The United Nations Staff Officers Specialised Training Materials (SO STM) for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has been developed by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. It was approved by the Under-Secretaries-General of DPKO and DFS as official guidance on 06 April 2018.

This version has been released for use by Member States in their pre-deployment training for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. However, the SO STM will be regularly updated so that it is fully responsive to the needs on the ground. Therefore, we strongly suggest checking for updated versions before a training programme is conducted.

The latest SO STM version can be found online at the Peacekeeping Resource Hub: http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community. A link to receive your comments and suggestions for improvement can be found in the resource hub at the same location.

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Preface

Background

The primacy of the United Nations in peacekeeping keeps increasing with the growing number of complex crises that pose threats to international peace and security. Accordingly, the United Nations has introduced a multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping which has also come with new challenges especially on performance standards of military staff officers at the Force and Sector Headquarters. Many United Nations staff members’ End of Assignment reports have also ascribed part of the problem to inadequate pre-deployment training of many staff officers to UN missions. Considering the crucial interfacing roles of staff officers between strategic, operational and tactical levels, they need to be proficient in performing their duties to ensure effective mandate implementation.

The development of this Specialised Training Material (STM) is therefore part of a joint initiative by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) to improve peacekeeping performance in the field. Specifically, this project was led by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) and supported by DFS, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and the Policy and Best Practices Section (PBPS).

It is noteworthy that this STM has been developed based on the presumption that qualified military staff officers would have at least completed their national basic staff courses as part of their career progression. This serves as the starting point for this STM. The STM is thus a generic training material that builds on this starting point by orienting military staff officers on the UN DPKO/DFS approach to peacekeeping operations.

In effect, this STM is not intended to substitute national training doctrines of Troop Contributing Countries but to provide guidance to the trainers of military staff officers’ courses in order to harmonize the different doctrinal perspectives and also to establish a baseline standard for pre-deployment training for military staff officers at Force and Sector headquarters in UN DPKO/DFS led peacekeeping missions.

In conducting training with this STM, it is essential to begin with the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) which are intended to provide all peacekeeping personnel (military, police and civilian) with a shared understanding
of the basic principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping to ensure coherence in United Nations mandate implementation.

With regards to Mission Specific Training, trainers should be guided by the Pre-deployment Information Packages (PiPs) in aligning their courses to reflect the peculiarities of the mission. The PiPs are accessible on ITS Community of Practice (CoP) website at https://pktcop.unlb.org.

Aim

The aim of this Specialised Training Material for Military Staff Officers is to support the pre-deployment training efforts of Troop Contributing Countries by providing UN DPKO/DFS training standards to ensure a common military approach to work at Force and Sector levels in UN peacekeeping missions.

Target audience

This STM targets all military personnel selected by Member States to be deployed as Military Staff Officers in UN peacekeeping operations. Military Staff Officers are required to have at least completed their national basic military staff course.

Training Objectives

The training objectives of the STM for Military Staff Officers are to generally prepare the participants for duties in a peacekeeping operation so they can:

- Contribute efficiently to implement military aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates in accordance with DPKO/DFS principles and guidelines including the Force Headquarters (FHQ) handbook;
- Perform their military functions in an effective, professional and integrated manner; and
- Demonstrate the core values and competencies of the United Nations.
Acknowledgements

ITS would like to thank the subject matter experts from across the UN system, Member States and other regional and international organizations who provided feedback during the drafting process, and the numerous training personnel from national peacekeeping training institutions and field missions who participated in the development workshops.

Contact person

For any proposal of update or improvement of this package, or any questions pertaining to the SO STM, please contact Mr. Donglin Duanmu (duanmu@un.org) or write to peacekeeping-training@un.org.

Any relevant update will be posted and explained on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website (http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community). Instructors are encouraged to check that site regularly.
General considerations for instructors

This package is not a course, but rather a compendium of critical training content for military staff officers in UN peacekeeping. No training material can cover the entire breadth of staff officer duties, with all its challenges and activities. The UN SO STM package should therefore be viewed as the baseline to underpin all UN SO-related training efforts for military peacekeepers. However, when designing a particular course, trainers need to be prepared to adapt these materials to the needs of their audience. As a result, the duration of training courses delivered based on the UN SO STM materials may vary greatly.

Concerning necessary competencies for participants to benefit from this training package, it is recommended that personnel receiving this training be proficient on their national basic staff officer courses. As such, it is expected that a staff officer be fully capable to perform regular staff officer duties before receiving a training based on the UN SO STM package. It is also critical for all participants to have received the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) as a pre-requisite before this training. The CPTM contains fundamental principles, concepts and ideas to UN peacekeeping, which should be well grasped by trainees before participating in a UN SO STM course.

The CPTM can be downloaded from: http://research.un.org/revisedcptm2017

Instructor Profile

This training package is best presented by instructors who master the CPTM and their national basic staff courses, and have previous experience working in a UN peacekeeping mission in a staff officer role at the Force or Sector Headquarters. Ideally, the instructor will be able to harmonize the national and peacekeeping doctrinal perspectives to provide the baseline standard for this pre-deployment training.

Specific knowledge on the particular mission where trainees are to be deployed is advisable, so as to be able to deliver a targeted course based on real experience.

Finally, instructors should be familiar and comfortable with facilitating scenario-based exercises.
**Training characteristics**

Training will vary for different units in different troop contributing countries, based on priorities and resources. However, some fundamental training characteristics should be respected when delivering a SO course:

- Training should be interactive and encourage the participation of trainees.
- Training should be mission-specific; where possible, it is advisable for trainers to bring in examples from the mission that trainees will be deployed to.
- Training methodology should be based on practice.

**Reference Materials**

Below are referenced materials which might be required for instructors in their preparations:

- Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008.02)
- DPKO-DFS Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy (2017.07)
- COE Manual 2017 (2017.08)
- Guidelines on Use of Force by Military Components in Peacekeeping Operations (2017.01)
- DPKO-DFS SOP on Headquarters Crisis Response in Support of Peacekeeping Operations (2017.01)
- DPKO-DFS Policy on Gender Responsiveness United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2018.01)

**Additional Resources**

Instructors are encouraged to check for the latest policies, guidance and data from the following sources:

- UN documents can be found on: http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.html (Search by document symbol, e.g. A/63/100)
• Repository for all official DPKO and DFS guidance is the Policy and Practice Database: http://ppdb.un.org (only accessible from the UN network)
• Official peacekeeping guidance documents are also accessible through the Peacekeeping Resource Hub: http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community
• UN films can be found on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/user/unitednations

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Module 1 at a Glance

Aim
The aim of this module is to provide staff officers with the necessary knowledge to understand the United Nations organizational issues and peacekeeping missions’ military structures. This includes the roles and procedures of different entities related with peacekeeping at NY Headquarters, mission and sector levels as well as the basics of the Integrated Assessment and Planning process in order to facilitate their participation in its implementation. In addition, a brief overview of the UN’s reviews and upcoming reforms are presented to highlight the changes that have been proposed for implementation in 2019.

Relevance
All military staff officers in the FHQ or SHQ of a UN mission need a clear understanding of standard procedures, mission structures, roles and duties for the different components and branches present in the mission HQ. Staff officers’ understanding of their functions, roles, structures and procedures in place at mission HQ will help them in performing their duties efficiently in above depicted environment.

Learning Objectives
• Understand the UN Secretariat, DPKO, DFS and Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structures
• Highlight the proposals within the UN Peace and Security Reviews
• Work within the Command and Control structures of UN Peacekeeping
• Understand the role of staff officers in the Integrated Assessment and Planning processes
Module 1: Structural Framework comprises of several segments that are structured to help achieve the learning objectives:

Unit 1: UN Secretariat Structure

Lesson 1.1: UN Secretariat Organizational Structure
Lesson 1.2: Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Lesson 1.3: Department of Field Support

Unit 2: Mission HQ Structure and Functioning

Lesson 2.1: Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structure
Lesson 2.2: Command and Control
Lesson 2.3: Field Headquarters Structure

Unit 3: Integrated Assessment and Planning

Lesson 3.1: Understanding Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP)
Lesson 3.2: IAP Process & Methodology
Lesson 3.3: Roles and Responsibilities of Military Staff Officers
Unit 1: UN Secretariat Structure

Starting the Lessons

Aim
The aim of these lessons is to equip military staff officers with general knowledge of the basic organization and functioning of UN Headquarters.

Unit Content
Lesson 1.1: UN Secretariat Organizational Structure
Lesson 1.2: Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Lesson 1.3: Department of Field Support

Learning Outcomes
- Understand the UN Secretariat, DPKO, DFS Organizational Structures.
- Highlight the proposals within the UN Peace and Security Reviews
Slide 5

Lecture Content

- Origin of the Secretariat
- Role of the Secretariat
- Organization chart
- Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) & Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
- The Departments: DPA – DPKO – DFS - DSS
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- Overseas Offices: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- Peace and Security Reform

Ask participants questions about the UN Secretariat: What is its role? How is it organized?
Key Message: The Secretariat comprises the Secretary General and such other staff as the organization may require.

It provides services to the other organs of the United Nations, such as the General Assembly, the Security Council and the ECOSOC, as well as their subsidiary bodies.
Functions of the Secretariat:

- Preparation of report and other documents containing information, analysis, historical background, research findings, policy suggestions and so forth, to facilitate deliberations and decision making by other organs.
- To facilitate legislative organs and their subsidiary bodies.
- Provision of meeting services for the G.A. and other organs.
- Provision of editorial, translation and document reproduction services for the issuance of UN documents in different languages.
- Conduct of studies and provision of information to various Member States in meeting challenges in various fields.
- Preparation of statistical publications, information bulletins and analytical work which the G.A. has decided.
- Organization of conferences, experts group meetings and seminars on topics of concern to the international community.
- Provision of technical assistance to developing countries.
- Supporting missions in countries, areas or locations as authorized by the G.A. or the Security Council.
Key Message: The Secretariat, one of the main organs of the UN, is organized along departmental lines, with each department or office having a distinct area of action and responsibility.

Offices and departments coordinate with each other to ensure cohesion as they carry out the day to day work of the Organization in offices and duty stations around the world.

The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General designated by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

It is composed of departments, offices and independent offices located in New York, while several other offices are established outside of the US territory.
The Office of Internal Oversight Services and the Office of Legal Affairs are directly attached to the Office of the Secretary General.

The Office of Internal Oversight Services is the internal oversight body of the United Nations.

It was established in 1994 by the General Assembly, to assist the Secretary-General in fulfilling his oversight responsibilities in respect of the resources and staff of the Organization through the provision of audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation services.

The Office of Legal Affairs provide a unified central legal service for the Secretariat and the principal and other organs of the United Nations.
Key Message: The Department of Political Affairs monitors and assesses global political developments with an eye to detecting potential crises before they erupt and devising effective responses.

The Department provides support to the Secretary-General and his envoys, as well as to UN political missions deployed around the world to help defuse crises or promote lasting solutions to conflict.

Where the Secretary-General’s diplomatic “good offices” are employed to help bring warring parties toward peace or to prevent political and armed conflicts from escalating, DPA is typically working behind the scenes to define and plan the mission and to provide guidance and backing to mediators.
Key Message: The Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates.

The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations.

DPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions.

Up to the late 1980s, peacekeeping operations were operated through the UN Office of Special Political Affairs. The official DPKO was formally created in 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali took office as Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Key Message: The Department of Field Support (DFS) provides dedicated support to peacekeeping field missions and political field missions in the areas of finance, logistics, information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources and general administration.

DFS was created in 2007 by removing various support functions from DPKO, for better efficiency.

In order to keep a good coordination between both Departments, DPKO and DFS keep a common Chief of Staff office and Executive Office.
Key Message: The Department of Safety and Security is responsible for providing leadership, operational support and oversight of the security management system.

It ensures security for staff and eligible dependents.

UNDSS is also a network of security coordinators and advisors deployed wherever UN programmes are implemented. UNDSS maintains offices in more than 100 countries.
The Under Secretary-General for Management (USG DM) has been delegated financial authority and responsibility from the Secretary-General for all financial matters relating to UN peacekeeping operations.

The Under Secretary-General for Safety and Security (USG DSS) is directly accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General for the executive direction and control of the United Nations security management system and for the overall safety and security of United Nations civilian personnel (and unarmed individual uniformed personnel) and their recognized dependents at both headquarters locations and in the field.

*Note: The mandate of DSS is limited to the protection of United Nations staff, facilities and their recognized dependents and has no formal authority or responsibility in relation to military members of national contingents and Formed Police Units.*

The Under-Secretary General for Field Support (USG DFS) directs all support for the peace operations by providing necessary strategic direction to guide the work programme of DFS. The Department of Field Support is responsible for delivering dedicated support to the field operations, including on personnel, finance, procurement, logistical, communications, information technology and other administrative and general management issues.
Key Message: Among the Independent offices, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.

OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.

OCHA’s mission is to:

- Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies.
- Advocate the rights of people in need.
- Promote preparedness and prevention.
- Facilitate sustainable solutions.
Key Message: Among the overseas offices, the Office of High Commissioner for the Human Rights (OHCHR), located in Geneva, is the principal UN organization mandated to promote and protect human rights for all. To this end, it focuses on three main areas: standard setting, monitoring and implementation on the ground.

OHCHR also acts as a secretariat for the three other components of the UN human rights system: the Human Rights Council; some 40 independent UN human rights experts; and the committees that monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties.

OHCHR is also the lead office for the Human Rights screening policy, allowing the various Secretariat Departments to obtain first-hand information about possible human rights violations committed by candidates to high profile UN positions.

Finally, the OHCHR and its antennas in the world conduct human rights violations inquiries in the framework of the HR screening for candidates to senior UN positions (SG Policy on HR screening of UN Personnel, December 2012).
Key Message: The key goals for the peace and security reform are to make the pillar more coherent, nimble and effective; make prevention the priority, especially of violent conflicts and crises; align the pillar more closely with the development and human rights pillars; and enhance the effectiveness and coherence of PKOs and SPMs, ensuring primacy of politics and flexibility of approach.
**Key Message:** The rationale for a single political-operational structure and why the regional structure is beneficial is it will enable improved regional strategies and responses; strengthen coherence and integrate delivery of mandates; provide clearer lines of engagement with and provision of substantive guidance and support to field presences; enhance cooperation with regional organizations and other partners; and ensure continuity of care in transitions.

The key features for a single political and operational structure are that it will be led by 3 ASGs with regional responsibilities, reporting to two USGs; it will combine the regional divisions of DPA and the Officer of Operations of DPKO; it will ensure the key operational link of the two departments; and the ASG’s managing divisions and teams are responsible for all political and operational functions.

Standing Principals’ Group will come together to ensure a coherent ‘whole-of-pillar’ approach; ensure communication and coherence in implementation of peace and security priorities; provide managerial coherence; provide high-level entry point for development and human rights pillars and partners; and, interact with principals of proposed global operational support and management depts.

The regional structure will manage the entire range of political and operational engagements in mission and non-mission settings; pay close attention to prevention and peacebuilding, including in non-mission situations; and manage coordination with regional and other partners.
Summary of Key Messages

- Created in 1945 through the UN Charter, the UN Secretariat is located in New York, with offices and agencies outside of the US (OHCHR in Geneva).

- The Secretariat supports the UN legislative bodies.

- Headed by a Secretary General appointed by the General Assembly, the Secretariat implements the decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.

- As regards leading and supporting peacekeeping operations, DPKO and DFS are the two most important departments the T/PCCs will have to deal with.
Ask participants questions about the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: What is its role? How is it organized?
Note to Instructor: The following points reflect key units within DPKO. The points below are narratives synchronized with animations in the presentation slide for ease of explanation.

1. DPKO is headed by an Under-Secretary General who is the Chief of all peacekeeping operations by delegation of the Secretary General.
2. The Chief of Staff Office is shared with DFS, in order to favour coordination between both Departments (Remember DFS was created in 2007 by separating the logistic and finance support functions from DPKO).
3. The Executive Office, also part of COS Office, is also shared with DFS.
4. The Situation Centre, activated 24/7 to follow closely every event within the peacekeeping operations, is also part of the COS Office as well as the Public Affairs Unit in charge of DPKO external communication. The Situation Centre was formed in April 1993 in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to provide situation monitoring and exchange of information services between Headquarters in New York and United Nations field missions worldwide. It was attached to COS office in 2010.

5. DPKO is composed of 3 main Offices headed by an Assistant Secretary General, and a Division.
6. The main role of the Office of Operations is to provide political and strategic policy and operational guidance and support to the missions.
7. It is managing peacekeeping operations from NY and is headed by an ASG who is also the designated USG DPKO deputy whenever the USG is away from headquarters.
8. Due to its political role OO is the primus inter pares among DPKO's offices.
9. The Office of Military Affairs oversees the Military part of the operations.
10. The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions oversees the judicial and police components of the peacekeeping operations.
11. The Policy, Evaluation and Training Division establishes the training doctrine for all DPKO and DFS personnel's; it works for DFS as well as for DPKO.
12. The Office of Operation is divided into 3 regional Divisions which oversee PKOs in their area of interest.
13. Africa 1 oversees the Sudan Missions and Somalia, while Africa 2 oversees the Great Lakes and Western Africa.
14. Asia, Middle East, Europe and Latin America Division oversees all PKOs in these areas of the world.
15. The Office of Military Affairs comprises of 3 main services and 2 teams: the military planning and force generation services oversee these functions of the PKOs, while Current Military Operation follows established missions.
16. The 2 teams support the Military Adviser in their respective domain of action.
17. The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions comprises the Police Division, which oversees the police component of the PKOs, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Section whose role is self-explanatory, a Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Section, a Security Sector Reform Section and the Mine Action Service which leads demining and educational actions throughout the PKOs.

18. The Policy, Evaluation and Training Division works both for DPKO and DFS. The Integrated Training Service establishes the training doctrine of the UN members and advises the T/PCCs on training issues.

Finally, there are three additional elements to the Divisions and services that must be mentioned:

19. Each of OO’s regional divisions has an Integrated Operational Team (IOT) which includes Liaison Officers from OMA, OROLSI, but also DFS (Finance and Logistic Support).

20. The role of the IOT is to make sure that OO's decisions and actions are well coordinated with the Support services and the services overseeing the military and police components respectively.

21. The Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell is a recent creation which pertains both to Force Generation Service and DPET. As its name indicates, it tackles the Force Generation issues at strategic / States level and advises the senior leadership on political actions to be pursued.

22. It also has a central coordination role in terms of approaching the Member States.

23. The Strategic Peacekeeping Partnership cell is also a recent creation.

24. Directly attached to the USG DPKO’s office, the role of the Office of Strategic Peacekeeping Partnership is:

   a. To strengthen the peacekeeping partnership by assisting in identifying gaps which impact delivery of mandates by UN peacekeeping missions by making recommendations on systemic issues relating to UN peacekeeping operations;

   b. To make recommendations for ensuring safety and security, welfare, and the Organizations’ provision of adequate support services to field uniformed personnel;

25. DPKO is manned by a total of 402 civilian and military staff, the latter being on secondment from their countries.
Key Message: The role of the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell is to plan and coordinate mid- to long-term DPKO/DFS engagement with Member States to help meet current and future UN peacekeeping uniformed capability needs.

The Cell is co-chaired by Chief FGS and Chief DPET Partnerships Team.

Along with OMA and DPKO, the SFGCP cell works on:

- The Strategic engagement of the T/PCCs
- The implementation of the new Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS)
- Knowledge Management
- Capability planning
Key Message: The Office of Operations (OO) provides political and strategic policy and operational guidance and support to the missions. Additionally, through its Integrated Operational Teams, OO makes sure that DPKO’s action is unified and that the information provided to the leadership is consistent despite the size and number of peacekeeping operations and the number and variety of actors involved, both on the ground and in the UNHQ.

The Integrated Operational Teams include senior officers and officers in the field of Military, Police, Finance and Logistic Support. They maintain contact with their parent service or department to ensure that unified and verified information reach the leadership.

Military and Police officers assigned to the IOTs are active duty officers seconded by their governments.
The Division of Policy Evaluation and Training (DPET) provides an integrated capacity to:

- develop and disseminate policy and doctrine;
- evaluate mission progress towards mandate implementation;
- develop, coordinate and deliver standardized training;
- develop policies and operational frameworks for strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners.

DPET works for the benefit of DPKO as well as for DFS.
**Key Message:** The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) is the largest provider of police, justice and corrections specialists in the world.

It also has experts on hand in weapons and ammunition management, mine action, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

OROLSI was established in 2007 by the UN General Assembly to find innovative ways to catalyze peacekeeping and peace sustaining processes, protect civilians and assist in re-establishing national rule of law and security institutions.
The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) is made up of five components:

- United Nations Police Division (PD),
- United Nations Mine Actions Service (UNMAS),
- Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS),
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Section (DDRS),
- and Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU).

For a total of 148 personnel in UNHQ.
Key Message: Police peacekeepers play an important role in protecting civilians - both by providing operational support in the face of imminent threats and by upholding law and order.

UN Police work with national law enforcement agencies to help prevent sexual- and gender-based violence, strengthen police relationships with communities and address transnational organized crime.

The United Nations Police Division (PD) provides critical support to national police services, so that they build trust with communities and provide public safety to their citizens.

PD is in charge of generating and deploying all individual UN police officers as well as all Formed Police Units.

PD is strengthening the deployment and recruitment modalities for UN police personnel and continuing efforts to increase the participation of female officers in PKOs.
**Key Message:** The Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Section (CLJAS) addresses issues related to both judicial and penal systems in conflict and post-conflict environments.

Its core responsibilities include:

- planning justice and corrections aspects of peacekeeping operations;
- providing advice on re-establishing the criminal justice chain;
- ensuring the timely deployment of personnel;
- developing guidance and delivering training;
- and strengthening partnerships and programme delivery with other rule of law actors.
**Key Message:** The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section (DDRS) provides support to field practitioners by planning new DDR programmes and providing operational advice and support.

By encouraging armed groups to disarm and return to civilian life, DDR creates space for peace consolidation and transition to recovery and development.

The Section also serves as an expert resource to the United Nations Secretariat, intergovernmental bodies and Member States on issues related to DDR.

The DDR Section, together with the World Bank, has also entered into a strategic partnership with the African Union to support the latter’s specialized capacity in the area.
Key Message: The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) applies mine action expertise to an increasingly wide range of explosive hazards, from unexploded missiles, artillery shells, rockets, grenades and mortars to unsafe and unsecure weapons and ammunition, improvised explosive devices and cluster bombs.

UNMAS leads, coordinates and carries out efforts to mitigate these threats when mandated by the United Nations Security Council or when requested by the Secretary-General or an affected country, often in response to a humanitarian emergency.

UNMAS is also developing a United Nations approach to IED threat mitigation.
**Key Message:** The Security Sector Reform Unit (SSRU) is the focal point and technical resource capacity on SSR for the United Nations system, as well as for national and international partners.

The primary objective of the Security Sector Reform Unit is to ensure that people are safer through the enhanced effectiveness and accountability of security institutions.

SSR officers in the field are responsible for a variety of core functions, including:

- ensuring that SSR support is integrated and coherent;
- supporting reforms in border security and management, defence and policing;
- strengthening oversight and management; articulating security sector legislation;
- mobilizing resources for SSR;
- and monitoring and evaluating programmes.
Note to Instructor: The following points reflect key units within the Office of Military Affairs. The bullet points below are narratives synchronized with animations in the presentation slide for ease of explanation.

1. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) works to deploy the most appropriate and effective military capability in peacekeeping missions.

2. The Office of Military Affairs is headed by the Military Adviser, a serving Lieutenant General at the level of Assistant Secretary-General, who is accountable to the Under-Secretary-General.

3. The Military Adviser is responsible for providing military advice to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and, when requested, through him or her to the Under-Secretaries-General for Political Affairs and Field Support, the Secretary-General and the Security Council. The Military Adviser also provides advice and support to heads of offices and divisions within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, operations with military components led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and missions with military advisory functions led by the Department of Political Affairs.

4. His/her deputy is a Major General, also on secondment.

5. The Military Adviser is supported by a Chief of Staff, Brigadier General on secondment, who heads the MILAD’s office and is responsible for the smooth functioning of OMA.

6. OMA’s three main services are:
   a. MILITARY PLANNING SERVICE whose main functions are:
      ➢ Providing military-strategic planning advice to the Military Adviser;
      ➢ Conducting military-strategic planning for emerging and existing Department-led operations;
      ➢ Producing foundational military guidance documents, including the command directive, military rules of engagement, military-strategic concepts of operation, and Statement of Unit Requirements; these three last documents are essential to the TCCs;
      ➢ Monitoring the military plans to reduce the time required to plan for major changes, including mission termination;
      ➢ Specifying the force or operational requirements for individual military personnel, military formed units and unit equipment in new or revised concepts of operation and contingency plans.

   b. FORCE GENERATION SERVICE whose main functions are:
      ➢ Acting as the principal military point of contact with troop-contributing countries conducting the force generation process, including the generation and rotation of all military contingents and individuals, and supporting the selection process for senior UN military appointments;
      ➢ Participating, in the contingent-owned equipment negotiation process, concluding memorandums of understanding for the timely deployment of troops and, when necessary, for the force adjustment, and providing
technical advice on contingent-owned equipment claims by Member States, as required;
➢ Initiating and maintaining records of service and performance for individuals and statistics and country profiles for all UN military deployments;
➢ Developing, in collaboration with the Department of Field Support, generic guidelines for troop-contributing countries and mission-specific military guidelines related to force requirements;
➢ Coordinating reconnaissance visits for troop-contributing countries providing contingents to peacekeeping operations;
➢ Maintaining and updating records of pledges made by Member States in the UN PCRS for the provision of troops, equipment and services to peacekeeping operations.

c. CURRENT MILITARY OPERATION SERVICE’s main functions are:
➢ Providing advice to the heads of the military components of Department-led operations on technical aspects of military operations, such as contingency planning, force rotations and operational reporting, in coordination with the integrated operational teams, to ensure that military aspects are properly integrated or coordinated, and interacting with permanent missions of Member States on all military technical operational issues, significant incidents, accidents, injuries, deaths, repatriations and other current issues;
➢ Providing the Military Adviser and, through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, senior leadership at UN Headquarters with military information and analysis related to current events;
➢ Coordinating visits by Member States, the military and police advisers, community and senior military staff from Headquarters to peacekeeping operations, briefing visiting military individuals, groups or delegations and coordinating the briefing and debriefing process for senior military officials in peacekeeping operations;
➢ Coordinating responses by the Office of Military Affairs to disciplinary issues involving military personnel

7. Two additional teams provide support to the leadership and the services in the accomplishment of their tasks:

a. The Policy and Doctrine Team drafts military policy and doctrine capability development documents, and acts as a liaison team with various regional organizations; (the Liaison Team was recently incorporated in this team);
b. The Assessment Team who enhances force protection and senior decision-making process, anticipates and responds to critical military and threat information requirements by providing operational and strategic level analytical products beyond the capacity of UN field missions.

8. OMA is manned by a total of 114 personnel, 103 of them are active duty officers seconded by their countries.
Summary of Key Messages

- By delegation of the Secretary General, DPKO assumes the political and executive direction of all peacekeeping operations.
- In addition to the political domain, DPKO also provides support in the military, police, judicial and mine action domains.
- In terms of crisis management, DPKO coordinates the efforts of the United Nations and of the governmental and non-governmental players.
Ask participants questions about the Department of Field Support: What is its role? How is it organized?
Key Message: DFS is made up of four main divisions: Field Budget & Finance, Logistics Support, Field Personnel and Information and Communication Technology.

At the United Nations Headquarters level, DFS is responsible for delivering dedicated support to United Nations field operations, including finance, field procurement, logistics, personnel, information technology, communications, and other administrative and general management issues.
The Department of Field Support (DFS) provides support in the areas of finance, logistics, Information, Communication and Technology (ICT), human resources and general administration to support the field operations.

DFS is led by an Under-Secretary-General. Unlike DPKO, the USG DFS has an Assistant Secretary-General as his deputy. As a reminder, DFS shares with DPKO the Chief of Staff office including the Executive Office.

A Senior Leadership Appointments section and an environmental management unit are attached to the office of the USG Field support, while the ASG Field Support directly oversees the Conduct and Discipline unit and a board of inquiry.

DFS has four main Divisions to execute its core functions. The Field Personnel Division supports the field missions in the domain of civilian personnel management; Field Budget and Finance Division provides financial and budgetary support to the field missions as well as to the T/PCCs; Logistics Support Division provides logistic support to the Field Missions and to the T/PCCs as well; and the Information & Communications Technology Division assumes governance of the communications and information technology in the field missions.

DFS also includes the Global Service Center bases overseas in Italy and Spain, as well as the Regional Service Center in Entebbe.

To fulfill its tasks DFS / UNHQ comprises of 420 civilian and military staff.
Key Message: The Department of Field Support has a few specialized units directly attached to the offices of the USG and ASG.

Part of a Strategic Support Team attached to the OUSG DFS, the Environmental Management Unit helps the USG DFS implement and monitor the DFS Environment Strategy that came into effect in January 2017.
Key Message: The Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) maintains global oversight of the state of discipline in all peacekeeping operations and special political missions. It provides overall direction for conduct and discipline issues in field missions, including formulating policies, training and outreach activities and handling allegations of misconduct.

CDU was formally established in the Department of Field Support in 2007 following the initial formation of a Conduct and Discipline Team in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2005. It was launched as part of a package of reforms in United Nations peacekeeping designed to strengthen accountability and uphold the highest standards of conduct.

Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) in field missions act as principal advisers to heads of mission on conduct and discipline issues involving all categories of personnel. The CDTs address all forms of misconduct by United Nations peacekeeping personnel, including acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.
**Key Message:** Attached to the Office of the USG DFS, the Senior Leadership Appointments Section operates in the context of leadership requirements in field missions led by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Political Affairs (DPA).

It monitors political developments with a potential impact on field leadership matters, suggests suitable candidates for senior leadership positions (save FCs, DFCs and Police Commissioners), supports high-level succession planning for Head and Deputy Head of Mission positions, and provides guidance and expert advice to senior management on political senior appointments processes.
Field Personnel Division (FPD)

- FPD is responsible for recruiting, managing, developing, and retaining highly qualified civilian staff.

- FPD sets the strategic HR vision for UN peace operations;

- FPD exercises overall leadership and responsibility for the conduct of human resources management (HRM) authorities delegated to DFS.

- FPD is also the primary human resources policy advisor to DPKO and DPA senior leadership at Headquarters and in the field.
**Key Message:** The Field Personnel Division (FPD) is responsible for recruiting, managing, developing, and retaining highly qualified civilian staff for service in UN field operations.

FPD sets the strategic human resources vision for UN peace operations; exercises overall leadership and responsibility for the conduct of human resources management (HRM) authorities delegated to DFS; and is the primary human resources policy advisor to DPKO and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) senior leadership at Headquarters and in the field.

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Key Message: The Field Budget & Finance Division (FBFD) is responsible for managing an efficient budgeting process with effective guidance to UN peace operations on the formulation of their budget proposals and performance reports, and providing guidance to the field and senior management in DFS.

FBFD also provides guidance to DPKO and DPA on financial rules and regulations, policies and procedures, results-based budgeting, and recommendations of legislative bodies.

It ensures the efficient processing of contingent-owned equipment and death and disability claims for contingents in field operations, and the communication and interaction with Member States on related memoranda of understanding, policies, and procedures providing strategic direction and oversight in these core activities.

For T/PCCs in particular, it is important to know that MOU & Claims Management Section (MCMS) in FBFD is their point of contact for:

- MOU negotiations and all kinds of MOU-related issues;
- Claims pertaining to reimbursements, losses, death and disability.

MCMS can be contacted directly or through OMA/Force Generation Service.
It is also worth noting the recent creation of the Reimbursement and Policy Liaison Section in 2016. It is responsible for COE policies and procedures, administration of the COE Working Group held every 3 years and administration of the Troop Cost Survey held every 4 years. In addition, this section is in charge of the policies and procedures that govern the payment of Enabling Capability, Risk Premiums and Rotation of Personnel and of the statistics related to the linkage of non-functional or absent equipment to troop cost.

Within FBFD, the MOU & Claims Management Section is the T/PCC’s point of contact for all MOU-related issues and for all claim-related issues.

**Key Message:** The Logistic Support Division is responsible for the implementation and monitoring of policies and procedures for all logistic issues in peacekeeping operations.

LSD consists of two services and two sections:

- Supply Chain Planning & Enabling Service
- Strategic Support Service
- Air Transport Section
- Movement Control Section
The Aviation Safety Section reports directly to the Director, Logistics Support Division.

The Logistics Support Division is headed by a Director, assisted by a Deputy Director. Outlining the importance of aviation safety and security, the Aviation Safety Section is directly attached to the Director’s office.
Key Message: The Logistic Support Division is now organized following the principles of the Supply Chain Management.

The Logistics Support Division has been reorganized following the principles of the Supply Chain Management in order to avoid disconnected efforts among cells. The current structure aims at ensuring LSD functions as one integrated supply chain, that plans, sources and delivers the products in a holistic way.

In that regard the Supply Chain Management Service does both the integrated planning of the supply chain, as well as the performance management and coordination.

Within the Supply Chain Performance Management & Policy Coordination section, the COE & Property Management Unit oversees the work of the COE Verification Units in the field, making sure the rules are applied the same way across all field missions. They are also responsible for defining the policy and guidance related to COE verification operations.
Key Message: The Strategic Support Service provides support to the field missions in terms of supply, engineering and medical logistics.

The Strategic Support Service role is to support requirements for peacekeeping missions, special political missions, and the United Nations Logistics Base. They assist peacekeeping missions in planning and management of materiel and services under a variety of strategic conditions. Specifically, the sections within SSS coordinate the provision of supply, engineering, property management, and medical support to missions while establishing arrangements with TCCs for contingent owned equipment.

The Specialist Support Section manages fuel, rations, various supply and vehicles contracts.

The Engineering Section works mainly on mission contracts in the field – but is also able to provide advice during the generation of engineering units.

The Medical support section deals with Medical Logistics. MSS controls that the Level 2 or Level 1 Hospitals deployed by TCCs meet the requirements in terms of medical equipment, spare parts, products, drugs. MSS also deals with policies and SOPs applicable in the field (editor of the Medical Support Manual), and correcting deficiencies in the field. Finally, MSS also looks at the professional qualifications of the medical personnel deploying with Level 1 and Level 2 Hospitals, to make sure that the
qualifications of the personnel provided match the requirements of the COE manual for each position.

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**Key Message:** The Air Transport Section is particularly responsible for the respect of the technical requirements pertaining to military aircraft and flying crews contributed by member states.

The Air Transport Section is of special importance for TCCs contributing air assets to UN operations. Working with the Force Generation Service, ATS defines the technical requirements pertaining to the TCC-contributed aircraft as an input to the relevant Statements of Unit Requirements, provides the UN Team’s air specialists during the AAVs and PDVs and leads the negotiation of the Letter Of Assist with the TCC, along with the Procurement Department. The management of UN commercially contracted air assets, fixed or rotary wings, is also part of the ATS’ responsibilities.
**Key Message:** The role of the Movement Control Section is to organize the transport of UN goods and personnel at the strategic level.

In addition, the Movement Control Section is to ensure that effective logistic capabilities in terms of Air Support, Strategic Air and Sea Lift for movement of Military personnel as well as civilian personnel and cargo, vehicles, and spare parts are provided at the required time and place, in the most effective and efficient manner, in order to support UN peacekeeping and other field operations.

Moreover, MOVCON organizes the strategic transport of the COE for the deploying or repatriating units. T/PCCs personnel are directly in touch with this service during the preparation phase of the transport. They also organize the deployment and rotation of military/police personnel by air, using either contracted commercial assets or UN assets. In case of movement carried out by the T/PCC under Letter Of Assist, MOVCON again is the service receiving and processing the LOA requests.
Key Message: The Information and Communications Technology Division (ICTD) is responsible for the management and administration of the department’s IT and communication systems on a global basis.

ICTD is also responsible for the operations and support of the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) Data Center, Enterprise Network Systems, and Satellite Communications Hub infrastructure supporting UN operations globally. It manages the data used by mission staff in the performance of their duties, with the growth in data managed globally by DFS supported missions, and backed up in UNLB. They are required to be able to rapidly configure data for use by mission staff.
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The United Nations Global Service Centre (UNGSC)

- UNGSC comprises of the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi / Italy (UNLB) and UN Support Base in Valencia / Spain (UNSBV).

- The UNGSC provides critical Logistics, Geospatial, ICT services and support to more than 37 peacekeeping, special political and other missions.
Key Message: The United Nations Global Service Centre (UNGSC) mandate is to ensure efficient and effective peace operations through the core Logistics, Geospatial, Information and Telecommunications Technologies services and support it provides to more than 37 peacekeeping, special political and other missions around the world.

The UNGSC is comprised of the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy (UNLB) as well as the United Nations Support Base in Valencia, Spain (UNSBV).

In November 1994, the General Assembly endorsed the creation of a permanent logistics base in Brindisi, Italy which was initially a site for pack-up kits and general supplies. The role of the UNLB expanded in 2002 to include the creation of the Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) Concept. The SDS is the United Nation’s Peacekeeping material reserve, which supports rapid deployment and the initial operational capability of a complex peacekeeping mission. The UNLB stores and maintains the SDS, provides airlift support to missions, and conducts UN logistics training.

