
• 12h = danger coming from the front
• 3h = danger coming from the right
• 6h = danger coming from the back
• 9h = danger coming from the left

**Announce of danger**

2/ Reaction

- **Fixation module**
  - Abnegation
  - Neutralization of the aggressor (self-defense)

- **Evacuation Module**
  - Protect the VIP
  - Remove from danger (opposite)
  - Search for cover

When the danger is announced, the protection team splits into two modules. The first module “Fixation module” is in charge to response to the threat by neutralizing the aggressor when necessary and possible. The second module called “Evacuation module” is in charge of the extraction/evacuation of the Principal.

It is obvious that the two modules have to act/react in coordination, and that one cannot achieve his task without the support/action of the other.
In case of attack

Slides 26 to 30 illustrate the role of these two modules.

Full contact report

- **L** Location
  - Grid Coordinates
  - Specific description of your location
- **I** Incident = what occurred
  - Attacked by
    • Number of attackers
    • Basic descriptions
- **A** Action
  - Returned fire (or not)
  - Any useful observations
  - Principal and Team health
- **R** Request = what your team need

Slide 31

In case of contact/aggression, a report is immediately made through the “LIAR” frame.

Essential information need to be broadcasted to the command post in order to facilitate the decision making. LIAR means that information has to be given on:
- Where the aggression is taking place
- Who are the attackers
- What is the reaction of the protection team
- What the team needs
2- Mobile protection

The aim of Mobile Protection is to:

- Eliminate or reduce the opportunity for attack during movement by vehicle by using defensive driving skills and vehicle formations to place mobile perimeters between the protected asset and a potential attacker or the means by which an attack may be delivered, and to enable immediate extraction should an attack take place.

Slide 32

Mobile protection refers to an extensive range of available counter-measures, applied during movement by vehicle of the Protectee between venues, to mitigate a perceived or actual threat. The threat may be from terrorists, criminals, politically disruptive groups, fixated persons, self-publicists and lone adventurers.

FPUs are more and more requested to support close protection teams and to provide with mobile protection. The role of these vehicles is not always well understood and known by FPUs commanders and members. FPUs should be trained accordingly prior their deployment within the mission area.

At the same time, FPU coordination should also be familiar with this type of recurrent tasks. Massive arrival of VIPs occurred several times in the past in peacekeeping missions. FPUs have to be able to fully integrate and sustain a close protection operational plan developed by UN security without any problem.

Mobile protection phase: definitions

- **Close Protection Unit**: The Close Protection Unit comprises all the officers deployed to provide protection in transit.
- **Convoy**: The convoy is the assembly of vehicles travelling together on the movement.
- **Escort**: The additional support provided by the respective Host Country.
- **Close Protection Operation**: The overall protection package, comprising direct, mobile and static protection phases.
- **Mobile Protection Phase**: The element of the protection operation specifically concerned with protection in transit.
Slide 33

Slide 33 is summarizing the different definitions in order to clarify the terminology used in connection with the Mobile Protection Phase.

**Mobile protection driving**

- The drivers of vehicles used in Mobile Protection remain responsible for the driving decisions they make.
- It is an appropriate requirement for all escort drivers to be properly trained in “Defensive Driving Techniques” and only those properly authorised should be used for this purpose.
- Officers must be aware that their vehicles can themselves constitute a lethal force and must therefore be able to justify their actions if used to force an escape or to prevent or frustrate an attack.

Slide 34

In addition to any terrorist or criminal threat to which a Protectee or other protected asset is subject, mobile protection operations are also vulnerable to the normal hazards of travelling by road.

The drivers of vehicles used in Mobile Protection, whether overt or covert, must at all times drive according to the type and level of training they have received, and remain responsible for the driving decisions they make.

Although speed of transit may be desirable in some operations, priority must be given to ensuring the transit is completed safely for the Protectee, the general public and for the Protection Officers themselves.

It is an appropriate requirement for all escort drivers to be properly trained in “Defensive Driving Techniques” and only those properly authorised should be used for this purpose.

