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# Module 1 – MINUSCA



## Instructor Notes And Guidance



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## How to use this pack

1. This pack has been developed as a resource for trainers who are running the MINUSCA Scenario-based Exercises (SBEs) on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV). The training pack contains 5 scenario-based exercises and 7 Snap Situation.
2. The **Scenarios are conceived for a detailed analysis of critical CRSV situations**, each of them consist of a one page hand out that participants are given to work on in groups of five to eight people. They are tasked with preparing a 10 minute presentation back to the plenary, which will be followed by a general discussion and de-brief. There is some flexibility around the timing of these exercises and snap situations (depending on whether they are delivered as part of a broader training module or in a stand-alone format, and depending on how detailed the discussions on each scenario and snap situation should be and obviously depending on the audience), but they will probably take between 1.5 and 2.5 hours to deliver. In addition, **the previous knowledge of the UN Core Pre-deployment training Materials and Protection of Civilians Materials are mandatory and essential.**

This will be broken down as follows:

- Introduction 15 minutes
- Scenario planning exercise 60 – 90 minutes
- Presentations and de-brief 30 - 60 minutes

3. The scenario-based exercises can be cut or reduced if the scenarios are delivered as part of a broader training course, but more time should be allotted to an advanced course, to allow for more detailed discussion. The scenarios and snap situations can either be run in conjunction with the complete training package (Reading modules, Conceptual training modules “Ppts”), or with a light training materials (five lesson plans) designed specifically to be used for induction training. The latter consists of:

- **Scenario-Based Exercises and Snap Situations;**
- **Instructor Notes and Guidance;**

4. **The scenarios** are intended to provide a practical setting to explore the set of issues related to combatting and addressing CRSV. Participants need to decide what actions to take at different levels, but also to understand the context of their actions for the mission as a whole (operational level). They need to plan and implement actions, understand the impact of this within the overall context of the whole UN operation and be able to coordinate with other actors to ensure a synchronized response. By being pre-deployment training, most of the scenarios are mainly aimed at the military, but all involve integrated planning between all the different elements of the mission. It is particularly important for all components of the mission to have a common understanding of the circumstances under which MINUSCA troops may be used to deter Sexual Violence attacks on civilians and in what circumstances they would be permitted to use force. It is important to understand that better training results will be achieved if the audience is comprised of military, police and civilian personnel. If the participants are exclusively military, civilian or police, the trainer/facilitator should remind them to factor the role of other mission components into their planning. This does not involve role-playing, but is intended to ensure that they think about all elements of mission rather than just their own professional discipline. Member States are encouraged to bring civilian representatives to the training sessions (from the UN Country Team, ICRC, NGOs etc.).



5. **These Instructor Guidance Notes** are intended to bring out learning points from the exercise and emphasize certain issues. They are not intended to be a comprehensive list of all of the issues contained in each scenario and hopefully more points will emerge during the discussion amongst the participants themselves. For some of the scenarios, there is no clearly right or wrong answer and the most important point will be for participants to have understood the dilemmas that the mission is facing and the constraints that it is operating under.
6. The trainer/facilitator should encourage interactive discussion amongst the participants and reflection on learning points that have come out of the modules rather than adopt a directive approach. Most groups of adults learn far more from discussing things amongst themselves than from sitting passively to listen to lectures. The trainer/facilitator should, therefore, use these notes to prompt questions and only interject if participants miss important issues, misunderstand things or state something that is clearly wrong. The trainer/facilitator should see his or her task as being to guide a boat with a rudder rather than to drive a car with a steering wheel.

## Which Advanced Scenarios to use?

7. **Despite the fact that the training is more focused on military and police audiences, all of the scenarios are aimed at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels and all contain CRSV issues and concern to military.** Since the scenarios are all based on real incidents, they contain considerable detail and the trainer/facilitator should ensure that groups have sufficient time to read them through before starting their discussions. Each scenario contains a sufficient number of issues to be run over one or two hours and the easiest way to divide them into levels of complexity is to allow more time for the more advanced scenarios to allow more points to come out in the discussions and de-briefs. The table below gives a rough division of the scenarios by target and level of complexity, but different audiences may respond to each scenario differently. The facilitator/trainer should read them all through and decide which to use.
8. **The scenarios have also been designed so that two or more can be run in conjunction with one another. To avoid repetition, much of the detail provided in the Instructor Guidance Notes to the earlier scenarios is not repeated in the later ones.**  
The trainer/facilitator should, therefore, read the whole of these Guidance Notes as some of the information given for one scenario will be relevant to others.
9. **Although the scenarios are set in a fictional country, all of the information contained within them is based on real incidents and challenges which have confronted the UN mission in combatting and addressing CRSV within its POC and CRSV mandate.** Since there will probably not be time to run more than two or three scenarios in any course, the trainer/facilitator could consider giving out the one page descriptions as hand-outs to participants. Some of the scenarios contain inter-related information and so after participants have completed an exercise based on one, the trainer/facilitator could give them another as a hand-out to reflect upon this as well.



## Guidance Notes for Scenarios

The trainer/facilitator should always keep in mind that the following is just a suggestion as for some scenarios and snap situations there is no clearly right or wrong answers. The suggestions are intended to guide and assist facilitators in their discussion and interaction with all participants in order to come out with the most important points. Therefore suggestions provided are for some of the scenarios/ snap situations and not necessary for all of them.

### Scenario 1: Rape in an Unauthorized Roadblock:

#### Scene 1

##### Violations Against Children.

- a. Three out of six grave violations (Slide) have been committed in this scenario (abduction, rape and use of child soldiers), and probably a fourth one (maiming).
- b. There was no attack on a school. The occupation of a school is not a grave violation. However, when in doubt, also report that to the CPA.
- c. Report through the chain of command and to the CPA (include details of perpetrator, age of children, number of children, boy or girl, and location and time of incident).