UNGSC is comprised of three core Service areas:

- Logistics Service
- Service for Geospatial Information and Telecommunications Technologies
- Base Support Service
Learning Activity

- Prepare an agenda for VTC between FHQ & MILAD concerning the general situation in the PKO mission based in Carana.

VTC is a common tool for interaction between the field and UN HQ in New York.

This Scenario based CARANA VTC should cover the personnel situation, main events, etc.

The agenda should cover the main offices / functions in DPKO.

This learning activity's outcome should show if they have understood and who they are supposed to interact with in UN HQ.

Agenda should not cover any major details but show an understanding of what topics that can be discussed with the strategic HQ.
Summary of Key Messages

- The Department of Field Support provides technical support to the field missions in the logistic, financial, communications, ICT and HR domains.

- It also advises DPKO and DPA in the same domains in relation with peacekeeping operations.

- Several of its services are the direct correspondents of the T/PCCs as regards MOU management, reimbursements claims, strategic transport of personnel and COE, and technical requirements applicable to air assets contributions.
Starting the Lessons

Aim
The aim of these lessons is to provide staff officers with the necessary knowledge to understand the United Nations peacekeeping missions’ military structures as well as the roles and procedures of different entities related with peacekeeping at the mission and sector levels.

Unit Content
Lesson 2.1: Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structure
Lesson 2.2: Command and Control
Lesson 2.3: Field Headquarters Structure

Learning Outcomes
• Understand the Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structures
• Work within the Command and Control structures of UN Peacekeeping
Module 1 – Lesson 2.1: Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structure

Lesson 2.1

Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structure

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Ask participants what they think ‘integration’ means in relation to peacekeeping missions? Who is being ‘integrated’? At what level does this take place?

Answers should include: Integration happens between the peacekeeping mission and the UNCT behind one overarching strategy under the leadership of the SRSG. Integration arrangements and structures vary according to context, phase of the mission and the situation on the ground.
Module 1 – Lesson 2.1: Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structure

**Learning Activity**

**Note to Instructor:** An optional introductory learning activity to this lesson is included here. If chosen, instructor will use the Integrated Mission slide and its animations to run this activity. The narrative below must be synchronized with animations in the presentation slide for ease of explanation.

Step by step, more entities show up. Ask people to explain those entities. Take a special note of the colour of lines. Ask people to guess or explain what is the meaning of those colours. Then, the whole picture appears. Ask people to describe the main features of the complete picture and what does it mean to staff officers.

Possible answers can be:

- Different layers of structures. Hence, staff officers need to report to immediate superiors or commanders, not jumping over the line.

- Some internal and some are external. Hence, staff officers need to coordinate and cooperate with both internal and external stakeholders.

- There are different lines of command and control relationship. Hence, staff officers need to tell the differences in those relationships, and take them into consideration when they coordinate with different entities.

- The unit of command is there: SRSG. Hence, staff officers need to follow the orders of the SRSG, considering the civilian leadership apart from military leadership in their decision-making, planning and reporting process.

**Additional Note to Instructor:** The following points reflect key positions in a standard Multidimensional Integrated United Nations Peacekeeping Mission. The bullet points below are narratives synchronized with animations in the presentation slide for ease of explanation.

A standard Multidimensional Integrated UN Mission is generally composed as follows:

- The SRSG has one or several deputy SRSGs.

- The Mission Chief of Staff controls various advisers and mission offices (press, public info, human rights, etc.) under supervision of one of the D/SRSGs.

- The Director or Chief Mission Support is responsible for the administrative and logistic support component. The CISS (Chief Integrated Service Support) is now called “Chief Services Delivery”.
Module 1 – Lesson 2.1: Integrated Peacekeeping Mission Structure

• Depending on the mandate, there is in general a Police Component alongside the Military Component. The terms Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) are often used.

• Joint civilian/military mission structures depend on the Mission headquarters: Joint Mission Analysis Centre, Joint Operations Centre, Mission Support Centre, etc.

• When a body of Military Observers exist in the mission, the Chief Military Observer usually reports to the Force Commander. S/he exerts operational control over MO Sectors / Senior Military Observers and Military Observer Team Leaders.

• Finally, the Mission coordinates its actions with other UN agencies and with governmental and non-governmental organizations present in the Mission area.

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Key Message: The Head of Mission (HOM) of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation is generally a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and reports to the Secretary-General through the USG DPKO.

The HOM is the senior UN Representative and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations in the mission area. S/he represents the Secretary-General, leads UN political engagement and speaks on behalf of the United Nations within the mission area.
The HOM also leads and directs the heads of all mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area, in accordance with the UN Integrated Strategic Framework for the mission. S/he provides political guidance for mandate implementation and sets mission-wide operational direction including decisions on resource allocation in case of competing priorities.

Lastly, the HOM delegates the operational and technical aspects of mandate implementation to the heads of all components of the mission and provides direction to those components through the component heads.

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Multidimensional peacekeeping operations generally have at least one Deputy SRSG to support the Head of Mission in executing the substantive civilian functions of the mission. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions also have a DSRSG “RC/HC” – meaning Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator who is often the head of the UN Country team and who is in charge of the coordination of the Mission’s work with other UN agencies and NGOs operating in the mission area.

Deputy SRSGs report to the HOM and they exercise managerial authority over those mission components that have been assigned to them, while the other is in charge of coordinating the mission’s activities with UN agencies, funds, programmes, etc. operating in the mission area.
The Head of Military Component (HOMC) reports to the HOM and exercises operational control over all military personnel, including Military Observers, in the mission (unless the CMO reports directly to the HOM).

The HOMC establishes the military operational chain of command in the field (although at mission start-up the structure of the Force is more often established by DPKO). S/he may establish subordinate Sector Commands, as appropriate (depending on HOM and DPKO approval, if only for financial reasons). In doing so, the HOMC places military units under the Tactical Control of military commanders in the operational chain of command.

Furthermore, the HOMC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Military Adviser in UN Headquarters. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.
The Head of Police Component (HOPC) reports to the Head of Mission, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the Police Component.

The HOPC, in consultation with DPKO, shall establish the police chain of command in the mission.

Furthermore, the HOPC maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Police Adviser at UN Headquarters. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.
The Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) reports to the HOM and is accountable to the HOM for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistical support to all mission components. S/he advises the HOM on the rules and regulations relating to the commitment of UN financial resources to ensure the provision of efficient and effective administrative and logistical support to all mission components.

The DMS/CMS has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose, including any contractual arrangements for the use of local resources. S/he will exercise his/her financial authority in consultation with the HOM.

The DMS/CMS is responsible for the strict observance of, and compliance with, UN technical and administrative regulations related to the administration of the mission and logistics management.

Furthermore, the DMS/CMS maintains a technical reporting and communication link with the Under Secretary-General, Department of Field Support at UN HQ. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the formal decisions or tasking that must be formally communicated between the USG DPKO and the HOM.
This section will delve into a few of the numerous integrated functions/organizations found in a complex multidimensional mission, specifically the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Mission Support Centre (MSC), Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and the Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC).
The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) is a joint uniformed/civilian entity that manages the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of the mission's operational information.

The Chief of JMAC ensures that the JMAC serves as a decision-support and planning-support tool for the HOM and Mission Leadership Team in the safeguarding and implementation of the mission's mandate. The HOMC and HOPC should also utilize the JMAC to support planning for any discrete component operations.

The Chief JMAC, in consultation with the HOM and the Senior Management Team, shall establish mission information requirements to guide JMAC tasking, analysis and reporting, in accordance with the DPKO Policy on JOC and JMAC (July 2006). Mission components contribute uniformed and civilian personnel to the JMAC, ensuring appropriate expertise is made available for the effective collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence.

The Chief JMAC will exercise tasking authority over all personnel (military, police and civilian) assigned to the JMAC and act as their day-to-day manager. The HOMC and HOPC retain operational control over military and police personnel assigned to JMAC.

Lastly, critical timely information of risk and threat must be passed to all mission components.
The Mission Support Centre is doing all functions of erstwhile Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC).
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Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC)

- IMTC is a joint uniformed/civilian organization
- Organizing induction and ongoing training in the mission
- Drawing up mission-wide training plan and guidance

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Learning Activity

Learning Activity

Building a mission...
Instructions:

A. Have all the participants count off 1 through 10.

B. Group participants with corresponding numbers (group 1, group 2, etc.).

C. Assign the following 10 roles/entities to each group:

1. JOC
2. JMAC
3. IMTC
4. Mission Leadership
5. HOM/SRSG
6. DSRSG
7. DSRSG/RC/HC
8. HOMC
9. HOPC
10. DMS

D. Ask people to think about the function of his or her selected function or entity and discuss with their group. Everyone plays the role of that person or chief of that unit, and needs to give a short statement to the plenary class, making a brief description of that unit including its major functions/composition/reporting lines/coordination partners (what), as well as the connection with military staff officers (the “so what?”).
Summary of Key Messages

- The HOM / SRSG has overall authority over all uniformed and civilian UN personnel present in the mission area.

- The HOMC and the HOPC exert operational control over all military and police personnel respectively, in the mission area.

- The DMS/CMS is responsible for the provision of administrative and logistic support to all components of the mission. S/he is the sole UN authority in the field allowed to commit UN financial resources.
A UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding operation operates at three distinct levels: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.

At the Strategic level, we find on top the Security Council (SC), which provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction and political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations. Together is the Secretary General who is in charge of implementing the SC decisions. United Nations Operational Authority over UN forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council.

‘United Nations Operational Authority’ involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of:
   (1) a specific mandate of the Security Council;
   (2) an agreed period of time;
(3) a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).

To that end the SG is helped by the UN Secretariat of which the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG DPKO) has been delegated responsibility from the Secretary-General for the administration of, and provision of executive direction for all UN peacekeeping operations.

At the operational level (field-based level) the following senior officials hold operational level authority, command and control responsibilities at the Mission Headquarters level:

a) Head of Mission (HOM);
b) Head of Military Component (HOMC);
c) Head of Police Component (HOPC);
d) Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary-General (DSRSG); and,
e) Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS).

More information on the operational level senior officials will be detailed in a subsequent lesson plan.
Learning Activity #1

Mix and Match the following terms of relationships...

Mix and Match Game

Match the following concepts with descriptions listed. Suggested instructions are included below.

Concepts:

1. Technical link/oversight
2. Tactical Control
3. Admin Control
4. Tasking authority
5. Operational Control
6. Operational Authority
Descriptions:

A. Relationship between Force Commander of a mission and his subordinate military staff and units

B. Relationship between Office of Military Affairs of UNHQ and the military component of a mission

C. Relationship between DMS/CMS and military enabling units of that mission

D. Relationship between a peacekeeping battalion’s commander and his subordinate staff and units

E. Relationship between a country-designated Senior National Officer and all contingent members from that country

F. Relationship between the SRSG and all civilian and uniformed personnel deployed to a peacekeeping operation

Suggested Instructions:

First, have participants do this exercise individually.

Then, have them compare and discuss with one neighbouring person (buzzing).

In the plenary, explain one concept after another and have participants explain the differences.

Finally, conclude by discussing what does it mean to staff officers.
As regards the chain of command, we again find the same actors we identified before:

In NY, at UNHQ level, the SC, SG and USG DPKO with the Office of Operations (OO) at the Strategic level.

In the field, the HOM / SRSG with the components under his/her command. Military and Police are represented here – but we could add the other components as well.

We find again the same three levels of command we studied before: Strategic in the UNHQ, Operational at the mission level as well as Tactical at the component level.

Now what are the roles of these actors in the command function?
- The SC decides
- The SG implements the decision with the help of the Secretariat
- The USG DPKO has delegated authority over the field missions
- The OO coordinates the actions of the various actors
- And finally, the SRSR, as the representative for the SG, is the UN authority in the field.

Now what are the roles of the Military Adviser (MA) and Police Adviser (PA) in this, vis a vis the strategic level?
• The MA and the PA have an advisory role, primarily to the USG DPKO, but also upon request to the SG and SC.
• Vis a vis their respective components in the field, both MA and PA have first a technical relationship: recruiting and deploying (overseeing the deployment) of formed units and individuals, organizing the rotations, providing guidance and policies, etc.

The HOMC and the HOPC maintain a technical reporting and communication link with the DPKO Military Adviser and the DPKO Police Adviser respectively. This technical reporting link must not circumvent or substitute the command chain between the USG DPKO and the HOM, nor should it interfere with decisions taken by the HOM in accordance with this policy directive.

Both advisers have an oversight responsibility, making sure the military and police components operate in respect of the extant policies, decisions and regulations.

As mentioned above, neither the Military Adviser nor the Police adviser belong to the chain of command. They do not exert superior command over their respective components. The chain of command goes clearly through the civilian channel: USG DPKO – HOM.

Lastly, it should be noted that both components – police and military – are under direct command and control of the SRSG, who is the civilian UN authority in the field.

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The military operational chain of command is established as follows: HOMC, Division, Sector (Brigade), Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders and Sub-units.

The level of the Division is shown in grey because it is very rarely implemented in UNPKOs (formerly once in MONUSCO and has not been implemented ever since).

Furthermore, Sub-sectors can be established if needed.

The HOMC exercises 'UN operational control' over personnel and contingents assigned by Member States to the peacekeeping operation. 'UN operational control' allows the HOMC to assign separate tasks to units and sub units within the military component, as required, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation (not meaning negotiation) with the senior national officer of the affected unit/sub-unit.

The HOMC may further assign military personnel and units to a specific subordinate commander (for example, at Division, Brigade or Sector levels). These subordinate officers will exercise UN 'operational control' or 'UN tactical control' over assigned personnel and units.

The contributing Member State retains 'administrative control' over non-operational administrative issues over deployed military personnel and units. Administrative control is exercised by a senior national officer of a contributed military contingent within a mission area. This authority is limited to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply and services and must not adversely influence the management and conduct of UN operations within a mission area.

The Integrated Support Service (ISS) is a joint uniformed/civilian organization under the management supervision of a civilian Chief of Integrated Support Services (CISS). Under the direction of the DMS/CMS, the CISS is responsible to meet as effectively and efficiently as possible all the operational support requirements of the uniformed and civilian components of the mission.

On behalf of the DMS/CMS, the CISS exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics, personnel and enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat / field engineers), transportation and movements units (including military transport helicopters), within the peacekeeping mission.
Learning Activity #2

• What are the similarities between the command and control in your own armed forces and that in the UN peacekeeping missions?
• What are the differences?
• What are the challenges?
• What does it mean to staff officers?

A Game of Firing Questions

Ask the following questions (like firing at the opponent in military operations) in an escalating and more challenging manner, one after another, to provoke and facilitate people’s thinking process:

1. **What are the similarities between the command and control in your own armed forces and that in the UN peacekeeping missions?**

   **Possible answers:**
   - Both require absolute execution for military orders
   - Both need unity of command
   - Both need clear division of labour, responsibilities and obligations
   - Both need clear reporting lines
   - Both need accountabilities for actions taken
   - Both need clear coordination structure with horizontal units
2. **What are the differences?**

*Possible answers:*

- Uniformed personnel in peacekeeping missions have two reporting lines with their home countries and with their commanders in mission.

- Lack of punishment or motivational mechanisms to control subordinates since the commander has no control of personnel, finance, promotion and discipline in mission.

- Commanders in mission cannot select the personnel under his or her command.

- Commanders must report to a civilian chief, SRSG, having closer coordination with civilian counterparts.

- Logistics are not controlled by commanders in mission.

- The control over force enablers is much more limited.

- Performance management is very different.

3. **What are the challenges?**

*Possible answers:*

- National caveats.

- Hesitation to carry out orders if there are clashes between the order of the home country and the order of the commander in mission.

- Commanders have to tolerate and accommodate incompetent staff officers and units that do not follow orders.

- Commanders often find logistic support cannot match operational demands.

4. **What does it mean to staff officers?**

*Possible answers:*

- Staff officers have to advise commanders on how to overcome those challenges.

- Strategically, there should be better coordination with member states, Security Council and General Assembly. Better policy guidance is needed.
• Operationally, there should be better planning, coordination and diplomacy.

• Tactically, there should be better training, leadership skills, effective communication, teamwork spirit and innovative means for performance management and motivation mechanism.

**Slide 89**

**Learning Activity**

Use only one word as a piece of advice to would-be UN staff officers, describing the command and control in peacekeeping missions.

**One-word flash**

Conclude this portion of the lesson by asking the participants to use only one word as a piece of advice to would-be UN staff officers, describing the command and control in peacekeeping missions.

First, allow them to discuss in pairs.

Then, post/stick the word on a flipchart in front of the class, and explain why they used that word.
Operational Control is the authority granted to a Military Commander in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to direct forces assigned so that the Commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign Tactical Command or Control of those units/personnel.

Operational Control includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent Commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters.
The Head of Police Component exercises operational control over personnel of the police component of the peacekeeping operation. Such control allows the HOPC to assign separate tasks to all individual personnel, units and sub-units within the police component, as required, within the mission area of responsibility. The HOPC may delegate such responsibility to the appropriate subordinate levels.

Police officers assigned by the HOPC to serve in integrated and joint offices, or to other offices within the mission, shall be responsible to, and report to, those heads of offices.
Tactical Control is the detailed and local direction and control of movement, or manoeuvre, necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

As required by operational necessities, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate the Tactical Control of assigned military forces/police personnel to the subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.
Administrative Control is the authority over subordinate or other organizations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in peacekeeping operations.
Tasking authority is the authority vested in specified senior appointments (Head of Military Component (HOMC), Head of Police Component (HOPC) or Director of Mission Support /Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) of UN peacekeeping operations to assign tasks to enabling units.

It is worth noting that the Command and Control Policy (2008) is currently under review.
Tasking Authority (cont’d)

Tasking authority over military or police personnel/units, when exercised by civilians is applicable for their routine, day to day employment and does not include tactical control of military/police resources exercised purely in pursuance of military or police operations.

“Enabling Units”

- Aviation
- Engineering
- Logistics
- Medical
- Signals
- Transport
- EOD
On behalf of the DMS/CMS, the CISS exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat / field engineers), transportation and movements units, including military transport helicopters, within the peacekeeping mission.

The HOMC shall exercise tasking authority over combat support units comprising combat aviation (attack/armed and observation helicopters), and other purpose-built helicopters for combat tasks such as reconnaissance and surveillance, combat engineers (field engineers) and EOD units. The HOMC exercises ‘UN operational control’ over these military enabling units whereas the ‘tactical control’ is exercised by the respective unit commanders.

The Head of Police Component (HOPC) reports and is accountable to the Head of Mission, exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the Police Component. The HOPC, in consultation with DPKO, shall establish the police chain of command in the mission.
Here is an example of centralized organization of the police component in a mission, but other types of organization of the Police component are possible depending on local factors. Refer to the Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (revised), 01 March 2010.

The contributing Member State retains ‘administrative control’ over non-operational administrative issues over deployed police personnel and formed police units. Administrative control is exercised by a senior national police officer within a mission area. This authority is limited to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply and services and must not adversely influence the management and conduct of UN operations within a mission area.

Operational control is often delegated to the level of the chief / deputy-chief operations, sometimes at the FPU or regional command level depending on the organization of the component.

Finally, the FPU commanders have tactical control over their units.

**Slide 98**

**Summary of Key Messages**

- The SRSG exercises UN operational authority over all military, police and civilian personnel deployed to a peacekeeping operation.
- The heads of military and police components exert operational control over military and police units and sub-units, respectively.
- Operational control can be delegated to sub-levels as circumstances warrant.
- The DMS has tasking authority over military and police enablers including military transport helicopters.
Lesson 2.3

Force HQ Structure and Staff Functions

Learning Activity

Note to Instructor: An optional introductory learning activity to this lesson is included here.

Form Follows Function

Use the method of story-telling to describe the structure of FHQ. Make it like telling an interesting story to your children. Since a great majority of military personnel are already very familiar with the structure of their own military headquarters, it is good to tap into their existing knowledge, instead of continuing with cumbersome presentations by the instructor which could easily lose the participant’s attention.

Suggested instructions:

Ask people to close their eyes. Imagine their children standing in front of them asking about the structure of the office place that their parents will work in shortly after the deployment into UN mission.

Give participants 5 minutes to think of some creative ways to describe the FHQ to their children.

After hearing all the contributions from participants, the instructor can give a demo in the following suggested way:

1. Put two flip charts in front of the class.
2. Ask all participants to put themselves in the mind of a Force Commander of a new mission.
3. Now, he or she is alone in the FHQ. There are already troops on the ground, since the generation of FC and troops could be simultaneous.
4. In order to make the FHQ function properly, what types of people he or she needs to recruit in the first place?
5. Then, what?
6. In a sequential manner, build up this headquarters one unit after another, focusing on functions that people can easily understand, instead of using jargons or abbreviations that people especially a layman find confusing.

Possible answer:

- **Stage 1:** It should be operations officer (U3) who can draft and issue orders to task various formed units, intelligence officer (U2) who need to collect information, and planning officer (U5) who need to start the reasoning process before jumping into action. Another option is to start from communications officers (U6). Without efficient communication channels, how could the FC get connected with various units and to issue any orders? After all, this stage is operations focused. The focus is to get the job done.

- **Stage 2:** Now, the FC decides to recruit people to support operations since troops have to eat, move and live. Hence, logistic (U4) and engineering officers (U8) are needed. Since many operations are related with civilians and mission partners, someone is needed for civ-mil coordination (U9).

- **Stage 3:** As the FHQ gets bigger and bigger, there should be some persons to manage and train exiting and rotating personnel. Hence, HR (U1) and training (U7) are needed.

Now, in another flip chart, use military jargons to describe those various types of personnel. Just like giving names to babies, those military terms, from U1 to U9 are needed to better call them in military context. Meanwhile, as the FHQ grows bigger and bigger, FC needs assistants to manage them. Hence, another layer of leadership came into being. Those entities formed in three different stages fall under the leadership of three different DCOSs: DCOS Ops, DCOS Support, DCOS PET. Officers of additional functions, like Military Assistant, Gender, Liaison, Medical, Welfare, etc. also came into being. Most of them work at FC Office.
Module 1 – Lesson 2.3: Force HQ and Staff Functions

**Slide 101**

Structure of FHQ

**Force HQ Organizational Models:**

- Military Observer Mission
- Standard Small/Medium Size Mission  
  *(Military Strength < 6,000)*
- Standard Large Mission  
  *(Military Strength 6,000 – 10,000)*
- Multidimensional Mission  
  *(Military Strength > 10,000)*

**Slide 102**

Military Observer Mission

[Diagram showing the structure of a military observer mission with roles and responsibilities.]

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Module 1 – Lesson 2.3: Force HQ and Staff Functions

Slide 103

Standard Small/Medium Size

Mission: U-Staff

Military strength below 6,000

Slide 104

Standard Large Mission: Modified U-Staff

Size 6,000-10,000
Learning Activity #1

Type: Small Group Discussion
Total Time: 25 minutes

Analyze the structure of the FHQ in different types of missions
Instructions:

Give the charts of FHQ of different types of missions (Slides 2-5) to all the groups.

Have a discussion on the major differences.

Write on the flip chart and report to the plenary.

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**Slide 107**

![Military Personnel, Evaluation and Training Diagram](image)
Module 1 – Lesson 2.3: Force HQ and Staff Functions

Slide 108

Military Operations

DCOD Operations

Admin

U-2 Intel

U-3 Operations

U-5 Plans

U-6 Comm

LNOs

Info Ops

Air Ops

Maritime Ops

Environment

U-4 Logistics

U-8 Engineer

U-9 CIMIC

EOD

Gender

Human Rights

Child Protection

Project Planning

Engineer Operations

Admin
Module 1 – Lesson 2.3: Force HQ and Staff Functions

Slide 110

Military Operations Centre (MOC)

Level
- Force HQ, Sector/Brigade HQ or Unit and Sub-unit

Tasks
- Monitor, coordinate and control all activities and responses for the execution of Mission Essential Tasks (MET) and logistics sustenance of the Force

Slide 111

Force Military Operations Centre

General
- Force HQ Command, Control, Communication and Information Centre

Personnel
- Force Chief U-3 Operations and a dedicated MOC Officer assisted by one Warrant Officer and four NCOs and two signal personnel

Tasks
- Control and execute operational activities
- Coordination, integration and timely passage of information & orders
Module 1 – Lesson 2.3: Force HQ and Staff Functions

Slide 112

Force Military Operations Centre - Organisation

- Maps and Satellite Imagery
- Operational plans, patrolling plans, schedule of events, information collection plan, etc.
- Video Tele-Conferencing (VTC) Facility
- UN Force Headquarters Handbook
- A forward, rear and lateral secure voice and data communication link with redundancy
- Hotline Communication to UNOCC, SitCen, JOC, JMAC, subordinate HQ, Units and Sub-units as well as the neighboring Missions MOC

Slide 114

Common Key UN Staff Functions

- U1 – Personnel
- U2 – Military Information
- U3 – Operations
- U4 – Logistics
- U5 – Future Plans
- U6 – Communications
- U7 – Training
- U8 – Engineer
- U9 – Civil-Military Coordination
Learning Activity #2

Type: Small Group Discussion
Total Time: 25 minutes

Participants should explain each staff branch responsibility and how to achieve successful interaction with other staff branches within missions.

Handouts to be given:

Print all slides - U1-U9 Roles of the Staff Cells & Staff Branch Responsibilities – from Learning Activity #2_M2L2.3_U1-9 Handouts.ppt
Module 1 – Lesson 2.3: Force HQ and Staff Functions

Slide 116

Important FHQ Activities

- Daily Operational Brief.
- Weekly FC’s Planning Meeting with FHQ Staff.
- Weekly Senior Management Team (SMT) Meeting.
- Monthly Operational Update to SRSG and OMA.
- Quarterly FC’s Conference with Commanders.
- Quarterly visit to all major units.
- Six Monthly Inter-Mission-Cooperation Conference (where applicable).
- Six Monthly Mission Operational Capability Review.
- Annual Force Report.
- Six Monthly Contingent Commanders Conference.
- Annual HOMCs Conference in United Nations Secretariat.

Slide 117

Correspondence, Reports & Returns Formats

- Staff Estimate
- Military Component Operations Order
- Fragmentary Order
- Daily Situation Report
- Daily Security Incident Report
- Weekly Situation Report
- Weekly Information Summary
- Incident Report
- Flash Report
- Notification of Casualty
- Monthly Report
- Annual Report
In UN peacekeeping, the following forms of internal and external correspondence are used:

1. Notes to the Secretary-General and other senior United Nations officials;
2. Inter-office memos, fax and email messages;
3. Letters to the Secretary-General and other senior United Nations officials;
4. Code cables to peacekeeping operations;
5. Notes verbales;
6. Talking Points;
7. Reports.

Staff Officers need to get familiar with the forms and uses of each types of written communication so that they can choose the most appropriate one for a given situation and feel more confident about their writing style. They also need to explore guidance on what constitutes good content, conventions on formatting, choice of language, tone and style etc.
Module 1 – Lesson 2.3: Force HQ and Staff Functions

Slide 119

Types of Reports

- Daily SitReps
- Weekly SitReps
- Special Incident (Flash) Reports
- End of Assignment Report
- Meeting Report
- Patrol Report
- After Action Report
- Inspection Report

Slide 120

Types of Oral Presentation

- Morning Brief
- Mission Analysis Brief
- Decision Brief
- Visitor Brief
Learning Activity #3

Type: Small Group Discussion
Total Time: 25 minutes

Participants should explain important FHQ Activities and Reports

Handouts to be given:

Print all slides - FHQ Activities & Reports– from M1_L2.3_Learning Activity #3_FHQ Activities & Reports Handouts.ppt
Instructions:

Write the following three questions on three flip charts and place the flip charts in different parts of the plenary room.

- What are the challenges of mutual cooperation among different cells in the FHQ?
- How different cells and posts can best cooperate with each other?
- How can the leadership of a FHQ improve the performance of staff officers in FHQ in mandate implementation?

People move around the room and write their answers on the flip charts.

Then, all participants get divided into three groups.

Each group analyses all the answers written on a flip chart and prepares to make a short briefing to the plenary to summarize people’s ideas.
Slide 123
Learning Activity

Learning Activity #5

The game of Simon Says...

Instructions:

Play a normal game of Simon Says…
Right Hand Up! Left hand up! Left hand down! Right hand down! Both hands up! Both hands down! Clap Once! Clap twice! Keep Clapping!...

Ask participants to draw lessons from this game in the context of Staff Officers.

Possible answers could be as follows:

- Strictly follow the order without any compromise. Do exactly what the commander tells you to do, since s/he has operational control of all his/her subordinates in the FHQ. No matter which country, which military background and which culture that the commander is from, you have to implement the mandate and execute all his or her orders without compromise. Do exactly as what you do in your own army.

- Have a clear understanding of the orders, don’t get confused or get misinterpretation. Some orders could be complicated, try your best to
comprehend every detail of the order. If necessary, it is always good to seek clarifications from the commander.

- Have a clear understanding of the real meaning of the remarks of commanders. Some remarks could have other intensions or purposes. The FC needs to talk about the same issue in different languages when s/he talks with public media, local government or local community or civilian component. As a staff officer, you need to which is the real intension of the commander, which is not, and follow only those remarks that are genuine orders.

- As a staff officer, it is very important to remain alert and concentrated. There are so many noises or disturbances in your day-to-day routine jobs. It is really important to remain focused on your main tasks and disregard or screen noises.

**Slide 124**

**Learning Activity**

1. Everyone gets a randomly selected Appointment Order as well as a page that describes the roles and responsibilities of each post or section (excerpts from the UN FHQ Manual).
2. Reading the job functions of respective post/section, each person thinks about how to best describe his or her duties to others.

3. Everyone presents a short description of his or her duties, taking special note on the connections with other units.

Handouts to be disseminated: M1_L2.3_Learning Activity #6_FHQ Structure_Handouts

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**Summary of Key Messages**

- Multi dimensional integrated missions are organised to ensure optimum command, control and coordination between all actors.

- Different levels of command and control exist in UN missions.

- Missions are configured as per their relative strength and level of complexity.

- All staff officers need to understand the tasks and battle routine of their own departments and also of others.
Starting the Lessons

Aim

The aim of these lessons is to introduce military staff officers to the basics of the Integrated Assessment and Planning process with a view to facilitating their participation in its implementation.

Unit Content

Lesson 3.1: Understanding Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP)
Lesson 3.2: IAP Process & Methodology
Lesson 3.3: Roles and Responsibilities of Military Staff Officers in IAP

Learning Outcomes

- Learn about the IAP Process in the UN
- Comprehend the role of the field Staff Officers and the role of the headquarters in the process
Start the lesson by inquiring among participants what they think integrated assessments and planning entails.
Key Message: Integrated Assessment and Planning allows political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities to share a common analysis and common strategic objectives for peace consolidation, planning and implementing responses in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Integrated assessment is defined as any UN analytical process at the strategic, programmatic or operational level which carries implications for multiple UN entities, and which therefore requires participation by concerned UN entities.
Module 1 – Lesson 3.1: Understanding Integrated Assessment and Planning

Slide 133

Requirements of Establishing a Multi-Dimensional Mission alongside UN Country Team

Joint Assessment

UN Country Team

UN PKO Mission

Common Vision and Priorities

Coordinated Planning

Coordinated monitoring and reporting

Slide 134

Joint Assessment

Joint Strategic Assessment is to ensure shared understanding of:
- Conflict or post-conflict situation
- Role of stakeholders
- Core peace consolidation priorities
- Risks and opportunities
**Key Message:** Joint conduct of Strategic Assessment is to ensure a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders, core peace consolidation priorities and to propose options for UN engagement based on an assessment of risks and opportunities.

The decision to launch a Strategic Assessment is made by the Secretary-General, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, or an Integrated Task Force (ITF) at Director level or above.

**Slide 135**

![Diagram of Common Vision and Priorities]

**Key Message:** Based upon the mandate, the strategic assessment and decisions of the SG and/or the Policy Committee, a Directive for the HOM/SRSG and Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) will be drafted by the ITF that provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements and basic planning parameters, including guidance on the development of an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).

This articulation of a common UN vision, priorities and respective responsibilities in support of peace consolidation includes a relationship, if any, to national plans and priorities.
Key Message: Integrated mechanisms for joint analysis, planning, coordination, monitoring and decision-making on joint strategic and operational matters at both field and Headquarters levels should be established.

At field level, integrated UN presences are required to put in place mechanisms for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-making, coordination and monitoring.
In the conduct of mandate implementation, the Military Component must be cognisant of the conduct of integrated monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC, the ISF, and other integrated plans and regular reports such as the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.
**Key Message:** The Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) or Integrated Task Force (ITF) consists of representatives of all relevant UN entities from headquarters to field level as well as external actors. Therefore, the ITF will include representatives of DPKO, DFS, DPA and DSS.

It is chaired by a senior representative from the lead department (DPKO or DPA). But also includes OCHA and other UN Offices.

The UN Country Team (UNCT) and any other UN field presence will be represented. UN agencies and funds as well as the World Bank and the IMF.

Finally, IMTFs/ITFs may also consider inviting external actors such as the host government(s), NGOs, external experts & academics, NGOs and civil society organizations, TCCs/PCCs for consultations, and Member states supportive of a possible UN operation may assist the Secretariat, e.g. by providing field information.
Learning Activity

Discuss how does each individual office contribute to the IAP process:
• OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
• PBSO: United Nations Peace Building Support Office
• DOCO: United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office
• OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
• UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
• UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
• WFP: World Food Programme
• IMF: International Monetary Fund

Ask students how each individual office contributes to the IAP process.
Summary of Key Messages

- IAP allows political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities to share a common analysis and common strategic objectives.

- Integrated mechanisms should be established for joint analysis, planning, coordination, monitoring and decision-making at both field and Headquarters levels.

- The IMTF consists of representatives of all relevant UN entities from headquarters to field level as well as external actors.
Lesson 3.2

Integrated Assessment & Planning Process and Methodology

Slide 145

Planning Framework for Integrated UN Presences

- Strategic Assessment
- Recommendation to SG/PC, SG/PC Decision and Recommendation to the Security Council
- Security Council Mandate
- Directive to SRSG, RC and HC
- Integrated Strategic Framework or Equivalent

Mission Concept

Mission Component CONOPS

Rules of Engagement
**Key Message:** The purpose of a Strategic Assessment is to bring the UN political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders and core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engagement on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities.

Ahead of Mission start-up planning or during the life-cycle of established integrated presences, the Strategic Assessment provides a basis for the development of recommendations on the nature and (re-)configuration of UN engagement for the consideration of the Secretary-General and, when required, subsequently the Security Council.

What triggers a Strategic Assessment (SA) is a dramatic change in conflict/post-conflict/poitical crisis situations and/or the need to (re-)formulate the UN's system-wide strategy.

A SA can be requested by the SG, Members of Policy Committee, Members of ECPS, ITF, Heads of Mission, IMPT and/or theUNCT.

Role of the ITF during the SA is to coordinate and validate, at Headquarters level, the integrated assessment and planning processes and products to be used.
Strategic options for United Nations engagement on peace consolidation priorities, including one recommended option (if there is agreement), or a limited number of options (if there are dissenting views) and recommendations on broad (re)configuration of United Nations presence (if any), with associated risks and opportunities, including the risks of strategic options for the United Nations as well as for affected populations.

The Policy Committee will consider the options presented in the SA Report and decide either on a status quo or on a change of options / UN strategy. It will also decide on the adapted planning instruments.

**Slide 147**

**Key Message:** At Headquarters, Integrated Task Forces (ITF) are the main forum for joint assessments, planning, coordination, sharing of information and analysis, consultations and decision-making support.

ITFs should consider all issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact in integrated settings, including entity-specific planning and reporting processes that may have implications for other entities.

ITFs should be used to resolve policy differences between UN entities, ensure information-sharing between Missions and UNCTs, and consult thematic entities as needed. They are established and chaired by lead departments on behalf of the UN system and include representatives of all relevant UN entities, including DPKO, DPA, DFS,
PBSO, OHCHR and DSS as well as UNDG and ECHA members based on the "2+4" formula.

Field presences should also be represented.

Task forces meet at the Director or Principal level as needed or as required by the present policy.

**Slide 148**

The following is a **recommended** methodology and process for drafting the Strategic Assessment report.

The Strategic Assessment TOR will specify the methodology, but the end product of a Strategic Assessment must include:

(a) A conflict analysis centred on the aim of the Strategic Assessment, including key conflict factors, their dynamics and risks including, as appropriate, the development of scenarios;

(b) The analysis of priority objectives for peace consolidation;
(c) The articulation of United Nations strategic options to address the situation in the country (including, where appropriate, proposals for United Nations reconfiguration);

(d) A risk assessment for each strategic option, with references to challenges and potential risks to affected populations and United Nations partners.

Ideally, a maximum of two to three strategic options should be presented at the end of the Strategic Assessment report. Of these, one strategic option for a United Nations approach to peace consolidation in the country may be recommended based on the analysis of possible scenarios and timelines for future developments (if there is agreement on the recommendation).

It should be kept in mind that the status quo could be one of the strategic options presented.

**Slide 149**

*Key Integrated Planning Documents*

- Directive to the S/ERSG, Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)
- Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)

These two planning documents are mandatory for United Nations integrated presences.
**Key Message:** The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. The scope would shift and narrow considerably in more volatile conflict situations.

