Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police

CARANA
Country Study

UN Peacekeeping Training Material

CARANA
Scenario Base Exercise
### CARANA GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AICF</td>
<td>Action Internationale Contre la Faim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>Assembly Zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEC</td>
<td>Banque Economique de Carana</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Chief Administrative Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Commission for the Consolidation of Peace</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Carana Defence Force</td>
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<td>CRCAC</td>
<td>CRC Assistance Mission to Carana</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
<td>Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNP</td>
<td>Carana National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>(United Nations) Civilian Police Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Continent Regional Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization &amp; Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDKR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration &amp; Repatriation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>DRCC</td>
<td>Demobilization and Resettlement Commission Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL Carana</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Carana</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTC</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission in Carana</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>Elassasonian Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Field Communications Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>JC</td>
<td>Joint Commission</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Commission for the Ceasefire</td>
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<td>JLT</td>
<td>Joint Liaison Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDM</td>
<td>Medécins du Monde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILOBS</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MNF Multi National Force
MODUK Ministry of Defence of UK
MPC Mouvement Patriotique de Carana
MPS Military Planning Service
MSF Médecins sans Frontières
NGO Non-Government Organizations
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDC Parti Démocratique de Carana
PF Patriotic Front (generic term)
PfP Partnership for Peace
ROE Rules of Engagement
SCR Security Council Resolution
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SRSG Special Representative to the Secretary-General
TCC Troop Contributing Country
UKDEL NATO UK Delegation in NATO
UKMIS GENEVA UK Mission in Geneva
UNAC United Nations Assistance to Carana
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO United Nations International Development Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNNY United Nations Headquarters New York
UN PKF United Nations Peacekeeping Force
WB World Bank
WHO World Health Organization
WFP World Food Programme
WV World Vision (NGO)
ZOS Zone of Separation
Background Notes

After years of violent conflict between the Caran dominated Government of Carana and rebel forces, a peace agreement (Kalari Treaty) was signed on 19th M+1 20xx in an attempt by the regional organization, the Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) to put a halt to the violence and pave the way for a peace process in Carana. The ceasefire agreement foresees that a United Nations mandated mission would take over from the light CRC observer mission in Carana (CRCAC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire as well as in the stabilisation of the country. The UN Security Council in Resolution 1544 of M+3 20xx authorises the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNHQ has planned the mission to date using its internal capacities. A Carana country study and technical survey have been completed as well as a basic UN strategic concept. These documents are provided as pre-reading to allow course participants to become familiar with the scenario that will be used throughout the complete course. They reflect the information/material that a new Mission Leadership Team (MLT) might expect from UNHQ.

Geography

Location
Carana is located on the east coast of the 8th continent between the 8th and 10th latitudes. The total area of Carana is 120 000 sq km with 300 km coastline. Carana has land boundaries of 1500 km with its neighbouring countries.

Topography
Carana is topographically divided into two major areas; the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. The terrain in Carana generally increases in elevation from East to West from sea level through to a height of 1200 m.

The undulation is mostly flat and smooth with insignificant areas of rocky, steep terrain.

The terrain along the coastline is flat with no cliffs or rocks. The water is calm but with only a few areas suitable for deep-water ships.

Hydrography
The three main rivers in Carana, the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo, flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The Kalesi River discharges in a large delta with surrounding swamp lands. Though all major rivers are in principle navigable, the Torongo is the only waterway used for transportation. Two dams along the Kalesi and Mogave are used to produce electricity. Carana has no large natural lakes.

Climate and Weather
The climate in Carana is hot and humid. Close to the equator, Carana has no distinct winter and summer. The average daily temperature during the dry season is 36 degrees C; the average nightly temperature is 22 degrees C. The rainy season runs from early October to December with an average precipitation rate of 250 mm a month.
Vegetation
Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Over the last century, the central and eastern areas have been cleared and cultivated, being used for agricultural purposes. Even though the soil in Carana is fertile, the intensive use of the land as pasture has left large areas barren and useless for agricultural purposes.

Approximately 20 % of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit.