Please refer to the FPU policy and the gradation of use of force to explain that vehicles may constitute lethal force and that drivers are accountable for their actions. Responsibility for the manner in which vehicles are used rests with the drivers who may have to justify their actions in legal proceedings.
Mobile protection planning

- **High Profile Mobile Protection Operations**
  - Overt mobile protection operations with uniformed officers and marked United Nations vehicles provide a high visibility presence intended to deter attack

- **Low Profile Mobile Protection Operations**
  - Covert mobile protection operations, by maintaining secrecy before the event and drawing the least attention to a movement in transit, minimize risk to the Protectee (covert approach with unannounced movements and discreet points of arrival and departure)
  - It may be also possible to provide a high security but low profile operation

Officers in charge of UN Mobile Protection should assess the specific circumstances of each operation and decide upon a relevant protection strategy, using the risk management process. This will enable other component elements, including direct and static protection, to support the package in the most appropriate and cost effective way and thereafter for the appropriate level of resourcing to be deployed.

The movement by road of Protectees need not always entail a formal escort. It may often be more appropriate, subject to the risk management decision, for the Personal Protection Officer (PPO) accompanying the Protectee to use a low profile, covert approach with unannounced movements and discreet points of arrival and departure. For example, for a Protectee at high threat but on private engagements, it may be appropriate to provide a high security but low profile operation. In such cases, if an Escort is required, the use of armed motorcyclists to facilitate progress, without road closures or other high profile activities may be the most effective measure. Alternatively, an entirely covert mobile operation may be preferable.

For a high security and high profile operation, a carefully managed and coordinated Escort including motorcyclists, supported by more heavily armed officers in cars, together with an overt or covert counter assault capability and other tactics, including decoys, may be required.

It is important that all officers engaged in the component parts of the protection package are aware of the protection strategy and the risks giving rise to it. This enables managers, event planners, and participating units to ensure that:

- Effective coordination can take place
- Resources are allocated and deployed appropriately
- The command structure is defined and understood
- Effective communications are arranged
- All participants are briefed effectively
In principle a convoy (which does not form part of a military convoy) should not contain more than five vehicles otherwise it becomes unwieldy. Non-essential vehicles not performing a specific task must be excluded. The practice of forming a second, separate convoy with its own escort arrangements may be considered if required.

Most convoys will consist of no more than four vehicles. Four is an ideal number; fewer vehicles make it easier to identify the Protectee’s car and thus contribute to compromising the occupant. All vehicles should conform to the same performance standard where possible.

All vehicles used should have four doors and depending on the threat should be ballistically protected, including the windows, door panels and undercarriage. All convoy vehicles should be fitted with front passenger rear view mirrors. Vehicle engines should be kept running until a Protectee is secure inside a building and should be started in plenty of time before the Protectee returns to allow it to reach its normal working temperature.

Convoy vehicles should always be kept fully fuelled and in any case never be allowed to fall below half full exclusive of any reserve tanks.
Mobile protection: convoy

- The list below shows the types of vehicles likely to be used on a frequent basis:
  - Point Car
  - Lead Car
  - Principal Vehicle
  - Protection Escort Team (PET) Car

Mobile protection: convoy

- In addition the following vehicles may be deployed in support of the convoy, whilst not being attached to its speed or route:
  - Pilot Vehicle
  - Rear Vehicle
  - Counter Assault Team (CAT) Vehicle
  - Sweep Vehicle

Slides 37 and 38

Slides 37 and 38 are listed the different types of vehicles to be used during a convoy (VIP escort/movement).

The role of each of them is developed in the slides 39 and 40.
Convoy composition

- **Point Car (PC)**
  - The Point Car driver is responsible for ensuring the route selected remains clear and travels at a distance in advance of the main convoy.

- **Lead Car (LC)**
  - The Lead Car driver is responsible for the speed and position of the convoy on the road.

- **Principal Vehicle (PV)**
  - The Principal vehicle is used to transport the Protectee and is driven by the Principal Driver.

- **Protection Escort Team (PET) Car**
  - The Protection Escort Team Car is used to transport Protection Officers only.

**Point Car**

The Point Car driver is responsible for ensuring the route selected remains clear and travels at a distance in advance of the main convoy so that if a route is no longer suitable the Protectee Vehicle can take an alternate route without being forced to slow or stop. Traffic control if required is managed by the local police and the Pilot Car should maintain communication with these authorities. The driver of the Point Car alone is responsible for negotiating the selected route.

The Point Car travels well ahead of the convoy, controlling and managing the traffic in front of it to ensure a non-stop journey or to notify the Convoy Commander of any obstructions or blockages.