A review of current ISFs reveals the following thematic priorities and may be indicative for future ISFs:

a) security sector reform,

b) DDR,

c) Rule of law,

d) Restoration of state authority,

e) Protection of civilians,

f) Return and reintegration and durable solutions,

g) Recovery (including at the early stage), and

h) Basic social services.
These issues involve potentially political and necessarily sequenced inputs from number of UN actors and, thus, could benefit from inclusion in an ISF to promote a coherent approach and a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities.

Slide 151

This figure represents the possible scope of an ISF in a peace consolidation or peacebuilding context.
The scope of an ISF may vary greatly in highly volatile environments (e.g. Sudan, Afghanistan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo).

The figure above demonstrates how the scope of an ISF may shift and narrow considerably in such cases. Such a shift is appropriate as the United Nations would be obliged to prioritize the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in these environments.

In countries with pockets of conflict, it may also be necessary to tailor the scope of an ISF to account for regional differences.
Learning Activity

Analyze the ISF of UN presence in Central Africa Republic and discuss about the following issues:

- Purpose of an ISF
- Findings from integrated assessments
- UN role and comparative advantages
- Peace consolidation priorities
- Form and depth of integration
- Agreed results, timelines, responsibilities and implementation arrangements
- Coordination mechanisms
- Common monitoring and reporting framework

The ISF of UN presence in Central Africa Republic can be downloaded from the following web link:

Key Message: Each Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) must contain a monitoring and reporting framework when it is presented for endorsement.

Whatever its shape or form, a monitoring and reporting framework should therefore seek to answer the following questions:

- Are the joint strategic objectives being realized?
- What is preventing progress towards the joint strategic objectives?
- What corrective measures could be taken?
- Are the entities participating in the ISF abiding by the commitments/agreements?
- Is the underlying analysis (of the conflict, of the operational environment) still valid and are the strategic objectives still relevant (if the situation on the ground has changed)?
Summary of Key Messages

- The purpose of a Strategic Assessment is to:
  - develop a shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation;
  - define the role of stakeholders and core peace consolidation priorities; and,
  - propose options for UN engagement on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities.

- The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation.
Roles and Responsibilities of Military Staff Officers in IAP

Key Message: Once deployed, the Military Component leadership should endeavour to familiarise themselves with the ISF, and through the FCOS and U5 Branch ensure that military related issues are taken into consideration as the Mission progresses.

Note that the directive for the HOMC/FC is issued by the UNHQ (DPKO/DFS) which provides guidance and direction on the organizational and administrative responsibilities that a HOMC/FC is required to exercise in the performance of duties in the mission area. The HOMC/FC directive is issued together with the military strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) all signed by the USG DPKO and the Military Adviser.
Except in the case of mission start-up, these strategic documents are likely to have been prepared well before an HOM or HOMC has been identified and so it is incumbent on the deployed leadership to evaluate the validity of the guidance material on a regular basis or as dictated by Mission headquarters.

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Role of Military Staff Officers in IAP (cont’d)

- Ensure military related issues are taken into consideration in strategic assessments
- Participate in the integrated mechanisms at appropriate levels of representation
Key Message: At field level, integrated UN presences are required to put in place mechanisms for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-making, coordination and monitoring. Existing mechanisms should be used where appropriate. The Military Component must ensure that it participates in the integrated mechanisms at appropriate levels of representation.

Each mission will be structured differently and the Military Component leadership that is deployed at mission start-up will need to identify the most appropriate monitoring and reporting mechanism, including identifying measurable and meaningful benchmarks and risk indicators, as part of their implementation arrangements to support decision-making.

New leadership should endeavour to provide appropriate inputs to update these integrated mechanisms if greater effectiveness of the military’s input can be achieved.
**Key Message:** Military inputs into the advance planning stage will especially concern the situation analysis, planning assumptions, risk assessment and constraints.

The military inputs to the Strategic Assessment include risk / threat evaluations.

If the Strategic Assessment recommends the deployment of a UN PKO and that recommendation is endorsed by the Secretary-General, the SG issues a Planning Directive stating the broad strategic objectives and the proposed form and scope of the UN PKO.

The USG’s Operational Planning Directive that will follow will include a situation analysis, planning assumptions, strategic objectives, priorities, benchmarks, risk assessment/constraints, functions and responsibilities of the ITF, timing and sequencing of planning activities and outputs, and required decision points.

Military inputs will especially contain the situation analysis, planning assumptions, risk assessment and constraints. Moreover, the military planning processes are mirrored by the logistic support planning – whose goal is to create a Mission Support Plan for all aspects of the Mission: Logistics, Personnel, Finances, and support needed by the various components of the mission.
Key Message: The operational estimate will lead to the development of a preliminary Concept of Operation.

There are roughly 4 steps leading to the vote of an UN SCR / Mandate; the first one is the elaboration of an Integrated Mission Plan.

During the development of the draft integrated mission plan, each component will develop its own operational estimate which is the basis for the development of the future CONOPS. The Operational Estimate is an approach to military planning that is based on concepts common to most military doctrines. It is a six-step process designed to analyze the nature of conflict/problem as a system, and develop, evaluate and select possible approaches/solutions (Courses of Action or COAs) to generate the desired change or outcome. The Operational Estimate is essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action. In the context of planning for UN military operations, the Military Planning Service (MPS) under Office of Military Affairs in UN DPKO is responsible for developing the Operational Estimate and the subsequent steps.

CONOPS Development: Having selected one COA from the options developed through the Operational Estimate, additional planning is undertaken to develop the approved COA into a full Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The preliminary CONOPS developed at this stage describes with greater specificity exactly what the force will do, where the force will do it and how the force will do it. This includes undertaking the troop-to-task process to develop an estimate of the required force size and capabilities.
Technical Assessment Mission: Once a CONOPS for the military component and its equivalent for other components have been developed, the ITF fields Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs). TAMs visit the area of operations (AO) to validate existing planning and gather additional information required to produce foundational planning documents. TAMs can take place at mission start-up, during mandate reviews, when mission restructuring or draw-down is under consideration, or in response to crises or specific requests by the Security Council. They provide critical opportunities to consult directly with key stakeholders, obtain crucial and up-to-date information, and work towards a harmonized approach with the UNCT and relevant non-UN actors. The OMA / Military Planning Service are always part of the TAMs – provided such a military component is to be necessary in the future mission.

Secretary-General’s Report to the UNSC: Once the TAM has returned from the field, the lead department drafts the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, incorporating the TAM’s findings into existing planning. The SG’s report identifies strategic priorities for UN engagement and proposes a mandate for the UN PKO; describes functional strategies for each component of the operation and how they will contribute to the overall strategy; proposes mechanisms to coordinate the efforts of the UN PKO, the UNCT, and any other relevant actors; and discusses logistical, budgetary and personnel requirements.

UNSC Mandate: The Security Council debates the Secretary-General’s proposal for the UN PKO contained in his report, and then drafts a mandate for the mission.
**Key Message:** The finalized CONOPS provides the basis for the preparation of the Rules of Engagement / Directive on the Use of Force and the Statement of Unit Requirements for each type of military unit.

It is not uncommon that the Security Council resolutions modifies the parameters and strategies envisaged by the Secretary-General; as a consequence, the draft plans will have to be revised accordingly.

**Refinement of the CONOPs:** Additional detail is fleshed out regarding the formed units to be deployed, and their strength, tasks, equipment, capabilities, deployment and organization. The overall size / structure of the force may have to be re-worked depending on the content of the Mandate (the size of the military components decided by the SC and inscribed in the mandate cannot be augmented by the Secretariat).

**Production of Mission Documents:** Following the refinement of the Mission Concept/Plan, the ITF creates mission documents, including a directive to the SRSG that provides political and procedural guidance, outlines the roles and responsibilities of mission leadership and provides other detail on expectations of how the mission should coordinate to reach objectives.

**Mission documentation:** The finalized CONOPS provides the basis for the preparation of the Rules of Engagement Directive on the Use of Force and the Statement of Unit Requirements for each type of military unit. Draft versions of the SURs have been prepared in the previous steps of the planning process. Although informal consultations with potential Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) begin in the strategic planning phases, it is at this point that the Force Generation Service of OMA set about securing formal commitments of forces from UN Member States for the UN PKO. Later, the plans can be reviewed and revised anytime, which may lead to publication of revised mission documentation. Once the mission has deployed, the SRSG and his team will issue the ISF and other mission plans.
Key message: The CONOPS and its associated documents (SUR, ROE), produced by the Military Planning Service (MPS) of the Office of Military Affairs are integral parts of the Integrated Mission Plan.

In summary, the CONOPS and its associated documents (SUR, ROE), produced by the Military Planning Service (MPS) of the Office of Military Affairs are integral parts of the Integrated Mission Plan. These documents are also necessary to the TCCs for preparation of the units they pledge to contribute, reason why the need to have them as early as possible, even in their first draft form. As per COE Manual 2017, the Statement of Unit Requirements will be included in the corresponding Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) as its Annex G.

Additionally, during the life of the Mission, MPS will also contribute to a number of events involving planning activities:

- Military Capability studies to review the format / capability of the Force,
- Strategic review initiated by DPKO / ITF
- Contingency Planning in case of crisis
- Drawdown planning to organize the withdrawal of the Force during the transition phase (or a simple diminution of the strength of the military component during a stabilization phase).
Learning Activity

Discuss the following different roles of IAP during the different life stages of the Mission:

- Role of the IAP at Mission Start-Up
- Role of the IAP during the Implementation of Mandates
- Role of the IAP during Drawdown and Withdrawal

Life Cycle of Peacekeeping Missions
Key Message: The life cycle of a peacekeeping operation can be divided into three phases: start-up, mandate implementation, transition.

The life of a UN operation may be schematically divided into several different phases. The life cycle of a PKO starts with the planning phase of the mission, which follows the process called “Integrated Assessment Planning (IAP)”.

One most important step in the planning is the approval of a Security Council Resolution (SCR) which authorizes the establishment of a mission (PKO or Political Mission). The mission starts with the date fixed by the SC in the initial SCR. It will end at the end of the last mandate as decided by the SC, after completion of the mandated tasks. The mandates are generally decided for one year, and renewed from year to year until completion of the mandated tasks.

- The start-up phase corresponds to the progressive strengthening of the operation: deployment of the administration, civilian personnel, police and military components, mission support dispositive etc.

- The implementation phase corresponds to the phase when the mission is fully manned and functional. It starts in theory when the Mission reaches its full operational capacity (FOC). From a planning point of view, capability reviews may be carried out during that phase in order to adapt the format of the mission and of the military and police components to the evolution of the situation on the ground or apparition of new requirements.
Finally, the transition phase takes place at the end of the mandate: the administration draws down, the military and police components progressively repatriate, UN properties sold, repatriated or disposed of and the mission budget liquidated. This phase often lasts several months, if not years, particularly in the case of large complex operations.

Key Message: During the start-up phase of a peacekeeping operation, initial funds, personnel and equipment are deployed by the UN and the necessary commodities and service contracts are organized.

A lot of events take place during the startup phase, the most critical phase of the operation since the mission has only minimum assets and is still fledgling.

The Finance aspect is to make the operation possible. Since the new mission does not have a budget yet, the SC and the GA approve rapidly a sum of money called pre-mandate commitment authority, to the tune of USD 50 Million maximum, in order to allow the mission administration (Director Mission Support) to fund the initial expenses needed to establish the Mission: contracts, purchase of equipment, transport of equipment (COE), travel of the staff members, etc.

The new mission also needs to be manned: The Secretariat provides a rapid deployment team of civilian staff which will constitute the initial core team of the PKO deployed in the field. OMA generates individual military staff officers, and UNMOs it
need be, to deploy to the field. Likewise, the generation of the formed units has started. Finally, Mission Support starts recruiting the necessary (civilian) local staff.

As regards various kinds of material and equipment: DFS organizes the transport of equipment already present in the Rapid Deployment Stock / Brindisi – thus saving time over the negotiation and realization of procurement contracts. Whenever possible, equipment available from the stores of other missions will be used. Indispensable procurement actions are started, although they may sometimes take a long time (although local procurement, when possible, is quicker – but also limited in terms of available goods). The COE of the military units is negotiated through the MOU system; their transport to the mission area will be organized by DFS/MOVCON as soon as declared available by the TCCs (following PDVs).

Finally, commodities and services are obtained by the negotiation of a number of contracts: Letters of Assist allow member states or other entities to provide a variety of services (e.g. strategic transport, etc.); System contracts, which are pre-arranged contracts negotiated in advance by the Secretariat for the short-term delivery of various goods (e.g. vehicles, etc.) are activated; Short term contracts are negotiated for provision of a variety of services; and Self-sustainment is negotiated with the MS (formed units).

**Key Message:** During the mandate implementation phase of a peacekeeping operation, the mandate and the budget are renewed annually while the formed military units are rotated on a yearly basis.
During the mandate implementation phase, the mission is up and running, delivering the mandated tasks. Although implementation of mandated tasks have likely started during the start-up phase, it is only after the Mission has reached full operational capability that it can really fully deliver the mandated tasks.

It is normally at full strength and full operational capacity (FOC). However, apart from the core jobs of the various components, a number of events are worth mentioning.

Finance-wise, the mission will have a complete budget, approved by the GA and renewed yearly with ad hoc modifications. As regards military personnel, the units will have to rotate every year. Therefore, troop contributing countries will be busy preparing and training the succeeding contingents. The Mission will prepare rotation plans to integrate the necessary movements of the various units.

After the initial COE verification following the arrival of the unit in the mission area, the quarterly COE verifications will be implemented by the COE Verification Unit and the military units. Damaged or worn out equipment will have to be replaced, in principle, at TCC’s expense.

It should be noted that in the course of a mission that lasts for many years, units may be withdrawn and replaced by other TCCs, or new units will be deployed to adapt to new requirements. Same operations as for the initial deployments will have to be carried out by DPKO and DFS and by the Mission.

In terms of planning, DPKO will organize Mission Capability Reviews through Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) each time it is necessary: following changes in the mandate, or evolution of the situation on the ground. This Integrated Planning activity will see the participation of OMA to organize, within the broader activity, their own Military Capability Reviews. Toward the end of the mandate implementation phase, DPKO, DFS and the Mission will start to plan an exit strategy to prepare for the Transition phase.
**Key Message:** After the end date of the last mandate, the transition phase allows the Mission to be gradually withdrawn, its assets redeployed or repatriated and its contracts closed.

Once the SC has decided to end the mission and a date has been fixed in a SC Resolution, a number of operations must be done to prepare and then execute the transition toward drawdown and liquidation of the Mission.

The transition includes handover to host country authorities, drawdown and liquidation. There is an important planning aspect to devise an exit strategy and prepare the various plans to drawdown the components of the mission. For the military component, there is an operational, political and logistic aspect to the drawdown. The sequence of withdrawal of the units has to be prepared in very close coordination with DFS and Mission Support, as the units COE will have to be transported locally within the mission area, then from the mission area to the capitals. Given that the mission’s transport assets have a limited capacity, the withdrawal plan must take into account the transport capacities of the mission. Likewise, contracts have to be put in place for the strategic transport of the COE and personnel. In the same way, Mission Support will have to prepare liquidations plans for the logistic support part, civilian personnel, general administration and finance.

Similar for any other UN activity, closing a mission has a cost that must be carefully assessed. Several options may have to be considered. As regard to materials, the units will have to prepare load lists the same way they did for the deployment. Additional consideration is to sort out which equipment will stay in the mission to be discarded,
given away or sometimes sold. The mission will have to consider what as well will happen with the UNOE. This can be given to the local government, sent back to UNLB for refurbishment and recycling to another mission, or sometimes shipped directly to another UN Mission.

Personnel repatriation has to be prepared as well, including conclusion of transport contracts (UN arrangement) or LOAs (national arrangement). Most of the time, rear parties will have to be left behind after departure of the main body in order to take care of the COE locally until its shipment.

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Learning Activity

Learning Activity
Analyze the SG Directive to SRSG of the UNAC in Carana and discuss the following issues:

• Situation assessment
• UN-system wide strategic direction
• Mission priorities
• Initial responsibilities
• Structural and coordination arrangements
• Basic planning parameters
Summary of Key Messages

- Military inputs into the advance planning stage will especially concern the situation analysis, planning assumptions, risk assessment and constraints.
- The operational estimate will lead to the development of a preliminary Concept of Operation.
- The finalized CONOPS provides the basis for the preparation of the ROE/DuF and the SURs for each type of military unit.
- The life cycle of a peacekeeping operation can be divided into three phases: start-up, mandate implementation, transition.
Module 2 at a Glance

Aim

The objective of this module is for peacekeepers to understand the key legal framework governing mission-specific and cross-cutting thematic mandates in UN Peacekeeping, and identify its main instruments and content.

At the end of this module you should understand what this legal framework enables/obliges peacekeepers to do as well as what it prevents them from doing according to this comprehensive legal framework.

Relevance

Module 2 provides an overview of the legal framework for UN peacekeeping operations. It presents the obligations and authorities provided by international law, the UN legal and policy framework, and the operational legal framework, and discusses their relevance for UN peacekeeping.

Learning Objectives

• Identify the key components of international law governing the UN’s mandated tasks in peacekeeping
• Understand the relevance of the core legal concepts and norms
• Understand what the legal framework enables/obliges peacekeepers to do and what it prevents peacekeepers from doing
## Overview

Module 2 examines the legal framework for the conduct of mission-specific and cross-cutting thematic mandates in UN Peacekeeping, which broadly comprises:

| Lesson 1: | International Law, encompassing International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee Law and International Criminal Law as it applies to the work of peacekeepers |
| Lesson 2: | UN Legal and Policy Framework, which essentially refers to the UN Charter, Security Council mandates, agreements the UN concludes with States participating in peacekeeping operations and relevant UN policies |
| Lesson 3: | Mission Specific Legal Framework, including its Security Council Mandate, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) |

As we go through the module, it will be useful to keep in mind that the overarching legal framework guides the work, priorities and conduct of peacekeepers in all activities.

This module relates to and expands upon the information presented in Chapter 1.4 in the Core Pre-Deployment Materials on the Legal Basis of UN Peacekeeping.
Overview

This module begins with an overview of how international law impacts the work of peacekeepers with regard to their mandated tasks.

The term ‘International Law’ commonly refers to a body of law that governs the legal relations between or among States and international organizations. These training materials look at international law as a combination of binding law (“hard law”) and non-binding law (“soft law”). Binding law refers to rules that are legally binding and that States must therefore apply, such as treaty law (i.e. conventions, agreements and protocols), as well as customary law. Treaties ultimately become binding through a process of negotiation, adoption and signature, followed by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

The components of international law most relevant for the work of peacekeepers are International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee Law and International Criminal Law. At the end of this segment, regional legal regimes will be touched upon briefly.
International Law

Slide 6

Ask participants who they think are entitled to human rights, and whose responsibility it is to protect them?

Answers should include that every human being enjoys the full human rights, and that all state authorities are responsible for respecting and protecting human rights, including the President, Prime Minister, Members of the Judiciary, Executive and Legislative branches.

Key Message: Human rights are universal and everyone in the world is entitled to the same basic fundamental rights. There are also some groups, who may have specific needs or are particularly at risk of discrimination and rights violations who have been given specific rights protections (e.g. children, refugees, indigenous people, persons with disabilities). Human rights are held by individuals and groups (rights-holders) and must be respected, protected and fulfilled by States and State actors (duty-bearers). Human rights are legal and internationally guaranteed through the laws built on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments.

Human rights are protected by most national legal systems and by international law. Although many countries have a long history of protecting certain rights of their nationals, the modern international human rights system was born after the Second
World War when states agreed that one way to prevent horrors like the holocaust was to agree on certain basic rights to which all people should be entitled.

Human rights are inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, ethnic origin, colour, religion, sexual orientation, language or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination.

States must respect, protect and fulfil those rights. Violations can occur through both action and inaction of state parties.

IHRL applies at all times, during war and peace. The primary subjects of IHRL are States, who are obligated to respect, promote and fulfil the human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and groups.

It may also be worth noting that human rights are inalienable, interrelated, interdependent and indivisible:

- Human rights are inalienable, in that no one can have his or her human rights taken away, other than in specific situations defined by law (for example, the right to liberty can be restricted if a person is found guilty of a crime by a court).

- Human rights are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible in the sense that the realization/achievement of one human right is linked to the realization of the others. For example, in order to be able to express a genuine political opinion through a vote, citizens must have access to a free press, the freedom to form political parties and the freedom to assemble in large groups to protest. Rights such as education, healthcare and an adequate standard of living are essential both to the right to life and the ability to exercise one’s freedoms.
Key Message: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, following its development by the UN Human Rights Commission under the chair of Eleanor Roosevelt. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights represented the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are entitled. It states that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. This means that no distinction can be made based on people’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, racial or social origin, property, birth or other status.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights initiated a process of rapid development of international human rights law. Its content has also been enshrined in, and continues to inspire, national constitutions and legislation of many States.

Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is technically a declaration and not a treaty, many of its provisions represent legal obligations on all States, such as the right to life, prohibition of torture and slavery, and non-discrimination, among others.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets forth 30 fundamental human rights of civil and political, as well as of economic, social and cultural nature, which are to be applied in respect of all human beings.

This slide only shows a few examples of civil and political rights included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

- Life
- Freedom from slavery
- Freedom from torture
- Protection from arbitrary arrest
- Fair trial
- Freedom of expression
- Freedom of movement

Examples of economic, social and cultural rights included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
- Join a trade union
- Education
- Food
- Housing and medical care
- Social security and work
- Equal pay for equal work

Divide participants into three groups and provide them with copies of Handout 2.1: Simplified Version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see annex).

Give the groups 10 minutes and ask each group to select three rights included in the Declaration and explain why they consider them as fundamental to human beings. In addition, ask participants which human rights they think would be most likely violated or abused in an area where they might be deployed as UN peacekeepers.

It was earlier explained that Human Rights are interrelated and interdependent. How are the rights the participants chose interrelated and interdependent?

Slide 9

[Diagram of the International Bill of Human Rights]
After the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the General Assembly promoted the development of treaties incorporating the human rights standards contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For a treaty to apply to a particular country, the State must have ratified or otherwise formally adhered to the treaty.

Two treaties were elaborated:

- Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, of 1966;
- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also of 1966.

In conjunction with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two Covenants and their Optional Protocols are referred to as the “International Bill of Human Rights”.

In addition to the two Covenants, the drive to expand the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contents into legally binding instruments led to the adoption of other human rights treaties. These human rights treaties build on, flesh out and supplement the International Bill of Human Rights, and focus on specialized areas or specific groups, such as women’s rights, children’s rights, rights of persons with disabilities, rights of migrant workers prohibition of torture, elimination of racial discrimination, among others.


Member States have established bodies and mechanisms that promote and protect the rights recognized by these treaties and monitor their implementation by State parties. These include, for example, the UN Human Rights Council, which is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly dealing specifically with the promotion and protection of human rights.

Note to Instructor – For more information on each of these Conventions see the Annex.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most rapidly and widely ratified international human rights treaty in history. Due its wide acceptance, the Convention has changed the way children are viewed and treated – i.e., as human beings with a distinct set of rights instead of as passive objects of care and charity.

The Convention sets out the civil, political, economic, social, health and cultural rights of children. States that have ratified this convention are bound to it by international law. Compliance is monitored by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, which is composed of members from countries around the world. States are required to submit periodic reports to the Committee explaining how they are implementing and complying with the Convention.

What is a Child? As discussed in Module 1, in some cultures, children enter adulthood once they marry, become partners or earn their own income. The social role they assume defines maturity, not age. The Convention defines a 'child' as a person below the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger. This definition guides actions of all peacekeeping personnel. How do you know whether a person is a child? When in doubt treat them as children and offer them the appropriate protection.
The 1st Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict requests that state parties take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not reached the age of 18 years are not forcibly recruited and do not take direct part in hostilities. It also prohibits armed groups from recruiting or using persons under the age of 18 years in combat under any circumstances.

In 2007, the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children and Armed Groups (the Paris Principles) along with the Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups were adopted in Paris in 2007. They represent an international commitment to prevent recruitment, protect children, support their release from armed forces or armed groups and reintegrate them into civilian life. Therefore, while not legally binding, they contribute to our understanding of international standards concerning the treatment of children in armed conflict.

Slide 11

Note to Instructor – More Information can be found at CPTM 2.7 Child Protection.

Let the slide build and ask participants to explain each principle.
The Convention guarantees a large number of rights, including for instance the right to:

- **Non-Discrimination.** All children are equally entitled to all the rights accorded to them in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international norms and standards on child protection. No child shall be discriminated on the basis of nationality, race, ethnicity, language, gender, age, religion, physical abilities or any other characteristic or status.

- **Best Interests.** In all actions concerning children and for all decisions related to children, the best interest of the child must be the primary consideration.

- **Right to life, survival and development.** Children have the right to live. Governments should ensure that children survive and develop healthily.

- **Participation.** When adults are making decisions that affect children, children have the right to say what they think should happen and have their opinions taken into account. This Convention encourages adults to listen to the opinions of children and involve them in decision-making.

The Optional Protocols to the Convention stipulate additional obligations for signatory states.

- The First Optional Protocol to the Convention requests state parties to take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not reached the age of 18 years do not take direct part in hostilities (Article 1). It prohibits (non-state) armed groups from recruiting or using persons under the age of 18 years in combat under any circumstances and requests state parties to prohibit and criminalize such practices (Article 4).

- The Second Optional Protocol prohibits the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. Both protocols have been ratified by more than 150 states.

*Note to Instructor – There is also a third optional protocol relating to communication of complaints which was adopted in December 2011 and opened for signature on 28 February 2012. It came into effect on 14 April 2014. Although very few countries have ratified the third optional protocol, it is significant as it added an independent complaints mechanism.*
The Paris Principles were developed by a broad range of stakeholders to influence the behaviour of states (both affected countries and donor governments), human rights actors, humanitarian actors, development actors, military and security actors (state and non-state), as well as international organizations and community-based organizations. While some of these actors have a specific mandate or role in relation to children, all have a role to play and broad responsibility for the rights and wellbeing of children associated with armed forces or groups.

The Principles reflect experience and knowledge from across the globe and are intended to both foster greater programmatic coherence and support and promote good practice. They are designed to guide interventions for the protection and wellbeing of children with the following objectives:

- To prevent unlawful recruitment or use of children;
- To facilitate the release of children associated with armed forces and armed groups and their reintegration into society; and
- To ensure the most protective environment for all children.

While it is clear that no single set of ‘best practice’ applies in all contexts, these Principles are designed to provide a framework and bring together ideas and approaches, which have been used successfully across the globe.
The Principles and Guidelines also recognise that there are almost always a significant number of girls amongst children associated with armed forces or armed groups. For a range of reasons, however, these girls are rarely provided with assistance. While there are commonalities between the circumstances and experiences of girls and boys, the situation for girls can be very different in relation to the reasons and manner in which they join the armed forces or armed groups; the potential for their release; the effects on their physical, social and emotional well-being; and the ability to reintegrate into civilian life.

The Principles also cover a range of other issues, including children among internally displaced persons and refugees as well as children and justice mechanisms.

**Slide 13**

**Key Message:** International human rights law provides for the right to a life free from sexual violence and from gender-based violence.

Sexual violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, is a gross violation of basic human rights. Acts of sexual violence may violate the right to security of the person and the right to be protected from torture and other ill-treatment, as well as other rights enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties. Sexual violence, including rape, is also recognised as a central element of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
'Gender-based violence' and 'violence against women' are terms that are often used interchangeably, as most gender-based violence is inflicted by men on women and girls. However, the 'gender-based' aspect of the concept highlights the fact that violence is an expression of power inequalities based on gender. “Violence against women” is understood as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women. It includes all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

According to the CEDAW Committee (general comment 19), the definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, and deprivation of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of CEDAW, regardless of whether any provisions expressly mention violence. Gender-based violence against women impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under international human rights law. The right to equal protection according to international humanitarian law, in time of international or internal armed conflict, is recognized.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for children’s right to be free from all forms of violence, and stipulates that state parties are obligated to protect children from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse. The Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child pornography and child prostitution includes the prohibition of child prostitution and child pornography.
Having explored IHRL and its key components, why do Human Rights matter to UN Peacekeeping? This has already been covered in Lesson 2.3 of the Core Pre-Deployment Materials on the Protection of Human Rights but will be reviewed again here.

Before building the slide, ask participants why they think Human Rights play an important role for UN Peacekeeping, in particular in the context of the protection of civilians.

**Key Message:** Human rights are a fundamental part of the normative framework of UN action – the “rule-book” for its activities as well as those of all of its personnel.

Human rights are relevant to UN Peacekeeping in a number of ways, including:

- As set forth in the UN Charter, the purpose of the UN includes to ‘promote and encourage respect for human rights’. Alongside peace and security and sustainable development, the promotion of human rights is a core pillar of the United Nations.

- Since human rights violations are often both a cause and a symptom of many modern conflicts, addressing human rights issues is essential to finding sustainable solutions, and therefore to the success of peace operations.
As a result, multidimensional UN peace operations include human rights as part of their mandate and structure.

The effective implementation of human rights mandates and the ability of peace operations to prevent and respond to violations is critical to missions' credibility.

Human rights promotion and protection are essential to all UN efforts to prevent conflicts, to achieve and maintain peace, and to assist in peacebuilding. This perspective ensures that UN action is aimed at ensuring respect for human rights in concrete ways for individuals. Human rights protection results when individuals, who otherwise would be at risk of or subject to deprivation of their rights, are able to fully exercise them.

Consistent with the centrality of human rights in UN action, DPKO doctrine requires that all peacekeepers promote and protect human rights through their work. Human rights are a cross-cutting responsibility of mission components. This applies and starts with the senior leadership as well as all mission components and their personnel – including military and police. Peacekeepers must act as a positive role model in the countries where they serve.

All mission personnel have human rights roles and responsibilities. Among other aspects, it implies that mission personnel must be able to recognize violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed by State, and sometimes non-State actors, report on those violations, and be prepared to respond appropriately within the limits of their mandate, functions and competence.

Ask participants to give examples of activities that military peacekeepers may be asked to carry out to promote and encourage human rights.

Answers should include:

- Record any human rights violations while on duty, including during tasks such as patrolling, observation, searches, or checkpoint controls.

- Report all human rights violations that were observed or where information was received.

- Intervene with armed groups or national security forces to ensure respect for human rights in aspects such as arbitrary detention, sexual violence, use of children etc.

- Provide escorts to human rights staff to facilitate investigations.

- Develop plans for possible crises to ensure rapid response.
**Key Message**: Because human rights are so central to the UN, there are several policies governing the role of UN entities in the promotion and protection of human rights. A key policy is the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), which was put in place to ensure that the UN does not support or collaborate with host state elements that are involved in human rights violations.

In line with this, all support provided by peacekeeping missions must be consistent with UN principles. Support includes training, capacity building, mentoring, technical cooperation, and financial support.

The HRDDP policy states: “Support to non-UN security forces cannot be provided where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures.”

All UN entities that plan to or are already providing support to non-UN security forces must conduct an assessment of the risks involved in providing or not providing such support. This assessment needs to take into account the risk of the recipient entity committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law or refugee law. If support is already provided when reliable information about violations is received, peacekeepers must suspend support to the offending elements.
Summary

Key takeaways regarding IHRL include:

- IHRL is part of the legal framework governing UN peace operations.

- Human rights apply to all human beings, they are non-negotiable and their content does not change. Nobody can take them away.

- Human rights are a core pillar of the UN and all its work, the UN Charter commits to promoting universal respect for human rights. Peacekeepers are obligated to promote and protect human rights through their work.

- Peacekeepers must recognize and respond to human rights violations and abuses. This has implications for the chances of sustainable peace as well as the credibility of the mission.
Key Message: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) consists of rules that apply in situations of armed conflict and seek to regulate the means and methods by which military operations are conducted and protect civilians, the wounded and sick, detained persons, and other persons who are not or are no longer directly participating in hostilities. IHL consists of international treaties and conventions as well as customary rules. Together they specifically aim to address humanitarian issues arising directly from armed conflict, irrespective of whether of an international or a non-international character.

The terms ‘international humanitarian law’, ‘law of armed conflict’ and ‘law of war’ may be regarded as synonymous, but ‘international humanitarian law’ is most commonly used.

IHL applies to all parties to armed conflicts. The nature of the protection it provides varies and is determined by whether the person in question is a combatant, a person hors de combat (wounded or prisoner), or a civilian.

IHL is only applicable in times of armed conflict. If distinguishes between two types of armed conflict:

- International armed conflicts (IACs) are conflicts involving two or more States, or involving a State and a “national liberation movement”, regardless of whether a
A declaration of war has been made or whether the parties involved recognize that there is a state of war.

- **Non-international armed conflicts (NIACs)** are armed conflicts between the armed forces of a State and organized non-State armed groups, or between such groups. Many armed conflicts today are non-international in nature.

For a situation to be considered a NIAC, the armed groups involved must demonstrate a minimum degree of organization and the hostilities between the parties must reach a certain level of intensity. This is to distinguish a situation of armed conflict, which is characterized by organized violence between two organized groups, from a situation that only involves sporadic violence by people who are not organized and does not necessarily require the intervention of the armed forces, such as riots and violent demonstrations.

These requirements do not apply to international armed conflicts. An international armed conflict could thus occur by the capture of a single soldier by the enemy State, by occupation of the territory of the enemy State, or even without any violence, such as when a State declares war but does not attack the enemy State.

Rules of IHL bind all parties to a conflict. The law applies when a conflict starts, and then equally to all sides, regardless of who started the fighting, or who is the lawful or unlawful party under the United Nations Charter or the national law. There is no relationship between the legality of a conflict and the application of IHL.

The United Nations, through its principal organs, such as the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat, and their subsidiary organs, such as the Human Rights Council, peacekeeping operations and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals have also played a central role in ensuring compliance with IHL and accountability for serious violations of IHL.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), founded in 1863, acts as the custodian of IHL. The ICRC is an independent, neutral organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and armed violence.

Note to Instructor – For more detail regarding the information presented here on IHL see ICRC Advisory Note as well as the ICRC International Humanitarian Law – A comprehensive introduction, both in the Annex.
The development of IHL dates back to the 19th century. Important instruments of IHL include:

- The 1907 Hague Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land, which superseded an earlier related Convention from 1899.

- The Geneva Conventions of 1949 comprise of four treaties, and three Additional Protocols, which, together, establish a comprehensive legal framework in international law regulating the conduct of the parties to armed conflicts. The Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols form the core of IHL. The Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions supplemented the Geneva Conventions and particularly strengthened the protection of civilians in international and non-international armed conflicts, and supplemented the rules that apply in non-international armed conflicts. Additional Protocol III supplemented the rules regulating the use of distinctive emblems (the red crystal, red cross and red crescent).

- The 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols prohibit or restrict the use of certain weapons (e.g. mines, booby-traps, incendiary weapons) and require the States parties to remove explosive remnants of war.
- Others not listed include the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

**Key Message:** IHL primarily covers two areas: the conduct of hostilities and the protection of those who are not, or no longer, taking part in fighting.

By governing the conduct of the parties to a conflict, IHL restricts the means of warfare.

- IHL only permits attacks against combatants and military objects. Directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects is prohibited.

- IHL therefore prohibits indiscriminate attacks, i.e., attacks that do not or cannot respect the obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian and military objects. Conflict parties are required to take all possible precautions before launching an attack so that these rules are respected.

- Regarding the means of warfare, IHL restricts the weapons and methods or tactics of warfare that can legally be utilized. Those weapons that may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited. This includes for instance the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their precursors.
IHL also requires the parties to the conflict to treat those who do not engage in hostilities, and who are no longer doing so humanely. This includes civilians, the wounded and sick, prisoners-of-war and other detained persons, medical personnel and humanitarian workers. For example, IHL requires parties to conflict to:

- Care for the wounded and sick and to protect medical personnel; and
- Ensure that the dignity of detained persons is preserved, including by allowing visits by ICRC delegates.

**Key Message:** The conduct of hostilities and the protection of non-combatants are defined by four basic principles.

Divide participants into four groups and give them 10 minutes for each group to define one of the four principles. Ask the groups to brief the plenary and discuss their suggested definitions with all participants. Refer to the explanations below.

The four basic principles of IHL can be defined as follows:

- **Distinction:** In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, parties to the conflict at all times have to distinguish between the civilians and combatants, and between civilian and
military objects. Operations must only be directed at military objects. This principle protects non-combatants.

- **Proportionality:** Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. This means that when considering a target, the damage to civilians and their property cannot be excessive in relation to the military advantage gained. Proportionality is not a requirement if the target is purely military. This principle protects non-combatants.

- **Military necessity:** Every injury done to the enemy, even if permitted by IHL, is excusable only so far as it is absolutely necessary; everything beyond that is criminal. In that sense, while proportionality is not a requirement for military targets, necessity limits the use of force. This principle protects combatants.

- **Unnecessary suffering:** It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. This relates to the prohibition of certain weapons discussed earlier. This principle protects non-combatants.