##### Assessment of the Situation.

- a. Homicide, abduction, rape and torture (in addition to the grave violations against children as mentioned above) have been committed by a small group of armed men in a roadblock.
- b. Immediate action required to:
  - i. Provide first aid to the injured women (survivor).
  - ii. Save the girl in captivity.
  - iii. Obtain release of child soldiers.
- c. Need to detain perpetrators for rape and homicide (prevent escape).
- d. Utmost restraint in use of force since child soldiers are involved.
- e. The armed personnel are not well organised and has a weak profile.
- f. Being local residents, own actions may invite crowd control challenges.

##### Actions by Patrol Leader.

- a. Follow suggested procedures/actions at the incident site (Slide).
- b. Preliminary enquiry with the survivor.
- c. Assessment of situation and reporting (Slide) to Company Commander and SWPA/WPA/CPA.
- d. Provide survivor assistance (Slide) – activate referral arrangements (Slide).
- e. Plan for extraction of the girl in captivity.
- f. Ask for additional reinforcement and resources. Additional build up would be helpful to display UN resolve and support crowd management if required.
- g. Leave a buddy pair (including a female peacekeeper) with communication to help and protect the survivor.
- h. Move tactically to the unauthorised roadblock to prevent the group from moving away with the girl.
- i. Call for local police (including female police) to reach the site of unauthorised roadblock at the earliest to assist apprehension, manage the crowd and take over the perpetrators.
- j. Call for UN police/FPU to assist in case deployed in the area.



- k. Tactically deploy/take position to prevent escape/moving out and dominate the location.
- l. Engage the leader of armed group to release the captive girl, child soldiers and the domestic help.
- m. Use female peacekeepers to engage with the women in the group.
- n. There could be instances where someone would act as a leader or no one will claim to be a leader. In such situations, on site commander will have to use judgement to establish the leader amongst them.
- o. Ask them not to move out from the location.
- p. Assistance of local leaders/village heads/religious heads/other influential persons may be called in to negotiate the release of girl/child soldiers and women, and surrender of weapons.
- q. Record events with a camera and let the group know that recording is taking place.
- r. Inform the leader that failing to release the victim would invite use of force.

#### **Actions by Company Commander.**

- a. Inform Battalion Commander and SWPA/WPA/CPA. Discuss on immediate responses. Keep them in loop and informed as the situation unfolds.
- b. Advise patrol commander to take following actions:
  - i. Assist survivor.
  - ii. Engage with the leader of the group.
  - iii. Save/extract the girl under captivity and the female domestic help.
  - iv. Ask for release of child soldiers.
  - v. Handle child soldiers carefully.
  - vi. Detain alleged criminals, including child soldiers.
  - vii. Preserve evidence.
- c. Handle the armed personnel carefully, prevent them from escaping and maintain utmost restraint since child soldiers are involved.
- d. There is a need to obtain more clarity on the female domestic help, to identify whether they are combatants/sympathisers or victims.
- e. Coordinate with local police to send a police party to apprehend the armed personnel.
- f. Coordinate with UNPOL.
- g. Quickly reinforce the area with additional troops (patrols in proximity/mobile elements/QRT). Patrol leader should be prepared to receive additional reinforcement.
- h. Engage with armed group leadership at different levels to save the girl and to inform the armed personnel to cooperate with UN.
- i. Advise patrol leader to apply graduated use of force as the last resort if situation so warrants.

#### **Survivor Assistance.**

- a. Provide first aid.
- b. Follow Referral Arrangements.
- c. Preferably a female peacekeeper must interact and accompany the survivor up to the health centre.
- d. Ensure safety and comfort.
- e. Obtain relevant information.



- f. After consultation with survivor, activate referral arrangements.
- g. Ask for Ambulance from the COB or UN helicopter for evacuation if the condition of the survivor is deteriorating. Preserve evidence if any.

#### **Actions Against Unauthorised Roadblocks.**

- a. In the current situation, following actions must be taken:
  - i. Cordon the area of unauthorised roadblock, including the school.
  - ii. Negotiate release of victims and children (child soldiers). In that, consider the best interest of the children.
  - iii. Motivate them to lay down the weapons and join the DDR process (Those who have committed SV will also undergo judicial process).
  - iv. Detain alleged criminals and hand over to the local police.
- b. For future:
  - i. Engage host Government authorities (civil/military/police) and armed groups/actors for closure of all unauthorised/illegal roadblocks and CPs in the AOR.
  - ii. Ensure routine monitoring of the AOR to prevent establishment of unauthorised roadblocks and CPs.

#### **Handling of Women in the Group.**

- a. Preferably female peacekeeper must interact with the women.
- b. Identify the status: victim, combatant, sympathiser, family member or domestic help.
- c. Involve them in negotiating release of the victim and influence other members in the armed group.
- d. If they are combatants, ask them to surrender the arms.
- e. The female combatants, family members and sympathisers are processed through DDR. All others to be processed through referral arrangements.
- f. Ensure utmost caution and restraint in using force.
- g. Provide medical assistance if necessary.

#### **Additional Resources/Actions at HQ.**

- a. Rapid build-up of additional troops would enhance efficacy in release of victims and detention of perpetrators.
- b. UN helicopter could be used for aerial observation of the activities in the roadblock.
- c. Battalion HQ can engage with the leadership of the armed group involved in obtaining release of the victim, local women and child soldiers, and surrender of weapons; allow them to join the DDR processes, and insist that unauthorised/illegal roadblocks and CPs are not permitted in the Mission.
- d. The CPA will also ensure that child soldiers will be assisted by UNICEF through psychosocial support and reunification with their families.
- e. The WPA will also ensure that victims have access to medical care.

#### **Handling of Child Soldiers.**

##### **Generic.**

- a. Identify them. They need to be protected; but they can also harm you.
- b. Announce that you mean no harm to anyone, particularly to the children.



- c. Depending on the situation and your impression of the commander, you might ask him to release the child soldiers and laydown the weapons. Maintain utmost restraint, caution and be judicious.
- d. Do not get provoked.
- e. In case of serious threat to life from a child soldier use of force only as the last resort for self-defence as per ROE. Follow principle of minimum use of force.
- f. Report to Military CP Focal Point and CPA (include sex-disaggregated number, age, and details of armed group of child soldiers).
- g. Discuss/consult the situation and response when situation permits. Follow standard procedures and directions provided by the CPA.
- h. Take them into custody, do not intimidate and handle with care and compassion.
- i. Child soldiers who have committed/suspected of a criminal act shall undergo judicial process/screening as per procedure.