The Point Car officer is responsible for relaying the instructions of the Point Car driver by radio to the Lead Car and for maintaining an accurate location of the Point Car to both the Convoy Commander and the Watch Officer. The exact location of the convoy in transit is of crucial importance, particularly in the event of an incident.

Slides 39 and 40
By being remote from the immediate vicinity of an attack on the convoy, the Point Car will be best able to radio for assistance.

**Lead Car**
The Lead Car driver is responsible for the speed and position of the convoy on the road. It is important that the speed of the convoy is such that it enables the Point Car to manage the traffic safely and efficiently.

The Lead Car driver should follow the instructions of the Point Car and, by watching the situation ahead and judging speed and distance, maintain a sterile area around the convoy wherever possible.

The Lead Car officer is responsible for relaying the instructions of the Point Car to the Lead Car driver. The officer must also remain tactically aware and alert to any vehicles that may be attempting to interfere with or threaten the integrity of the convoy.

The Lead Car is responsible for ensuring that there is enough room for the convoy to move as one.

The Lead Vehicle will also carry national staff used for translation, coordination with host country escort, vehicles and navigational support.

**Protectee Vehicle**
The Protectee vehicle is used to transport the Protectee and is driven by the Protectee Driver. He should follow the instructions of the Lead Car and, by watching the situation ahead and judging speed and distance, maintain a sterile area around the convoy as required in accordance with the Operational Plan.

The Protectee Driver is also responsible for ensuring the smoothest ride possible for the Protectee in normal circumstances, as well as the highest level of defensive driving skills in the event of incident.

The Personal Protection Officer will travel in the Protectee Vehicle and is responsible for providing cover to the Protectee, communication with the convoy and preparing for the use of firearms and transfer to an alternate vehicle if the Principal Vehicle is immobilised.

**Protection Escort Team (PET) Car**
The Protection Escort Team Car is used to transport Protection Officers only. Of the convoy vehicles, the PET Car may drive the most abruptly, using blocking tactics to prevent following vehicles from intercepting the convoy.

In the case of low profile convoy operations, the PET vehicle may opt to increase the distance between the Protectee Vehicle and the PET vehicle in order to reduce the profile of the convoy however, at no time should the PET vehicle be unable to observe the Protectee vehicle nor be at a distance that exceeds to effective range of
the firearms carried in the PET vehicle.

In the event of incident the vehicle may be used as a shield for the Protectee Vehicle and deploy Protection officers to engage with the threat as required.
The PET Car will be used to transport the Protectee in the event of the Principal Vehicle becoming immobilized.

**Pilot Vehicle**

Where a convoy travels across unfamiliar boundaries a Pilot Car may be provided subject to an appropriate threat assessment.
The Pilot car provides:
• Enhanced communication within that area, and
• Detailed working knowledge of local routes and conditions.

**Rear Vehicle**

Rear Vehicles will be utilized only in high profile mobile security operations.
The driver of the Rear Car should maintain a sterile area to the rear of the convoy in order to prevent encroachment on the convoy from that direction and alert the PET Car to anyone attempting to do so.

**Counter Assault Team (CAT) Vehicles**

The inclusion of a CAT should be considered only for particularly high threat escorts. CAT is deployed to oppose an attack, either to protect the Protectee directly or to cover the withdrawal of the Protectee.

A CAT may be deployed in uniform or covertly, depending on the decision to adopt a high or low profile escort.
Where movement of a Protectee is part of a wider operation, a CAT should only be deployed after consultation between the Protection Coordinator and the other interested agencies.

Under some circumstances, additional CPOs assigned the role of Counter Assault Officers may travel in the PET or Rear Vehicle in order to further reduce the profile of the convoy while maintaining an enhanced support capability.

**Sweep Car**

The sweep car is normally staffed by three officers, each armed with handguns and two with enhanced firearms capability. Although part of the overall convoy deployment, the Sweep Car operates as a detached component, shadowing the convoy from a discreet distance so that it is not likely to be caught up immediately in an attack on the convoy.

However, it should be well placed to respond to other vehicles that pose a threat to the integrity of the convoy or to an ambush. Should an incident occur, officers would provide contingent tactical support to the main convoy, and the driver will assume
responsibility for communications and coordinate external assistance to the convoy. The Sweep Car will also assist the main convoy by:
• Stopping to deal with any incident where immediate action is required such as another convoy vehicle being involved in a minor traffic accident.
• Where a convoy vehicle is disabled or breaks down, the Sweep Car will provide immediate replacement, thus preserving the integrity of the convoy structure and function.