**Slide 23**

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**Key Message:** IHL affords special protection to various categories of persons who, owing to their sex, age, profession or status, are particularly exposed to certain risks.
These categories are:

- **Medical and Religious Personnel**
  - Medical personnel exclusively assigned to medical duties must be respected and protected in all circumstances.
  - Religious personnel exclusively assigned to religious duties must be respected and protected in all circumstances.
  - Both lose their protection if they commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to conflict parties.

- **Members of the Armed Forces assigned (exclusively) to Civil Defense.**
  
  Discuss with participants what they think counts as ‘Civil Defense’ tasks.

  The list of Civil Defense tasks is limited to the 15 following tasks:

  1. Warning;
  2. Evacuation;
  3. Management of shelters;
  4. Management of blackout measures;
  5. Rescue;
  6. Medical services – including first aid – and religious assistance;
  7. Fire-fighting;
  8. Detection and marking of danger areas;
  9. Decontamination and similar protective measures;
  10. Provision of emergency accommodation and supplies;
  11. Emergency assistance in the restoration and maintenance of order in distressed areas;
  12. Emergency repair of indispensable public utilities;
  13. Emergency disposal of the dead;
  14. Assistance in the preservation of objects essential for survival;
  15. Complementary activities needed to carry out any of the tasks mentioned above.

- **Special Categories of Persons**
  - Women (separate slide to follow)
  - Children (separate slide to follow)
  - Journalists and War Correspondents – Civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of armed conflict must be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities. This is applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.
- Displaced persons – Under IHL, persons displaced for security reasons from military operations are entitled to satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

Note to Instructor: Rights of Refugees and IDPs under their specific conventions will be discussed in the section on International Refugee Law.

- Peacekeepers – Under customary International Law State practice treats military personnel of peacekeeping forces, which are usually professional soldiers, as civilians because they are not members of a party to the conflict and are deemed to be entitled to the same protection against attack as that accorded to civilians, as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities, or as long as the peacekeeping operation to which they belong does not become a party to the conflict. Military personnel of peacekeeping forces are entitled to be treated humanely in accordance with the relevant IHL rules that require the human treatment of civilians and persons no longer in combat. By the same token, objects involved in a peacekeeping operation are considered to be civilian objects, and are consequently protected against attack. Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, intentionally directing attacks against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations constitutes a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law.

- Specially Protected Objects

  Civilian objects: undefended, or open, towns or non-defended localities; Hospital and safety zones, demilitarized zones; Neutralized zones (temporary, small, near the frontline; Cultural property; Objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population (water/energy supply systems); Works and installations containing dangerous forces (dams, dykes, nuclear power plants); The natural environment (widespread, long-term and severe damage).
Key Message: Children are often the most vulnerable group in any population affected by armed conflict. Orphaned or otherwise left to their own resources, they often have no choice but to seek safety, food and shelter with organized armed groups or criminal gangs, where they can become victims of forced recruitment, slavery and sexual violence. Parties to a conflict must provide children with the care and assistance they require, facilitate their education and religious practice, and protect them against any form of assault.

Specifically, IHL stipulates that:

- Children should not be the target of attacks;
- Due to their particular vulnerabilities, children are entitled to special protection, care and aid;
- Children, when interned, should be held in separate quarters from adults;
- Parties to the conflict must endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal of children from besieged or encircled areas;
- States must not forcibly recruit children and must take all possible measures to prevent the participation in hostilities by children under 18 years of age.
Key Message: Women are entitled to the same general protection, without discrimination, as men during conflict. In addition, women are also entitled to special protection, which takes into account their specific needs. However, more needs to be done for women. In time of war, women are often left to take care of children and other dependents on their own and under extremely difficult circumstances. In addition, they are particularly exposed to the risk of sexual violence and abuse by weapon-bearers or organized criminal groups. IHL has been criticized for not providing sufficient protection against this risk, and the term conflict-related sexual violence is not used in IHL.

However, the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, their Additional Protocols of 1977 and customary rules of IHL prohibit rape and other forms of sexual violence in times of armed conflict. This rule is a norm of customary international law and binding on all. The prohibition of rape and other forms of sexual violence may also be covered by the prohibition against cruel treatment and torture. Rape was already expressly prohibited in the Lieber Code of 1863, which outlawed all wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, including rape.

IHL also requires that women must be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. Moreover, the cases of pregnant women and mothers having dependent infants who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict must be reviewed with the utmost priority. Also, to the maximum extent feasible, the
death penalty should not be imposed, and may in any case not be carried out, on such women.

**Slide 26**

Before building the slide, discuss with participants why they think IHL plays an important role for UN Peacekeeping, in particular in the context of the protection of civilians.

First of all, as mentioned earlier, peacekeepers are afforded special protections by IHL. As such, attacks on peacekeeping personnel are prohibited and breaches can constitute war crimes.

**Key Message**: UN peacekeeping operations are not bound by any IHL treaty, since the UN as an organization is not party to any IHL treaties, including the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. However, UN peacekeeping operations are bound by customary rules of IHL which are mostly contained in the “Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law”.

As a result, if peacekeeping missions become a party to conflict, either through the use of force in self-defense, or through the conduct of offensive operations as authorised by the Security Council, peacekeepers would be bound by IHL.
In cases where a United Nations peacekeeping operation has become a party to a conflict or where the operation has not become a party to a conflict but individual military personnel engage in military operations in support of, for example, of the host country armed forces, the protection to which peacekeepers are normally entitled would not apply to those peacekeepers and targeting them would not become unlawful under IHL. This has consequences for the safety of peacekeepers and threatens one of the fundamental tenets of peacekeeping: impartiality.

In addition to the customary rules of IHL and the Secretary-General’s bulletin, national laws remain binding for peacekeepers throughout their operations. In case of violations of IHL, members of the military personnel of a United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national courts.
Learning Activity

Scenario

- There is an armed group within your AOR which has been carrying out attacks on civilians in isolated villages. The armed group live amongst the civilian population who are of the same ethnic group as them and do not always wear uniforms or carry their weapons openly.

- You are aware that the state security forces are planning to launch operations against the group.

Run Learning Activity 2.1: Soldiers or civilians from the annex to this module.
Summary

Key takeaways regarding IHL include:

- IHL is a body of public international law that applies in situations of armed conflict and prescribes means and methods of combat, including limits on the use of certain weapons, and demands the protection of the civilian population.

- IHL also prescribes the treatment of civilians and persons who are hors de combat, such as detained persons.

- IHL offers special protections to certain categories of persons, including women, children, the wounded, the sick, as well as medical and relief personnel.

- When a mission becomes a party to the conflict, it is bound by IHL. In any case, national laws apply to peacekeepers and violators of IHL and peacekeepers can be prosecuted in national courts for violations of IHL.
It is the responsibility of States to protect their citizens. When governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, individuals may suffer such serious violations of their rights that they are forced to leave their homes, and often even their families, to seek safety in another country. Since, by definition, the governments of their home countries no longer protect the basic rights of refugees, the international community has to step in to ensure that those basic rights are respected.

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the foundation of international refugee law. Also referred to as the Refugee Convention, it defines the term “refugee” and sets minimum standards for the treatment of persons who are found to qualify for refugee status.

IRL generally applies in times of peace, war and occupation, and is primarily addressed to States.

**Slide 32**

In the 1951 Convention, refugees are defined as “any person who [...],

- owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and

- is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or

- Does not have a nationality and is outside the country of her/his former habitual residence and unable or unwilling to return to it.
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (art. 1).

Fleeing a country where an armed conflict is taking place entails qualification as refugee only where these specific requirements (e.g. evidence of individual “well-founded fear of being persecuted”) are met. In emergency mass influx situations, UNHCR has used group-based recognition with a presumption of qualification for refugee status. However, certain people are excluded from refugee status, for instance those suspected of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity etc.

There are also several regional refugee frameworks, which are discussed later in the module. Such regional instruments expand this definition of refugees to persons who flee their country of origin or nationality due to foreign aggression, foreign domination, and events seriously disturbing public order.

Because the Convention was drafted in the wake of World War II, its definition of a refugee focuses on persons who are outside their country of origin and are refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951. As new refugee crises emerged during the late 1950s and early 1960s, it became necessary to widen both the temporal and geographical scope of the Refugee Convention. Thus, a Protocol to the Convention was drafted and adopted in 1967.

As war and conflict as well as natural disasters force people from their homes, IRL, where applicable, can contribute to protect human rights in emergency situations, including the right to adequate food. At global level, the protection of refugees is provided by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and by its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

An important provision of the Refugee Convention is the stipulation that the Convention does not apply to persons against whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

- He/she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;

- He/she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;

- He/she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Any person falling into these categories may not be granted the status of refugees and therefore the protections attached to this status. They fall under one of the “exclusion clauses” of the Refugee Convention.
Key Message: The Refugee Convention does not limit the application of its provisions only to formally recognized refugees, and provides an important basis for standards of treatment for asylum-seekers (who may later be recognized as refugees). The benefits provided under the various provisions of the 1951 Convention have different levels of applicability depending on the nature of the refugee’s sojourn or residence in the country.

Rights of refugees include:

▪ Prohibition of discrimination for race, religion or country
▪ Prohibition of Expulsion or Return (“Refoulement”)
▪ Freedom to practice religion
▪ Right to acquire property
▪ Access to courts
▪ Public education
▪ Assistance
▪ Freedom of Movement
Freedom of Movement

While some provisions envisage a minimum treatment for all refugees (for example, Article 33, on non-refoulement), others extend the treatment enjoyed by nationals to refugees present “within” the country (for example, Article 20, on rationing) and to “refugees lawfully staying in the territory” (for example, Article 23, on public relief).

Before showing the UNHCR logo, ask participants who they believe is the lead actor in the UN system with regard to the protection of the rights of refugees.

In the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations General Assembly created the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR is mandated to protect and find durable solutions for refugees. Its activities are based on a framework of international law and standards that includes the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the four Geneva Conventions (1949) on international humanitarian law, as well as an array of international and regional treaties and declarations, both binding and nonbinding, that specifically address the needs of refugees.

Slide 34

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are defined as persons that are displaced due to armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or human-made disasters, but who have not crossed an international border.
According to OCHA, at the end of 2015, a record number of nearly 41 million people were internally displaced.

Unlike refugees, IDPs do not enjoy a special legal status under international law. Nevertheless, apart from domestic laws, IDPs, as civilians, are protected by IHL as well as IHRL. Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000) notes that “[…] the overwhelming majority of internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups in situations of armed conflict are civilians and, as such, are entitled to the protection afforded to civilians under existing international humanitarian law” (para. 3).

The prevention of displacement and the protection of IDPs and other affected populations within their own country are the responsibility of national authorities. Particularly in situations of armed conflict, IDPs may find themselves in territories over which State authority is absent or difficult to enforce. If national Governments are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities, the international community has a role to play in promoting and reinforcing efforts to ensure protection, assistance and solutions for IDPs. Children that are internally displaced are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to the six grave violations and therefore need particular protection, including from UN peacekeepers.

In 1998, the UN Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs issued the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. While the principles per se are not legally binding, they draw on (binding) international humanitarian and human rights law. Some of the principles are relevant for the right to adequate food in emergencies and for food aid. An updated second edition of the Guiding Principles was presented in 2004.
Ask participants to explain which of the listed rights peacekeeping missions are expected to protect? Discuss some of the challenges missions will face in protecting those rights.

Key Message: IDPs, like all human beings, enjoy human rights that are articulated by international human rights instruments and customary law. In situations of armed conflict, moreover, they enjoy the same rights as other civilians to the various protections provided by IHL.

The UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement restate and compile existing international human rights and humanitarian law as they relate to the internally displaced. The Guidelines also attempt to clarify grey areas and gaps in the various instruments with regard to situations of particular interest to the internally displaced.

The Guiding Principles note that arbitrary displacement in the first instance is prohibited (Principles 5-7). Once persons have been displaced, they retain a broad range of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, including the right to basic humanitarian assistance (such as food, medicine, shelter), the right to be protected from physical violence, the right to education, freedom of movement and residence, political rights such as the right to participate in public affairs and the right to participate in economic activities (Principles 10-23). Displaced persons also have the right to assistance from competent authorities in voluntary, dignified and safe return, resettlement or local integration, including help in recovering lost property and possessions. When restitution is not possible, the Guiding Principles call for compensation or just reparation (Principles 28-30).
Before building the slide, discuss with participants why they think International Refugee Law plays an important role for UN Peacekeeping, in particular in the context of the protection of civilians.

The 2008 UN Capstone Doctrine, a high-level document outlining the principles and guidelines for UN Peacekeeping, identifies the promotion of social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict, as one of the four critical areas to achieving sustainable peace.

Moreover, refugees and IDPs are civilians, and as such fall under the protection of civilians mandate for UN peacekeeping operations. Displaced persons are often particularly vulnerable, making their protection a priority concern for many missions. For example, in UNSCR 2277 (2016), the Council mandated MONUSCO to “Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence, including by deterring, preventing and stopping armed groups from inflicting violence on the populations, paying particular attention to civilians gathered in displaced and refugee camps”.

In addition to the protection of civilians, peacekeeping operations are often tasked with the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, or other durable solutions to their displacement. A durable solution is achieved when internally displaced
persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through:

▪ Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (hereinafter referred to as "return");

▪ Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge (local integration);

▪ Sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country)

**Example:** In UNSCR 2295 (2016), the Council mandated MINUSMA to "[…] contribute to the creation of a secure environment for […] the voluntary, safe and dignified return or local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees".

**Summary**

**Key takeaways regarding IRL include:**

- The rights of refugees are protected by International Refugee Law, in particular the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

- While there is no particular body of international law dedicated to the protection of the rights of IDPs, they are nevertheless protected under IHRL and IHL.

- In the context of peacekeeping operations, the POC mandate includes refugees and IDPs. In fact, given their particular vulnerabilities, missions often have to prioritize the protection needs of refugees and IDPs.
Key Message: International criminal law is the part of public international law that deals with the criminal responsibility of individuals for international crimes. There is no generally accepted definition of international crimes. A distinction can be made between international crimes which are based on international customary law and therefore apply universally and crimes resulting from specific treaties which criminalize certain conduct and require the contracting states to implement legislation for the criminal prosecution of this conduct in their domestic legal system. The international core crimes, i.e., crimes over which international tribunals have been given jurisdiction under international law, are: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials signalled the birth of present-day international criminal law, i.e., the prosecution of individuals for international crimes before international tribunals. In the early 1990s international criminal law served as foundation for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by the UN Security Council. The creation of various international or UN assisted criminal courts and the proposals of the International Law Commission, which resulted in the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002, contributed to the rapid development of international criminal law during the last two decades.

There are several institutions of international criminal justice today. The most important institution is the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as ad hoc tribunals and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism). The Mechanism
continues the jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions of the ICTY and the ICTR.

The ICTY, the Mechanism, and the ICC, have jurisdiction over certain violations of both IHL and IHRL that amount to international crimes.

Apart from these institutions, some "UN assisted" courts and tribunals have been created with the support of the United Nations – judicial bodies with both international and national judges such as:

- **Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).** Its mandate was to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996). Since the closure of the SCSL in 2013, the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone carries out its functions;

- **Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).** Its mandate is to prosecute senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979);

- **Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).** Its mandate is to prosecute persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction could be extended beyond the 14 February 2005 bombing if the Tribunal finds that other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005 are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an intergovernmental organization and international tribunal, with its seat in The Hague in the Netherlands. The ICC began functioning on 1 July 2002, the date that the Rome Statute entered into force. The Rome Statute is the multilateral treaty that serves as the ICC’s foundational and governing document. States that become party to the Rome Statute, for example by ratifying it, become member states of the ICC. Currently, there are 124 states that are party to the Rome Statute and are, therefore, members of the ICC.

The ICC may investigate individuals suspected of involvement in one or more of the four core international crimes:

- Genocide
- Crimes against humanity
- War crimes
- Crime of aggression (the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime is established in theory but has not commenced yet in practice)

To date, the prosecutor of the ICC has opened investigations into 10 situations (two in the Central African Republic: Cote d’Ivoire; Darfur, Sudan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Georgia; Kenya; Libya; Mali; Uganda). Where warranted, trials are being held, and the Court’s Pre-Trial Chambers have so far publicly indicted 39 people.
The ICC will only prosecute an individual if State parties are unwilling or unable to prosecute. Therefore, if credible national investigations or proceedings into crimes have taken place or are ongoing, the Court will not initiate or proceed with the prosecution. This is called the principle of complementarity. It applies regardless of the outcome of national proceedings. Even if an investigation is closed without any criminal charges being filed or if a national court acquits an accused person, the Court will not prosecute that individual for the crime in question so long as it is satisfied that the national proceedings were credible.

The ICC aims to end impunity for any individual’s actions in such instances, irrespective of the official capacity of that individual (Article 27).

The ICC has been established as a permanent, independent body – outside the UN system. The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed on the territory of a State Party (i.e. a State that has ratified the ICC Statute) or where the alleged perpetrator is a national of a State Party.

There are three ways to initiate an investigation by the ICC:

- Referral by State parties
- Referral by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
- Prosecutor on his/her own authority (generally with the authorisation of a pre-trial chamber)
International Criminal Law (ICL) seeks to end impunity for all perpetrators of international crimes. This includes of course those crimes committed against children. The Rome Statute of 1998, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002, recognized “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities” as a war crime. In the first case before the Court, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a former warlord from eastern DRC was found guilty on the charges of recruiting and using child soldiers under the age of 15 in the Ituri conflict from 2002 to 2003.

Likewise, acts of CRSV can fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Depending on circumstances, rape, for instance, may be a war crime, a crime against humanity or an act of genocide.

CRSV is also a crime in most national legal systems.
Under Article 25 of the Rome Statute, an individual person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:

- Commits such a crime [...];
- Orders, solicits or induces the commission [...];
- Aids, abets or otherwise assists [...];
- In any other way contributes [...];
- In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide.
Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court codified the doctrine of command responsibility. Under this article, military commanders carry individual responsibility for crimes committed by forces under their effective command and control if:

- they either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes, and
- they failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the crimes or submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

Commanders can also be held responsible for failure to take action. Armed forces or groups are generally placed under a command that is responsible for the conduct of its subordinates. As a result, in order to make the system effective, hierarchical superiors should be held to account when they fail to take proper measures to prevent their subordinates from committing serious violations of international humanitarian law. They may therefore be held to be responsible for criminal activities to which they made no personal contribution. It is also worth noting that superior orders are not a defence for crimes.

Military Commanders also have specific responsibilities regarding the implementation of Rules of Engagement.
In addition to existing international treaties and conventions, national governments have cooperated within their respective regions thus developing or reinforcing legal frameworks. Signatory states are bound by the treaties and their provisions are relevant for peacekeeping missions if they are deployed in the respective regions.
The focus of such regional legal framework is normally on human rights and/or on refugee and IDP rights. Concerning human rights, and in addition to the International Bill of Human Rights, there are three primary regional human rights regimes currently in place. Regional Human Rights Commissions and Courts were established to create oversight mechanisms for these regimes.

The main regional human rights regimes are:

  - Defines and guarantees human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe
  - Is overseen by the European Court of Human Rights

  - Consolidates in the Americas a system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man
  - Is overseen by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

  - Promotes and protects human rights and basic freedoms in Africa
  - Is overseen by the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights

Similar to the realm of human rights, refugee law has also seen the creation of regional legal regimes. The following are the most prominent examples:

- **OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969)**:
  - Entered into force in 1974 to address unique aspects of refugees in Africa following wars of independence from colonial powers

- **Declaration of Cartagena (1984)**, which was adopted in the framework of the Organization of American States.
  - Focused on the protection and humanitarian challenges affecting refugees in Central America in the 1980s

  - Also known as the Kampala Convention, it specifically establishes state responsibility for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons, whose displacement is the result of "natural or human made disasters"
Learning Activity

2.1

Soldiers or civilians

TIME
Total: 15 minutes

EXERCISE

Scenario

• There is an armed group within your AOR which has been carrying out attacks on civilians in isolated villages. The armed group live amongst the civilian population who are of the same ethnic group as them and do not always wear uniforms or carry their weapons openly.

• You are aware that the state security forces are planning to launch operations against the group.

NOTES TO INSTRUCTOR

Divide participants in groups and give them 10 minutes to discuss this scenario.

What is there proposed course of action?

There is no single answer that is right or wrong. However, the following elements should be identified in the discussion:

- Distinction between civilians and combatants is the key challenge in this context;

- Protection threats come from both state and non-state parties;

- More information is required, such as the history and previous conduct of the parties involved;
• Activities can be taken under all three tiers of the POC Operational Concept, including outreach to armed group leaders and political engagement with the security forces to alert them of the challenges of this operation;

• Most courses of action are likely to create opportunities and threats for the protection of civilians.
Lesson

Starting the Lesson

Overview

Apart from international and national law, peacekeeping missions and their activities in the area of protection of civilians are also governed by the particular legal and policy framework of the UN, which includes:

- The Charter of the United Nations
- Security Council resolutions
- The Agreement with host States, i.e. Status of Forces or Status of Mission Agreement (SOFA or SOMA)
- The Agreement with participating States, i.e. the UN Member States who have agreed to contribute troops or police personnel to UN PKOs ("TCC (or PCC) MOU")

Relevance

The UN Legal and Policy Framework is relevant to understand (i) the legal basis for the UN’s deployment in a host country, and (ii) the legal regime that applies to all day-to-day activities in the host country.
**Key Message:** The Charter of the UN is the founding document of the Organization and the basis of all the Organization’s work. It was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by 50 Member States. The UN was established to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the UN to achieve this purpose.

Interestingly, the UN Charter does not make reference to UN peacekeeping, even though it is today the most expensive and arguably the most visible activity of the UN.

The legal basis for the establishment of a PKO is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII:

- Chapter VI – Pacific settlement of disputes
- Chapter VII “Action with respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”
- Chapter VIII – Regional Arrangements
Article 1 (2) establishes the equal rights and the right to self-determination of peoples.

Article 2 (4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all Members to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of other States.

- The UN Charter basically establishes that any use of force without the consent of the State on whose territory the force is used is unlawful. There are only two exceptions:
  - Authorization by the Security Council: As per Article 39 of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council may authorize collective security operations when they conclude that there is a situation of “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”
  - Individual or Collective Self-defense: Article 51 establishes the right of self-defense.

- Regarding the first case, authorization of force by the Security Council, the political nature of such decisions makes it often improbable for such an authorization to be granted in a timely fashion. Over the years, the five permanent members of Security Council have vetoed each other’s decisions for
political or national interest reasons, preventing the Council from authorizing action.

- The right of a state to undertake a self-defense action is an inherent customary international law and it is a privilege of states. The Charter merely reaffirmed this right granted to states in the interest of their survival. It should be noted that the scope of the self-defense according to Article 51 of the UN Charter does not include a response to an economic or political threat.

Article 2 (7) states that the United Nations has no authority to intervene in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, while this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Note to Instructor: The Repertoire website covering the practice of the Security Council includes those cases where the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations was raised and the authority of the Council to involve itself in a particular situation was questioned. Go to the ‘Constitutional Issues’ tab and click on ‘Purposes and Principles of the UN’.

Article 24 (1) gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This is often referred to during discussions concerning the appropriateness for the Council to include a situation or a thematic item on its agenda. Under Article 25, Member States agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Security Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. All UN peace operations are deployed on the basis of the UN Charter, more precisely Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter.

- Chapter VI deals with pacific settlement of disputes and is associated with traditional peacekeeping.

- Chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”, which allow the Security Council to take enforcement measures. In recent years, the Security Council has increasingly authorized peace operations based on Chapter VII.

- Chapter VIII deals with partnerships and the involvement of regional organizations.

Note to Instructor – Ensure familiarity with the differences between Chapter VI and Chapter VII and their implications for UN peacekeeping.
The peacekeeping operation and its members enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to which the Government of the Host State is usually a party (over 150 States are party).

The Convention gives legal status to the UN and subsidiary bodies under the national laws of its Member States. This enables the UN to manage day-to-day operations, such as entering into contracts, acquiring and disposing of immovable and movable property, and instituting legal proceedings.

The Convention also clarifies that the UN enjoys immunity from every form of legal process in its Member States except when the UN has expressly waived its immunity. Particular privileges and immunities to the UN and its officials include:

- Exempting the United Nations from all direct taxes as well as from customs duties and quotas concerning goods for the United Nations’ official use. With regard to indirect taxes, the Convention merely provides that in case of “important purchases for official use” the State concerned will make appropriate administrative arrangements for tax reimbursement.

- Immunity from the legal process for words spoken or written and actions taken in an official capacity, known as functional immunity. It also covers immunity from personal arrest or detention.
• Privileges and Immunities are granted in the interests of the UN, not for personal benefit of individuals.

The Secretary-General has the right and the duty to waive immunity in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the UN. Each case is assessed on its particular merits.

**Example:** In both Kosovo and East Timor, UN staff were denied immunity after evidence of their involvement in serious crimes such as murder, rape and sexual abuse came to light.

Privileges and immunities do not protect personnel from their responsibility under international laws.

All members of the peacekeeping operation, including locally recruited personnel, are immune from legal process in respect of all acts (including words spoken or written) performed by them in their official capacity. If the Government of the Host State considers that a member of a UN peacekeeping operation has committed a criminal offence, under para 47 of the Model SOFA, the Government is under an obligation to “promptly inform the Special Representative and present to him any evidence available to it”.

If the accused person is a civilian, the Special Representative shall conduct any necessary inquiries and then agree with the Government whether or not criminal proceedings should be instituted. Members of the military component of UN peacekeeping missions are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating states. Thus, they cannot be prosecuted in the Host State for crimes they commit.
Before deployment of a peacekeeping operation, the UN and the Host Government sign a Status of Forces or Status of Mission Agreement (SOFA/SOMA) for the establishment of the mission on the Government’s territory.

The difference between SOFA and SOMA is that for peacekeeping operations with armed personnel a SOFA is adopted (which applies to all military, civilian and police personnel), while for UN peace operations with only unarmed personnel (for instance Special Political Missions), a SOMA is adopted.

The SOFA/SOMA sets forth the legal framework that regulates the status of the peacekeeping operation and its members in the Host State, including privileges and immunities for UN personnel (see above). Despite privileges and immunities, the peacekeeping operation and its members are under an obligation to respect local laws and regulations. Therefore, such laws and regulations apply to the mission and its members unless expressly or impliedly excluded by the SOFA or other provisions of international law, or exempted by the Government.

It is important that peacekeepers respect and follow the national laws of the host country. Failure to abide by host state laws will have consequences to the individual, the T/PCC and the mission’s standing. The SRSG / HOM is responsible to the Secretary-General and the Host Country for the conduct of all the Mission’s personnel.
SOFAs/SOMAs are modelled after existing templates, adopted by the General Assembly in 1990, and typically:

- State that UN premises in the host country are inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the UN, which controls access to all its premises.

- Stipulate that UN equipment and vehicles are immune from search and seizure.

- Give the UN the right to un-restricted communication throughout the host country.

- UN has the right to disseminate information on its mandate to the public which is under its exclusive control and cannot be the subject of any form of censorship.

- Supplement the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN discussed earlier, and give “functional immunity” to all peacekeeping personnel, including military and police. However, they also set out certain limitations to existing privileges where this may be appropriate.

- Address criminal offences committed by civilian members of the UN peacekeeping force which will be dealt with by joint decision of the commander of the mission and the local government. Also, if any military member of the UN peacekeeping force commits a criminal offence in the host country, the sending State has exclusive jurisdiction under the SOFA.

- Establish rules and procedures for cooperation between the sending state and the host state such as defining the legal status and arrangements for the UN’s use of facilities, transportation and other equipment and communications; requiring UN forces to observe International Humanitarian Law.

- Establish freedom of movement in the country.

- Include a mechanism to resolve disagreements on any of these issues between the host country and the UN.
The UN and the sending State, the troop or police contributing country (T/PCC), conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) governing the contribution of personnel to UN peace operations.

The MoU is a legal agreement detailing the following:

- How the UN will reimburse governments for troops, formed police units (FPUs) or equipment loaned to a peacekeeping operation.
- The obligations of contributing governments to ensure appropriate quality personnel and equipment appropriately trained and prepared for their mission.
- Transfer of authority over a member state’s troops or police unit to the UN, as it regulates that the UN Force Commander, or Police Commissioner, shall have operational control over the troops/police contributed.
- Obligations of TCCs/PCCs, commanders, troops and police for prevention of misconduct (which may also amount to crimes), including sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations (since 2007), and other stipulations regarding the code of conduct.
For contributed military contingents, the UN respects the principle of the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the contributing State over the contributed soldiers, for any crimes they may commit while assigned in the field mission.

The MoU is NOT an operational document that dictates operations, locations or types of tasks to be undertaken.

Note to Instructor – For more information see Chapter 9 of the Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions in the Annex.

Slide 58

Issues of conduct and discipline have already been covered in Lesson 3.3. of the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials, this slide is only meant as a brief reminder.

While applicability of the laws of the sending State are limited, as a general rule, disciplinary power (for Police FPUs and Military contingents) lies with the sending State. In the case of Military contingents, criminal jurisdiction also lies with the sending State. However, Member States contributing peacekeeping contingents, in signing their MoU, acknowledge the UN’s requirement that all personnel must maintain the highest standards of integrity and conduct. This includes acknowledgment of a code of conduct for all personnel. In signing the MoU, T/PCCs commit “to comply with the Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking United Nations
Peacekeeping and the applicable portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the fundamental basis for our standards." A short version of the 10 rules is available as pocket card.

When it comes to conduct and discipline, peacekeeping personnel need to remember that:

- Their conduct represents the UN
- They should not hinder or jeopardize the mandate
- They should not become a safety and security risk

There are three principles that underpin UN standards of conduct. They are based on UN Core Values and Competencies:

- Highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity
- Zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse
- Accountability of those in command who fail to enforce the standards of conduct

Slide 59

**DPKO-DFS Policy Framework**

- Compliance with DPKO-DFS policies is mandatory for all peacekeepers
- Examples of relevant policies include:
  - Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions (2011)
  - POC in UN Peace Operations (2015)
  - Use of Force by Military Components (2017)
  - Prevention and Response to CRSV
The UN Departments for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) have an evolving doctrinal framework built on a number of policies and other high-level documents.

At the top sits the UN Capstone Doctrine (2008), which outlines the principles and guidelines for UN Peacekeeping. The Capstone Doctrine captures decades of experience from peacekeeping operations and defines the nature, scope and core business of contemporary UN peacekeeping. It serves as a guide for all UN personnel serving in the field and at UN Headquarters, and helps direct the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations. All policies in peacekeeping have to be aligned with the Capstone Doctrine and are reviewed regularly.

Compliance with DPKO-DFS policies is mandatory for all peacekeeping personnel, military, police and civilian. The slide lists some examples of relevant recent policies:

- In 2011, DPKO, DPA, DFS and OHCHR adopted the Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions, which provides guidance on how human rights should be integrated into the activities of UN peace operations and political missions, in order to maximize UN actions to address the human rights dimensions of conflict and build a foundation for sustainable peace. The policy sets out the purposes, roles and scope of activity of human rights components of peace operations and political missions.

- The 2015 DPKO-DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping explains the fundamental principles of POC in peacekeeping, identifies and organizes the range of POC tasks, guides the development of mission-specific POC strategies, and outlines how missions are expected to assess and respond to POC threats.

- The 2017 DPKO-DFS-DPA Policy on Child Protection in UN Peace Operations is an update of the 2009 policy. It lays out the guiding principles for Child Protection in peacekeeping, defines the roles and responsibilities of peacekeepers in this regard, and gives guidance on planning for Child Protection mandate implementation.

- The 2017 DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations outline the constraints and authorities of military and police personnel with regard to the use of force while on duty in UN peacekeeping operations.

- The DPKO-DFS Policy on the Prevention and Response to Conflict-related Sexual Violence is due for release in 2018. It will be the first CRSV Policy and will outline the basic principles, tasks and planning issues to be considered for Women, Peace and Security mandate implementation in peacekeeping.
Key takeaways regarding UN Legal and Policy Framework include:

- The UN Charter is the foundation and basis for all UN work across the Organization. In the area of peace and security, Security Council resolutions give important guidance to the work of peacekeeping operations.

- The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of UN personnel does not mean peacekeepers can break laws with impunity.

- Peacekeepers must observe Host State and sending State laws as laid out in the SOMA/SOFA and MoU.

- Specific policies have been developed to guide the work of peacekeeping missions in the implementation of mission-specific and cross-cutting thematic mandates. Peacekeepers are expected to read and understand these policies. Compliance with relevant UN policies, such as the POC Policy, is mandatory for all peacekeepers, irrespective of whether they are military, police or civilians.
Lesson 3

Starting the Lesson

Overview
This section covers aspects of the operational legal framework for UN peacekeeping that have been drafted specifically for each mission.

The operational legal framework consists of a number of documents, some of which were already covered earlier in this Module (SOFA, MoU).

As a result, this section will focus on:

- Security Council mandates for peacekeeping operations
- Rules of Engagement
- Directives on the Use of Force

Relevance
The mission specific legal framework shapes each UN peacekeeping operation and its activities relative to the needs of a particular mission and its operational environment.
The last section discussed relevant cross-cutting thematic Security Council resolutions guiding the work of UN peace operations overall. This section covers the specific resolutions with which the Council authorizes peacekeeping operations – these resolutions are the highest legal basis for the deployment of missions.

**Key Message:** Every peacekeeping operation begins with the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution that establishes it, consistent with the UN Charter. When establishing a PKO, the Council will want the consent of the Host State to its deployment. Depending on the PKO’s mandate and role, it will also want the consent of the other parties to the conflict concerned. The consent of the Host State is a legal requirement. In contrast, the consent of the other parties to the conflict is typically wanted for practical and operational, rather than legal reasons – without it, the peacekeeping operation cannot reasonably be expected to perform its tasks.

The Security Council resolution also provides the mandate of the PKO, i.e. the tasks assigned to it, including any authorisation to use force. Mandates, or tasks, differ from mission to mission. The range of mandated tasks outlined in a mandate differs between peacekeeping missions, based on the conflict environment, the challenges it presents and other related factors. Of course, as noted earlier, Security Council mandates may also set cross-cutting thematic tasks.
Included in the Security Council resolution that authorizes the deployment of a peace operation are not only the tasks for the mission, but also the maximum uniformed strength of a mission. Like the tasks given to a mission, the Council also routinely reviews the authorized strength of a mission, at least once per year.

The Security Council mandate is, in principle, time-bound (usually one year). It can be renewed and may be modified by the Council throughout the lifetime of the operation. Cross-cutting, thematic mandates may also be adopted by the Council, for instance on POC, women, peace and security, or children and armed conflict.

Almost always, before establishing a peacekeeping operation, the Security Council requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report setting out the functions, tasks and parameters of the proposed operation. The Secretary-General’s report is then considered by the Security Council which then adopts a resolution.

Slide 66

The first mission to receive an explicit protection of civilians mandate was UNAMSIL in 1999. That resolution marked a landmark in the conceptual thinking about UN peacekeeping. The language has since been repeated (with some changes) and expanded upon in subsequent resolutions, which have also tended to repeat the caveat phrases ‘in the areas of deployment’, ‘within capabilities’ and ‘without prejudice to the responsibilities of the host government’.
The slide shows UNSCR 2295 (2016) which extended the mandate of MINUSMA until June 2017. The language used to describe the protection tasks is commonly used across missions with a POC mandate.

Visit the Research Tools section of the UNSC Repertoire Website – http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/data.shtml – and select the Mandate Analysis tab to download a searchable excel spreadsheet (which is updated approximately every three months). Select one or two missions that the participants are familiar with or will deploy to, and examine the specific language for POC in that mission.

The next few slides will explore some of these phrases. Key terms like ‘threat’ and ‘civilians’ were already defined in Module 1.

**Slide 67**

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**Key Message:** The expression “all necessary action” gives the mission authority to take all steps, up to and including the use of deadly force (as a last resort) to protect civilians under threat. Peacekeepers with a POC mandate are authorized to use force in accordance with the rules of engagement.

It is important to remember that “all necessary action” does not only relate to the military activities of the operation. It also includes the range of civilian and police actions at the disposal of a peace operation.
Use of force by military and police forces must be supported by adequate understanding of local conditions, including intelligence as appropriate. Due to existing limitations of collection assets and modern technology in field missions, most of the information gathering work is done through reaching out to the local population and leaders, local protection actors etc.

**Slide 68**

**Key Message:** ‘Within capabilities’ acknowledges resource constraints and demands the prioritization of resources.

Realistically, a peace operation will not be able to protect everyone everywhere in its area of responsibility. Existing resources, even in large complex missions with thousands of soldiers, are simply not enough when the area is vast, terrain is rough, lines of communications are poor, and logistics challenging. However, this cannot be an excuse for inaction. Peacekeeping missions are obligated to use their resources in the most effective and efficient manner to carry out their mandate. The prioritization of resources has to be based on a thorough threat and vulnerability analysis, as well as on coherent and coordinated operational and tactical planning. This analysis should be done by all mission components, not just military. Any shortfalls need to be communicated to senior mission leadership, who will bring it to the attention of UNHQ and ultimately the Security Council.
The limited capabilities are also an important aspect of expectation management when it comes to the ability of missions to keep peace. In particular, vis-à-vis the local population, but also vis-à-vis the international community, missions need to communicate clearly what they are able to achieve with the existing resources.