### **Scene 2.**

- a. The child soldier and the group leader have challenged you and a minor provocation may result in an unwanted fire fight.
- b. Treat the child as a soldier, not as a child.
- c. Take immediate protective measures for self-defence. Display proactive posture and firm resolve.
- d. Do not provoke or intimidate. Ask them to lay down the arms, calm down and come out of cover to talk. Negotiation is always the first step. Try to diffuse the situation and induce them to talks.
- e. Negotiation should include:
  - i. Laying down of arms
  - ii. Stopping the torture and release of the captive girl immediately, failing which you may be compelled to use force.
  - iii. Release of child soldiers.
  - v. Surrender the weapons and take part in the DDR programme of the Mission (Those who have committed SV as well as other serious crimes will undergo judicial process).
- f. If you assess that it is not safe for the children that you negotiate their release from the armed group on the spot, involve CPA/CP actors for negotiating the release of the children
- g. Deploy other members to prevent the groups escape and to dominate the activities in the area.
- h. The two child soldiers who are rushing out also must be handled carefully. In principle you have the responsibility to help them, accept them. You have to inform the Child Protection Adviser immediately who can find a child service for you to hand the children over to. Do not hand them over to the police or national military – they might be punished as former rebels.
- i. Also consider that, when they run to you, they may be fired upon by other groups members from inside the who want to prevent them from escaping or set an example for other children. In that situation, you might want to discourage that they continue to run towards you.
- j. The child soldiers may be using it as a ruse to attack you (though it is a least likely course in the given scenario). The leader and other members of the group must be asked not to harm the children.



- k. Ask the children to stop, preferably under a cover, make them lay down the weapons and then take them into custody.
- l. A cover group should be ready to use force in case the group opens fire.
- m. Reinforcing troops will enhance leverage over negotiation and consequent apprehension/detention of the perpetrators.

#### **Child Survivor Assistance.**

- a. Provide first aid; ensure safety and comfort, and obtain relevant information.
- b. Contact family member as identified by the child (obtain informed consent). If no family member available, contact social worker as per referral arrangement for minor.
- c. Follow Referral Arrangements ensuring immediate medical assistance, including PEP.
- d. Preferably a female peacekeeper must interact and accompany the minor survivor and family member/social worker up to the health centre.
- e. Ask for Ambulance from the COB or UN helicopter for evacuation if the condition of the survivor is deteriorating. Preserve evidence if any.

#### **Actions that could have prevented the incident from taking place.**

- a. Establishment of a dynamic protective grid.
- b. Realistic threat and vulnerability assessment and instituting response measures.
- c. Effective situational awareness about intentions, activities and modus operandi of the armed groups.
- d. Monitoring and surveillance of the activities in the area to support MARA and MRM.
- e. Establishment of an effective early warning mechanism (disseminate early-warning indicators).
- f. Enduring presence in vulnerable areas and conduct of mobile operations.
- g. Deployment of static and mobile check posts.
- h. Active day and night patrolling, including in unconventional space to dominate vulnerable areas.
- i. Projection of robust profile to deter perpetrators.
- j. Strong advocacy and constructive engagement of armed groups/perpetrators.
- k. Activation of CLA and CAN.
- l. Facilitating community reconciliation and rapprochement.

Engagement of community elders, heads, leaders (including women), religious heads, other influential people to obtain information, influence behaviour and attitudes, and to facilitate negotiation/mediation in times of crisis.

## **Scenario 2: Security of Survivors and Inhuman Acts**

### **Scene 1.**

#### **Assessment of the Situation.**

- a. Eight female survivors of alleged rape and torture are in the COB, and one amongst them needs medical attention being pregnant. All of them needed to be protected. The COB may be under threat (some members are carrying fire arms).
- b. The mob may swell further leading to a crowd control situation. Need to disperse the mob quickly.
- c. A referral arrangement for the survivors and the mob dispersal requires assistance from the local police.





- d. It is case of sectarian violence demanding careful handling of the situation.
- e. Since mob comprise local women and children, use of force may be more difficult.
- f. Difficult to identify perpetrators.

#### **Courses of Action.**

- a. Report the situation to Battalion Commander. Parallel reporting to SWPA/WPA/HRO/CPA.
- b. Keep the COB in high alert – “Stand To”. Sentry posts, OPs and QRTs to be activated. Keep the entries and exits to the COB sealed. Inform all detachments operating outside the COB about the situation and ask them to take up tactical positions away from the mob.
- c. Record activities of the mob. Company Operations Centre to remain in hotline communication with Battalion HQ and with other relevant entities.
- d. Two track preliminary enquiry:
  - i. With the survivors to find out what, where, how, who, when details of SV.
  - ii. With mob to find out their perspective, demand, and to establish who are the leaders.
- e. Consult with survivors on invoking referral arrangements.
- f. Survivors cannot be handed over to the mob.
- g. Courses open to engage with mob are – persuasion, negotiation, pressure from the community/armed groups/government leaders, and graduated use of force.
- h. Use relevant interlocutors to influence the mob leaders.
- i. Ask for additional reinforcement.
- j. Ask for local police/security forces to disperse the crowd peacefully.
- k. Undertake key leader engagements to defuse the situation.
- l. Engage mob through public address systems to disperse peacefully.
- m. Be ready to carryout crowd control actions as per ROE.