**Convoy composition**

• FPUs are often requested to support close protection teams (UN or local) with vehicles and personnel. This situation can be explained due to:
  - The arrival of several VIPs
  - The lack of manpower and vehicles of UN security or of local security forces
  - The "specific" equipment of FPUs (armored vehicles, long rifle, police officers trained on close protection…)
• FPUs may then take part of the convoy as:
  - Point car or lead car
  - Rear car or sweep car
  - LC and PET when no present (rare)

Slide 41

FPUs may be involved in the security of several VIPs, provide UN security with additional armoured vehicles for the escort and play a key role in securing the road (advanced car, junctions…). The image of FPUs may also be seen more "less" aggressive than an escort composed of military vehicles. The FPUs are taking part of the convoy as PC or LC and RC or SC in most of the cases.

**Convoy communication**

• Effective communications within, from and to the convoy and with any Host Country Escort are vital and need careful consideration as a key operational feature of the protection plan
• Standard radio channels may be heavily monitored and maintenance of radio silence should be observed, except in emergencies
• Coded alternatives are recommended (venue and road names are not given in plain language)
• All vehicles in an escorted convoy should have direct car-to-car communications
• It is good practice for radio call signs to be changed regularly
Effective communications within, from and to the convoy and with any Host Country Escort are vital and need careful consideration as a key operational feature of the protection plan. An effective solution to the communication structure is potentially complex.

Standard radio channels may be heavily monitored by enthusiasts and others and are therefore unsuitable for the transmission of confidential information. Where communications depend on such systems, the maintenance of radio silence should be observed, except in emergencies.

For operations where high security is required, the use of robust, reliable encrypted systems is highly recommended.

In all communications, whether encrypted or not, it is important that venue and road names are not given in plain language. Coded alternatives are recommended.

Where possible, all vehicles in an escorted convoy should have direct car-to-car communications. The need is increased during high threat/risk operations where ancillary vehicles may need to be excluded during the movement if intelligence is received en route of a raised or imminent threat of attack.

**Convoy Internal Communications**
The benefit of a dedicated car-to-car radio channel within the convoy has been clearly identified. It allows for the continuous flow of information required for convoy cohesion and control as well as the ability to respond immediately to a dynamic situation.

**Communications with Venues**
Radio communication with venues or points of arrival should be established wherever possible. When a convoy stops at, or is in the final approach to, the point of arrival, its vulnerability is greatly increased.

Real-time information or situation reports from the venue to the convoy will enable the escort to manage the arrival efficiently and safely, hold off or abort the approach if circumstances require and re-route to an alternative point of arrival.

**Communications with other Areas**
Where cross border movement occurs, links should be maintained with the original communications centre until they are firmly established with the new area. This may require the newly receiving monitoring station to communicate receipt of convoy communications back to the original monitoring station after potential periods of radio ‘dead spots’.

**Radio Call Signs**
Notwithstanding the global UN radio communications protocols, it is good practice for radio call signs to be changed regularly, particularly for on-going or repeat escort...
operations. The repeated use of the same call signs introduces avoidable operational vulnerability to hostile.

**Mobile protection: one vehicle**

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FPUs may be tasked to provide a VIP with an escort. In this case, FPU drivers have to be aware of and familiar with the driving tactics used in order to prevent any attack and provide the principal with adequate security.

Slides 43 to 58 show the movement of a convoy constituted by the Protectee vehicle and the Protection Escort Team vehicle (FPU vehicle or not) in case of overtaking by a third vehicle. In anticipation of an overtaking by an unknown vehicle, the PET starts moving toward the middle of the road in order to protect the PV.

At the same time, the driver of the PV moves to his right in order to facilitate the manoeuvre of the driver of the PET vehicle. The movements have to be coordinated and initiated upon order of the PET leader.

The PET vehicle places itself between the PV and the unknown vehicle in order to prevent from any attack.

The two vehicles return to their initial position after the overtaking.