**Slide 69**

**Key Message:** According to international law, host governments bear the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians within their borders. Where such mandates apply, UN peacekeepers are mandated to undertake protection activities in support of host government actors, not to replace them. Peacekeepers, however, have the obligation to protect civilians in situations where the host government is unable or unwilling to do so.

Field missions do their best to have the host government engaged on the protection of civilians so the mission can perform a supporting role. However, bearing in mind that missions operate within the principles of peacekeeping, missions are authorized to use force against elements of government forces in accordance with their rules of engagement where such forces are themselves engaging in physical violence against civilians. Due to the possible negative impact on the strategic consent of the host country, the use of force against host country security forces is a complicated matter. It is always preferable to take preventive measures and use political action to obtain compliance with principles of human rights and the use of force by the national security apparatus.
Key Message: The Security Council in some cases tasks peacekeeping operations with the protection of particular groups, especially women and children.

The Council can request the deployment of Women Protection and Child Protection Advisors to advise mission leadership and coordinate protection activities.
Key Message: ROE and DUF are mission-specific and outline the circumstances as to when and how the use of force is authorized in accordance with the mandate of the particular operation as well as international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict.

The ROE and DUF are approved by the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. They always include the use of force in self-defence. The use of force beyond self-defence depends on the mandate of the operation.

There is a master list of rules contained in the 2000 ‘UN Guidelines for the Development of ROE for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’. Annexes to that document include Sample ROE as well as the master list of ROE from which mission-specific ROE are selected.

ROE commonly include:

- Use of force (Rule 1)
- Use of weapons systems (Rule 2)
- Authority to carry weapons (Rule 3)
- Authority to detain, search, disarm (Rule 4)
- Reactions to civil actions or unrest (Rule 5)
ROE also define the weapon state.

The Use of Force is a command responsibility. The Force Commander and Police Commissioner are responsible to make sure that all personnel under their command understand and follow the ROE and DUF. This responsibility also applies to commanders of national contingents.

To ensure the appropriate use of force in peacekeeping operations, TCCs should prepare their troops in terms of mind set and skills. TCCs must understand and embrace the approved mission-specific ROE since the appropriate application of these ROE is mandatory for all deployed military units in a peacekeeping operation. All United Nations peacekeepers operate strictly under the United Nations chain of command.

T/PCCs are not permitted to augment, restrict or modify ROE or DUF according to national interpretation(s), nor are T/PCCs allowed to impose any caveats on the authorizations to use force that are contained in the ROE or DUF, without formal consultation with UNHQ and the express written agreement of DPKO.


Slide 72
UNSO STM 219

Module 2 – Lesson 3: Mission Specific Legal Framework

DPKO and DFS released new Guidelines on the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in early 2017. The Guidelines provide clarity on the appropriate use of force at the tactical and operational levels of UN peacekeeping operations. The Guidelines are intended to mitigate hesitation, accelerate decision making, improve performance and ultimately protect lives and property.

Key Message: It is important to keep in mind that the objective of the use of force is to influence and deter, not necessarily to defeat, threats seeking to harm UN personnel, equipment and property or people under protection, such as the civilian population.

In some cases, the use of force may also be authorized to respond to other threats, including those caused by armed spoilers intending to distract the peace process. In 2013, the UN Security Council equipped MONUSCO with the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which is specifically tasked to undertake offensive operations. For the purpose of this offensive mandate, the FIB has a different authorisation of the use of force and is able to carry out both joint and unilateral military operations to neutralise armed groups.

The basic principles guiding the use of force are:

- **Graduated**: Application of increasing levels of force ensures that only the minimal level of force is used. It ensures that excessive force is avoided and minimizes the loss of, or damage to, life and property.

- **Last resort**: Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort should be made to resolve a potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force. Mediation, negotiation, use of deterrent posture, robust communications are examples.

- **Necessity**: Force can only be used when absolutely necessary in self-defence, in defence of UN staff, property and equipment, or in defence of the mandate. There is a duty to use reasonable efforts to resolve the situation and achieve the authorised objective without use of force.

- **Proportionality**: Use no more force than necessary to suppress the threat.

- **Legality**: Force can only be used within the limitations of the legal framework, including IHL, Security Council mandates, UN ROE, national law, and host state law.

- **Accountability**: The authority to use force remains a command responsibility, but the individual applying that force retains accountability for their actions being in accordance with IHL, and the mission-specific ROE. This reinforces the importance of all peacekeepers understanding the concept and principles discussed in this module.
It must be noted that peacekeepers sometimes may not have enough time to embrace gradual application of force and may have to act immediately by resorting to deadly force to avoid greater harm. This would only apply where the attack, or threat of an attack comes so unexpectedly that even a moment’s delay could lead to the death of, or serious bodily injury to, oneself, other United Nations personnel or other persons under the protection of the mission.

**Key Message:** UN Force Commanders should be aware of the full extent of their authority to act under the mission mandate and the mission specific rules of engagement. Inherent in the authority to act is a responsibility to act within the capabilities of the peacekeeping operation and its areas of deployment.

Missions with mandates to protect civilians are equipped with rules of engagement that provide for both proactive and reactive use of force. As to the use of force to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, mission specific strategies allow for proactive, pre-emptive, preventative and /or deterrent measures, up to and including the use of deadly force.

Failure to act is not an option. Potential consequences include the preventable loss of life or damage to property. Failure to act may be treated as insubordination under conduct and discipline regime, leading to the potential repatriation of commanders or even whole contingents.
It is important to remember that peacekeepers are authorized to act in accordance with the ROE, and don’t need specific written approval to use force in accordance with the ROE. To be successful, ALL commanders and troops must have a clear understanding of when, and at what level, force can be used in implementing assigned tasks.

Failure to use force in line with the ROE, much like the use of excessive force, can negatively impact the mission’s success and may raise issues of individual and organizational responsibility.

Case study 1: Discuss with participants how peacekeepers’ interpretation of the ROE relate to the incident in UNMISS of 17/18 February 2016, when gunmen in military uniforms stormed the UNMISS POC site in the north-eastern town of Malakal, firing on civilians and setting shelters ablaze. The attack on the camp, where about 48,000 people were sheltering, left at least 40 dead and 123 wounded. Nearly 20,000 people lost their homes after they were torched by the attackers based on the occupants’ tribal affiliation. For more details see Handout 2.3: UN Press Release on the Special Investigation into the Malakal Violence of 17-18 February 2016 in the Annex.

Following an armed attack on an IDP camp in Malakal, South Sudan, which was under the protection of UNMISS, a Board of Inquiry found inadequacies in peacekeepers' response and a lack of understanding of the rules of engagement by some. The final report points at failures of the UN as well as TCCs.

From the UN’s Board of Inquiry (BOI) report:

- The Sector North Commander ordered that troops should use their APCs to engage the SPLA troops by firing back on them and that under no condition should SPLA soldiers enter the Log base. Some troop commanders hesitated about the use of lethal force and sought written authorization for it.

- Moreover, once the security situation began to deteriorate, the Mission, at all levels, failed to manage the crisis effectively. This failure manifested itself in a lack of urgency to enhance the security within and around the POC site, the reluctant attitude of the units of some of the TCCs present in Malakal to be proactive, including requesting written confirmation to use force as in the rules of engagement (ROE); the absence of external perimeter patrolling around the POC sites; and culminating in the abandoning of sentry posts when armed elements were approaching the berm leaving the POC site fully exposed and, ensuring that civilians would be placed in serious risk in the very location to which they had come for protection.

- The Board also found that many of the applicable UN/UNMISS procedures, regulations and rules including on command and control vis-à-vis civilians and uniformed personnel, UNMISS ROEs, Force Directives and Orders were adequate to respond when faced with such an incident, however, they were not properly
coordinated, disseminated or understood among the various civilian, military and police components in the mission, nor were they fully/appropriately applied by some of the TCCs deployed in Malakal. Moreover, with regard to the UNMISS military operations, the Board underscored that this was not the first instance in which military units in Malakal had demonstrated an unwillingness to proactively implement ROE, Force Directives and Orders. However, this persistent underperformance had not been reported through the appropriate chain of command.

• The Board concluded that despite relevant guidance, beginning with the Mission’s Chapter VII POC mandate and including standing orders on POC operations, and particularly with regard to the ROEs, the TCCs were not adequately trained or familiar with the manner in which they were to respond. The lack of regular, targeted table top exercises was one example of a failing in this regard. The BOI further found that the UNMISS uniformed personnel detailed to protect the POC site were not adequate in number or properly skilled and equipped to fulfil the given mandate.

• On ROE/Contingency preparedness, the BOI recommended that UNMISS military leadership should ensure that training in the practical application of the ROEs and use of force is conducted regularly in accordance with the guidance from the DPKO Military Advisor with a focus on scenarios relevant to the current operational situation in a concrete location.

• The BOI also recommended that the Force Commander and Police Commissioner, in consultation with the SRSG, should immediately take action in cases where units show a lack of knowledge of ROEs or demonstrate a lack of will to use force beyond self-defence. Each case of underperformance of troops and police should be thoroughly investigated and the results reported to the UNHQ and the Permanent Missions of the involved TCCs/PCCs. Decisive action should be taken to hold the TCC contingents accountable, up to repatriating Commanders and/or Units.

Case study 2: Examine and discuss the incidents in UNMISS of 11 July, when gunmen in Juba attacked the Hotel Terrain camp, a private compound close to a peacekeeping base, robbing, beating and raping aid workers and local staff, and killing a local journalist. For more detail see the Executive Summary of the special investigation in the Annex.

Following another tragic armed attack on a civilian compound in Juba, South Sudan, in July 2016, the UN Secretary-General ordered a special investigation. Extracts taken from the Executive Summary of the special investigation report, which was released publicly, are conveyed below:

• After fighting broke out, the Force and Police components continued to display a risk-averse posture unsuited to protecting civilians from sexual violence and other opportunistic attacks.
The Special Investigation found that the lack of preparedness, ineffective command and control and a risk-averse or “inward-looking” posture resulted in a loss of trust and confidence – particularly by the local population and humanitarian agencies – in the will and skill of UNMISS military, police to be proactive and show a determined posture to protect civilians under threat, including from sexual violence and human rights violations.

The Special Investigation made a series of recommendations, including:

- DPKO to ensure that missions have rigorous contingency plans in place;

- UNMISS to regularly conduct scenario-based training and rehearsals on mandate implementation, use of rules of engagement and directives on the use of force;

- All T/PCCs junior and senior commanders should conduct scenario training on the mandate and rules of engagement, and police FPU commanders should be trained on the directives on the use of force during their pre-deployment training;

- All TCCs to confirm in writing that troops are willing and able to conduct dismounted patrols, including standing patrols by day and night outside the perimeter of UN compounds and POC sites in surrounding areas as ordered by the Force Commander;

- All personnel of T/PCC to use the rules of engagement to the fullest extent.
There is no room for doubt regarding individual or unit responsibilities in relation to the protection of civilians. As part of any individual or unit’s pre-deployment preparation, any doubts must be resolved, and expected actions understood and rehearsed.

This applies equally to individuals as it does to unit commanders since all have obligations and are accountable under the legal framework discussed in this module.

If responsibilities are unclear, do not hesitate to seek advice or clarification from your unit’s Legal Adviser. Other sources of clarification can be your commanding officers, Protection of Civilians Officers, Human Rights Officers or Military Legal Officers at Force HQ in missions. Substantive issues or requests for clarification regarding the UN legal framework, the mission’s mandate and/or the mission’s ROEs or DUF may additionally be consulted with the mission’s Senior Legal Adviser, and/or referred to UN Headquarters and the Office of the Legal Counsel.

Failure to understand the legal obligations does not excuse wrongful action or inaction.
Summary

Key takeaways regarding Mission Specific Legal Framework include:

• The mission specific legal framework is targeted at individual missions based on the operational environment.

• The Security Council mandate establishes a peacekeeping operation and gives missions and its personnel specific tasks. Given the particular importance for each mission context, peacekeepers must understand their mandate.

• ROE and DUF translate that framework into specific guidance for military and police units and individuals on when, where, and how much force is to be used. T/PCCs are not allowed to impose additional caveats on their personnel serving in peacekeeping missions, unless they are approved in writing by DPKO.
Peacekeepers need to understand how international and national legal frameworks governing human rights, international humanitarian law and peacekeeping more broadly affects the work of missions in the field.

Bodies of international law provide special protection for those members of communities that are most vulnerable (e.g. women, children, refugees etc.).

As a key task for peacekeepers, they must ensure to monitor and report violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Peacekeepers do not have impunity from laws of the host or sending State, and may also be held accountable for unlawful activities under international law.

If ever there is any lack of clarity regarding the legal framework for peacekeeping, or obligations deriving from it, peacekeepers can ask their higher command, the Military Legal Officer, POC Adviser or civilian Legal Officers for advice. Ignorance is not an excuse for a violation of law.
Module 3 at a Glance

Aim

The objective of this module is to ensure all military staff officers in the FHQ and SHQ of a UN mission understand the UN Military Planning Process, its intelligence acquisition and processing arrangements, how to utilize its logistics/support operations and finally how to work with DSS during a crisis situation.

Relevance

All military staff officers in the FHQ and SHQ of a UN mission need to understand the UN Military Planning Process and its mission support concept for peacekeeping operations in order to fully participate in the process. In addition, staff officers must be aware of the mission crisis response to implement timely and effective plans in the case of a crisis situation. Successful military operations rely on commanders and staff understanding and employing a common and comprehensive planning and decision-making process. This is further based on critical analysis of the Operational Environment which culminates in developing effective Courses of Action.

Learning Objectives

- Identify the phases of the Military Planning Process
- Explain the basic methods to analyze the Operational Environment (OE)
- Develop and evaluate Courses of Action (COA)
- Understand the mission intelligence cycle and its various techniques/methods of intelligence acquisition
- Understand the principles of UN HQ crisis management policy and UN HQ response in support of DPKO-led field missions.
Overview

Module 3: Operational Framework comprises of several segments that are structured to help achieve the learning objectives:

Unit 1: Military Planning Process

| Lesson 1.1: | Overview of the Military Planning Process |
| Lesson 1.2: | Analysis of the Operational Environment |
| Lesson 1.3: | Mission Analysis |
| Lesson 1.4: | Course of Action Development |

Unit 2: Peacekeeping Intelligence

| Lesson 2.1: | Peacekeeping Intelligence Overview |
| Lesson 2.2: | Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle |
| Lesson 2.3: | Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle Management Tools |

Unit 3: Mission Support

| Lesson 3.1: | UN Mission Support Concept |
| Lesson 3.2: | UN Mission Support Entities in the Field |
| Lesson 3.3: | UN Mission Support for Uniformed Personnel |

Unit 4: Crisis Management

| Lesson 4.1: | Crisis Management Basics |
| Lesson 4.2: | UN Security Management System |
Starting the Lessons

Background

All military staff officers in the FHQ of a UN mission need to understand the UN Military Planning Process for peacekeeping operations in order to fully participate in the process.

Successful military operations rely on commanders and staff understanding and employing a common and comprehensive planning and decision-making process.

Unit Content

Lesson 1.1: Overview of the Military Planning Process
Lesson 1.2: Analysis of the Operational Environment
Lesson 1.3: Mission Analysis
Lesson 1.4: Course of Action Development

Learning Outcomes

• Identify the phases of the Military Planning Process
• Explain the basic methods to analyze the Operational Environment (OE)
• Undertake the Analysis of the OE
• Develop Courses of Action (COA)
• Evaluate different COAs
Ask participants what they think the Military Planning Process entails. Who is part of this process? At what level does this take place?

Answers should include: what is the mission, commander’s intent, resources required, budget constraints, etc. This happens at the Strategic Level all the way through the Tactical levels.

Key Message: The Military Planning Process is a methodical process that relies on joint efforts of commanders and staff to seek optimal solutions and to make decisions to achieve an objective in a dynamic environment.

In a traditional military operation, the planning process will determine resource requirements – troops and equipment required to achieve the task.
In the context of a UN PK Mission many of these factors would have been determined as part of the strategic planning in UNHQ, and provided as guidance through relevant documents like:

- the Security Council Resolution outlining the mandate of the mission,
- the Mission CONOPS,
- Integrated Strategic framework (ISF),
- Mission Concept.

**Key Message:** Good planning requires a methodical process that clearly defines the steps that lead to optimal solutions.

A basic principle of good planning is that individual short-term decisions should support strategic long-term goals. This requires comprehensive situational analysis by staff officers and guidance and direction from leadership to manage the process effectively.

This process should reflect the following Principles of Planning:

- Comprehensive: All significant options and impacts on work of other
components are considered.

• Efficient: Efficient use available resources.

• Inclusive: All components affected by the plan have opportunities to be involved.

• Informative: Results are understood by stakeholders (people affected by a decision).

• Integrated: Individual, short-term decisions should support strategic, long-term goals.

• Logical: Each step should lead logically to the next.

• Transparent: Everybody involved should not only be aware of the desired end-state but also understand their roles in each step of the process.

Note to Instructor: It is important for all to understand these basic principles of planning and be able to apply them as they are common themes across all aspects of military operations.
Themes of Planning

- Determine the nature of the problem and what is to be achieved.
- Gather information.
- Generate options to achieve those goals.
- Decide on the way ahead and then execute it.

Even though planning skills are used in everyday military life, participants should be aware that, in a peacekeeping operation they will be engaging with civilian mission components and many agencies and organizations that may not be familiar with the military planning process, but will possibly have a process of their own. The military staff officer must be flexible enough to combine these processes especially in an integrated mission.

Successful military operations rely on commanders making correct decisions that are developed into feasible plans and executed in a timely and appropriate manner.
The usual non-linear nature of Peacekeeping Operations imposes many command and control challenges for peacekeepers. Unit and sub-unit commanders who are remotely deployed or who face rapidly changing situations should be able to take decisions in line with the mission’s overall objective. They would therefore need a clear understanding of their higher commander’s intent and total comprehension of their assigned task/role and its purpose in higher commander’s plan to enable them to make timely and appropriate decisions.

Hasty and incomplete planning will likely result in the inefficient use of resources, potential loss of life, and ultimately mission failure.

Mastery in planning and decision making is achieved by the commander and staff understanding and employing a common and comprehensive process.

**Slide 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of Military Planning Process in UN Peacekeeping</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Analysis of the Operational Environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Course of Action Development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Production of Operations Orders.</td>
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There are five distinct phases of MPP:

1. Analysis of the Operational Environment.
3. Course of Action Development.

5. Production of Operations Orders.

Phases of Military Planning Process (MPP)

Note that Phase 1 is ongoing throughout the process, and that each Phase is reviewed as the process progresses.

Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE), often referred to as Area of Operations Analysis (AOA) or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), is the first phase of MPP, and a phase that continues throughout the planning process as the plan is further developed. In this context, the Operational Environment is viewed strategically, and will therefore be much larger in size than the resultant Area of Operations.

Although MPP is a sequential process, it is also a circular process. Planning Officers must continually review each step of the process as their knowledge of the potential mission improves and the commander’s guidance evolves. Failure to continually review each step will limit the planner’s ability to provide suitable courses of action, and ultimately limit the commander’s ability to choose the most appropriate course of action.
Phase Progression
MPP works most efficiently when the commander is able to provide guidance at regular intervals to ensure the planning is meeting his or her requirements. It is therefore recommended that each phase of MPP be presented as a verbal brief, supported by audio visual aids, to at least a Service Chief, but ideally the MILAD or DMILAD, to ensure plans are progressing appropriately. If this is not feasible, it is vital that the part of Mission Analysis that analyses the commander’s intent is completed in specific detail to ensure there is no misunderstanding between the commander and the planning officers.

The Military Component Planning Process has six steps. It is depicted cyclically because of its continuous nature in DPKO led Peacekeeping Operations.

Also, the Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) is centrally located due to the fact that it provides inputs for the development of each step.

AOE is essentially research followed by analysis of that research. Once the need to conduct MPP has been established, Planning Officers must study as much as they can about the area in which the operation will take place. AOE will start out broad and often incomplete. It will become more detailed, more accurate and more complete as the planning becomes more developed and more refined. Mission analysis will almost always commence before a full AOE has been completed.
**Key Message:** It is critical that planners follow the process sequentially, understand the risks associated with the assumptions they make, and refrain from shaping their analysis to suit a predetermined course of action.

MPP is a logical process that facilitates timely planning and complex decision-making required by peacekeeping operations. It is an assumption-based method where known information is analyzed and unknown information is deduced using risk-managed assumptions. It is a comprehensive process that forces planners to consider the full scope of determining factors before presuming a military solution.
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Requirements for Military Planners and Decision-makers

- Follow the process sequentially
- Consider the full scope of determining factors
- Understand the risks associated with the assumptions
- Refrain from shaping their analysis to suit a predetermined course of action

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Time Allocation

One-third/Two-thirds Rule:
A general rule of thumb is to allocate a minimum of two-thirds of the time available for planning and preparation to sub-units
Key Message: It is important to note that sub units will need adequate time for their planning and preparations. As a general rule, a minimum of two-thirds of the time available is allocated to sub-units.

It is accepted that the requirement to plan peacekeeping operations does not always provide planners with the infinite time required to produce the perfect plans. A time constraint however should not necessarily cause a break from the process, rather it simply requires the process to be adjusted to meet the needs of the time restriction.

The application of one-third/two-third rule allows subunits to do detailed planning and preparation. Consideration should however be given to the use of information technology for parallel and collaborative planning if available and secure.

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A comprehensive Information Collection Plan needs to be developed through the tasking of all available resources to gather and provide pertinent information within a required time limit as part of the information cycle.

MPP is an assumption-based method where known information is analyzed and unknown information is deduced using risk-managed assumptions.
MPP works most efficiently when the commander is able to provide guidance at regular intervals to ensure the planning is meeting his or her requirements. It is therefore recommended that in each phase of MPP commanders should be presented with a verbal brief, supported by audio visual aids, to ensure plans are progressing appropriately.

If this is not feasible, it is vital that the part of Mission Analysis that analyses the commander’s intent is completed in specific detail to ensure there is no misunderstanding between the commander and the planning officers.
Summary of Key Messages

- The Military Planning Process relies on joint efforts of commanders and staff to seek optimal solutions in a dynamic environment.

- The Principles of Planning call for the MPP to be comprehensive; efficient; inclusive; informative; integrated; logical; and transparent.

- The five phases of MPP include: Analysis of the OE; Mission Analysis; COA Development; COA Analysis and Decision; and Production of OPORDs.
Key Message: Although MPP is a sequential process, it is also a circular process. Planning officers must continually review each step of the process as their knowledge of the potential mission improves and the commander’s guidance evolves. Failure to continually review each step will limit the planners ability to provide suitable courses of action, and ultimately limit the commander’s ability to choose the most appropriate course of action.

As mentioned in the previous MPP Overview presentation, Phase 1 is ongoing throughout the process, and each Phase is reviewed as the process progresses.

Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) is essentially research followed by analysis of that research. Once the need to conduct MPP has been established, planning officers must study as much as they can about the area in which the operation will take place. AOE will start out broad and often incomplete. It will become
more detailed, more accurate and more complete as the planning becomes more developed and more refined. Mission analysis will almost always commence before a full AOE has been completed.

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Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE) helps the command and staff elements to refine their situational awareness and understanding in order to have better visualization of the operational environment.

AOE helps commanders and staff understand, visualize & describe the operational environment. It is often referred to as Area of Operations Analysis (AOA) or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). In this context, the Operational Environment is viewed strategically, and will therefore be much larger in size than the resultant Area of Operations (AO).
The AOE consists of three steps:

a. Define the Operational Environment (raw facts).
b. Describe the Operational Effects (the effect of those raw facts on a PKO).
c. Threat Analysis and Adversary Courses of Action.
The purpose of this step is to learn about the area in which the operation will take place, and specifically to:

a. Review the existing situation - what is the cause of the unrest and what peace agreements are in place?

b. Scope the likely threats - who’s who and what is their agenda?

c. Identify significant characteristics of the environment - such as climate, terrain, infrastructure, lines of communication, etc.

d. Determine AO limitations – define the ‘Area of Interest’ and ‘Area of Intelligence Responsibility’.

e. Identify intelligence gaps - what is unknown?

f. Determine key future information requirements.

A detailed list of the information requirements that should be researched for a peacekeeping operation (e.g. geography, infrastructure, economic situation, population, humanitarian situation, the conflict, country’s political system, Armed Forces and Armed Groups) is listed in the annex.
Note to Instructor: Handout out the Annex detailing the information requirements for the AOE in order for participants to better understand what is included in the AOE.

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This step analyses the information gathered in step 1 to determine its impact on the operation (i.e. it provides the ‘so what’).

Key Message: The effect of the environment on both friendly and adversary forces needs to be determined, and these assessments should not be made in isolation or with bias. In isolation one factor may appear to be of value to friendly forces, but it may be of even greater value to an adversary force.

Similarly, it is unlikely that an operational environment will be homogeneous. Some factors will have differing effects in different areas, and will suit different types of operations and/or force structures.

Planning officers should therefore identify the factors that favour certain types of operations and/or balance of forces so that the effects are provided in context.

Example 1: An example of assessing the effect on friendly and adversary forces; in isolation, fine weather may appear to be positive for the PKO, but it might be
even more valuable to an adversary who relies solely on a dirt road network for logistics.

**Example 2:** An example of assessing the effect on different friendly force structures; A strong regional identity in the AO might be positive for a small regional PKO force, but this may not hold true for a large multi-national PKO force.

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**Key Message:** The military threat assessment focuses solely on armed threats to the PKO that might affect the safety and security of own forces, designated persons and designated infrastructure.

The military threat assessment for a peacekeeping operation can be even more complicated to conduct than for war-like operations because the adversary is commonly defined by irregular and complex relationships that often change if other conditions change.

It is unlikely that the adversary will be a force easily identified by their military uniforms, equipment and tactics. However, while the likely adversary may not have the makings of a traditional military force, their potentially strong organization, local knowledge, passion for their cause, local support networks and fighting experience could still make them a formidable foe.
Key Message: Risk management is both a command and staff responsibility. It behoves both elements to work together to ensure an effective risk management system is in place in the mission.

First, all threats to the force’s current and future operations need to be identified. Each threat is then assessed to determine the risk of potential loss based on probability and severity of the threat.

The probability and severity levels of a threat are estimated based on the available knowledge on its probability of occurrence and the severity of its consequences. Therefore, risk is a product of the likelihood of an event occurring and the impact if that event does occur.

**Example 1:** The risk to personnel of a helicopter being shot down may be low because the likelihood of the event occurring is low, even though the impact may be fatal.

**Example 2:** Similarly, the risk of a Navy ship being engaged with small arms may be low, even if the likelihood is high, because the impact will likely be minimal.

The risk of each threat must be assessed not only as risks to personnel, but also other risks such as those to essential equipment and to mission success.
Key Message: Threats are a product of both capability and intent.

A potential adversary group with intent to cause harm but with minimal capability is a limited threat, whereas a group with significant capability but no intent poses almost no threat. The capability of the peacekeeping force to counter threats also needs to be considered, because again, even if an adversary has every intent to oppose a peacekeeping force, if that peacekeeping force is able to prevent the militant group from operating effectively, they again pose little threat to the operation.
The military threat assessment, like most of the AOE, evolves throughout the planning process.

In the early stages, it will be a generic assessment combining the influences of:

- External actors to the AO (neighbouring states, NGOs, special interest groups),
- Internal actors to the AO (political groups, clans or tribes, business groups) and,
- Key leaders (allegiances, political agendas, religion).

By the end of the planning process, the threat assessment will have thoroughly considered likely adversary courses of action, and adversary reactions to each of the friendly forces COAs being considered for the peacekeeping force.

Due to the usual complex nature of current conflicts, there may also be the need to study the external interest and internal dynamics players such as regional organisations, countries, governmental and non-governmental organisations, etc. Threat evaluation determines the threat’s intent, capabilities and limitations and how the threat’s reaction under a given circumstance could in anyway affect mandate implementation.
Key Message: Threat evaluation is a detailed study of the conflict parties, their composition and organization (to include size, leadership and chain of command), tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, sustainment systems, source of motivation, external and internal support, military and political objective, etc.

At a minimum, an assessment of all the potential adversary groups must include:

- Political agenda.
- Leadership.
- Force size.
- Force structure and disposition.
- Logistics and sustainability.
- Capability and known tactics.
Key Message: Risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential loss that may result from hazards due to the presence of an enemy, an adversary, or some other hazardous condition.

Once the threats have been risk assessed, measures required to mitigate against the highest risks must be considered. The risk analysis provides planning officers with a priority list of threats that need to be mitigated against based on how high the risk is for each threat.

Example of mitigating against a high-risk threat: to mitigate against the threat of roadside IEDs, a PKO plan would need to include factors such as personal protective equipment, mine protected vehicles and explosive ordnance disposal teams.
Key Message: Individual threat-risk assessments are conducted throughout the Military Component Planning Process (MCP) and must consider both mission and non-mission related aspects that may have an impact. The end result of this assessment is an initial estimate of risk for each identified threat expressed in terms of Very High, High, Medium, Low or Very Low as determined from the standardized application of the risk assessment matrix.

**Likelihood** (probability that an event will occur)

- Very Likely/Imminent – Occurs often, experienced continuously.
- Likely – Occurs several times.
- Moderately Likely – Occurs sporadically.
- Unlikely – Unlikely, but could occur at some time.
- Very Unlikely - Can assume it will not occur.

**Impact** (The degree of injury, property damage, or other mission-impairing factors)
Module 3 – Lesson 1.2: Analysis of the Operational Environment

Catastrophic - Death or permanent total disability, system loss, major property damage, loss of mission mandate.

Severe - Permanent partial disability, temporary total disability in excess of three months, major system damage, significant property damage, loss of credibility.

Moderate - Moderate injury, moderate system damage, moderate property damage.

Minor - Minor injury, minor medical treatment, minor system damage, minor property damage.

Negligible - First aid, negligible system impairment.

Risk Levels

Very High - Loss of ability to accomplish mission.

High - Significantly degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.

Medium - Degrades mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.

Low – Low impact on accomplishment of mission.

Very Low - Little or no impact on accomplishment of mission.

Risk management here is distinct from the one done by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). In MCPP, risk management is directed at reducing operational uncertainties while taking advantage of opportunities. This leads to the development of control and risk reduction measures to ensure acceptable levels of risks are not exceeded.

Risk management is a crosscutting exercise in the entire MCPP and even more crucial during the execution process.
Key Message: The threat is not only affected by the COAs of the peacekeeping force. Adversary groups will have their own choice of COAs that need to be considered.

To develop adversary COAs, planning officers have to view the operation from the perspective of the adversary and determine adversary COAs in the same manner that COAs are developed for the peacekeeping force. Each of these adversary COAs will result in different threats and risks to the peacekeeping force. The most dangerous and most likely adversary COAs need to be studied in extreme detail.

Furthermore, based on the Threat Evaluation, the data gathered needs to be analysed and the potential problems visualised and clearly stated or expressed in the form of effective schematics. For example, instances of demonstrations, rioting, seizures, etc. may be the conflict parties’ most dangerous and most likely COAs. Also, a conflict party might want to disrupt the electoral process in order to maintain the on-going political stalemate. Accordingly, counter COAs would be developed by describing the options available to them.

The most dangerous COAs are those that when taken by conflict parties would have serious consequences on the achievement of their objectives and the most likely COAs are those that are feasible and therefore likely for them to take. After coming up with the most likely COAs, a comprehensive Information Collection Plan needs to be
developed through the tasking of all available resources to gather and provide pertinent information within a required time limit as part of the information cycle.

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Learning Activity #1

Ask participants to determine the
Most Likely and
Most Dangerous COAs
for
MPC and
ICSC
in Carana scenario.

Learning Activity #2

Have a discussion about the questions staff and commanders need to ask when analyzing threats and risks to civilians.

For example:
- Who are at risk, where are they, and where are they moving?
- What are their vulnerabilities?
- What are the particular threats and risks facing civilians?
- What types of (armed) actors are responsible for violence against civilians?
- What are their motivations to attack civilians?
- Which HR violations are being committed, and what strategies/tactics are used?
Learning Activity #3

Risk Assessment Matrix

**Task:** As Sector West HQ Staff, jointly prepare a Risk Assessment Matrix based on the current scenario, deployment information and map.

1. Makeni and Ravana are two neighboring countries with international boundary as shown in the map. It’s been more than two years Makeni is facing internal conflict arising out of ethnic disturbances and violence which is also partially caused by neighboring Ravana. Makeni has two major ethnic groups, Maku (consists of 60 percent of the population) and Rava (30 percent) while there are few other tribes who constitute the remaining 10 percent. Rava is majority population in Ravana which has a significant (approx. 20%) Maku population who are facing oppression in their own country Ravana. The major political parties are right wing Democratic Party of Makeni (DPM) and leftist Makeni Liberation Forces (MLF) which is pro Rava ethnic group. In the last election of 2014, DPM formed the government and is in power till date. Makeni Defence Forces (MDF) are the National Armed Forces primarily composed of Maku population. MLF has its own armed wing.

2. UNOMA (UN Operations in Makeni) has been established one year ago, primarily to minimize ethnic violence between the two major ethnic groups which has totally destabilized the country. Govt. has very little control over the armed groups including its own MDF. Clashes between MDF and armed wing of MLF have become very frequent. Attacks on Maku and Rava populations by the opposing groups as well as their pro-armed groups have increased manifold. UNOMA has a strong POC mandate.

3. Current Scenario and Deployment of Forces.

   a. UNOMA Forces deployment in Sector West is as shown in the map.

   b. MDF are mostly concentrated in Valuka and Kawempe areas. They maintain almost brigade size forces in each of these locations. MDF are preparing heavily to expand their dominance in areas north of Daburi, Jabur and areas around Tampi. The villages in these areas are mostly habituated by Rava people. MLF armed groups are located in Remakri and Olama with approximately battalion strength in each location. MLF is heavily engaged in recruiting soldiers forcefully from minority groups in population centres around Bomla and Dukri to beef up its strength. Both the forces are hostile to UN Forces and look for opportunities to attack UN convoys, patrols and camps as well as UN assets. MLF armed wing is very much hostile to the govt. officials who are operating in Capital Ajman and District HQ Trishal.

   c. IDP Camp 1 is primarily composed of 10,000 Maku population displaced from their habitation from the east. IDP Camp 2 has about 7,000 Rava tribes who were evicted from the northern region due to armed violence caused by MDF. The Refugee Camp at Tongi are populated by Maku tribes of Ravana who were
forced to flee their homes due to violence and pressure created by Rava population in Ravana. IDP Camp 2 has a UN platoon size forces protecting it. IDP Camp 1 is regularly patrolled by UNBAT from JABUR but no continuous presence. Refugee camp has local police protection and sometimes patrolled by UNBAT from Borura.

d. District Hospital at Trishal is overloaded with patients and injured victims who are taken care of by Red Cross and a few available government doctors.
Summary of Key Messages

- The AOE consists of: defining the OE; describing the Operational Effects; Threat Analysis and Adversary COAs.
- The military threat assessment focuses solely on armed threats to the PKO that might affect the safety and security of own forces, designated persons and designated infrastructure.
- Threats are a product of both capability and intent.
- Risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential loss.
Key Message: Mission Analysis is the principal decision-making tool that guides the planning process. It takes the higher-level guidance provided to the planners, challenges it against the facts and assumptions, and then refines it to better detail the mission and the planning requirements.

The higher-level guidance for the military component of peacekeeping operations may be very specific and well developed resulting from IMPP, such as a Security Council Mandate or USG’s Directive, or it may simply be verbal guidance from the MILAD or Service Chief to enable the MPP to commence.

For the military planning staff of the mission FHQ to have a better understanding of the operational area and the options available to mission elements and conflict parties, the process of AOE needs to be carried out. The AOE is a systematic and continuous process of analyzing the threats and the operational environment in order to produce an appropriate description of how they affect mandate implementation. Hence, this
process informs the Force Commander in selecting the appropriate Course of Action (COA) for an effective and efficient implementation of the mandate.

Specifically, the Mission Analysis must:

a. Analyse Higher Command Intent.
b. Draft Commander’s Intent.
c. Identify and analyse tasks.
d. Identify and analyse constraints and restrictions.
e. Identify and analyse critical facts and assumptions.
f. Draft the Mission Statement.
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Analyse Higher Command Intent

- Must understand the purpose of the operation and the key effects – Ideally at least two levels up.
- Must understand the key tasks – What is to be done.
- Must understand the commanders Scheme of Manoeuvre and synchronisation of effects – How.
- Identifies your role in the Commander’s plan and where the Main Effort will be – What are my Commander’s priorities and how do I fit into the plan.

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Draft Commander’s Intent

Purpose → Method → End State
Commander’s Intent provides specific military direction and intentions from the MILAD derived from the higher-level Directives and Mandates.

**Key Message:** Commander’s Intent is not meant to be too specific, it will not provide detailed tasks or actions, rather it provides direction to the planning officers so that they can determine the solution.

The end state should refer to conditions for the force to withdraw (the exit strategy) that can later be used to develop benchmarks against which progress can be measured.

The Commander’s Intent can be divided into three parts; purpose, method and end state.

a. The purpose provides the reason for the force conducting the operation.
b. The method describes generically how the purpose is to be achieved.
c. The end state defines the success criteria for completion of the operation.