#### **Handling of Mob.**

- a. Commanders must anticipate that situation will deteriorate further, particularly when the survivors are not handed over.
- b. Some miscreants/criminals may exploit the situation to initiate hostile acts that can lead to mob violence.
- c. Responses have to be calibrated and cautious since the mob comprises women and children, in addition to many innocent and curious locals.
- d. Since it is dusk, and night settling in, handling of mob becomes more and more difficult.
- e. Following actions may be undertaken;
  - i. Identify leaders and engage them firmly and peacefully.
  - ii. Persuade them to ask the mob to disperse without violence.
  - iii. Carryout negotiations with key leaders.
  - iv. Explain UN views and legalities of the incident. Explain to them that it is a criminal incident that would be dealt under the rule of law of the country.
  - v. Display readiness to use force as the last resort.
  - vi. Activate focus lights all around the COB, observe and monitor crowd behaviour, identify ring leaders and persons carrying arms, announce mob to disperse.
  - vii. When situation demands, initiate graduated use of force.



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### **Survivor Assistance.**

- a. Keep them together in a separate protected area.
- b. Female officers/medics/interpreters, etc. to engage the women and girls.
- c. Provide first aid and pay special attention to the pregnant women.
- d. Administer PEP if held in the COB medical facility.
- e. Provide basic necessities (food, water, clothing, shelter, etc).
- f. Consult and initiate referral arrangements.

### **Additional Help.**

- a. Ask for additional reinforcements.
- b. Battalion/Force HQ to engage key community leaders at appropriate levels to defuse situation.
- c. Coordinate with UNPOL and local police for crowd control actions.
- d. Identify and utilise interlocutors to mediate, negotiate and persuade the mob to disperse.
- e. Ask for air evacuation/medical support for survivors requiring immediate attention.

### **Measures to Prevent Further Escalation.**

- a. Disperse the Mob as quickly as possible.
- b. Shift the survivors to safety away from the COB as early as possible.
- c. Continue to engage the key leaders to defuse the situation.
- d. Maintain a deterrent posture and display readiness to handle the situation firmly.

### **Scene 2.**

#### **Assessment of the Situation.**

- a. Mob has crossed the threshold and activities indicate further deterioration of situation.
- b. The mob is unstable and hostile, COB is under threat and a sectarian clash in the proximity of COB is possible.
- c. Stone pelting, encircling move by armed personnel, trying to snatch the weapon of the sentry and firing of two shots, are all provocations, if not dealt cautiously may lead to premature and injudicious use of force.

#### **Handling Aggressive Behaviour of Mob.**

- a. Continue firm and direct constructive engagements, persuasion and negotiation, in addition to involvement of interlocutors.
- b. Continue public announcements to communicate that the aggressive behaviour is illegal and must be stopped immediately and that the mob should disperse, failing which, peacekeepers will be forced to take protective measures.
- c. Be ready to use force. Go through the procedures prior to the use of force.

#### **Assault of Women in the Crowd.**

- a. Preferably it should be dealt with by local police.
- b. However, ask the mob leaders to attend to the issue immediately to prevent it becoming a uncontrolled mob fight.

#### **Handling of Pregnant Women.**

- a. The COB medical facility should be able to take care of the situation.



- b. An air evacuation at night or an evacuation to a medical facility on ambulance through the violent crowd may not be possible.
- c. Outside support of qualified doctors and equipment may be sought.

#### **Prevention of Sectarian Clash.**

- a. Immediate dialogue with minority community through interlocutors to reassure and stop their movement toward to the COB to be undertaken.
- b. If possible depute the commanders of detachments operating outside the COB to reach the minority community area to engage them.
- c. Without causing undue alarm, explain to the mob leaders that the situation may spiral out of their control if the crowd is not dispersed at the earliest, leading to unwanted bloodshed between two communities.
- d. Bring in additional reinforcement to interposition between two groups.
- e. Involve local police in all actions.

#### **Best Practices to Contain Escalation.**

- a. Anticipation, foresight and taking advance steps; 'Reading through' the evolving situations.
- b. Key leader engagement; both direct and through interlocutor.
- c. Faster build up and tactical positioning.
- d. Involvement of local police/law enforcement agencies/influential community leaders.
- e. Situational awareness of potential/impending SV, criminal activities, community dynamics, etc.
- f. Efforts of UN and others in reconciliation.
- g. Sensitisation of the communities.
- h. Provision of safe and secure environment (proactive domination of the AOR).

#### **Scene 3.**

##### **Assessment of the Situation.**

It is difficult to know whether the individual is dead or alive in the darkness. An inhuman, brutal and criminal act, including mutilation is being carried out in front of the COB. The mob has turned hostile and is likely to attack the COB anytime. It is a befitting case for limited use of force.

##### **Response.**

An inhuman and disrespectful criminal act even on a dead body in the presence of peacekeepers warrants action. The COB commander may undertake the following actions:

- a. Ask the two individuals to stop criminal act/mutilating.
- b. Fire in the air and ask them to surrender.
- c. If they continue to perpetrate act of violence, use of force may be invoked on one of the individuals (target the area below the knee).
- d. Ask the mob leaders to surrender the two murderers and other associated with the murder at once to the military.
- e. Take support of local police where required.
- f. Apprehend perpetrators and leaders.



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## **Scenario 3: Control and Safety in IDP/Temporary Camps**

### **Scene 1.**

#### **Assessment of the Situation.**

The IDP camp is being used for staging attacks on minority community and hoarding weapons. The minority community camp is gearing up to face an attack and plans to pre-empt with the support of the Ex-Séléka fighters. Both sides have a history of brutal SV in the past. The situation is volatile and can deteriorate further if appropriate steps are not taken by the host government and the UN peacekeepers.

The UN military units and sub-units may usually have only a support role to play with regard to security issues pertaining to IDP camps. However, when the situation is beyond the control or capability of humanitarian agencies, local police or UNPOL, military units may be tasked to carry out specific operations.

#### **Courses of Action.**

- a. Political dialogue at Mission HQ level with parties concerned to end sectarian violence.
- b. Constructive engagements for reconciliation and rapprochement, including through women leaders from both communities.
- c. Reorganising the administration and security of the camps to control movement and activities.
- d. Controlled entry and exit in the IDP camp.
- e. Community policing in the IDP camps with the support of the UNPOL.
- f. Sensitisation of the camp inmates to shun violence.
- g. Organise selective searches to confiscate weapons.
- h. Organise joint patrolling (police and community representatives).
- i. Use military sub-unit to assist humanitarian agencies and the police forces in joint operations; such as patrolling, specific searches, apprehension, etc.
- j. Deploy a military sub-unit in the proximity of the minority camp.
- k. Improve security conditions (lighting, fencing, separate enclosures, etc.) in the camps to protect women and girls.
- l. Increased patrolling by mixed teams to sensitise and reassure vulnerable population.
- m. Utilise CPs to check inflow of weapons and movement of armed groups.