After showing several times the movements of the vehicles, practical exercises have to be proposed and executed.
After the case of mobile protection with one vehicle, slides 59 to 74 show the movement of a convoy constituted by the Protectee vehicle and the Protection Escort Team vehicle (FPU vehicle or not) in case of overtaking by a third vehicle. In this situation, the LC and PET car move toward the middle of the road in order to protect the PV. The driver of the PV initiates his movement to the right side of the road upon order of the PET leader.

The vehicles in charge of the Protectee protection return to their initial position after the overtaking. After showing several times the movements of the vehicles, practical exercises have to be proposed and executed.

**Attacks on convoys**

- The Point, Sweep and Pilot Car (if deployed) may be operating out of sight of the main convoy. For this reason, if a convoy is attacked, it is imperative that all escort officers are informed immediately by car-to-car radio.
- The immediate radio alert will enable those not directly involved to inform the relevant command centre, provide an exact location, give a situation report and summon assistance.
- The primary defensive characteristic of a convoy is its ability to distance itself rapidly from the site of an attack and thus from danger.
- Point or rear car should take all decisions to allow the convoy to move on.
Attacks on convoys

• In the event of a contact, the BG will get into the back seat with the Principal and give him/her cover.
• If possible the Operators in the PET vehicle should engage the threat.
• At all times during a fire fight the operators must be careful not to muzzle each other.

Since it is likely that an attack will focus on the core of the convoy, i.e. Lead Car, Protectee Vehicle or PET Car, the immediate radio alert will enable those not directly involved to inform the relevant command centre, provide an exact location, give a situation report and summon assistance.

This function will usually fall to the Point Car, but in the potentially confused circumstances of a sudden attack, if not immediately undertaken by the Point Car, by any officer able to make the broadcast.

Where an attempt is made by an attacker to halt the convoy, e.g. by a vehicle driven across the route, this should wherever possible be skirted, allowing the convoy to move on. If this cannot be achieved, ramming to remove the obstruction is a further option provided:

• The circumstances can be fully justified
• The probability of removing the obstruction outweighs that of disabling the ramming vehicle
• The Protectee Vehicle should not engage in ramming unless completely unavoidable

During operations conducted in remote environments or in circumstances where definitive care is expected to be further than sixty minutes from the convoy position at any time, medical assets should be assigned to the convoy or staged at pre-designated points along the route. This may include host country or United Nations medical assets.
Attacks on convoys: left side

Slides 77 to 85

Slides 77 to 85 illustrate the tactic to be used by the PET vehicle in case of attack on the left side of the road.

The main objective is to protect the PV by placing the PET vehicle between the PV and the place from where shooters are in action.

Attacks on convoys: right side

Slides 86 to 94

Same comments as per slides 77 to 85
Attacks on convoys: front

Slides 95 to 117

Slides 95 to 117 illustrate the tactic to be used by the PET vehicle in case of attack coming from the front of the convoy.

The main objective is to protect the PV by placing the PET vehicle between the PV and the place from where shooters are in action. In this case, the PET vehicle overtakes the PV and stops its progression. Use of firearms is done according to the principles of self-defence.

Following this manoeuvre, the two vehicles start moving backward. The PV is always under the protection of the PET vehicle during the whole process.

Attacks on convoys: rear

Slides 118 to 121

Slides 118 to 121 illustrate the tactic to be used by the PET vehicle in case of attack coming from the back of the convoy.

The PET vehicle is already in position to protect the PV. It keeps moving forward,
accelerating and using force according to the principles of self-defence.

**Attacks on convoys: roadblocks**

Slides 122 to 125

Slides 122 to 125 illustrate the tactic to be used by the PET vehicle or the Point Car in case of roadblocks placed on the road.

In this case, when feasible, the convoy makes a U turn and moves in the opposite direction. Roadblocks may be used to ambush the convoy.

In case of presence of removable objects, the PET vehicle or PC can be used as a hammer in order to remove the objects. The priority is here to keep the convoy moving, without any stop that may put the Principal in danger.

**3- Static protection**

The aim of static protection is to:

- Eliminate or reduce the opportunity for attack by placing defensive perimeters between the protected asset and a potential attacker or the means by which an attack may be delivered
- Perimeters may be intended to:
  - Deter, detect, delay, defend or defeat an attacker

Slide 126
Recent world events have demonstrated graphically the capability and intent of terrorist groups to pursue their ends against static targets. While these horrendous acts may be foremost in our minds it should also be recognized that other incidents of criminal activity and events of public disorder can also have a serious impact on United Nations security. This reality has lead security professionals to increase awareness and introduce effective counter-measures, such as personal protection, armed security guards, restricted access and routine search regimes by properly trained staff at United Nations premises and many other locations and buildings to which UN staff travel or access.