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![Requirements of Commander’s Intent](image)
Example 1:

**Purpose:** Restore security in the AOR while dominating the area to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolution.

**Method:** Free movement of the population throughout the AOR without fear of attack or harassment by conflict parties or criminal gangs.

**End State:** Complete cessation of interference with humanitarian aid, attacks on civilians and hostilities against the UN’s presence.

Example 2:

**Purpose:** To Neutralise Conflict Parties’ ability to conduct offensive operations by conducting operational activities to seize all arms, ammunitions and war-like materials in the AO.

**Method:** Dominate the AO with a system of Checkpoints, Observation Posts and Patrols, then conduct Cordon & Search operations whiles providing intimate support to the disarmament processes in the AO.

**End state:** Conflict Parties do not have the capacity to threaten the peace process through the use of arms.

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**Learning Activity #1**

Analyze the following example of Commander’s Intent and answer the following questions:

- What is the reason to conduct the mission?
- What are the key tasks?
- How the objective is to be achieved?
- What are the commander’s priorities?
- What are the success criteria?
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**Commander’s Intent – Example**

- **Purpose:** To disrupt insurgents’ ability to conduct offensive operations by denying them access to XXX town, their key logistics hub.
- **Method:** I will use a robust joint military force to overwhelm insurgents and secure key infrastructure in XXX town, build defendable positions, & then expand our military presence to secure key LOC using force if required.
- **End State:** The deployment of a joint military force has reduced insurgent influence in, & ability to use, XXX town and the region; & enabled the expansion of TFG presence.

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**Identify and Analyse Tasks**

- Specified Tasks
- Implied Tasks
- Essential Tasks
**Key Message:** By categorising the required tasks as specified, implied and essential, the planning officer starts the process of shaping the operation. Generic orders now become much more specific and the planning process becomes much more focused.

**Specified tasks** are those found clearly stated within the USG’s Directive or Security Council Mandate. They must be completed because they have been ordered specifically from above (e.g. stabilize areas of tension, generate a safe and secure environment, Support HA and DDR, etc.).

**Implied tasks** are those that must be performed to accomplish a specified task, but which are not specifically ordered. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the directive or mandate, the enemy situation and courses of action, and the terrain. Analysis of the unit’s current location in relation to its future area of operations provides insights into implied tasks that may be required to perform specified tasks. Additionally, an analysis of the doctrinal requirements for each specified task might provide implied tasks. Only those implied tasks that require allocation of resources should be retained (e.g. establish liaison and monitoring mechanisms with local forces).

Once planning officers have a list of specified and implied tasks, they ensure they understand each task’s specific requirements. After analyzing specified and implied tasks, they present to the commander for his/her approval a tentative list of tasks that must be executed to accomplish the mission. These tasks are the **essential tasks**.

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**Learning Activity**

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**Learning Activity #2**

1. Discuss what are the specified tasks, implied tasks, and essential tasks for a peacekeeping infantry battalion.

2. Analyze the latest mandate of UNMISS and determine the tasks for an infantry of this mission.
Tasks Listed in the UN Infantry Battalion Manual

**Primary Tasks**
- Patrolling
- Observation Post
- Check Point
- Outreach & Engagement
- Situational Awareness
- Cordon & Search
- Convoy & escort
- Operation Base

**Support Tasks**
- Disarmament & Demobilization
- Critical Infrastructure & assets Protection
- Crowd Management
- Detention

**Other Tasks**
- Buffer Zone
- Joint Operations
- Reinforce/Relief
- Extract/Evacuate

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**Identify and Analyse Constraints and Restrictions**

- Constraints/limitations ("must do" actions)
- Restraints/Restrictions ("Must not do" actions)
- Caveats (Restrictions on the deployment or employment of forces)
**Key Message:** Operational Limitations include constraints and restrictions.

Constraints (also referred to as limitations) are characteristics that cannot be changed and that affect the conduct of operations, such as distances, timings, and limitations of own force equipment and capabilities.

Restrictions are actions that a superior authority imposes that affect the manner in which the subordinate commander can conduct the operation. Examples of restrictions are; being required not to break international laws or agreements, not to conduct a pre-emptive strike, and not to operate in a contested region.

Caveats – Restrictions attached to the deployment of troops or employment of resources (e.g. movement, use of aircraft or ROE limitations).

A simple way to remember the meaning of constraints and restrictions is;

a. constraints = ‘must do’ actions (i.e. must operate within an urban environment)

b. restrictions = ‘must not do’ actions (i.e. must not disrupt legal economic activity)
Learning Activity #3

Discuss the specified tasks, implied tasks, and essential tasks for the military component in a peacekeeping mission in the implementation of the POC mandate of MINUSMA, and answer the following questions:

- How is POC stipulated in the UNSCR mandate?
- What is the role of military forces in protecting civilians?
- What are specified, implied and essential POC tasks?
- What are the constraints that affect the conduct of POC tasks and operations?
- What are the limitations of our own forces capabilities?
**Key Message:** Planning officers gather two categories of information concerning the mission: facts and assumptions.

**Facts** are statements of known data or actual or existing circumstances of the operational environment including the Conflict Parties' and the mission components' strengths, dispositions, resources, etc. Critical facts are therefore those facts that need to be analysed because of their crucial importance in determining the state of affairs in the mission.

**Assumptions** are suppositions about the current or future situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place of necessary, but unavailable, facts and fill the gaps in what the commander and staff know about a situation. They are regularly validated.

**Example:** The population generally supports the implementation of the mandate and the presence of peacekeeping troops in the Mission area.
**Key Message:** An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity.

Validity means the assumption is likely to be true. “Assuming away” potential problems is dangerous. Necessity is whether or not the assumption is essential for planning. If planning can continue without the assumption, it is not necessary and should be discarded.

**Assumptions are replaced with facts as soon as possible.**
Key Message: On completion of analysing critical facts and assumptions, the planning officer will be left with many Information Requirements (IR), sourced from the list of assumptions, that need to be answered in order to effectively conduct the mission. The most important of these are termed Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).

CCIRs identify information needed by the commander to make critical decisions, especially to determine or validate courses of action. They help the commander filter information available to him/her by defining what is important to mission accomplishment. They also help focus the efforts of subordinates and staff, assist in the allocation of resources, and assist staff officers in making recommendations.

CCIR should be limited to ten or less to enhance comprehension. The CCIR directly affect the success or failure of the mission. This is what distinguishes them from other ‘nice to have’ Requests for Information (RFI) that will provide information that is valuable but will not change the way in which the operation is to be conducted.
The final output of this phase is the development of a mission statement if it hasn’t already been specifically provided by the commander from the beginning, or the development of a proposed mission statement for the commander’s approval.

**Key Message:** The mission statement should describe the task with a purpose, and can be expressed using the elements of who, what, when, where and why. The mission statement must precisely and concisely state the mission based on the previous steps in the Mission Analysis phase.
Breakdown of a Mission Statement

Who – Sector Northeast.....
What – is to conduct security operations.....
When – from 21 0800hr Oct 16......
Where – in the Company A’s AOR......
Why – in order to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the local population within a safe and secure environment.

Example of a Mission Statement

Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the UNPKO Military Component will contribute to the development of a sustainable security environment by protecting civilians within capabilities and in its area of deployment, and supporting the implementation of the XXX peace processes in order to foster the reinsertion of state authority.
Mission Analysis Brief - Purpose

• To integrate the planning efforts

• Seek approval of the re-stated Mission Statement.

• Obtain further guidance from the Commander

Mission Analysis Brief - Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Briefer</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Purpose of brief and current mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U2</td>
<td>AOE deductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threats’ Most Likely COA and Most Dangerous COA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U3</td>
<td>Facts and Assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of Higher Commander’s Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommended essential tasks and end state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U1</td>
<td>Personnel service support and key deductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U4</td>
<td>Sustainment capacity to achieve the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U5</td>
<td>Initial Intelligence Collection Plan (CICIs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommended broad COAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Proposed restated mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Guidance and intent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Learning Activity #4

**Scenario.** You are members of the FHQ staff of a UN mission. A crisis has broken out in your AOR’s neighbouring country where the UN established a new mission. UNHQ requires your mission to release an infantry battalion to support the new mission for 90 days. The COS has directed the FHQ staff to conduct a Mission Analysis and be prepared to give a Mission Analysis Brief with the following Force Commander’s guidance:

- Protection of civilians must remain our highest priority.
- We must continue to be prepared to deal with the all identified threats within the mission area.
- It is imperative that we remain prepared to respond quickly and robustly to deal with any cross-border threats to civilians.
- We will provide the reallocated infantry battalion with all necessary logistic and training support prior to its deployment.

Learning Activity #4 (cont’d)

**Requirement.** Using the reference material and the provided briefing template, each group needs to brief on the outcome of their mission analysis. The briefing is to be completed within 15 mins. Be prepared to answer questions from the FC throughout the brief.

- **Group 1.** AOE summary and threat ML COA and MD COA.
- **Group 2.** Facts, assumptions, higher commander’s intent, essential tasks and end-state.
- **Group 3.** Recommended CCIRs, broad COAs and restated mission, if required.
Learning Activity #5

**Decisive Tasks, Shaping Tasks and Sustainment Tasks**

**Task:** Read the following mandate of MINUSCA and list down separately the Decisive Tasks, Shaping Tasks and Sustainment Tasks.

**MINUSCA Mandate**

In its resolution 2301 adopted on 26 July, the Security Council decides that MINUSCA’s mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks established in paragraphs 33 to 36 of this resolution, and, when relevant, in a phased manner, and further requests the Secretary-General to reflect this prioritization in the deployment and in the allocation of resources to the mission;

The Security Council further requests the Secretary-General to reflect this prioritization in the deployment and in the allocation of resources to the mission;

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council authorized MINUSCA to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment.
Immediate priority tasks:

a) Protection of civilians:

- To protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the CAR authorities and the basic principles of peacekeeping in line with S/PRST/2015/22, the civilian population from threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, especially through maintaining a proactive deployment, a mobile and flexible posture, and active patrolling, including in areas of displacement and eventual return as well as at risk communities, while mitigating risks to civilians posed by its military and police operations;
- To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisers, Women Protection Advisers and Gender Advisers;
- To identify and report threats to and attacks against civilians and implement prevention and response plans and strengthen civil-military cooperation;
- To fully implement and deliver, in close consultation with humanitarian and human rights organizations and other relevant partners, the mission-wide protection of civilians strategy;

b) Promotion and protection of human rights:

- To monitor, help investigate, and report publicly and to the Security Council on violations of international humanitarian law and on violations and abuses of human rights committed throughout the CAR, including undertaking a mapping of such violations and abuses since 2003 to inform efforts to fight impunity;
- To monitor, help investigate and report on violations and abuses committed against children and women, including rape and other forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;
- To assist the CAR authorities in their efforts to protect and promote human rights and prevent violations and abuses, including through the establishment of a national human rights commission and to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations;

c) Facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance:

- To improve coordination with humanitarian actors, in order to facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered, civilian-Fed delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with United Nations guiding humanitarian principles and relevant provisions of international law, and for the voluntary safe, dignified and sustainable return
or local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons or refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors;

d) Protection of the United Nations

- To protect the United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

Core priority tasks:

a) Support for the reconciliation and stabilization political processes, the extension of State authority and the preservation of territorial integrity:

- To provide good offices and technical expertise in support of efforts to address the root causes of conflict, in particular in mediation and reconciliation processes, inclusive national dialogue, transitional justice and conflict-resolution mechanisms, working with relevant regional and local bodies and religious leaders, while ensuring the full and effective participation of women in line with the CAR action plan on Women, Peace and Security;

- To support efforts of the CAR authorities to address marginalization and local grievances, including through dialogue with the armed groups, civil society leaders including women and youth representatives, and by assisting national, prefectural and local authorities to foster confidence among communities;

- To support a gradual handover of security of key officials, and static guard duties of national institutions, to the CAR security forces, in coordination with the CAR Authorities, and based on the risks on the ground;

- To advise the government in its engagement with neighbouring countries, the ECCAS, and the AU, in consultation with UNOCA;

- To promote and support the rapid extension of State authority over the entire territory of the CAR, including by supporting the immediate redeployment of police and gendarmerie in priority areas and main supply routes, which would contribute to the development of stable security institutions in more remote areas;

- To reinforce co-location of MINUSCA with vetted and trained national police and gendarmerie in agreed priority areas, as part of the deployment of the territorial administration and other rule of law authorities, for increasing State presence in these priority areas outside of Bangui;
• To help the CAR authorities in developing and implementing a nationally-owned strategy to address illegal taxation and illicit exploitation of natural resources related to the presence of armed groups;

• To actively seize, confiscate and destroy, as appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of armed elements, including all militias and other non-state armed groups, who refuse or fail to lay down their arms;

b) Security Sector Reform (SSR)

• To provide strategic and technical advice to the CAR authorities to design and implement a strategy for the SSR, taking into account the work done by EUMAM-RCA and in close coordination with EUTM-RCA, and with the aim of ensuring coherence of the SSR process, including through a clear delineation of responsibilities of the FACA, the internal security forces, and other uniformed entities, as well as the democratic control of both defence and internal security forces;

• To support the CAR authorities in developing an approach to the vetting of defence and security elements (FACA, police and gendarmerie) which includes human rights vetting, in particular to promote accountability of violations of international and domestic law amongst security forces and in the context of any integration of demobilized armed groups elements into security sector institutions;

• To take a leading role in supporting the CAR authorities on the reform and development of the police and the gendarmerie, through the design and implementation of a capacity-building and development plan, undertaken pursuant to an overall security sector reform strategy, and by providing technical assistance, in close coordination with other technical assistance providers, to the CAR Government;

• To support the CAR government in developing an incentive structure for police and gendarmerie and the selection, recruitment, vetting and training of police and gendarmerie to include at least 500 new police and gendarmerie elements, with the support of donors and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), taking into account the need to recruit women, and in full compliance with the UN Human rights due diligence policy (HRDDP);

• To coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners in the CAR, in particular with EUTM-RCA, in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of SSR, for the benefit of both the FACA and the CAR internal security forces (police and gendarmerie);

• To coordinate with the CAR authorities in designing a plan for the progressive, and coordinated re-operationa...
within the framework of the SSR programme and in compliance with the HRDDP, in close coordination with EUTM-RCA;

c) Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR)

- To support the CAR Authorities in developing and implementing an inclusive and progressive programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and, in case of foreign elements, Repatriation (DDRR), of members of armed groups, based on the Principles of DDR and Integration into the Uniformed Corps, signed at the Bangui Forum on 10 May 2015, while paying specific attention to the needs of children associated with armed forces and groups;

- To support the CAR authorities in undertaking an inclusive dialogue on community security and local development with members of armed groups and other national stakeholders, including representatives of local communities, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflict;

- To support the CAR authorities and relevant civil society organizations in developing and implementing Community Violence Reduction programmes for members of armed groups non-eligible for participation in the national DDRR programme;

- To provide technical assistance to the CAR authorities in developing and implementing a national plan for the integration of eligible demobilized members of armed groups into the security and defence forces, in line with the broader SSR agenda;

- To provide technical assistance to the CAR authorities in their development and operationalization of a national commission for Small Arms and Light Weapons to address civilian disarmament and the fight against the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons;

- To destroy, as appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of disarmed combatants in keeping with its effort to seize and collect arms and related materiel the supply, sale or transfer of which violate the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 2262 (2016);

d) Assistance to advance the rule of law and combat impunity

**Urgent temporary measures:**

- To urgently and actively adopt, within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment, at the formal request of the CAR Authorities and in areas where national security forces are not present or operational, urgent temporary measures on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent and without prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations, which are limited in scope, time-bound and consistent with the objectives set out in
Module 3 – Lesson 1.3: Mission Analysis

paragraphs 33, 34 (a) and 35 (a), to arrest and detain in order to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity;

- To pay particular attention, in implementing the urgent temporary measures in the conditions stated above, to those engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR, including acts that threaten or impede the political process, or the stabilization and reconciliation process, or that fuel violence;

- Requests the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Security Council any measures that may be adopted on this basis;

e) Fight against impunity, including the Special Criminal Court (SCC):

- To provide technical assistance to the CAR Authorities to identify, investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law and of violations and abuses of human rights committed throughout the CAR so that they can be brought to justice, and to help prevent such violations and abuses;

- To provide support and to coordinate international assistance to the justice and correctional institutions to reinstate the criminal justice system, within the framework of the United Nations global focal point on rule of law, in a manner that emphasizes civilian oversight, impartiality and the protection of human rights;

- To provide technical assistance to the CAR Authorities in partnership with other international partners, to operationalize the SCC consistent with CAR laws and jurisdiction and in line with the CAR’s international humanitarian law and international human rights law obligations, with the aim of supporting the extension of State authority;

- To provide technical assistance, in partnership with other international partners, and capacity building for the CAR authorities, in order to facilitate the functioning of the SCC, in particular in the areas of investigations, arrests, detention, criminal and forensic analysis, evidence collection and storage, recruitment and selection of personnel, court management, prosecution strategy and case development and the establishment of a legal aid system, as appropriate, as well as, to provide security for magistrates, including at the premises and proceedings of the SCC, and take measures for the protection of victims and witnesses, in line with the CAR’s international human rights obligations, including with respect to fair trials, and due process;

- To assist in the coordination and mobilization of bilateral and multilateral support to the operationalization and functioning of the SCC;

**Essential tasks:**
(a) Support for national and international justice and the rule of law

- To help reinforce the independence of the judiciary, build the capacities, and enhance the effectiveness and accountability of the national judicial and penitentiary system;

- To help build the capacities of the national human rights institution coordinating with the Independent Expert on human rights as appropriate;

- without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the CAR authorities, to support the restoration and maintenance of public safety and the rule of law, including through apprehending and handing over to the CAR authorities, consistent with international law, those in the country responsible for crimes involving serious human rights violations and abuses and serious violations of international humanitarian law so that they can be brought to justice, and through cooperation with States of the region as well as the ICC in cases of crimes falling within its jurisdiction;

- To provide strategic, policy and technical advice to the CAR authorities to design and implement a comprehensive strategy for transitional justice;

b) Illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources

- To support the CAR authorities to develop a nationally-owned strategy to tackle the illicit exploitation and trafficking networks of natural resources which continue to fund and supply armed groups in the CAR taking into account, where appropriate, the reports of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and the decisions of the Kimberley Process (KP), with the aim of extending the State authority over the entire territory and its resources;

Additional tasks:

- To coordinate international assistance as appropriate;

- To assist the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 57 of resolution 2127 (2013) and the Panel of Experts established by the same resolution, including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the mandate of the Committee and Panel of Experts;

- To monitor the implementation of the measures renewed and modified by paragraph 1 of resolution 2262 (2016), in cooperation with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), including by inspecting, as it deems necessary and when appropriate without notice, all arms and related materiel regardless of location, and advise the Authorities on efforts to keep armed groups from exploiting natural resources;
• To seize and collect arms and any related materiel the transfer of which to the CAR violates the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) and to record and dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate;

• To provide transport for relevant State authorities in carrying out inspections and monitoring visits in key mining areas and sites as appropriate and on a case by case basis and when the situation allows, as a means to promote and support the rapid extension of the State authority over the entire territory;

Learning Activity #6

Decisive Tasks, Shaping Tasks and Sustainment Tasks

Task: Read the enclosed Security Council Resolution 2304 (2016) and list down separately the Decisive Tasks, Shaping Tasks and Sustainment Tasks.
Having thoroughly analysed the requirements of the mission, and after receiving command guidance and approval of the proposed mission statement, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander must involve him/herself in their development. His/her guidance and intent focus the staff’s creativity to produce a comprehensive, flexible plan within the time constraints. His/her direct participation helps the staff get quick, accurate answers to questions that occur during the process. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable COAs (difficult for the enemy to deduce).
Key Message: The centre of gravity (COG) for any force can be defined as the characteristic, capability or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to engage in the operation.
Module 3 – Lesson 1.4: Course of Action Development

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**Example Centres of Gravity**

- Ability to see, move and respond quickly and decisively
- UN Mandate – legitimacy, international support
- Local support – consent and trust

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**Elements of Centre of Gravity**

- Critical Capabilities
- Critical Vulnerabilities
- Critical Requirements

Understanding own and adversary’s COG is critical to developing a successful plan.
A COG will consist of:

- Critical Capabilities (a characteristic of key element of a force that if destroyed or neutralised will significantly undermine operational capability);

- Critical Requirements (an essential condition, resource or means that is needed for a critical capability to be fully functional); and,

- Critical Vulnerabilities (an element of a critical requirement that is vulnerable or that can be made vulnerable).

While a COG can have several elements, there can be only one COG for each force. Understanding own and adversary’s COG is critical to developing a successful plan.

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Key Message: Directly targeting the adversary’s COG may not always be the most effective approach to defeating the adversary. The aim is to affect the adversary COG while avoiding their strengths and minimizing the risks to own force. To do this effectively, the CriticalCapabilities of both own and adversary forces must be analysed.

When conducting this analysis, it is important to remember that it is not simply a comparison of the two forces that is being conducted. The analysis must result in identifying critical capabilities of the adversary that are vulnerable and can therefore be targeted, and identifying critical capabilities of own force that are vulnerable and therefore need to be well defended.

A simple comparison of forces for a peacekeeping operation will almost always show that the peacekeeping force has greater strength than the adversary, but such a simple comparison is dangerous because that strength advantage only matters if it is used to advantage.
Key Message: A Decisive Point (DP) is the achievement of desired effects.

A DP may be a physical effect, such as securing a vital piece of local infrastructure or destroying a piece of adversary equipment, or it may be less tangible such as winning the support of the local population or degradation of the adversary’s will to fight.

A DP is decisive because the operation cannot progress further until it has been achieved. DPs should be described in terms of their effect, must be measurable and have a clearly articulated purpose.
**Key Message:** A Line of Operation (LOO) is the linking of Decisive Points to achieve the required effect on the adversary's COG.

A LOO may be expressed functionally, such as a logistics LOO or a humanitarian LOO, or environmentally, such as land LOO or a maritime LOO.

The result of this step is that the operation will be broken down into distinguishable Lines of Operation with easily identifiable Decisive Points that must be achieved in order for the operation to progress.
Key Message: Broad COAs are developed by scoping the various ways in which the mission can be achieved, guided by the multitude of parameters imposed by the planning process thus far that increase the likelihood of mission success.

Each COA considered must meet the criteria of:

- **Suitability.** It must accomplish the mission and comply with the commander’s guidance. If it cannot achieve the mission then it is not an acceptable COA.

- **Feasibility.** The PKO must have the capability to accomplish the mission in terms of available time, space, and resources.

- **Acceptability.** The tactical or operational advantage gained by executing the COA must justify the cost in resources, especially casualties.

- **Distinguishability/Exclusivity.** Each COA must differ significantly from any others, otherwise the staff are not providing the commander with real alternatives.

- **Completeness.** It must be a complete mission statement.
Key Message: A broad COA should only be considered if it can achieve the mission statement and comply with the commander’s guidance. COAs should not be developed just for the sake of providing choices. As soon as it is apparent that a COA cannot meet the criteria, it should be dismissed.

The commander only wants to be presented with options that can achieve success. Planning officers should also be wary of forming a bias in favour of any given COA, and push that as the best option. The best COA will be chosen once all COAs have been objectively analysed, and each COA needs to presented objectively. A good COA positions the force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution.

Suitability - Will it result in Mission accomplishment?
Feasibility - Achievable within allocated resources?
Acceptability - Accepted doctrine, risk, etc.
Exclusivity - Different from other COAs?
Completeness - Answers the 5W questions?
Key Message: Planning officers must now turn broad concepts into real options. This increase in detail is required for the COAs to be properly tested and for the commander to receive enough information to make a quality decision.

This step requires planning officers to develop each COA almost to the point being able to write a CONOPS document for each one. Failing to develop each COA to this detail won’t allow the COAs to be analysed well enough to result in the best COA being chosen by the commander.

To develop the COAs in enough detail, at a minimum the following must be considered for each COA:

- Main effort.
- Supporting effort.
- Integration of different Lines of Operation.
- Command, control and communications.
- Adversary threats, risks and COA.
- Tested against suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguish-ability and completeness.
The Main Effort establishes an activity, the successful accomplishment of which is decisive to the achievement of the mission. This is normally resourced to ensure the responsibility for its execution is assigned.

The Scheme of Manoeuvre gives a general description of how the intent is to be achieved.

For each COA, the Scheme of Manoeuvre usually provides an understanding of the manner in which the mission would be accomplished by assigning roles to sub-units and other resources to be employed. Also, the Main Effort, End State, and Success Criteria have to be designated and well defined.
**Module 3 – Lesson 1.4: Course of Action Development**

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**COA Presentation Example**

**COA #1**

- **Intent:**
- **SOM:** (Scheme of maneuver)
- **ME:** (Main Effort)
- **End State:**
- **Success Criteria:**

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**Synchronisation Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSN</th>
<th>INTENT</th>
<th>END STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td></td>
<td>H + 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H + 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H + 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H + 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H HR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>H + 72</td>
<td>H + 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H + 36</td>
<td>H + 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H + 12</td>
<td>H HR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **MANOEUVRE:**
  - SUB UNIT 1
  - SUB UNIT 2
  - SUB UNIT 3
  - MOBILE RES
  - RES SUB UNIT
  - GS
- **SP ARM:**
  - ENGR
  - COMM & TC
- **SVC:**
  - LES
  - INS
  - ES
**Key Message:** A Synchronisation Matrix is an effective way to organise the details of each COA.

The synchronisation matrix lists the main events of each line of operation against each phase, for both own force and adversary. This allows the commander to see what is supposed to occur and when. It also allows the Decisive Points to be highlighted so the commander can focus his or her attention accordingly.

The lines of operation will differ for each operation, and only some of them will be the responsibility for the military force. However, coordinating all of them is necessary for the peacekeeping plan to be successful.

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The analysis of the COAs leads to the comparison of their individual advantages and disadvantages. From here, the COAs are compared with each other using the same criteria to determine the most appropriate COA. This exercise is called Course of Action Comparison.

Although Course of Action Comparison is combined with the Course of Action Analysis, it is classified as a separate step by some military doctrines.
COA Comparison entails the juxtaposing the most feasible COAs against a criterion in order to select the most feasible COA for the operation.

The criterion for comparison is decided upon considering factors such as the aim of the operation, the assigned mission, commander’s intent (up to two-levels-up), the ROE, etc.

Available criteria include Functions in Combat, SWOT Analysis, and Principles of Peacekeeping, etc. The chosen criterion is then weighted against the COAs.

For DPKO led peacekeeping missions, the use of the Peacekeeping effort, Guiding Principles and other factors like Risks for mission personnel and country elements as well as peculiar mission specific factors are recommended.
Learning Activity

1. Analyze the two Courses of Action for the deployment of UN military component in Carana mentioned in the following slides
2. Make COA comparison with the given format
3. Give a short COA brief

Course of Action (COA1)

**Intent:** To restore peace and security in Carana through effective safeguarding of the United Nations demilitarised zone while dominating the Area of Operation to ensure compliance with UN Security Council Resolution.

**SOM:** To divide the force into three sectors, secure the demilitarised zones with a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and Obs Posts with each sector maintaining a company size reserve for employment under orders of Force HQ.

**ME:** Safeguarding the United Nations demilitarised zones and population centres in each Sector

**End State:** Complete cessation of hostilities in Carana with UNAC presence felt in the entire country

**Success Criteria:** Free movement of UNCT and locals throughout Carana without fear of attack or harassment by conflict parties or criminal gangs.
Note: This COA seeks to decentralise the Force’s enabling units to the various Sectors while maintaining a battlegroup size Force Mobile Reserve at Xalksa to be ready to reinforce any of the sectors.

The demilitarised zones will be safeguarded with a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and OPs.

Note: This COA seeks to centralise the Force’s enabling units at Xalksa with a strong (brigade group size) Force Mobile Reserve ready to support any of the sectors while maintaining a system of Checkpoints, Patrols and OPs to safeguard the demilitarised zones.
Module 3 – Lesson 1.4: Course of Action Development

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**COA Comparison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA1 (Statement/or Schematic)</th>
<th>COA2 (Statement/or Schematic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intent</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM ME</td>
<td>SOM ME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADVANTAGES</strong></td>
<td><strong>CRITERIA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Use of Force</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on Investment</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary (of advantages and disadvantages)

Total Score: 26 vs. 19 Total Score

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**COA Decision Brief Template**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Briefer</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Higher Commander’s Intent, situation, HOMC Guidance, conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U2</td>
<td>AOE (Relevant aspects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Ops / U3</td>
<td>Re-stated Mission and Status of own forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff branches - U1, 4, 5, 6, 9</td>
<td>Own situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Plans / U5</td>
<td>COA Comparison (including risks and control measures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Apportion tasks to staff areas: plan for the further development of the selected COA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Staff Officers would upon completing the COA analysis, prepare a COA Decision Brief for presentation to the FC. The purpose of a Decision Briefing is to obtain the commander’s decision on a recommended COA.

Staff Officers will present the COAs where possible using graphics and sketches to justify their recommendations including draft Task Organisations (Task Orgs), the assumptions used and make recommendations. The commander, by his/her judgement may accept, modify, or even decline the COAs.

Upon completion of the Decision Brief, the FC makes his/her decision on one or two COAs and provides further guidance for the next step of the MCPP – Development of CONOPS and Orders. If the FC selects two, s/he may indicate which COA has priority over the other. The Chief of Staff will then apportion tasks to the staff for the further development of the selected COA – Synchronisation Matrix.

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Headings of the Op Plan

- BACKGROUND
- CURRENT SITUATION
  - Conflict Parties
  - Own Forces
  - Assumptions
  - Limitations and Constraints
- MISSION
- EXECUTION
  - Concept of Operations
  - Tasks
  - Coordinating Instructions
- INTEGRATED SUPPORT SYSTEM
Module 3 – Lesson 1.4: Course of Action Development

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Example - OP ORDER

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Summary of Key Messages

- Steps to develop COAs:
  1. Confirm Centre of Gravity (COG)
  2. Conduct Critical Capability Analysis
  3. Develop decisive points (DP) and lines of operation (LOO)
  4. Develop broad COAs
  5. Develop detailed COAs

- The COG for any force can be defined as the characteristic, capability or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to engage in the operation.

- Each COA must be suitable; feasible; acceptable; distinguishable; and complete.
Starting the Lessons

Aim
The aim of these lessons is to inform military staff officers in missions on the concepts and practices of intelligence acquisition and processing in a complex United Nations peace operation environment.

Unit Content
Lesson 2.1: Peacekeeping Intelligence Overview
Lesson 2.2: Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle
Lesson 2.3: Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle Management Tools

Learning Outcomes
- Understand intelligence acquisition principles
- Understand the mission intelligence cycle
- Identify various techniques/methods of intelligence acquisition
- Identify the various products of processed intelligence
- Recognize and protect sensitive intelligence
Lecture Content

- Why “Information” has changed to “Intelligence”
- Definition and objectives of Peacekeeping Intelligence
- Principles of Peacekeeping Intelligence
Why has the UN now embraced Intelligence instead of Information?

- Mandates and operating environments of United Nations peacekeeping missions have evolved, so too have the capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyse information.

- In high-tempo, complex and dangerous environments, where asymmetric and transnational threats pose serious dangers to peacekeepers and negatively impact mandate implementation, there is a need for peacekeeping missions to better understand their operating environments and contexts, maintain a strategic overview of developments, and predict specific threats and opportunities to enable peacekeepers to effectively execute their mandates.
These evolving requirements have led the Security Council, Member States and the Secretariat to give increasing consideration to peacekeeping intelligence as a critical enabler to permit missions to operate safely and effectively. In resolution 1894 of 2009, the Security Council called on the Secretariat to give “priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, including information and intelligence resources, in the implementation of mandates” for the protection of civilians. The Council has since highlighted the need for intelligence capacities for MINUSMA in light of its complex security environment, notably in resolution 2295 of 2016.

**Key Message:** The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) has also recognized the importance of enhancing information gathering and analysis. In its 2017 report (A/71/19), the Special Committee “recognizes that some peacekeeping missions have been deployed in fragile political and security environments with asymmetrical and complex threats. In this context, the Special Committee recalls […] its request for the Secretariat to develop a more cohesive and integrated United Nations system for situational awareness...”

The Special Committee has highlighted, inter alia, the importance of complementarity with other approaches to safety and security; that peacekeeping intelligence policies and practices must uphold the principles of the UN Charter and of peacekeeping; that respect the sovereignty of host and neighbouring states must be ensured; and that the security and confidentiality of sensitive information must be carefully managed.
Module 3 – Lesson 2.1: Peacekeeping Intelligence Overview

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**Definition**

Peacekeeping intelligence is the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate.

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**Objectives of Peacekeeping Intelligence**

- Support a common operational picture
- Provide early warning of imminent threats
- Identify risks and opportunities
Key Message: The fundamental purpose of peacekeeping intelligence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to enable missions to take decisions on appropriate actions to fulfil mandates effectively and safely.

Specifically, peacekeeping intelligence is intended to:

- Support a common operational picture: Up-to-date, accurate peacekeeping intelligence supports the establishment and maintenance of a coherent, real-time, operational understanding of the mission area to support planning and operations.

- Provide early warning of imminent threats: Peacekeeping intelligence contributes to early warning of imminent threat to life, major destruction of property, significant restrictions of movement, etc., in order to enable the mission to act appropriately in accordance with its mandate.

- Identify risks and opportunities: Peacekeeping intelligence can provide mission leadership with an enhanced understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape, and of associated risks and opportunities for mandate implementation, including with respect to the safety and security of UN and associated personnel.

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These overarching principles shall inform all activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations at all stages of the management of peacekeeping intelligence. All subordinate guidance, directives, plan and operations will comply with and apply these principles.

**Under rules:** All peacekeeping intelligence activities will be undertaken in line with the Security Council mandates of peacekeeping operations, in full compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and consistent with the overall legal framework governing United Nations peacekeeping operations, including all legal and human rights standards and obligations.

Peacekeeping intelligence activities must be conducted with full respect for human rights, including in particular the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association.

**Clandestine activities**, defined as the acquisition of intelligence conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of the activities because they are illicit and/or are inconsistent with the legal framework, principles, policies and mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, are **outside the boundaries of peacekeeping intelligence** and shall not be undertaken by participating mission entities.
Regular training and education including standardized pre-deployment training for all personnel involved in all aspects of peacekeeping intelligence as well as regular audit and oversight of the peacekeeping intelligence workflow will reinforce this principle.

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**Learning Activity**

**Learning Activity #1**

Form two groups.

Debate over the pros and cons of having clandestine intelligence in peacekeeping missions.
Within mandates: The acquisition and management of peacekeeping intelligence by United Nations peacekeeping operations will be conducted exclusively in support of the effective and efficient implementation of missions’ mandates, including with respect to the safety and security of United Nations personnel.
Independence: The peacekeeping intelligence activities of peacekeeping operations will be fully autonomous from and independent in all aspects of any national intelligence systems or other operations and will maintain their exclusively international character.

Missions may liaise with non-mission entities for the purposes of receiving intelligence and may share specific intelligence with non-mission entities, including host states, provided they do so under conditions and within the parameters described in this document and related guidance.
Accountability, capability and authority: Those that are given the authority to make decisions in regards to peacekeeping intelligence activities must have the proper capabilities to execute these functions, and remain accountable for the effective execution of these responsibilities within their respective chains of command to the Head of Mission and ultimately to the Secretary-General.

Within the mission, the Head of Mission is accountable for the functioning of the peacekeeping intelligence system, and is responsible to ensure effective governance, training and practices are in place for personnel engaged with or using peacekeeping intelligence products to ensure compliance with this Policy and associated guidance.
Security and confidentiality: Peacekeeping intelligence shall be stored and shared in a secure manner, ensuring proper access for those who require it for decision-making and operational planning.

Based on an assessment of risk, missions will put in place procedural, technological and physical security tools in consultation with DPKO and DFS Headquarters to ensure secure information management and communications within the peacekeeping intelligence system. Confidential peacekeeping intelligence products shall be shared and disseminated on the basis of the “need to know” and “need to share” concepts, which require that peacekeeping intelligence should be disclosed to mission personnel if and only if access to said information is required for them to carry out their official duties.

It also requires a written delegation of authority from the originator or staff member who originally applied the classification level. It implies that peacekeeping intelligence is only disclosed to trusted individuals to ensure that it is not widely disseminated, in particular where disclosure is likely to endanger the safety or security of any individual or group, violate rights or invade privacy. In doing so, missions will seek to establish and maintain a high degree of confidence among all of their interlocutors in their ability to appropriately acquire, protect and manage peacekeeping intelligence.
Module 3 – Lesson 2.1: Peacekeeping Intelligence Overview

Learning Activity #2

Based on the peacekeeping intelligence principles, discuss the do’s and don’ts for military peacekeepers in the provision of intelligence support.

Summary of Key Messages

• The fundamental purpose of peacekeeping intelligence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to enable missions to take decisions on appropriate actions to fulfil mandates effectively and safely.

• Principles of Peacekeeping Intelligence include:
  1. Under Rules
  2. Within Mandates
  3. Independence
  4. Accountability, capability and authority
  5. Security and confidentiality
Key Message: The peacekeeping intelligence cycle is the process by which peacekeeping intelligence is acquired, examined/collated, analysed and disseminated based on clearly identified Intelligence Requirements.