#### **Advise to the Force Commander/MLT.**

- a. Declare the camps as weapons free zone.
- b. Ask for Mission HQ approval for searches in the camps for confiscating weapons and apprehending suspects.
- c. Deploy JPT to engage and sensitise communities.
- d. Key leader engagement/political dialogue with communities and armed groups.
- e. Provide safe areas to vulnerable sections.
- f. Engage host Nation in PoC.

#### **Early-warning Indicators.**

- a. Decrease in activities inside the camp.
- b. Inmates that usually go out for subsistence and other activities are not moving out.



- c. Unusual silence and confinement in huts/rooms.
- d. Moving out of suspected men.
- e. Movement of groups of men in the proximity of minority camps.
- f. Hate speeches.
- g. Movement of armed men.

**Handling of Community and Sectarian Dynamics.**

- a. Bring together the religious and ethnic leaders, including women leaders for reconciliation.
- b. Mediate between communities and reassure vulnerable population.
- c. Interposition troops physically to separate.
- d. Increase operational activities to deter armed groups or to prevent attacks.
- e. Robust and proactive force projection.
- f. Preventive arrests by local police.
- g. Active advocacy to convey that violations will not be tolerated and perpetrators would face criminal justice system.
- h. Demonstrate that their activities and conduct are being closely monitored and responsibility and accountability for any violations would be apportioned.
- i. Promote community defence/protection measures and early-warning systems.

**Important Measures to be Instituted.**

- a. Minority Community at Place of Worship.
  - i. Deploy a TOB/standing patrol in the vicinity of the camp.
  - ii. Provide perimeter security.
  - iii. Coordinate early-warning arrangements.
  - iv. Coordinate local alarm schemes and local protection measures.
  - v. Reassure and build confidence.
  - vi. Sensitise them to desist from taking support from Ex-Séléka fighters to strike pre-emptively.
  - vii. Engage Ex-Séléka fighters to prevent initiation of violence.
- b. Engagement of Majority Community.
  - i. Sensitise on futility of continued violence and nudge for reconciliation.
  - ii. Wean them away from weapon culture through vocational and recreational activities.
  - iii. Confiscate arms and apprehend suspects.
  - iv. Sensitise them to desist supporting local armed group.
- c. Engagement of Armed Groups.
  - i. Advocacy to bring them in to the DDR processes.
  - ii. Sensitise that violations will be dealt with by force and perpetrators would face criminal trial.
  - iii. Dominate the area through proactive operations to deter violence and display resolve to protect civilians, including through use of force.
- d. Safety of Women and Children.
  - i. Provide escorts for subsistence activities.
  - ii. Patrolling inside the camps by police or jointly with the military.
  - iii. Separate facility for women and girls within the camps.



- iv. Involve/consult with the women and girls in designing protection measures.
- e. Domestic Violence.
  - i. Usually it will be dealt by the community/traditional justice system
  - ii. Local police have the primary responsibility to respond to domestic violence.
  - iii. If committed in the presence of military component, interfere, stop and detain the violator for further handing over to the local police. Involve community leaders/elders in decision making.

#### **Actions to Confiscate Weapons/Apprehend Suspects.**

- a. Military should be involved only if it is beyond the capacity of the local police/UNPOL.
- b. When military is tasked for confiscation, it should be carried out as a joint operation with the police.
- c. Procedures as described in cordon and search operations will be carried out.
- d. Search should be carried out only on specific information, in the presence of community representative.
- e. It should not inconvenience inmates or women and girls.
- f. Utilise metal detectors, dogs, etc. to locate hidden weapons.
- g. Detain suspects for further questioning by the police and imposing caution in their mind.
- h. If threatened with a hostile act, respond as per ROE.

#### **Measures to Prevent Further Deterioration.**

- a. Political dialogue.
- b. Reconciliation.
- c. Proactive posture.
- d. Ending impunity through prosecution.
- e. Advocacy.

#### **Scene 2.**

##### **Assessment of the Situation.**

Sexual slavery and forced prostitution is perpetrated by some members of the IDP camp. It is imperative for the UN to save the girls as soon as possible and ask the host police to prosecute the perpetrators.

##### **Actions to be Taken.**

- a. Obtain more information.
- b. Coordinate with the camp authorities, local police, UNPOL and informers from the community.
- c. Carry out cordon and search to rescue the girls.
- d. Involve female military peacekeepers and female police personnel.
- e. Use IPOs and or local police to obtain necessary evidence.
- f. Use force if deemed necessary.
- g. Detain perpetrators and hand them over to the local police as per Interim SOP on Detention.
- h. Maintain confidentiality in dealing with victims.
- i. Engage relevant community elders/leaders/parents to prevent ostracising the girls.
- j. Invoke referral arrangements.



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## **Scenario 4: Impending Attack (threat of mass killing and mass rape) on a Village**

### **Assessment of the Situation.**

- a. Ex-Séléka fighters are planning for a reprisal to target a border village in a remote and inaccessible area.
- b. The safety and security of the villagers particularly that of women and children are threatened.
- c. Information indicates to impending mass rapes, torture and killings.
- d. Considering the strength of the Ex-Séléka fighters, you may need additional reinforcements from the battalion.
- e. Since the village is only 50 km away, a quick reaction (vehicle or APC mounted) team can be effective in 2 to 3 hours.