What is required for all static protection operations is the proper application of risk management together with sound, well thought out and effective protection methods and principles.

Many of the static protection measures currently used by the United Nations have been established and developed within the system over a long period of time; in the current security climate however as the threat against its staff has become more widespread and frequent so the United Nations is increasingly basing its future security systems on knowledge gained from member states and their contemporaneous experiences with international terrorism. Methods to counter new threats from terrorism continue to be developed and the United Nations must ensure that it always stays ahead of this challenge, or suffer the inevitable consequences.

Static protection refers to an extensive range of available counter-measures, applied at, outside or within perimeters to protect a person, activity or place from a perceived threat. The threat may be from terrorists, criminals, politically disruptive groups, fixated persons, self-publicists and lone adventurers.

**Static Protection Planning**

- **Information Gathering**
  - Effective information gathering will depend primarily on two main activities:
    - Liaison
    - Reconnaissance
- **Liaison**
  - All static protection operations are conducted in partnership with other organisations and groups
- **Reconnaissance**
  - The aim of reconnaissance is to gain a thorough tactical appreciation of the area of operations, its inherent strengths and vulnerabilities

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UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards for Formed Police Units, 1st edition 2015
Information Gathering

The foundation of any risk management process is the availability of information. Information is made available to the United Nations through a variety of means. It is essential that security practitioners have a complete understanding of the need to collect or gather information, the recognition that not all information has value, and that the collection of information within the UN context is strictly for the safety and security of UN personnel and assets.

Information gathering is the key prerequisite for the risk management process, effective operational planning and decisions on the command structure and resourcing.

It is unlikely that first intimation of an event will provide enough information to do anything but enable initial scoping for the event and indicate the type of information which is likely to be required.

Effective information gathering will depend primarily on two main activities:

- Liaison
- Reconnaissance

Liaison

The importance of the role of liaison in planning for static protection operations cannot be overstated. Virtually all static protection operations are conducted in partnership with other organisations and groups whose active cooperation is vital however, not always forthcoming.

The range of issues is potentially vast, but it should include anything which provides and exchanges essential knowledge, establishes cooperation, promotes clarity of aims and mutual expectations, such as:

- Identification of all stakeholders, their roles and responsibilities
- Details of organisational structures, and links between respective functional levels i.e. policy, executive and service delivery levels of an organisation,
- Conditions that any stakeholders may impose,
- The circumstances under which an event will be discontinued and the method and ownership for such decisions, and means by which this will be communicated,
- The conditions under which a venue will be evacuated,
- Clarification of the role, powers (including armed response and the use of force) and capability of security staff, either permanent or temporarily contracted for the specific event,
- Copy lists of invited and confirmed guests, chronology of events, copies of invitations, car passes and any other relevant materials, such as plans, maps and contact lists, etc
- Specimen copies of all staff passes and badges, etc

Liaison with organisers and partners should be seen as ongoing rather than as a one-time only process and a suitable officer should be appointed to undertake the
role. Effective liaison ensures that each operation is flexibly tailored to its specific needs and avoids the dangers which may stem from insensitive application of an ill-fitting standard package.

### Reconnaissance
The aim of reconnaissance is to gain a thorough tactical appreciation of the area of operations, its inherent strengths and vulnerabilities. Maps and plans, no matter how detailed, will not reveal the extent to which a venue is overlooked by surrounding buildings, or trees that obstruct the view into or from a venue in different seasons. During periods of conducting reconnaissance, as with all other operational phases, Officers should carry out hostile surveillance detection strategies, being aware that reconnaissance in itself may compromise operational intent and planning strategies. Urban street plans give no indication of topography, lines of sight or ambient lighting, etc. Temporary environmental factors, such as the presence of scaffolding or road work, can only be ascertained by recent reconnaissance.