Standards, tools, techniques and procedures for the effective and efficient completion of each stage of the cycle by individual mission components are the subjects of subordinate operational guidance.
Key Message: Direction refers to the process of identifying questions that need to be answered, specifying outstanding “Information or Intelligence Requirements (IRs)” in relation to those questions, and seeking this information through a variety of means.

Direction ensures strong central control of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle, tying the requirements of the Head of Mission and his/her Senior Leadership Team to the management of peacekeeping intelligence. It provides the basis for IRs, prioritization of tasks and timeframes shall flow through the peacekeeping intelligence management structures established in the mission.

Decisions on intelligence activities shall be taken under the authority and accountability of the Head of Mission or within the delegated authority he or she designates.
In a UN peacekeeping mission, the HoM together with the MLT are responsible for the Priority Information Requirement (PIR) which is the tasking order that prioritize the mission information requirement.

When a member other than HoM/MLT requires the analysis of information other than already in the PIR, the Request for Information (RFI) is issued. All these activities are concentrated and directed to the JMAC.

Information requirements are established and prioritized to support decision-making. Staff and technical resources to fulfil these requirements are defined as well as timelines. Use of collection assets is planned and coordinated to respond to various simultaneous requirements. In the field, this will be coordinated (pending the set-up of a mission between FHQ J2 – Military Information Branch, JOC and JMAC) by JMAC.
Learning Activity #1
(Part 1 of 2)
Discuss the intelligence support requirements and tasking considerations for the following situations:

- Quick Impact Projects
- Convoy escort
- IED disposal
- IDP camp protection
- UN camp perimeter defense

Learning Activity #1
(Part 2 of 2)
Based on the discussions of the different situations, answer the following questions:

- What information is required?
- How do we collect it?
- What is the priority?
- How do we synchronize/coordinate efforts?
- What is the timeframe?
**Key Message:** Acquisition refers to the process of obtaining data and information to serve as the basis for analysis. Effective acquisition requires direction and planning to ensure resources are used in such a manner as to most effectively meet the IRs. This includes tasking assets according to IRs, ensuring intelligence is reported in a timely manner, tasking assets within their capabilities, and putting in place mechanisms to ensure corroboration and/or verification of information and data as appropriate.

The parameters for the effective, responsible and ethical acquisition of peacekeeping intelligence shall be described in the mission’s Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan. In addition to being compliant with this and other United Nations policy and guidance, the latter will describe acceptable and unacceptable tools, techniques and procedures of peacekeeping intelligence acquisition by the mission, applicable legal obligations, and considerations that shall be undertaken when acquiring intelligence, based on the assets available to the mission and in line with operational guidance subordinate to this Policy.

In addition to the acquisition of peacekeeping intelligence through the tasking of mission acquisition assets, missions may receive intelligence voluntarily provided by Member States as well as other non-mission entities and shall establish mechanisms to facilitate the secure receipt and handling of such products. In liaising with external parties for the acquisition of intelligence, mission personnel shall fully observe and shall
act in consistence with the mission’s mandate and all principles, rules and obligations of
the Organization, including in regard to the promotion and protection of international
human rights laws and norms. Liaison with non-mission entities for the purposes of
sharing intelligence may also be governed by written arrangements agreed between
the United Nations and such parties, within these broader parameters.

Sources of Information: Signal Information (SIGINF) including Communications
Information (COMINF) and Electronic Information (ELINF), Imagery Information (IMINF),
Human Information (HUMINF), media, reports, other agencies, NGOs, IOs, other sources.

SIGINF is a very important source of information gathering, but SIGINF is an asset for UN
to be sceptical as a means of information gathering. It could violate privacy and
national laws. To overcome fear of broad phone surveillance in the national and
international community, the UN could limit such monitoring to ‘tactical’ level, meaning
that surveillance would be confined to current operations and for specifically-approved
targets.

Broadly speaking, Signals Information cover the following:

- Communications Information (phone taps, interception of faxes, monitoring
  radio exchanges etc), i.e. words
- Electronic Information (electromagnetic, non-communications transmissions like
  radar and aircraft IFF (automated aircraft identification signals) – i.e. non-verbal
  electronic signals

IMINF will be critical to support the decision-making process and also during operations.
However, it should be used in the most cost-effective way since most of its equipment is
highly expensive and contingents would not contribute those assets very easily.

Imagery Information (any imagery ranging from satellites, to mission helicopters, to
snapshots taken by an observer or tourist).

Examples MINUSTAH successfully used photos of gang men and their leaders in
screening individuals entering or leaving cordoned off areas. Aerial imagery was
also used to provide near-real time information and all up-to-date maps to be
produced.

Another example is the use of Satellite Imagery for Haiti, where it contributed to
situational awareness in planning in the aftermath of the earthquake. Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and balloons have also been used in some missions like
MINUSMA and UNMISS to collect intelligence.

HUMINF – Human Information. Proved to be key sources, while technologies helped
considerably (MINUSTAH 2006-07).

Usually UN peacekeeping missions are deployed in underdeveloped countries, where
most of the infrastructure has been destroyed and/or the country's high-tech industry
has not even begun.
Module 3 – Lesson 2.2: Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle

Most PKO missions are believed to be a HUMINF-rich environment (e.g. UNPOL, UNMO, DSS, civil affairs, political affairs, human rights components, and force elements as well as outside sources of information, e.g. representatives from UN agencies, UNICEF, UNDP, NGOs, etc.).

HUMINF is commonly used in peacekeeping operations as it can be conducted openly to maintain impartiality, and has little cost associated to it unlike the more high-tech methods that require skilled operators, maintainers and analysts.

- **Advantages** – can be real-time; Provides a ‘feeling on the ground’; Can reveal direct and indirect relationships (political, financial, military, criminal, romantic); Cost-effective

- **Limitations** – time lag between collection and reporting/verifying can render the information useless; no certainty of collection success; may be politically sensitive; often difficult to determine reliability of sources or verify the information.

OSINF (Open source information) is a collaborative source of information in creating and sustaining effective partnerships between UN agencies, NGOs as well as indigenous organizations. In actuality, the vast majority of information is not secret and may be collected by different components of the mission such as military, police, human rights, civil affairs, political affairs, child protection, etc. However, information collected by different mission actors needs to be properly analysed as well as purpose oriented.

There are many sources to join this open source gathering; National, military, law enforcement, business, academic, NGO or media, and civilian groups. These groups can contribute to the collective intelligence of all people. Open source information collation and analysis efforts should be enhanced in other agencies that have been present in the mission area for some time and will likely have well established collection methods and networks. This includes humanitarian actors, though interaction with them must take due consideration to the need to preserve their ‘humanitarian space’.
Learning Activity #2

Discuss the following questions:

- What intelligence acquisition means are there in a peacekeeping mission?
- Are there differences in intelligence collection for military, police and civilian components?
- What are the pros and cons of each intelligence acquisition method?
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Common Intelligence Acquisition Methods

- Patrons (vehicle, aerial, foot, boat, market, day and night)
- Routine Liaison Visits
- Static or mobile checkpoints
- Observation Posts
- Community Liaison Assistants

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Aerial Reconnaissance

- Reach remote and inaccessible areas
- Quickly deployable to respond to emergency situations
- Centralized airspace management
- UAVs or tethered balloon
Key Message: Aerial reconnaissance is needed to quickly reach remote and inaccessible areas. It can be quickly deployed and allows missions to respond to emergency situations.

The United Nations will rely primarily on Member States’ provided aerial reconnaissance assets. Commercial options could be considered when member states provided assets are not available, particularly in the early stages of a field mission.

Airspace management rests with the Aviation Section for both manned and remote-controlled air assets. Centralized airspace management ensures that manned aircraft are kept safely clear of UAVs or tethered balloons as approved by national civil airspace authorities.

Key Message: Signals Monitoring are means designed to monitor or to analyze radio communication and other electromagnetic emissions in support of situational awareness and decision making of senior mission management.

Modalities for the use of signals monitoring will be defined in the SOFA/SOMA and/or in bilateral arrangements with the host-country.
Key Message: Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is an openly mounted surveillance device whose presence should also have a dissuasive and preventive effect.

Deployment of CCTV devices should seek to minimize intrusiveness and impact on the local population. With regards to privacy and data storage, UN practice should abide by local or national laws and regulations, in particular for the amount of time data (pictures) can be stored.
Key Message: Data acquired by missions shall be recorded and stored in a manner that permits convenient comparison, evaluation, assessment, retrieval, analysis and reporting.

Participating mission entities shall make use of standardized tools for the collation of data, including common databases, taxonomies and planned indexing and menus. DPKO and DFS will design and promulgate, in consultation with missions, common and, where necessary, specialized tools, which shall be supported by training.
Key Message: Analysis refers to the methodical breaking down of information into its component parts; examination of each to find interrelationships; and application of reasoning to determine the meaning of the parts and the whole.

Through the retrieval of collated information acquired through the tasking assets, peacekeeping intelligence analysts shall apply processes of reasoning, integration and interpretation using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies.
**Key Message:** Peacekeeping intelligence analysis shall be a whole-of-mission process that makes full use of all resources available to the mission according to the comparative advantages, including expertise in the local situation, languages and cultures; military and police intelligence analysis capabilities; and security threat information analysis techniques.
**Key Message:** Dissemination (also referred to as “distribution” in some UN and DPKO/DFS information management guidance) is the process of conveying peacekeeping intelligence to mission decision-makers and other relevant mission personnel.

Peacekeeping intelligence products developed as part of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle may be disseminated directly by individual participating mission entities to their respective managers, or jointly through the mission intelligence coordination structure.

The delegation of authority to disseminate peacekeeping intelligence products shall be clearly identified as part of the mission’s Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan and/or internal guidance for participating mission entities.

The dissemination of peacekeeping intelligence products shall be done in compliance with the “need to know/need to share” concepts as well as the UN Information Security Classifications organizational requirements for information classification, security, handling, ownership and sharing.
UN Strictly Confidential applies to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE or IMPEDE THE CONDUCT OF THE WORK of the United Nations.

UN Confidential applies to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause DAMAGE TO THE WORK of the United Nations.

Unclassified applies to information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected NOT TO CAUSE DAMAGE to the work of the United Nations.
The default approach towards the dissemination of information within missions, including peacekeeping intelligence products, should allow for sharing of information within the mission; information should be classified on an exceptional basis and only as required according to the criteria in the Secretary General’s Bulletin on Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling (ST/SGB/2007/6).

The decision to share peacekeeping intelligence with non-mission (e.g. members of the United Nations Country Team) and/or non-United Nations entities (e.g. the Host State) rests with the Head of Mission, as the delegated official by the Secretary-General, in consultation with UN Headquarters as required. Should the Head of Mission elect to further delegate decision-making authority over peacekeeping intelligence sharing to subordinate personnel, this delegation shall be documented and accompanied by guidance on principles and parameters for peacekeeping intelligence sharing with partners.

In accordance with the UN Policy on the Framework of Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System, arrangements for the sharing of intelligence with other UN entities shall include cases in which peacekeeping intelligence relates to the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, premises and assets and is therefore relevant to the broader United Nations system operating within the mission area. Such intelligence shall be passed to the senior-most UNDSS representative.
(or his/her designated representative) and the Designated Official for security. These arrangements shall be included in the Mission Intelligence Support Plan.

Missions may share peacekeeping intelligence with non-mission, non-United Nations entities, such as host state security forces or parallel security operations insofar as doing so falls within the mission’s mandate and is consistent with applicable rules, regulations, policies and procedures of the United Nations. When shared with such entities, products shall be accompanied by written arrangements ensuring originator control over any subsequent use or application. All instances of peacekeeping intelligence sharing must be registered centrally by authorized and trained personnel, documented and justified in terms of the mandate, and approved by the Head of Mission or the delegated authority. Arrangements for decision-making and record keeping on the sharing of intelligence shall be detailed in the mission’s Intelligence Support Plan.

All decisions to share intelligence products with non-mission entities shall be taken based on the rules, regulations and policies of the United Nations. Where peacekeeping intelligence may be shared, either directly or indirectly, with non-United Nations security forces, the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP) applies. Mechanisms, structure and processes required to ensure compliance are included in the HRDDP. Where technical arrangements exist for the ongoing sharing of sensitive information between the mission and non-United Nations security forces, a general and preliminary risk assessment may be conducted but shall be regularly reviewed and decisions to share peacekeeping intelligence shall be taken on a case by case basis.

The sharing of peacekeeping intelligence products with third parties that could raise issues in terms of the Mission’s mandate, the UN Charter, UN rules and regulations, and any bilateral arrangements or agreements with non-UN parties may be submitted to the guidance of the Mission’s Senior Legal Advisor for advice. Further advice may in addition be sought from UNHQ, including the Office of Legal Affairs.
Summary of Key Messages

- The peacekeeping intelligence cycle is the process by which peacekeeping intelligence is acquired, examined/collated, analysed and disseminated based on clearly identified Intelligence Requirements.

- The cycle includes:
  - Direction, requirements and tasking;
  - Acquisition;
  - Examination, evaluation and collation;
  - Analysis;
  - Dissemination.
Key Message: The aim of this lesson is to understand key mechanisms that shall be used for the management of peacekeeping intelligence in missions.

Because requirements and capacities for the management of peacekeeping intelligence differ significantly across mission settings, the structures, leadership and tools required for the operationalization of this Policy may likewise differ. As such, the application of these tools to mission peacekeeping intelligence systems shall be appropriately calibrated to the specific conditions of the mission.
Module 3 – Lesson 2.3: Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle Management Tools

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Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy Framework

- **Strategic**
  - Policy on Peacekeeping Intelligence
  - SOP on Acquisition
  - Corporate info management/Analysis tools and guidance

- **Operational**
  - Military Handbook
  - Police Strategic Guidance Framework
  - JIAC/IOC/Policy and Guidelines

- **Mission**
  - Mission PEO Intelligence Acquisition Plan
  - PEO Intelligence Support Plan
  - Component Acquisition Plans
  - Information Mgt. Processes and SOPs

- Training
- Unit reqs.
- Job desc.

Slide 137

Mission Intelligence Coordination Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary Manager</th>
<th>Planning responsibility</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>SRS/G/DO</td>
<td>Mission IRs MI Plan</td>
<td>Medium-to-long term, threats to mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>SRS/G/IR, JIAC Acquisition Plan</td>
<td>Safety and security of UN personnel, premises, assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Information management and flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operations Centre (supporting)</td>
<td>Force Cmdr.</td>
<td>Force Plan</td>
<td>Military intel, planning of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U2</td>
<td>Police Comm.</td>
<td>Police Plan</td>
<td>PC's intel, Criminal intel, planning of operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key Message: In addition to participating mission entities responsible for peacekeeping intelligence acquisition, collation and analysis, missions shall establish a mission intelligence coordination structure to direct and oversee the peacekeeping intelligence cycle within the mission.

The structure is composed of the participating mission entities responsible for the acquisition, collation, analysis and dissemination of information with the role of meeting the objectives of peacekeeping intelligence activities in the mission, i.e., the JMAC, relevant functions in the Force and Police Components, and UNDSS. The MSC (former JOC) should also be a permanent member of the structure in its function as the mission information manager and thus facilitator of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle. Other mission sections such as the Political Affairs Division, Office of the Legal Adviser or the Human Rights Division, may be invited to participate on a permanent or ad hoc basis, and shall be consulted as required.

The purpose of the Structure is to operationalize the central control and direction of the mission’s peacekeeping intelligence system by ensuring a close connection between the acquisition and analysis activities of all participating mission entities and the requirements of senior mission leadership, while also operationalizing appropriate oversight and accountability in the mission’s peacekeeping intelligence management processes. The Structure does not perform an analysis function nor does it have analytical capacities of its own.

The Structure shall have dedicated resources for this purpose that are distinct from information collection and analysis functions.

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Joint Mission Analysis Center

Chief JMAC operationalizes the central control and direction of the mission’s peacekeeping intelligence system.
The Chief of the JMAC will normally be a civilian, assisted by a specified number of information analysts and collection officers, both civilian (including from mission security) and uniformed. In addition, liaison officers from other offices (such as the UN Country Team) may also be invited to participate.

Since most mission information gathering is either coordinated through, or processed by the JMAC, it is important to understand the structure and staffing of a generic JMAC. The actual structure of the JMAC will vary from mission to mission depending on mandate, size, composition, operational requirements and available partner organizations. Ideally all will have: separated analysis from collection and data management; specified liaison personnel to manage liaison with major contributors; and arranged their analysts into thematic, operational or geographic categories.

Missions without an established JMAC will still have a requirement to conduct integrated analysis. This could be done through regular strategic meetings of mission components where multi-source information is discussed and individual components are tasked with drafting risk assessments or other integrated papers as required.

Learning Activity

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**Learning Activity #1**

Discuss why missions should establish a coordination structure?
Module 3 – Lesson 2.3: Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle Management Tools

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Peacekeeping Intelligence Management Tools
- Intelligence Requirements (IRs)
- Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan
- Mission Intelligence Support Plan

Slide 141

Intelligence Requirements (IRs)
- Derived from gaps or voids
- Usually phrased as questions
- Form the basis of a Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan
**Key Message:** Intelligence Requirements (IRs) derive from gaps or voids between what is known and what is not in relation to a problem or potential problem that should be resolved to ensure the effective, efficient and safe execution of the mission mandate.

Usually phrased as questions, IRs form the basis of a Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan, which allows mission leadership and the mission intelligence coordination structure to ensure that acquisition is being conducted for all required IRs and that resources are being used appropriately and in an effective, prioritized way.

IRs and the Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan shall be reviewed periodically but at minimum annually. Ad hoc, one-off taskings outside of the peacekeeping intelligence plan may also be issued in response to urgent requirements.

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**Key Message:** The Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan translates the strategic direction provided by Senior Mission Leadership and requirements communicated by operational planners into tangible IRs and provides a roadmap for the fulfilment of these requirements through directed acquisition and analysis work by participating mission entities.

It includes the intelligence categories necessary to meet these requirements, key mission actors involved in fulfilling requirements, and a schedule of key intelligence requirement deadlines.
The Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan serves as the primary basis for the development of acquisition plans by participating mission entities (e.g., Military Intelligence Acquisition Plan), which will be at a greater degree of specificity and incorporates the IRs of the Primary Client of that participating mission entity (see Annex C). This document may be marked as handled as a sensitive document if deemed appropriate by mission intelligence coordination structure Chair, in consultation with the Head of Mission.

**Key Message:** The Mission Intelligence Support Plan describes the boundaries within which the peacekeeping intelligence cycle will be executed and identifies key considerations to be observed when providing direction to the peacekeeping intelligence cycle or executing tasks within it.

This document may be classified if deemed appropriate by mission intelligence coordination structure Chair in consultation with the Head of Mission. The support plan shall be prepared in close consultation with DPKO/DFS Headquarters and must include, but is not necessarily limited to, the following elements:

- Acceptable and unacceptable methods for use by participating mission entities in acquiring data and information that specifically address the capabilities of the assets available to the mission.
• Specific considerations that must be taken into account when conducting peacekeeping intelligence acquisition activities (e.g. respect for international human rights standards including the rights of children, privacy considerations, criminal justice norms and standards, national and international laws and standards and other obligations deriving from the United Nations Charter, etc.).

• Additional peacekeeping intelligence management, information management and security tools and measures beyond those described in United Nations and DPKO/DFS Policy (e.g. instructions for use of a secure information/communications system, structuring of secure/controlled access spaces, guidance on data retention, etc.).

• Arrangements and parameters for the sharing of peacekeeping intelligence with non-mission United Nations entities and non-United Nations entities, such as the host government or non-United Nations armed forces. This should include measures for ensuring the application of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy where applicable, sharing of relevant peacekeeping intelligence with United Nations entities that are members of the Security Management Team, and any additional guidance on the sharing of intelligence with non-mission entities if that authority has been delegated by the Head of Mission.
While the focus of the military intelligence gathering and analysis are for the purposes of military operations, the intelligence gathering and analysis of UNDSS are concerned specifically with the safety and security of UN personnel, assets and programmes in the area of operations. Whereas the MSC focuses on day-to-day situational awareness, the JMAC carries out analysis on emerging issues and trends, basing its assessments on its verification and analysis of past events.

The focus of UNPOL is on policing-related information gathering. While JMAC products incorporate political, security, human rights, development, and humanitarian considerations, various mission substantive sections, such as Political, Civil Affairs, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Humanitarian, and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) have significant information collection capabilities and analysts are able to contextualize information from their respective lenses. The military component can contribute to and benefit from the work of these entities. Regular contact (weekly meetings) and information exchange at senior and working levels are strongly advised. This exchange – through the MLT (in which the Head of Military Component is represented) and through the military personnel assigned to the JMAC and MSC – will greatly improve synergies and information sharing.

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**Example: POC Mission-wide Intelligence Support**

- Have a comprehensive and current understanding of the threat environment
- Integrate threat/predictive assessments
- Identify trends of violence against civilian communities
- Assess the intentions and capabilities of perpetrators
- Analyse conflict dynamics
- Predict potential threats to civilians
- Have mission-wide information priorities

**Key Message:** Peacekeeping intelligence analysis shall be a whole-of-mission process that makes full use of all resources available to the mission according to the comparative advantages, including expertise in the local situation, languages and
cultures; military and police intelligence analysis capabilities; and security threat information analysis techniques.

**Slide 146**

**Learning Activity**

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**Learning Activity #2**

Draft Priority Information Request (PIR) and Collection Plan for Carana Scenario with the following details:

- Define the different factors you will take into account
- Define the tasks you would assign to the collection sources
- Identify the leading source and the supporting sources

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**Summary of Key Messages**

- Missions shall establish a mission intelligence coordination structure to direct and oversee the peacekeeping intelligence cycle within the mission.
- Intelligence Requirements (IRs) derive from gaps or voids between what is known and what is not.
- The Mission Intelligence Acquisition Plan translates the strategic direction provided by Senior Mission Leadership and requirements communicated by operational planners into tangible IRs.
- The Mission Intelligence Support Plan describes the boundaries within which the peacekeeping intelligence cycle will be executed.
Starting the Lessons

Background

Today, the typical field environment is remote, austere and, increasingly, dangerous, sometimes openly hostile to a United Nations presence. In such settings, lines of communications (for support and sustainment) are often long and subject to frequent and extended natural and man-made disruptions. Local markets for goods and services are limited or non-existent, and the rule of law can be tenuous or wholly absent. Moreover, potable water is scarce and in high demand, fresh food can be difficult to procure in quantity, housing stock is frequently in short supply, and reliable communications infrastructure is lacking.

The required logistics functions are generated from various sources including the UN owned, military/police contingents or contractors. The exact composition of the logistics component is decided by DFS at UN Headquarters during the mission planning process in consultation with relevant offices of DPKO or DPA. The combination of logistics support resources selected for a particular mission will depend on various factors including the mission’s tasks, its operating environment, economics, available budget, urgency of deployment and security situation.

Staff officers’ understanding of logistic support structures and services in place at mission area will help them in performing their duties efficiently in above depicted environment.
Aim
The aim of this lesson is to provide staff officers with an overview of the United Nations logistics system and its operations in support of field missions.

Unit Content
Lesson 3.1: UN Mission Support Concept
Lesson 3.2: UN Mission Support Entities in the Field
Lesson 3.3: UN Mission Support for Uniformed Personnel

Learning Outcomes
- Describe UN mission support concept
- List various mission support entities in the field
- Define the Contingent Owned Equipment System (COE) and United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE)
- Explain the medical support in the field
Lesson 3.1: UN Mission Support Concept

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Mission Statement of UN Mission Support

*Why they exist*

We help international peace operations succeed

*What they do*

by providing support solutions that are

*How they do it*

rapid, effective, efficient and responsible.

They prioritize strategic mandate tasks

rules and regulations, environment, ethical standards
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Vision Statement of UN Mission Support

They are not there yet

What they aspire to achieve

We strive to be recognized for operational excellence.

measurement, awards, certification

consistent, reliable, sustainable results

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The Full Spectrum of UN Mission Support

- Strategy, policy, advocacy
  - Planning
  - Performance and analytics
  - Member state interaction
- Budget development / reporting
  - Trust fund management
  - Payment / claims processing
- Recruitment
  - Roster management
  - Post management
  - Entitlements and benefits
- Property, asset, inventory mgt.
  - Procurement support
  - Systems contract mgt.
  - Strategic deployment stocks
- MOU administration
  - Troop deployment / rotation
  - Troop reimbursements
- COE verification
  - COE reimbursements
  - Death and disability claims
- Office accommodation
  - Living accommodation
  - Camp facilities
  - Construction services
- Fuel management
  - Water supply
  - Waste management
- Power generation / supply
  - Rations management
  - IT hardware / infrastructure
  - Applications and solutions
  - Geo information services
  - User support
- VSAT/HF/VHF infrastructure
  - Telecom services
  - Air transport
  - Movement control
  - Aviation safety
  - LOA management
- Ground transport
  - Fleet maintenance
- Medical services
  - Medical supplies
  - MEDEVAC / CASEVAC
  - Conduct and discipline
  - Boards of inquiry
  - Audit management
  - Risk management
  - Naval transport
Supply includes contract management (fuel, rations, services etc), Transport includes maintenance to third line, AirOps includes Air Safety (direct to CAO). Medical includes medivac/casevac and dental, engineering is facilities management, civil engineering, accommodation. De-mining is separate.
Learning Activity #1

Discuss about the Activities or Tasks involved within UN Mission Support.
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**Complexity and Criticality**

- Meet the needs of clients & stakeholders
  - Security Council
  - Member States
  - TCCs, PCCs, financial contributors, host governments
  - Missions
  - SRSGs and field staff
  - Client organisations
  - DPKO, DPA, AU, others

- Deliver in complex environments
  - Remote locations
  - High security risks
  - Poor infrastructure
  - Weak markets
  - Budget pressure

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**Learning Activity**

**Learning Activity #2**

Discuss about the Complexity and Criticality of UN Mission Support.
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Operating environments are increasingly remote...

Largest ops are now in remote/hard-to-reach areas with long supply lines

63% peacekeeping personnel authorized for land-locked or hard-to-reach areas

Note: Circles indicate size of authorized deployment. Boundaries shown and designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement by the United Nations.

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Sharing services is now common

70% of staff in the field already use shared service providers and the objective is to reach 100%

Note: Circles indicate size of authorized deployment. Boundaries shown and designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement by the United Nations.
Key Message: Service centres serve two main goals:
1. to deliver predefined modules for goods and services, which are critical enablers for rapid deployment; and
2. to host the operational support teams responsible for delivering day-to-day support services.

The global service centre consolidates service packages for global delivery. The global service centre delivers predefined modules for goods and services at the global level, including Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Asset Management; Financial Systems technical support; Global Education grants processing; Field Contract management; and Airfield air terminal standards.

The regional service centre delivers services at the regional level through operational support teams responsible for providing day-to-day support services that do not require the presence of the recipient of the service at the moment the transaction is performed. The Regional Service Centre is owned, managed and staffed by the Regional Missions they serve. The Entebbe Centre for example, is governed by a Steering Committee comprising the directors and chiefs of mission support of the regional missions such as MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMISS, etc.
Learning Activity #3

Discuss what are the major considerations for Mission Support on a Strategic Level.

How many troops?

$28m / battalion
direct cost per infantry battalion (850 people at $32k per person per year)
Module 3 – Lesson 3.1: UN Mission Support Concept

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How many locations?

34 locations
Typical number of locations for 8 largest missions

Source: UNO calculations

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What asset mix?

2 modalities
Total cost of ownership of military support solutions often higher than for commercial solutions

Source: UNO calculations
Summary of Key Messages

- UN Mission Support aim to provide solutions that are rapid, effective, efficient and are within the rules, regulations, environment and ethical standards of the UN.

- Mission Support involves Personnel, Logistics and Finance functions meeting the needs of clients and stakeholders in complex, often remote, operating environments.

- Their Global and Regional Service Centers deliver predefined modules for goods and service and host operational support teams responsible for delivering day-to-day support services.
Additional Learning Activities…

Learning Activity #4

Establishing a new Mission Support Structure

1. Designate three tables with names of the three major entities: Military, Police or Civilian.

2. Let people randomly select a unit by drawing lots, and then reorganize themselves by sitting at the table with the name of the major entity that the unit falls under.

3. Look at the organizational graph together to see whether somebody has sit at the wrong table.

4. Ask people to think about the function of his or her selected unit and discuss with others who are sitting at the same table.

5. Everyone becomes the representative of that unit and needs to give a statement to the plenary class, making a brief description of that unit including its major functions/composition/reporting lines/coordination partners (the “what”).

6. The other person talks about the implications of the civilian function to military staff officers (the “so what?”).

7. If someone has no clue about a unit or title, he or she can have only one chance to seek a rescue line, i.e. designating a person from the whole class to represent him or her to make that statement.

8. All the others become a panel of judges, raising their hands to show complete satisfaction.

9. Count the number of hands and make a note on the blackboard or flipchart.

10. Whoever gets the most number of hands win the game. Who have not raised their hands can give corrections or further elaborations.

UNITS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office of the DMS/CMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geospatial, information technology and telecommunications services (GITTS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Mission Training Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Module 3 – Lesson 3.1: UN Mission Support Concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Supply Chain Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated warehousing, Property Management/COB (incl. Receipt and Inspection, Property Disposal, Property Control and Inspection, and fixed asset management functions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement control and distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Service Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Support Services (Rations/Supplies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Learning Activity #5

**Telephone or VTC: Q&A session**

Arrange a telephone or VTC Q&A session with a senior military officer under DMS of a large peacekeeping mission, preferably the Deputy Chief of Service Delivery.

1. Think about the questions you want to ask him/her and write down the questions on a sheet of paper.

2. Post all the questions on a big flip chart.

3. Ask people to read through all the questions and tick on those that they like most.

4. Ask those questions that are the most popular in the Q&A session/VTC.
**Key Message:** The Director or Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS) is responsible and accountable to the Head of Mission for the effective general management of the human, financial and physical resources allocated to a mission.

The D/CMS contributes to the implementation of the mission mandate by providing the necessary managerial, logistical, technological and administrative support. The ability of the D/CMS to engage, advise on and help shape the plans of programmatic components is critical to ensure that support components can deliver client-oriented, timely end-to-end support services against competing priorities.

In December 2014, guidance on mission support structures was promulgated for small and large peacekeeping missions. In September 2017, supplementary guidance was issued to further standardize mission support structures. Peacekeeping missions and large special political missions are requested to implement this guidance within Financial Years 2018-2019.
Key Message: The following Supply Chain functions are organized together under a single management structure headed by a Chief, Supply Chain Management:

- Acquisition Planning
- Procurement
- Integrated warehousing, Property Management/COE (incl. Receipt and Inspection, Property Disposal, Property Control and Inspection, and fixed asset management functions)
- Movement control and distribution

Supply chain management is responsible for all supply chain areas that are integrated on the basis of end-to-end processes, namely, Plan, Source, Deliver, Return and Enable and Cover activities related to demand planning, acquisitions, procurement, warehousing, asset and inventory management, transportation and freight planning (air, land, sea), expediting movement and tracking distribution, business intelligence and performance management.

The Chief Supply Chain Management reports directly to the D/CMS.
Key Message: Chief, Service Delivery is responsible for overseeing the following functions:

- Mobility (Aviation and Transport)
- Engineering and Facilities Management (including Mail and Pouch, Camp Maintenance services, etc.)
- Life Support Services (Rations/Supplies)
- Medical

Delivery management is responsible for the provision of key logistics support services to all mission components and other clients of the Mission Support organization through technical sections. The heads of each of these service delivery sections shall report to the Chief, Service Delivery.
Key Message: Mission Support Centre is the nerve centre for logistics functions in a mission involving information gathering, analysis, planning, coordination, execution, monitoring and feedback.

It is to provide all mission components, other UN and non-UN entities with a single point of coordination for all aspects of logistics support in the mission area.
Key Message: Due to complex nature of peacekeeping operations and its support requirements, there is necessity for an entity which can receive requests for logistics support, analyse the requirement, prioritise according to overall guidance provided by senior mission management, plan and coordinate implementation of tasks related to the request, task technical/other sections and then monitor implementation.

In addition there is a requirement to coordinate logistics support with other UN and non-UN entities operating in the mission area. It is the Mission Support Centre that has been organised and staffed to effectively carry out above-mentioned functions.

Tasks of Chief Mission Support Centre:

- Exercises managerial and supervisory control over all logistics support.
- Develops, prepares, coordinates and monitors overall logistic support plans.
- Ensures adequate logistics support to military, police, security and substantive components of the mission.
- Supervises Section budget, its preparation and execution.
- Monitors and coordinates all multifunctional logistic requirements between UN HQ and the mission.

- Works closely with the Chief Supply Chain Management (CSCM) or the Chief Service Delivery (CSD) in the development of guidance and procedures for logistics support.

- Acts as the principal liaison between the mission and Headquarters staff for logistics matters and coordinates day to day support of logistics operations.

- Leads logistics reconnaissance missions to various locations in the field in order to monitor the logistics support.

- Organizes and chairs logistics meetings

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**OPERATIONAL CONTROL VS. TASKING AUTHORITY**

- Force enablers are under operational control of HOMC

- DMS/CMS has tasking authority over force enablers
Key Message: As per the DPKO Command and Control Policy in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, all force non-combat logistic support units are tasked by the Director Mission Support.

The Policy of “Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (Feb 2008 – Ref 2008.04) clarifies the authority and command and control arrangements for the uniformed components of United Nations peacekeeping operations. This document also provides important information regarding the relevant civilian and other managerial structures and their relationship to the uniformed components so as to enable more effective integration of the mission effort in multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

Operational and tactical control rest with the senior military or police officers in the mission. “Integration of civilian and military support asset and elements should be ensured for optimum utilization of resources”. “Military logistics and support units/elements, including force logistics units, signals units, force military engineering units, force supply and transport units, force aviation units are considered military components of the Mission Support and are tasked by the Director of Mission Support (DMS)”.

Integration of civilian and military support assets

Military logistics and support units
are tasked by the Director of Mission Support (DMS)
Key Message: The distribution of tasks between the various logistic support assets of the Mission, including military assets, is centralized by the Mission Support Centre in order to ensure that every mission component receives equitable support, consistent with identified priorities.

Mission resources are distributed to all mission components on an equitable basis, depending on functional needs and assessed priorities. This is the reason why the management of the logistic support assets – civilian and military – are centralized at mission level, with a unique point of entry for all requests for support (Mission Support Center).

Irrespective of their origin or ownership, the following assets are considered common to the mission:

- Engineering Units
- Transportation Units
- Aviation Units
- Communication Units
- Medical Units
- Logistics Units

These assets will be tasked and used along and in complement with UN assets and commercially contracted assets, under coordination of the Mission Support Centre.

Take note that combat engineering units are not tasked by MSC.
**Key Message:** In order to facilitate the communication between the military component and the Mission Support, there are military officers selected and deployed within each support entity of the Mission.

Service Delivery is formerly called Integrated Service Support (ISS). Service delivery cells are always composed of a majority of UN civilian staff plus a number of military staff officers specifically selected for their background and qualifications to work within designated positions – as requested by the DMS services.

Apart from providing qualified help, this practice aims to facilitate the communication between the military component and the Mission Support. For the same reason, in many large missions, the Deputy Chief Service Delivery is a seconded military officer, with a rank of P4 or P5, depending on the rank of the Chief Service Delivery.

**Military logistics capability**
- Providing special military expertise and advise in relation to military unit deployment and support
- Direct contact to contingent logistic structure

**Working relations**
- Deployed as Subject experts, staff officers with MSA entitlement. (Like a Military Expert on Mission)
- The Deputy Chief Service Delivery is a military seconded personnel (= UN Staff contract) (Formerly DCISS)
- Integrated planning and operational structure
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FOCAL POINTS FOR PREPARING TASKING ORDERS IN FHQ

- Force Engineer (U-8)
- Military Medical Officer
- U4

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COORDINATION BETWEEN FC AND DMS

FC remains involved in tasking process through consultation with DMS involving:
- mission and military priorities
- Budgeting
- Unit level requirements
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EXAMPLE: MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ENGINEER UNIT TASKING PROCESS

1. Mission and Force Priorities
2. Engineer Tasks Specified
3. Mission and Force Engineers Coordinate
4. Preliminary Task Orders Developed
5. Task Order Sent to Military Engineer Units through U8 for Execution
6. Consultation with Relevant Entities
7. Task Orders submitted to Chief of Service Delivery

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EXAMPLE: MEDICAL SUPPORT RELATIONS

- Head of Mission
- DMS
- Dy DMS
- FC
- Dy FC
- CMO
- Mission med officer
- Reporting Medical, Professional, Ethical & Clinical Issues
- Force Medical Cell
- MMC (Mission Medical Cell)
- MMC (Mission Medical Cell)
- Force Medical Cell

- UNOE Clinics
- Contract Clinics
- TCC Level 1
- TCC Level 2
- TCC Level 3
Medical Services Section
The mission’s civilian Medical Services Section, led by the CMO, is responsible for overall medical support operations in the field. In order to accommodate timely approval of critical, time-sensitive medical operations, including medical evacuations (MEDEVAC), the Medical Services Section shall report directly to the Director of Mission Support (DMS) or Chief of Mission Support (CMS) for certain operational matters, such as life-threatening emergencies and administratively to the Deputy DMS/CMS for all other routine matters.