### **Courses of Action.**

The villagers need to be protected by physical deployment of troops. Following actions may be taken:

- a. Deploy a TOB of a platoon size immediately in the proximity to the village.
- b. Subsequently build up with additional strength to interpose between the Ex-Séléka fighters and the village.
- c. Utilise the monitoring and surveillance assets to get early-warning.
- d. Carry out active day and night patrolling activities.
- e. Seek contact with the Ex-Séléka fighters to demonstrate presence of UN military and to restrain them from reprisals.
- f. Coordinate with National border management entities/local police to maintain close watch on cross border activities.
- g. If and when a threat is imminent or has manifested, use force as per ROE.
- h. Strengthen local protection measures in the village.
- i. Involve host security forces in enhancing local security.

### **Early- warning signs.**

In this context, some of the early-warning indicators would be:

- a. Crossing of border.
- b. Movement of large groups of armed men, particularly at night.
- c. Sighting of unknown persons in the vicinity of the village.



- d. Villagers not moving out on routine chores, especially women and girls.
- e. Villagers evacuating to safety.
- f. Electronic signatures (radars, mini-UAS, area surveillance devices, etc.).
- g. Empty market places, empty fields, schools, medical services, etc.

#### **Protection of Villagers.**

- a. Deploy TOB in the proximity of village.
- b. Interposition LRP/standing patrol/TOB between the armed group and village.
- c. Initiate village defence scheme/protection measures.
- d. Activate local alarm scheme.
- e. Coordinate early-warning with locals.
- f. Provide them with radios, cell phones, (hotline) whistles, torches, etc. for passage of information (coordinate with CAS).
- g. Deploy GSR, NVDs, and sensors. Use mini-UAVs to monitor routes of ingress.
- h. Increase patrolling activities to show presence.
- i. Institute day and night watch arrangements.
- j. Use of illumination rounds, trip flares, etc.

#### **Assistance from the Battalion HQ.**

- a. Additional troops if situation demands (QRF/Force Reserve, etc).
- b. UAV/satellite imagery and air photo support to locate the armed group.
- c. Obtain additional information.
- d. Provision of utility helicopters for aerial reconnaissance.
- e. Provision of Attack Helicopters to neutralise assaulting Ex-Séléka fighters/rebel groups.
- f. Political engagement of armed groups' leadership.
- g. Ask host government for deployment of police personnel and border controls.

#### **Assistance to the Community.**

- a. Provide safety and security.
- b. Communication facilities (INMARSAT, Cell Phones, radios, field phones, etc).
- c. Help to initiate self-protection measures, including training.
- d. Help to re organise the village (re-siting, re-grouping, deployment of protective fencing, etc.).
- e. Lighting arrangements.
- f. Assist community to identify threats & provide early-warning (ensure gender-sensitivity).

#### **Preventive Actions at Battalion Level.**

- a. Ensure good situational awareness – Acquire timely, accurate and actionable information.
- b. Periodic military analysis and appreciation.
- c. Planning (including contingency planning) and coordination.
- d. Maintain high operational readiness.
- e. Observation, monitoring and surveillance to identify threats.
- f. Establishment of early-warning network in the battalion AOR (ensure gender-sensitivity).
- g. Engagement of armed group leaders to defuse tension and prevent CRSV including respect for IHRL, IHL, etc.
- h. Engagement of government authorities at provincial levels.





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### **Actions at Sector/Force/Mission HQ.**

- a. Political engagement of parties to the conflict.
- b. Active advocacy.
- c. Engagement of National and local government officials at respective levels.
- d. Engaging armed groups and actors directly or through interlocutors to influence attitudes and behaviour.
- e. Targeted DDR/DDRRR programmes.
- f. Periodic assessments and appreciations.
- g. Provision of force reserves and force multipliers.

## **Scenario 5: Abduction, Forced Marriage, Sex Slavery and Extortion**

### **Assessment of the Situation.**

A female political leader and 3 girls have been abducted. Four of the politician's family members require immediate medical attention. The Ex-Séléka fighters are stationed nearby. Historical precedence indicates rape, torture and sexual slavery. A forced marriage is also on the card. Military is the last resort. The group appears to be strong and sure to return to collect ransom. Although within the capability of the company, additional reinforcements would be required.

### **Courses of Action**

- a. Abductees must be saved through extrication.
- b. Organise electronic monitoring (radars, UAVs/mini-UAVs, observation flights, satellite imageries etc.
- c. Cordon the wooded area with available strength, equipped with NVDs and lighting arrangements.
- d. Ask for additional reinforcements (QRF) and Special Forces if required.
- e. Establish contact with the Ex-Séléka leader for immediate release of the abductees.
- f. Involve local law enforcement agencies/police in the process.
- g. Based on information obtained, close in the cordon to prevent escape.
- h. Engage in negotiation for the release and to join the DDR process.
- i. Use force only as the last resort.
- j. Record all actions on video camera.

### **Assistance from Battalion Commander and Higher-Up.**

- a. Political engagement of senior Ex-Séléka leadership for release.
- b. Provision of information from other sources.
- c. Employment of Force Multipliers (UAV, observation flights, attack helicopters, etc.).
- d. Additional reinforcements, including Special Forces.
- e. Public information campaigns and involvement of media to exert pressure on Ex-Séléka leadership.
- f. Engage all parties to the conflict to stop extortion and illegal checkpoints/roadblocks, etc.
- g. Obtain commitments from parties to the conflict.



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### **Preventive Measures.**

- a. If the COB had been active, such an incident would not have taken place. Following preventive actions must be carried out:
- b. Conduct active routine operations.
- c. Establish local early-warning network and local alarm schemes.
- d. Coordinate with community in initiating community protection measures.
- e. Operate at night, in unconventional space and at different times.
- f. Observe and monitor activities of Ex-Séléka fighters or suspected persons.
- g. Engage them as part of advocacy to refrain from committing violations.
- h. Carry out pre-emptive and proactive deployment.
- i. Maintain good situational awareness.

### **Engagement of Armed Groups in the AOR.**

- a. Seek contact, either directly or through interlocutors.
- b. Sensitise them on key messages to prevent violations, end impunity through apportioning responsibility and accountability.
- c. Monitor their activities, interactions, communications, logistics sustenance, etc.
- d. Dominate the space through relentless operations.
- e. Demonstrate to them that you are looking for confirmed SV offenders for processing through criminal justice system.
- f. Influence their conduct and discipline.