Where possible, reconnaissance should be carried out on the same day of the week and time of day as the proposed event to gauge the volume of normal pedestrian and vehicular movement and assess the extent to which they are likely to be affected or interfered with by static protection measures. The use of a digital or video camera is recommended during reconnaissance to assist in both planning and later briefing. These should be supplemented by aerial photographs taken from relevant perspectives particularly in ‘High Risk’ locations. An officer conducting reconnaissance of premises should, whenever possible, be accompanied by a person intimately familiar with them, their access and through routes, normal functions, occupants and contingencies, and the extent of existing security arrangements. Knowledge of works recently carried out in a building, or visits by external contractors, should be sought in relevant cases. Local intelligence units should not be overlooked as a potentially valuable source of information about factors affecting a venue’s security.
Maps and detailed floor plans of a venue and its surroundings must be of good quality, an appropriate scale and as up to date as possible. Inaccurate or illegible plans are a potential liability.

Specialised maps and plans of subterranean structures of sewers, drainage systems, service conduits, etc. if available, should be obtained where appropriate.

Protection Strategy
The protection strategy meeting will normally be chaired by the UN security and the Host Country authorities, together with any other specialists who may be identified. Whether protection is the primary strategic aim, or is embedded in a larger operation as one of several aims, a separate static protection plan should be developed.

The protection strategy meeting will assist all those involved to identify the aims of the operation and lay the groundwork for planning and operational coordination. Although developed separately, the protection plan must integrate with (or at least take account of) any other strategic intentions to avoid a conflict of aims.

Protection planning should make full use of the risk management process which focuses clearly on relevant issues.

Planning & Tasking Meeting
The senior Security Advisor will normally chair the protection planning and tasking meeting. Where a Protection Coordinator is appointed, it will normally be for that officer to develop the protection plan and task the contributing units to meet the tactical plans and strategic aims.

The Protection Coordinator, who is extensively briefed on the Protectees involved, should also take part where an operation is complex or involves the coordination of the protection teams for a number of Principals.
Composition
The composition of the protection planning group should reflect the range of protection and support specialist units involved. Representatives of other strategic aims should also attend to ensure that protection planning does not develop in isolation.

Planning Development
Where appointed, Protection Coordinators will normally act as the liaison between the participating or contributing protection units, develop the protection plan in consultation with them, and submit it for approval. Protection Coordinators will usually remain responsible for ongoing review of the plan to ensure its continued relevance to changing circumstances.

Site Meetings
In addition to any formal planning and tasking meetings, it is good practice to hold a site meeting with event organisers and representatives of relevant groups. Each will have perspectives, needs and interests relevant to their own specialization which need to be rationalised and coordinated towards the common strategic aim. Mutual expectations should be clarified.

Advance Planning
Many large-scale events require planning to begin well in advance. It is important that the risk management process is revisited periodically to ensure that the original planning assumptions, decisions on counter-measures and rationale for them remain relevant. Risk assessment is a dynamic process requiring constant revision.

Briefing
Briefing provides the vital link between those who planned the protection package and those who will deliver it. Whilst general or joint briefings provide necessary understanding of the context and structure of an operation, a specific briefing on protection issues for those involved in delivering it must always be carried out. They should include the threat assessment in as much detail as the sensitivity of the intelligence on which it is based allows. Full understanding of the threat will enable individual officers to deal more effectively and appropriately with the circumstances they encounter than information limited to a neutral statement of the threat level. Where the threat assessment is credibly supported by intelligence, the commitment of those providing protection is likely to be enhanced if the intelligence can be shared with them. Where circumstances permit, briefing in situ should be considered. This will improve tactical appreciation of the operating environment and the relevance of the protection plan for those delivering it. Where this cannot be done, the use of good quality photographs (including aerial), and clear accurate maps will serve as acceptable alternatives.
A reminder of relevant legal powers may be appropriate during briefing. Contingencies, and the circumstances which will initiate them, should be explained fully.

**Defense plan**

- Planning for defence in depth requires consideration and definition of the location and function of each of several possible perimeters.
- The term ‘perimeter’ should be interpreted as broadly as possible as any measure on or along it which deters, detects, delays or defeats a potential attacker from aggressively approaching a protected person, place or activity.
- The key function of perimeters is to prevent attack by excluding:
  - The means of delivering it and those intent on doing so.
  - Detection and neutralisation of an attacker when attempting to enter.