Force Medical Cell
The Force Medical Cell (FMC) is led by the FMO, and includes all other force medical staff officers. The FMO is accountable to the FC for ensuring that the military operational requirements of the force are met by all military medical support deployed in the mission.

Mission Medical Cell
The Mission Medical Cell (MMC) is an informal structure that incorporates the mission Medical Services Section with the FMC to form a single office to better facilitate cooperation. Where possible, the offices of the CMO and FMO should be co-located to maximize their collaborative efforts. The CMO leads the MMC and collectively executes all of the medical functions of the mission.

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Summary of Key Messages
- Acquisition Planning, Procurement, Integrated Warehousing & Property Mgmt/COE, and MOVCON are organized by the Chief, Supply Chain Mgmt.
- The Chief Service Delivery is responsible for Mobility, Engineering and Facilities Mgmt., Life Support Services and Medical Support.
- Mission Support Centre is the nerve centre for logistics functions in a mission involving information gathering, analysis, planning, coordination, execution, monitoring and feedback.
- All force non-combat logistic support units are tasked by the Director Mission Support.
Learning Activity #1

**Brainstorming on equipment (What are the equipment)**

Ask participants to list the types of equipment that a military unit can have, e.g. infantry battalion and engineer company.

Use two flipcharts in front of the class. One is to note down the equipment needed by an infantry battalion and the other is used for equipment needed by the engineer company.

Think about the differences and similarities between the equipment needed by two types of units.

Use a red marker to circle the similarities (e.g. the common elements could be self-sustainment equipment, the differences could be major equipment). Some are minor equipment, either affiliated to a major equipment or for self-sustainment purpose.

Learning Activity #2

**Scenario Discussions**

As a staff officer, what would you do in the following scenarios...

1. ... you accompany the FC for an inspection to the camp of an infantry battalion, you noticed that almost half of the APC is unserviceable?

2. ... you were asked by a contingent commander to coordinate with COE section to make changes on the COE inspection report.

3. ... you are asked to draft talking points for the FC who will pay a visit to an outgoing contingent about to be rotated. You know this contingent is often faced with challenges of unserviceable equipment that has significantly hampered their capacity in mandate implementation.

Learning Activity #3

**Weighing the pros and cons over the acquisition of equipment (Where do they come from?)**

Debate over whether missions perform better if contingents use all UN-provided equipment or completely COE.

Summarize the debate with key messages for staff officers.
### LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL - DEPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Element</th>
<th>Deployment Means</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOs, UNMOs, IPO</td>
<td>Commercial Air/LOA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil. Contingents and FPUs</td>
<td>UN short-term charter aircraft.</td>
<td>By air/road/rail to final deployment locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOE and COE</td>
<td>High Priority – airlift</td>
<td>Routine – sea-lift</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL - SUSTAINMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>UN Staff, SOs, UNMOs, IPO</th>
<th>Military Contingents and FPUs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Accommodation</td>
<td>UN provided to SOs (or MSA).</td>
<td>Existing camps, if any. New contingents self-sufficient if required. UN provided thereafter or contingent self sustainment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Accommodation</td>
<td>UN provided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mission specific initial provisioning. Standard UN scales thereafter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>UN provides water source/contingents may provide water treatment plants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>UN provided</td>
<td>UN provided.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR UNIFORMED PERSONNEL – SUSTAINMENT (CONT’D)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SOs, UNMOs, IPO</th>
<th>Mil. Contingents and FPUs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface Transport</td>
<td>UN provided. Standard scales.</td>
<td>COE Major Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport</td>
<td>UN provided.</td>
<td>UN provided, or under LOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>UN DPKO Wan (voice, data, fax, e-mail, Internet). Telephone landline, Cellphone, VHF.</td>
<td>UN provided up to Bn HQ. Self-sustained for internal comms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Level 1: UN/TCC/PCC clinic. Level 2, 3, 4: UN provided, or under LOA.</td>
<td>Level 1: Self-sustained. Level 2, 3, 4: UN provided, or under LOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Treatment</td>
<td>UN provided</td>
<td>UN provided /contingent sewage plants /trucks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Learning Activity #1

Discuss about the logistic support that uniformed peacekeeping personnel have from UN mission support entities in the field

UN EQUIPMENT SUPPORT SOLUTIONS

- UN Owned Equipment (UNOE)
- UN contracted resources
- Contingent Owned Equipment (COE)
UN Civilian support, through UN Owned Equipment and Personnel

Positives:
- direct control
- easily adjusted to specific requirements
- can operate in all but the most hostile environments

Negatives:
- can take time to assemble required personnel, equipment & establish

Commercial support, UN contracted

Positives:
- comes fully staffed and equipped

Negatives:
- takes time to conclude contractual arrangements
- commercial support cannot always be relied upon in hostile conditions
- limitations on capacity

Military/Police support, Contingent Owned Equipment and Personnel

Positives:
- can operate under the hostile conditions
- can be mobilized relatively quickly

Negatives:
- they may not be fully equipped
- their rotation schedules often affect support continuity
- their support can be expensive
- force generation can be challenging

Host Nation resources are governed by Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)
- Buildings and land for deployment
- Custom and duty-free import
- Electricity and water supply
- Visa free entry
- No landing/take off/parking fees/docking charges for UN aircraft and ships
Learning Activity #2

Discuss …

- How to get equipment for military peacekeepers in remote regions?
- How to maintain and repair equipment in harsh environment and far away from home countries?
- How to ensure quality and interoperability of equipment from various countries?
**Key Message:** The Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) system was adopted by the United Nations to simplify the means by which countries are reimbursed for providing equipment, personnel and self-sustainment support services to formed military or police contingents in peacekeeping missions.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the binding agreement between the UN and the Troop/Police Contributing Country (TCC/PCC) is the cornerstone of the COE system. The rates of reimbursement and the standards are reviewed every three years by a COE Working Group, an extension of the General Assembly. The last Working Group met in January 2014.

**Major equipment** means major items directly related to the unit mission as mutually determined by the United Nations and the troop/police contributor. Major equipment is accounted for either by category or individually. Separate reimbursement rates apply for each category of items of major equipment. These rates include reimbursement for minor equipment and consumables in support of the item of major equipment.

**Minor equipment** means equipment in support of contingents, such as catering, accommodation, non-specialist communication and engineering and other mission-related activities. Specific accounting of minor equipment is not required. Minor equipment is divided into two categories: items designed to support major equipment; and items that directly or indirectly support personnel. For personnel-related equipment, rates of reimbursement for minor equipment apply.
Key Message: The COE Manual is the key document for COE and MOU related issues. It contains the consolidation of recommendations made at various working groups through issue papers submitted by both Member States and the Secretariat.

It also lists the current monthly reimbursement rates as well as the current rates for major equipment (Annex B) and current rates for self-sustainment (Annex C).

The 2014 COE Manual is the latest edition (A/C.5/69/18). The original is in English but translated in all UN official languages.

The new COE Manual is to be published in early 2018.
Key Message: The troop/police contributors are reimbursed under wet or dry lease arrangements, at the rates adopted by the General Assembly. Reimbursement is limited to those items of serviceable major equipment (including associated minor equipment and consumables) specifically agreed in the MOU negotiation phase.

The lease of major equipment:

- **Dry lease** - troop/police contributor provides equipment to the mission and the United Nations assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment.

- **Wet lease** - troop/police contributor provides and assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting deployed major items of equipment, together with the associated minor equipment.
Key Message: ‘Self-sustainment’ is a logistics support concept for troop contingent/police unit in a peacekeeping mission whereby the contributing State provides some specific or all logistics support to the contingent on a reimbursable basis.

Self-sustainability lasts for the first 30 to 90 days.

In an established mission, logistics support is in place and contractors deliver rations according to religious, dietary or national preferences (e.g., western-style, beef-free or pork-free). Reserves of rations are stored according to menu types requested by contingents. Commercial contracts for the supply of water and for diesel to run generators and vehicles are likewise in place.

In a mission’s start-up phase, however the situation is usually quite different. Contingents and peacekeepers that arrive in a newly established mission must expect hardships. The United Nations may not yet have had the time to establish the required logistics, so, according to the mission MOU, contingents must be self-sufficient for the first 3 months in some or all categories.

Units are expected to deploy to the mission area with 30 to 90 days supply of:
- Rations and drinking water
- Canteen supplies (cigarettes, toilet articles, etc.)
- Repair parts
- Diesel fuel
Learning Activity #3

Discuss about the advantages and disadvantages of different equipment support solutions.

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LEVELS OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE FIELD

- Basic Level
- Primary Care (Level One)
- Hospital care (Level two)
- Hospital care (Level three)
- Tertiary/Out of Mission Medical Support (Level four)
Key Message: Levels of medical support for UN peacekeeping missions have been standardized. This is necessary to ensure that the highest standards of medical care is provided to peacekeepers, particularly as medical units and personnel can come from different countries with varying standards of medical care.

These levels are as follows:

**Basic Level.** This effectively refers to basic First Aid and preventive medicine practised at the smallest sub-unit level. As there is no doctor present, care is provided by the peacekeeper, or by a trained paramedic or nurse, using basic medical equipment and supplies.

**Primary Care (Level One).** This is the first level where a doctor is available and may be either a COE or UNOE facility. It provides first line primary health care, emergency resuscitation, stabilization and evacuation of casualties to the next level of medical care within a peacekeeping mission.

**Hospital Care (Level Two).** Again, these services may be provided by COE or UNOE (contingent staffed facilities) and have mission-wide responsibilities. It is the next level of medical care and the first level where surgical expertise and facilities are available. The mission of a Level Two medical facility is to provide second line health care, emergency resuscitation and stabilization, limb and life-saving surgical interventions, basic dental care and casualty evacuation to the next echelon.

**Hospital Care (Level Three).** This is the highest level of medical care provided by a deployed UN medical unit. It combines the capabilities of Level One and Two units, with the additional capability of providing specialized in-patient treatment and surgery, as well as extensive diagnostic services. It is important to note that a Level Three unit is rarely deployed, and that this level of support is generally obtained from existing civilian or military hospitals within the Mission area or in a neighboring country.

**Tertiary/Out of Mission.** A tertiary medical facility provides definitive medical care and specialist medical treatment unavailable or impractical to provide for within a Mission area. This includes specialist surgical and medical procedures, reconstruction, rehabilitation and convalescence. Such treatment is highly specialized and costly, and may be required for a long duration. It is neither practical nor cost-effective for the UN to deploy such a unit within the Mission area. Such services are generally sought in the host country, a neighbouring country, or in the troop contributing country itself. The UN can arrange transfer of a patient or casualty to such a facility, and for reasons of cost, compensation and pension, continues to monitor the patients’ progress.
Key Message: Medical evacuation is a mission responsibility shared between the FMedO and the CCMO.

The doctor responsible for treating the patient initiates the evacuation. The responsibility for planning and establishing an effective medical evacuation system lies with the planning staff in DPKO and the administration and medical staff in the Mission area.

The CCMO liaises with UNHQ Medical Services Division for all matters relating to external AeroMedical Evacuations (AME). The FMedO co-ordinates in-theatre evacuation activities, with the support of the Mission administration and the guidance of the Medical Services Division. Details of the evacuation plan are to be included within every Mission’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The FMedO is responsible for SOP, planning and keeping a roster of uniformed medical personnel to use as escorts for evacuations.

Except in actual evacuations, which are the responsibility of the CCMO, the FMedO has technical and operational control over the AME Team.

There are three categories of patient or casualty transfer, these being:

- Casualty Evacuation (Casevac)
- Medical Evacuation (Medevac)
- Medical Repatriation.
**Casualty Evacuation (Casevac).** Evacuation of a casualty from the site of injury to the closest medical facility, which should ideally be conducted within 1 hour of injury.

**Medical Evacuation (Medevac).** Evacuation of a casualty between two medical facilities, either within the Mission area (in-theatre) or out of it (out-of-theatre). The casualty may either return to duty (RTD) within the time-frame stipulated in the holding policy, or be repatriated.

**Medical Repatriation.** Return of a patient or casualty to his/her home-country because of medical reasons, following which s/he would be unlikely to return to duty.

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FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

- Will the United Nations provide me with uniforms?
- What about my welfare?
- How much equipment support can I get in the mission?
- What about medical services in the mission area?

**Will the United Nations provide me with uniforms?**

No, because the United Nations pays your country US$ 73 monthly to provide you with clothing and equipment.

However, the Organization does provide you with a few items of clothing that identify you as a United Nations peacekeeper. They are:

- 1 blue beret
- 1 blue field cap
• 1 metal hat badge
• 6 cloth shoulder patches
• 2 olive drab armlets
• 2 United Nations blue scarves

What about my welfare?

Welfare normally is a national responsibility and a full-time staff officer for welfare is included in each contingent. Canteen stores are also a national responsibility.

Nonetheless, such provisions depend on the MOU between your country and the United Nations.

How much equipment support can I get in the mission?

The maximum total weight including your personal military gear is normally 45 kilograms.

What about medical services in the mission area?

United Nations medical support aims to provide you with a standard of medical care in peace operations that approaches the level available in times of peace.

Summary of Key Messages

• UN Equipment Support are categorized under UN Owned Equipment, UN contracted resources and Contingent Owned Equipment (COE).

• The COE system was adopted to simplify reimbursement to countries providing equipment, personnel and self-sustainment support services.

• ‘Self-sustainment’, between the first 30-60 days of deployment, consist of rations/drinking water, canteen supplies, repair parts and diesel fuel.

• Medical evacuation is a mission responsibility shared between the FMedO and the CCMO.
Additional Learning Activities…

Learning Activity #4

Debate over whether logistics should be done by Military or Civilians

Divide the whole class into two groups and seat them on opposite sides of the room.

- One side will argue that the logistics of peacekeeping missions should be done by the Military component
- The other side will argue that the logistics of peacekeeping missions should be done by the Civilian component

After the debate, ask people to draw a conclusion from this discussion.

In one sentence, every participant must answer what impressed them the most from this discussion.

Learning Activity #5

Categorization with the lens of logistic support

1. First, ask participants to list all the different types of uniformed personnel in UN missions, including military and police.

2. Then, ask them to think in the perspective of logistic supply and put all those types of uniformed personnel into two categories, based on the differences of logistic support means.

3. Filling the blanks. If it is “UN provided”, tick the box. If not, leave it blank.

4. Put additional remarks if further explanations or certain conditions are required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of uniformed personnel in peacekeeping missions</th>
<th>UN Staff Members, SOs, UNMOs, IPO</th>
<th>Military Contingents and FPUs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Accommodation</td>
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<td>Office Accommodation</td>
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<td>Food</td>
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<td>Water</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Module 3 – Lesson 3.3: UN Mission Support for Uniformed Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface Transport</th>
<th>Air Transport</th>
<th>ICT</th>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>Waste Treatment</th>
<th>Surface Transport</th>
<th>Air Transport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In the end, ask students to answer the following questions (in a progressive manner, like firing weapons under the regulations of ROE):

- What is the difference in terms of deployment for the two categories of personnel?
- Why in the deployment of contingent equipment, some are air-lifted and some are sea-lifted?
- Why is there such a difference in terms of logistic support for different types of military personnel?
- Why staff officers need to know such differences?
- What roles do staff officers play?
Starting the Lessons

Aim

The aim of this lesson is to provide staff officers with an overview of the crisis response in the UN HQ and DPKO-led field missions as well as highlighting DSS’ role during a crisis situation.

Unit Content

Lesson 4.1: Crisis Management Basics
Lesson 4.2: UN Security Management System

Learning Outcomes

- Understand the principles of UN HQ crisis management policy and UN HQ response in support of DPKO-led field missions.
- Define the DPKO-led field mission crisis response.
- Comprehend the DSS role in a crisis situation.
Lesson 4.1

Crisis Management Basics

Definition

A crisis is defined as an incident or situation, whether natural or human-made, that due to its magnitude, complexity or gravity of potential consequence, requires a UN-wide coordinated multi-dimensional response.

Such situations include two or more of the following:

- Presents an exceptional risk to the safety and security of UN personnel, premises and assets;
- Presents an exceptional threat to the effective functioning of a UN mission or other field presence;
- Presents an exceptional threat to the effective implementation of the mandate or a UN mission or other field presence;
- May have a significant negative humanitarian impact; and/or,
- May give rise to serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.
Key Message: Crisis Management should be guided by the principles of accountability; field-focus; adaptation to context; inclusiveness; simplicity and predictability; respect for values, standards and principles; and respect for humanitarian principles.

The following paragraphs clearly define these principles as they guide effective crisis management:

Accountability: Crisis management should be guided with clear accountability framework and structures.

Field-focus: Necessary response activities should be implemented at the lowest effective level of authority in the field, with Headquarters playing a supporting role. Unnecessary layers of management should be removed.

In exceptional circumstances, such as incapacitation of the field leadership or when the scope of the crisis extends beyond the capacity of the UN presence in the field, Headquarters may assume greater crisis management responsibilities until such time as the field can be strengthened or re-established.

Adaptation to context: The UN response to any crisis should be managed to reflect the prevailing circumstances. Form should follow function, and responses should be based on criteria of expected impact, transaction costs and assessment of risks.
UN entities should ensure that their readiness, capacity and response level is appropriate to the evolution of a situation.

Inclusiveness: In response to any crisis, there should be appropriate consultation among UN entities and between the field and Headquarters such that the various streams of response activity and messages are complementary and harmonized to the highest degree possible, taking into account all recognized principles of UN engagement across humanitarian, human rights, development, political and security areas.

Views of those affected by crisis and relevant stakeholders need to be taken into account and help guide UN actions in the field and at Headquarters.

Simple and predictable: UN crisis management architecture and processes should be clear, light and simple and known by all stakeholders to allow for a certain level of predictability in any response.

Decision-making, coordination and information sharing should be streamlined to enable an accelerated response.

Structures set up for crisis response should be time-bound with clear activation and de-activation protocols with proper follow-up arrangements agreed upon at the conclusion of the response.

Respect for values, standards and principles: Crisis management should be guided by the overall values, standards and principles articulated in the UN Charter and relevant international law, including the Secretary-General’s renewed commitment to uphold the responsibilities assigned to the UN whenever there is a threat of serious and largescale violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

Respect for Humanitarian Principles: Crisis management arrangements should take full account of recognized humanitarian principles.

As per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (19 December 1991) and subsequent resolutions, humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Adherence to these principles reflects a measure of accountability of the humanitarian community.
Key Message: The SG is responsible for ensuring that the UN system responds appropriately to crisis situations and for ensuring the effective coordination of UN crisis response at HQ and in the field.

The SG typically delegates the responsibility for ensuring an effective, coordinated UN crisis response to a lead coordinating entity or entities at HQ and to senior individuals in leadership roles in the field.

All USGs, including heads of agencies, funds and programmes, are individually responsible and accountable for directing preparedness and response activities within their entities, in their mandated areas of responsibility.

All UN entities are jointly responsible for the development and implementation of UN-wide crisis response strategies in the field and at UN HQ, including communicating and coordinating their response with the crisis coordination mechanisms.
Roles and Responsibilities in the Field

- **Senior-most UN official** in country (e.g. HoM/SRSG/DSRSG, RC, HC) is responsible/accountable at the field-level

- **RC or HC** continues in the lead for all development or humanitarian operational activities respectively

- **Designated Official** responsible for security of UN personnel, premises and assets

**Key Message:** Crisis response activities in the field should be implemented at the lowest effective level of authority, with HQ playing a supporting role. Unnecessary layers of management should be removed.

At field level, the following responsibilities and accountabilities apply:

- The **senior-most UN official** in country (Head of Mission/SRSG/DSRSG, RC/HC or RC) is responsible and accountable for coordinating UN crisis management efforts in-country. In line with the principle of mutual accountability, the UN leadership team is jointly accountable for the development and implementation of UN strategy.

- The **Resident Coordinator** should remain in the lead for coordinating all operational activities for development and should continue to perform the UNDP Resident Representative and Designated Official functions when applicable. Where a **Humanitarian Coordinator** has been designated, s/he should remain in the lead for coordinating the humanitarian response, reporting to the Emergency Relief Coordinator.

- The **Designated Official** in-country (normally the senior-most UN official in-country) has specific security management responsibilities pursuant to the Security Policy Manual and is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security. He or she is responsible for the security of UN personnel, premises and assets throughout the country or designated area of operation and for leading security management team meetings.
In exceptional circumstances, the SG, in consultation with relevant entities, may decide that the nature of a situation warrants the highest level of management engagement and shall either directly oversee or delegate the authority to the DSG or an appointed EOSG representative to oversee the coordination of the UN response. This determination shall be made by the SG, either at his/her discretion, or upon request by at least two affected UN entities.

During crisis activation in mission settings, the Head of Mission shall retain operational authority at all times over deployed uniformed personnel and shall exercise his or her operational authority over the military and police components through the respective heads of those components. The Head of the military component and/or the Head of the police component shall continue to exercise operational control over all military and police personnel in the mission.

Key Message: The lead coordinating entity/entities shall be responsible for ensuring the effective coordination of UN crisis response efforts. When it is necessary to have multiple coordination mechanisms operating in parallel, the lead coordinating entity shall ensure appropriate collaboration and information sharing between these mechanisms.

Lead coordinating entities will usually be determined as follows based on the type of UN field presence on the ground:
a) In mission settings, DPKO is the lead coordinating entity for countries/areas with peacekeeping operations deployed, and DPA is the lead coordinating entity for countries/areas with special political missions deployed;

b) In non-mission settings, DPA and the relevant Regional UNDG Chair shall oversee crisis response coordination efforts as co-leads.

In all cases the SG shall make the final determination on the lead coordinating entity/entities.

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Key Message: Preparedness refers to the normal day-to-day activities to ensure readiness to support developing and/or ongoing crisis situations in a country/area with a deployed peacekeeping operation.

In line with the Policy Guidelines on Joint Operations Centres (JOC), the JOC is an integrated entity supporting mission decision-makers in situational awareness and crisis response and shall be reachable by the UNOCC on a 24/7 basis for clarification of events in the field.

As specified in the SOP on Integrated Reporting from DPKO-led Field Missions to UNHQ, significant developments shall be reported to the UNOCC via a Special Incident (“Flash”) Report, as required, which is separate from the integrated daily situation report sent each working day at 06:00 hours New York time.

In addition, recalling its role as an integrated entity supporting mission planning and decision-making, the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) is well placed to assist with mission preparedness efforts through its provision of predictive assessments and integrated analysis.
Key Message: Enhanced Monitoring shall be undertaken within DPKO and DFS in response to a deteriorating situation or a situation that has the potential to evolve into a crisis in a country/area with a deployed peacekeeping operation.

While Enhanced Monitoring does not involve a departure from standard decision-making procedures, measures shall be put in place to enhance the preparedness of DPKO and DFS and the affected peacekeeping mission(s).

Based on developments in the field, Enhanced Monitoring may evolve into the activation of crisis response procedures for enhanced coordination or even return to the Preparedness stage.

A return to the Preparedness stage shall suggest the discontinuation of all Enhanced Monitoring arrangements previously put in place.
**Key Message:** Upon the rapid and significant deterioration of a situation or in the event of the sudden onset of a crisis that requires coordination among multiple pillars of the UN, arrangements for accelerated and streamlined decision-making, operational coordination, information flow and communications shall be put in place and/or strengthened.

On behalf of the Secretary-General, the lead coordinating entity/entities shall be responsible for activating the crisis coordination mechanisms. The lead coordinating entity/entities should consult the senior-most UN official(s) in-country, including the RC (and HC, if distinct), and in the relevant UN regional office in non-mission settings, and the Designated Official, if different, and inform them if activation is being considered.

When a decision to activate is taken, the UNOCC will notify the UN system, including at field level, on the decision and next steps.

The Senior Action Group or other Principals-level forums chaired by the Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General or Chef de Cabinet may request the lead coordinating entity/entities to activate the crisis coordination mechanism on behalf of the Secretary-General.
Upon activation, all information between the affected mission and UNHQ related to the situation and developments within the mission’s area of operations and its crisis management activities over the past 24 hours shall be shared with the UNOCC. Offices in DPKO and DFS shall coordinate all requests for additional information with the UNOCC, copying the relevant IOT, to avoid burdening the affected mission with similar requests through multiple channels during a time of crisis.

**Key Message:** When a crisis response is activated, lead coordinating entities or, in exceptional circumstances, the Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General or an appointed EOSG representative should establish structures for clear, centralised and joint crisis management at two levels; the leadership-level (Crisis Management Team) and working-level (Operations Coordination Body).

- The leadership-level, a cross-pillar decision-making body, is to serve as a Crisis Management Team (CMT), chaired by a Crisis Manager. The lead coordinating entity/entities will (jointly) designate a Crisis Manager, who will usually be the USG or ASG of one of the lead coordinating entity/entities. In the absence of the USG and ASG, existing succession arrangements for the delegation of authority are retained. In exceptional circumstances the Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General or an appointed EOSG representative may assume this role.
• The working-level, cross-pillar operations coordination body, will be led by a Crisis Coordinator, to support day-to-day operations of the crisis response, including developing policy recommendations, ensuring effective information management and managing common messaging. The Crisis Coordinator will be appointed by the Crisis Manager. The person may differ depending on the nature of the crisis, but will be a person of sufficient seniority and capability as well as provided with adequate resources and authority to undertake the task as Crisis Coordinator.

• The Crisis Manager shall determine the CMT membership based on the specific nature of the crisis. It should include representation from relevant UN entities, including political, security, military, police, humanitarian, human rights, development as well as relevant administrative, support and public information entities. Wide representation from the different pillars of the UN should be balanced against the need for streamlined and effective coordination. Representation of agencies, funds and programmes should be assured, at a minimum, through the 2+4 formula and based on the nature of the crisis.

  o The core CMT members may include the following:

    ➢ DPKO: Under-Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General OORL, Military Adviser, Police Adviser, Regional Director / IOT Team Leader
    ➢ DFS: Under-Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General, Director of Field Personnel Division, Director of Logistics Support Division
    ➢ DPKO and DFS: Chief of Staff, Chief Focal Point for Security, Chief Public Affairs Section
    ➢ DSS: Chief of the Peacekeeping Operations Support Section
    ➢ UNOCC Director
    ➢ Senior representatives of other relevant United Nations entities

• The “2+4” formula was adopted in 2006 and states that humanitarian and development actors are represented by OCHA and DOCO, respectively. In addition to these two, up to four representatives from the UN agencies, funds and programmes may participate based on their involvement in the country in question and capacity to engage.

• The UNOCC supports the crisis coordination structures, the Crisis Manager and Crisis Coordinator by providing situational awareness, maintaining a crisis venue and information management platforms, providing secretariat services for relevant meetings, ensuring secure communications, and tracking action points.

The Crisis Manager shall be responsible for sharing decisions taken by the CMT and the cross-pillar operations coordination body with all relevant UN entities in a timely manner.

Members of CMT may decide to alter existing reporting, analysis and information sharing arrangements in frequency and format, which should be consolidated both at Headquarters and in the field to streamline information flows.
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Crisis Response Mechanism

FIELD

- Crisis Manager
  (Head of Mission)
- Crisis Management Team
- Crisis Coordinator
  (Appointed by the
  Crisis Manager)
- Operations Coordination
  Body

UNHQ

- Crisis Manager
  (SG/DPKO)
- Crisis Management Team
- Crisis Coordinator
  (Regional Director / IOT Team Leader)
- Operations Coordination
  Body
  (ITF, ITF–plus, or new
  body)

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Crisis Information Management

During crisis, there is a HQ need for enhanced and additional reporting, inter alia, to:
- effectively support the mission in crisis management
- give strategic direction and advice
- respond to public information demands
- assess safety, security and location of UN personnel

Crisis Management + Information Exchange = More effective crisis response!
With a common crisis information management mechanism, decision-making and operational coordination can focus on response options rather than information exchange.

**Key Message:** To avoid parallel information flows to senior leadership, information from the mission and other UN actors shall be channelled through the UNOCC for dissemination to relevant UNHQ actors for situational awareness and to guide decision-making and response. UNOCC will disseminate the integrated information to relevant UNHQ actors reflecting a common operational picture of the situation.

The Crisis Manager, together with the UNOCC and in consultation with the field, shall be responsible for ensuring that information is collected and disseminated in a timely fashion within the UN system. The UNOCC shall monitor the development and implementation of relevant standard operating procedures (SOPs) and toolkits in this regard.
Key Message: For internal communication, DM, DFS (for peace operations), DSS and DPI are responsible, in consultation with the lead coordinating entity/entities, for coordinating timely and continuous internal information dissemination to UN personnel.
Key Message: The CMT has the sole responsibility of determining when to deactivate crisis coordination mechanisms.

The decision may be made, inter alia, because the crisis has abated and no longer requires sustained accelerated attention and support from Headquarters, in which case at its last meeting, the CMT should outline any measures that should be taken and if and how mechanisms should continue to monitor the situation and inform the system on follow-up measures.

Crisis coordination mechanisms may also be deactivated if the crisis has become protracted or if mission-planning has commenced and it is determined that there is sufficient standing capacity both at Headquarters and in the field to manage the situation, and thereby no longer requires additional support from the dedicated crisis response coordination architecture.

The Crisis Manager, at the last CMT meeting, shall clarify the following:

- The return to the Enhanced Monitoring or Preparedness stage at UNHQ
- Measures taken to continue monitoring the situation in order to keep the broader United Nations system informed on follow-up measures
Crisis Management - What to consider?

- Improve situational awareness and communications
- Integrate analysis and planning for early identification and response to deteriorating situations
- Decentralize crisis management
- Accelerate decision-making and coordination structures on all levels
- Develop guidance clearly outlining roles and responsibilities, authority and accountability
- Identify a central venue for crisis response activities
- Exercise flexibility of available funding in addressing urgent needs

Organizational Resilience

- ORMS Elements
- Support to Staff, Survivors and Families
- Crisis Management
- Security
- Business Continuity
- IT Disaster Recovery
- Crisis Communications
- Mass Casualty Incident Response
Key Message: The ORMS aims to assist UN entities to build resilience by aligning and harmonizing preparedness efforts to enhance the Organization’s ability to continuously deliver its mandates.

Organizational Resilience (OR) is what it sounds like – the ability of an organization, whether UNHQ or a PKO, to be resilient – to be able to bounce back from a shock, an attack (as occurred against UNHQ in Abuja), and/or a natural disaster (Haiti).

Not a new project or a revolutionary idea – just a sensible and useful way of approaching crisis management.

It looks across the spectrum of existing activities from preparedness, through response and recovery and all of the elements therein and seeks to draw them together to make sure they are coherent and practiced.

Example: The need to make sure that security plans, Business Continuity plans and crisis management plans, all identify the same alternate location and are working on the basis of the same crisis decision-making infrastructure and timeline.

At the end of the day, the point of OR is to make sure we have a clear, common road map that everyone is familiar with, through practice, so that we can respond effectively to and recover from crises.

The UN Organizational Resilience Management System (ORMS) was approved by the General Assembly in June 2013, under A/RES/67/254, as the emergency management framework for the Organization.
Key Message: ORMS is a comprehensive risk based emergency management methodology to prepare for, prevent, respond and recover from disasters, that can be applied in all duty stations irrespective of size, organizational structure and culture, and risk exposure.

At its essence, ORMS involves:

- Harmonization of emergency management planning and plans
- Common governance and implementation structures for emergency management
- Jointly conducted emergency management awareness, training and exercises
- Emphasis on a risk-based approach, with risk prevention and mitigation, and situational awareness
- Implementation Standards that describe principles and define roles and responsibilities, which can be applied to meet local conditions
Key Message: The OR approach has application guiding crisis response both at HQ (New York) and in the field.

HQ DPKO-DFS is involved in the crisis management in respect of a crisis in New York.

- In addition to ensuring the safety of staff, the imperative for DPKO-DFS is to ensure the ability to provide continuing support to our peacekeeping missions.

The response to crises in the field - in which there is a PKO - will be led by the mission, coordinated with the UNCT and other actors.

- Many crises can be handled at the mission level, but where more strategic support is necessary, DPKO-DFS will provide it.

- Due to the nature of peacekeeping, which to some extent is designed to deal with crises, missions and DPKO-DFS are called upon to respond to two types of crisis:
  - Internal: Those that directly impact the mission and it’s ability to conduct business:
• an attack against the facilities or personnel;
• a communications or IT system failure;
• a disease outbreak affecting staff; or
• a natural disaster.

▪ **External**: Those that relate to the mission’s ability to respond to crises, which may not directly affect the mission’s ability to carry out business, but is instead a function of the mission mandate:

  • the ability of the mission to respond to election related violence;
  • or to respond to a threat to civilians posed by an armed group.

▪ **External** crises fall beyond the purview of OR but linkages and overlap exist - for example the same crisis decision-making architecture is used, and often a response to an external crisis may invoke organisational resilience elements, such as the targeting of the UN.
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**Summary of Key Messages**

- A crisis is defined as an incident or situation, whether natural or human-made, that due to its magnitude, complexity or gravity of potential consequence, requires a UN-wide coordinated multi-dimensional response.
- Crisis Management should be guided by the principles of accountability; field-focus; adaptation to context; inclusiveness; simplicity and predictability; respect for values, standards and principles; and respect for humanitarian principles.
- The Crisis Response Coordination Mechanism consists of the following phases: preparedness, enhanced monitoring, activation and de-activation.

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**Summary of Key Messages (cont’d)**

- The Organizational Resilience Management System (ORMS) is a comprehensive risk based emergency management methodology to prepare for, prevent, respond and recover from disasters, that can be applied in all duty stations irrespective of size, organizational structure and culture, and risk exposure.
- The OR approach has application guiding crisis response both at HQ (New York) and in the field.
Introduction to the Security Management System

The goal of the United Nations Security Management System is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority.
UNSMS Policies and Procedures apply to...

- All UN civilian and eligible dependents
- Case by case to Individually deployed military and police personnel
- Security Risk Management model as tool also for Military and Police Components

Security Risk Management and Military and Police Components

The UN security management system applies to individually deployed military and police officers.

In peacekeeping missions, Heads of military and police components are mandatory members of the Mission/Country Security Management Team.
Module 3 – Lesson 4.2: UN Security Management System

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Applicability

However, by DPKO-DFS policy...
the Security Risk Management Process
is applicable to military and police
components’ formed units.

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The DSS role in Crisis Management

- Designated Official (DO)
- Country Representatives
- Security Management Team (SMT)
- Field Security Officers: Full-time Professionals - Principal Security Advisor (PSA) and/or Chief Security Advisor (CSA)
- Chief Security Officer for PK Missions
- Field Security Officer
- Single-agency Security Officers
- Wardens
- Personnel employed by the UN System
**Security Management Team** – the SMT comprising heads of agencies has a collective responsibility to support the D.O.

**Designated Official (D.O)** – holds the prime responsibility for the management of safety and security crisis situations in the field in consultation and with support from the Security Management Team (SMT) and under overall guidance and directions from the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Safety and Security – note the Head of Mission is normally appointed the Designated official.
UNDSS USG

- USG for the DSS – acting on behalf of the SG supports crisis management activities coordinated by the D.O's through strategic guidelines and advises the SG and the Executive Heads on the process and the situation.

- If the DO and SMT are unable to fulfil their responsibilities the UNDSS USG will assume operational lead over crisis management in the field.

Roles and Responsibilities

- **Executive Group on Security** – in the most complex situations critically affecting most organizations in the United Nations Security Management System the UNDSS USG may call a meeting of the executive group on security comprising executive heads of organizations affected by the crisis to coordinate strategic issues pertaining to crisis management.

- **Host Country** - the primary responsibility for safety and protection of UN personnel, other individuals covered by the UNSMS (this excludes uniformed components unless they are individually contracted) and the property of UNSMS organizations rests with the host government.
Chief Security Advisor (CSA) or Security Advisor (SA) is in an advisory role and a member of the SMT but not a representative.

Crisis coordinator – to ensure that the D.O continues to provide security leadership within his/her area of responsibility and uninterruptedly discharge a full range of security management functions and responsibilities in crisis situations, the DO shall designate a crisis coordinator to manage specific aspects of a crisis situation or exigencies associated with specific safety accidents or security incidents under overall guidance of the D.O.

Normally the most senior UNSMS security professional, senior program manager or specialist in a related field with specific crisis situation, safety accident or security incident can be designated as a crisis coordinator.
Integrated Missions – the Head of Mission (HoM) with D.O responsibilities may choose to incorporate representatives (those most affected) from the SMT into the Crisis Management team structure.

Alternatively, the HoM may choose to keep the SMT structure separate and manage / direct the team or task the RC/HC to debrief the SMT members.
**Module 3 – Lesson 4.2: UN Security Management System**

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![Suggested Example Diagram](image)

**Note to instructor:** Discuss with the audience this suggested methodology. Remember it’s not the plan that is important, it’s the planning. We want harmonized plans.

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**Summary of Key Messages**

- The UN Security Management System (SMS) applies to all UN civilian and eligible dependents; and on a case-by-case basis to individually deployed military and police personnel.

- The DPKO-DFS Security Risk Management Process Policy is applicable to all military and police components’ formed units.

- The Security Management Team (SMT) comprises the D.O. (i.e. HoM), Heads of Agencies, Programmes and Funds, CSA and reps of IGO/NGOs who have signed the MOU.