### **Coordination.**

Coordination would be required for information management, negotiations, and execution of the tasks. Coordinate with local population, local police, government officials, neighbouring units, humanitarian agencies, Mission substantive components, and IOs/NGOs.

### **Assistance to the Injured Family Members.**

- a. Provide immediate first aid.
- b. Assist in evacuating to the nearest civil medical facility.
- c. If the life is in danger, heli-lift the casualty to the nearest medical facility (UN or civil) which has the technical support available.
- d. Keep records.

## **Guidance Notes for Snap Situations:**

**As a reminder, suggestions are intended to guide and assist facilitators in their discussion and interaction with all participants in order to come out with the most important points.**



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## Snap Situation 1: Rape During House to House Search

### **Assessment of the Situation.**

Rape and torture during house to house search is going on. The Ex-Séléka fighters must be stopped from committing SV and detained for ending impunity. It is within the capability of the COB and PoC is a mandated obligation.

### **Suggested Response.**

- a. Move the company QRT, preferably in APCs to be effective in 15 to 20 minutes.
- b. Ask the village chief/leaders to engage the Ex-Séléka fighters to prevent further searches and SV. Let them inform the Ex-Séléka fighters that the UN military is on the way.
- c. Ask the villagers to yell collectively and beat drums, etc. to infuse caution and divert attention of the Ex-Séléka fighters.
- d. Engage the rebel group leaders (by Company Commander, Battalion Commander, Sector/Force HQ).
- e. Ask local police to reach the spot quickly and take actions to detain the Ex-Séléka fighters for further prosecution.
- f. Tactically move into the village, ensuring that it does not lead to a fire fight straight away.
- g. Establish contact with the Ex-Séléka fighters and ask them to stop the searches and collect themselves.
- h. Build up additional forces to cordon the area to prevent escape of the perpetrators.
- i. If situation demands, use force as per ROE.
- j. Take stock of the situation, assess number of SV committed and provide survivor assistance as per SOP. Preserve evidence. Maintain confidentiality.
- k. Report through chain of command and parallel to SWPA/HR-G WPA.
- l. Detain perpetrators and hand them over to the local police.
- m. Video record all proceedings.

### **Measures that could have prevented the incident.**

- a. Active advocacy with the Ex-Séléka group to abstain from illegal activities and SV.
- b. Activation of early-warning network.
- c. Area domination by day and night patrolling and pre-positioning of troops in vulnerable areas.
- d. Use of technology for night surveillance.
- e. Organising village defence/self-protection schemes.
- f. Real-time situational awareness.
- g. Precedence of proactive deterrent posture.

## Snap Situation 2: Forced Abortion

### **Assessment of the Situation.**

Forced abortion is illegal. Evidently, the girl may have been under their custody for long and used as sex slave. The girl needs to be saved. Apprehending the armed men may lead to further information and rescue of other such girls in the custody of the group. It is within the capability of the COB.



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### **Suggested Response.**

- a. Move the company QRT to be effective in 10 to 15 minutes. Action should be swift but unobtrusive; to avoid alerting the armed men prematurely.
- b. Simultaneously report through chain of command and parallel to SWPA/HR-G WPA.
- c. Reposition patrols and CPs to intercept the pick-up, in case they decide to scoot.
- d. Ask the MSF attendant to maintain calm and delay the process.
- e. Stop short of the medical facility and tactically move in to secure (cordon) the area.
- f. Innocuously make an entry in the facility to prevent the doctor and girl being used as human shield.
- g. Engage armed men politely to let go the girl and the doctor.
- h. Ask local police to reach the spot quickly and take actions to detain the armed men for further investigation.
- i. Detain them, persuade them to join the DDR process, and hand them over to the local police.
- j. Video record all proceedings.

### **Measures that could have prevented the incident.**

- a. Active advocacy with the Ex-Séléka group to abstain from holding abducted girls in the camp as sex slaves.
- b. Situational awareness about the activities of armed groups.
- c. Surveillance and monitoring of the area.
- d. Effective movement control measures, such as CPs, etc.
- e. Joint efforts to locate missing girls/women in the AOR.
- f. Visits to camps of armed groups to see if any illegal activities are going on.

### **Snap Situation 3: Forced Marriage**

#### **Assessment of the Situation.**

It is a case of abduction with an intention of forced marriage (without the consent of the girl and the family). The girl has to be rescued from the Ex-Séléka fighters to save her from sexual persecution. While the matter of forced marriage has to be dealt by the local police, the UN military can conduct a joint operation to obtain release of the abducted girl. It is within the capability of the COB.

#### **Suggested Response.**

- a. Move the company QRT (preferably APC mounted) along with the local police to the Ex-Séléka camp site.
- b. Simultaneously report through chain of command and parallel to SWPA/HR-G WPA.
- c. Engage/negotiate with the Ex-Séléka group leader for the release of the girl.
- d. Explain the criminal nature of the offence and that the persons involved would be prosecuted.
- e. Facilitate the local police to obtain release of the girl.
- f. If the Ex-Séléka group is unrelenting, ask battalion/Sector/Force HQ to engage Ex-Séléka group leadership to obtain a release. Build up additional forces to display resolve to rescue the girl.
- g. Focus mainly on negotiation and persuasion.
- h. If situation warrants, use force to rescue the girl.



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### **Measures that could have prevented the incident.**

- a. Active advocacy with the Ex-Séléka group to abstain from forced marriages.
- b. Situational awareness (including early warning) about the activities of armed groups.
- c. Surveillance and monitoring of the area.
- d. Effective movement control measures, such as CPs, Mobile CPs, standing patrols, etc.

## **Snap Situation 4: Murder and Abduction**

### **Assessment of the Situation.**

Two men have been brutally murdered in public and their wives have been abducted by Ex-Séléka fighters. Due process of law for committal of murder will be pursued by the local police. There is certainly a need for extrication of abducted wives (who are prone to rape, torture and killing) of slain civilians. If it is beyond the capacity of the local police, UN military unit/sub-unit may undertake operations to rescue the abductees. It is within the capability of the COB.