Planning for defence in depth requires consideration and definition of the location and function of each of several possible perimeters. It allows for the possible compromise of an outer perimeter without significant increase in vulnerability of the protected person, place or activity, i.e. an outer perimeter providing and early warning indicator and delaying factor to any hostile approach.

Defence in depth relies on presenting an attacker with a series of perimeters, each of which increases the risk to them of:
- Detection
- Delay, or
- Defeat.

Defence in depth buys time during which inner perimeters may be alerted to a breach or emerging threat, and to institute dynamic counter-measures or the initiation of contingencies.

The term perimeter obviously includes hard or physical structures such as fences and walls, but also includes other means such as human perimeters consisting of uniform security on cordons, fixed posts or foot patrols and plainclothes officers deployed to-surveillance detection, mobile units on random, short, or targeted patrols along perimeters or in defined perimeter areas.

There are no hard and fast rules about the siting and function of any particular perimeter. These issues must be considered and determined in relation to:
- Each specific static protection operation,
• The environment within which it is taking place, and
• The threat or threats to which it is subject.

### Perimeters

**Outer Perimeter**

- The activities at outer perimeters will generally comprise measures intended to have maximum effect at a distance from the protected asset focusing primarily on deterring and detecting unauthorized activities. Because of their distance from the core of the protected event, outer perimeters will often be of extended length and rely heavily, but not entirely, on mobile patrol assets.

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The range of options is broad, but may include any combination of the following:

- Armed security, vehicle screening, patrols, providing deterrent high visibility and capable of providing immediate armed intervention or support;
- Surveying, identifying and monitoring potential weapons launch sites for mortar base plates (MBP) rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and man portable air defence system missiles (MANPADS), according to the launch site profile for each weapon type;
- Searches of car and truck parks for VBIEDs on or near an intended approach route;
- Searches and vehicle checks in streets leading to the protected event;
- Host Country traffic patrol points to regulate, segregate and control movement of vehicles towards a protected event;
- Discreet identification and research (ownership and occupancy, etc) of buildings and other structures overlooking approach routes, venues or points of arrival;
- Overt or covert observation of vehicles and pedestrians moving towards an event
Perimeters

Intermediate Perimeter
- One or more intermediate perimeters may be utilised to deter, detect and delay attackers (use of appropriate signs and information boards, exclusion of vehicles unconnected with the event…)

Inner Perimeter
- Once searched, the area must be kept sterile. The inner perimeter may constitute the last physical impediment to gaining access to an event.

Intermediate perimeter may include:
- Use of uniform security officers, road signs or concrete anti-ram blocks where necessary, admission ticket, points of entry and other vulnerable locations
- Establishment of a continuous visible line of demarcation, with tape, barriers or fencing, to distinguish clearly to those approaching a change of status between controlled and uncontrolled space. Where instituted, a demarcation line must be staffed appropriately to maintain its integrity and deal as necessary with infractions;
- Use of appropriate signs and information boards should be considered where this will assist individuals to know what is expected of them and to reinforce a perimeter.

In the inner perimeter, search of an appropriate type or combination of types before the event should be carried out in order to detect, remove or disable a device, weapon or harmful substance concealed in advance for use during the event. Once searched, the area must be kept sterile.
- Take control of the perimeter and place personnel to keep the area secure.
- Escort the Protectee
- Secure and control all escape routes from the venue
- Secure all areas that the Protectee might move to be placing covert personnel there
- Set up and secure a safe haven or holding room within the venue
Slide 132 illustrates an example of the different perimeters described above.

The overall security of a protection operation depends largely on how well the advance team searches the venue during the operational advance phase. The team must allow enough time for a thorough, unrushed search, with consent from the owner of the premises or a designated representative. The advance team must know what they are searching for. They must be able to locate and recognize anything that may pose a threat to the Protectee, for example explosives or electronic devices. Once the advance team has searched an area, the area must be secured.
The three basic rules for searching the venue are as follows:

- Search from outside to the inside
- Search from the bottom to the top
- Investigate all possible hiding places and articles
Summary

- Tactical considerations
- Basic knowledge on VIP protection
  - Direct protection
  - Mobile protection
  - Static protection

Slide 136

The officers should be given a summary of the key points of the lesson before being asked if they have any questions.

QUESTIONS

Slide 137

Lesson 2 – Basic tactics on VIP protection (practical element)

There are eleven and half hours of practice recommended for this subject which should be carried out at the discretion of the instructor.