### **Suggested Response.**

- a. Engage the Ex-Séléka group leaders (by Company Commander, Battalion Commander, Sector/Force HQ).
- b. Report through chain of command and parallel to SWPA/HR-G WPA.
- c. Reach the Ex-Séléka camp with the company QRT, preferably in APCs.
- d. Ask local police also to reach the camp to proceed with investigations of murder and to obtain release of the abducted women.
- e. Engage/negotiate/persuade with the camp leaders to release the captive women.
- f. Build up additional forces to show resolve and force projection.
- g. As a last resort, use force to save the captive women, disarm the members, and detain the suspected murderers.

### **Measures that could have prevented the incident.**

- a. Active advocacy with the Ex-Séléka group to abstain from illegal activities and SV.
- b. Activation of early-warning network.
- c. Area domination by day and night patrolling and pre-positioning of troops in vulnerable areas.
- d. Organising village defence/self-protection schemes.
- e. Real-time situational awareness.
- f. Precedence of proactive deterrent posture.
- g. Monitoring of activities of Ex-Séléka fighters, including their camps.

## **Snap Situation 5: Sexual Mutilation**

### **Assessment of the Situation.**

Sexual mutilation, including mutilation of dead bodies is a criminal act. Primarily it is a law and order problem. It should be best handled by the local police. Congregation of unruly mob of 300



odd personnel may lead to a crowd control situation. UN military may be required to support the local police or protect itself against mob frenzy.

**Suggested Response.**

- a. Report through chain of command and parallel to SWPA/HR-G WPA.
- b. Inform the local police/local administration/NGOs for quick disposal (burial) of the dead bodies.
- c. Ask local police to handle the crowd and peacefully disperse them.
- d. Let the police arrest the leaders and personnel carrying mutilated genitals.
- e. Be ready to assist local police for any emergencies.
- f. Alert all military detachments operating outside the COB about the incident.
- g. Be prepared for a crowd control situation at the COB.
- h. Engage/negotiate/persuade the local leaders/armed group leaders to stop mutilation and disperse the crowd.
- i. Video record all proceedings. Identify leaders and active trouble creators for subsequent engagement/advocacy.

**Measures that could have prevented the incident.**

- a. Although the fight between the two groups happened a night prior, in retrospect, there were two options available to the Unmilitary in location.
  - i. To interpose prior to the fire fight, so as to prevent the incident from taking place; or
  - ii. To interpose during the fire fight to control the situation (may not be tactically viable/sound).
- b. Early-warning from the communities and own appreciation would have facilitated a pre-emptive deployment.
- c. Active advocacy and sensitisation of communities and armed groups to prevent employment of inhuman and brutal measures.
- d. Effective reconciliation and mediation efforts.

## **Snap Situation 6: Female Genital Mutilation**

**Assessment of the Situation.**

It falls under the category of harmful traditional practices. In some communities it is a cultural practice and in some cases it is forced upon some communities by another. Notwithstanding the sensitive nature and cultural background to it, FGM is a HR violation and a crime that are legally prohibited in most countries. Being a sensitive issue, the Military and Police Components need to make the local law enforcement agencies to respond proactively to prevent violation of the legal provision.

**Suggested Response.**

- a. Obtain more information on the political and cultural dynamics of the event.
- b. Inform and discuss with SWPA, WPAs, CPAs and HROs.
- c. Diplomatically engage various community and ethnic leaders and sensitise on the legality of the issue.
- d. Inform the local police to take necessary steps to prevent such mass violation.



- e. Preventive arrests, declaring curfew and engagement of local population through government political, administrative and security machinery would be beneficial.
- f. Deploy QRT/mobile teams to dominate the area to prevent the Ex-Séléka fighters operating with impunity and to deter them from forcing the tribal communities that are against the practice.
- g. Facilitate the police to confront the organisers to prevent the event.
- h. Use force to protect vulnerable people or in self-defence.

**Measures that could have prevented the incident.**

- a. Sensitisation of the legal provisions with the local communities and the armed groups.
- b. Active advocacy with armed groups to abstain from promoting harmful traditional practices. Help local law and order machinery to establish rule of law and in improving governance.

## **Snap Situation 7: Sexual Violence Offenders**

**Assessment of the Situation.**

DDR and SSR are major instruments of the Mission to ensure safe and secure environment. Members of the various Armed Groups (including ex-combatants) and the former Government forces (military, gendarme and police) have been identified as primary perpetrators, who are prone to continue such violations in post conflict situations as well.

To end impunity, sexual offenders (alleged/confirmed) must undergo due process of law, including investigation, prosecution and sentencing if convicted.

**Suggested Response.**

- a. Criminal proceedings against SV offenders will be carried out by the local police.
- b. UN military peacekeepers may assist the local police to apprehend the offenders with the approval of the Mission HQ.
- c. There are no amnesty provisions in any peace agreements for offenders of SV crime.
- d. All former combatants must be processed through DDR. It contributes to reduction of SV crimes in the society. During the DDR process it is essential to screen all combatants to verify their involvement in SV crimes. Reintegration of the ex-combatants, women and children formerly associated with armed groups as well as female ex-combatants and former child soldiers and their families is a challenge and therefore must be done carefully. Special provisions (separate accommodation, bathing, toilet facilities, etc.) must be made to protect women and children in DDR camps to prevent SV.
- e. As part of the SSR, the new defence forces and police forces must not recruit people with criminal record. Advocacy on prevention and prosecution for SV crimes must be carried out regularly. Strict code of control must be enforced amongst all the security forces.
- f. UN military peacekeepers are obliged to detain perpetrators/confirmed offenders and subsequently hand over to the local police as per interim SOP on Detention.
- g. UN Military peacekeepers can detain and disarm armed groups/personnel in the context of PoC mandated missions, particularly when an act of SV imminent/impending or ongoing. They are



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also authorised to detain when an arrest warrant is issued by ICC/ICT/special courts against personnel who have committed SV crimes.