The west and south of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are used for agricultural purposes.

Natural Resources
Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not equally dispersed throughout the country. In the jungle covered mountains of the west, rare wood and timber are the main natural resources. Diamonds are found along the Kalesi River in the provinces of Mahbek and Barin. Copper is mined in the highlands west of Mia. Coal is mined in the province of Hanno.

The soil in Carana is naturally fertile. The rivers and coastal waters are rich in fish.

Human Geography
Human development in Carana has been shaped by differences in climate zones, creating a divided society featuring disparate social structures organized around different modes of subsistence. The most salient cleavage is between the semi-nomadic pastoralists inhabiting the pasturelands in the southwest, and the largely sedentary farmers and miners in the east.

Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Facts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>14 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Age Distribution              | <15 : 44 %  
|                              | 15 to 18 : 13 %  
|                              | 18 to 60 : 39 %  
|                              | >60 : 4 %        |
| Fertility Rate                | 5.1 children per woman |
| Sex Ratio                     | 1.06 females/male |
| Infant Mortality              | 9.1 deaths per 100 live births |
| Life Expectancy               | Total population: 45.3 years  
|                              | Male: 42.1 years  
|                              | Female: 47.9 years |
| Language                      | In Carana there are more than 20 original languages or tribal dialects spoken. The official and administrative language is French. |
Ethnic Distribution

The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these
groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalised. The three
major ethnic groups, the Caran, Kori and Tatsi represent 90 percent of the
population. The Kori (32%) live in the west and are the dominant ethnic group in
the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Caran (44%) are the ethnic majority in the
country and mainly live in the east and centre of Carana. The Tatsi (14%) live in
the south, and are the majority in Leppko Province.

The national boundaries result from the colonial time and do not represent the
ethnic distribution of the region. The Caran make up 10% of the population of
neighbouring Sumora, the Kori make up 38% of the population of Katasi and the
Tatsi make 30% of the population of Rimosa.

Religion

According to 2010 World Bank estimates some 75% of the population of Carana
are Christian. Islam is practised by over 20%, mainly in the South. About 35% of
the population are Protestant Lutherans and Baptists, while 40% are Roman
Catholic. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni who overwhelmingly live in the
South; however, there are small but active Shia communities along the coastal
plains. Several of the Sunni groups are extremist in nature and have instituted
Sharia Law in the southwest areas of Leppko. In terms of ethnic distribution the
majority of the Caran are Catholic, while the majority of the Kori are Protestant.
The Tatsi people are mainly Sunni Muslim.

The 1991 Constitution (suspended) provides for freedom of religion while
prohibiting certain forms of religious fundamentalism. Christian holidays are
celebrated as national holidays. Missionary groups within Carana are tolerated
and include Lutherans, Baptist, Grace Brethren and Jehovah’s witnesses. They
tend to operate only in the West and South. The Catholic Church is influential in
Caran occupied territories.

History

Colonial Period

The State of Carana was founded in 1904 as French colony. Since the French
administration focused on the exploitation of the natural resources and accepted
the tribal and religious structures of the country, as well as the role of local
authority, the period between 1919 and 1951 was relatively calm and peaceful.
The following period from 1951 to 1955 was characterised by rapidly evolving civil
unrest based on the increasingly popular movement for national liberation. From
1952, unrest and riots were frequent and developed into more organised actions
and violence against the colonial power. In 1954, the French lost control of most
of the country outside the capital and the main coastal cities. To retain a minimum
level of control, they were forced to agree to certain forms of cooperation and to
an autonomous State of Carana.

In 1955, the legal status of Carana changed from a French colony to a republic of
the French community. In 1962, Carana gained full independence.
As a result of a long period of French colonial rule, a strong French influence on
nearly all-cultural, social and economic aspects of the country is still visible, and in
some areas still dominates. Important parts of the infrastructure, particularly the
railway and road systems were built during the French colonial period and have
not been improved until now. The architecture of the political/administrative system in Carana also reflects the strong French influence imposed over recent decades.

Post-Colonial Developments
After the liberation of Carana, Joseph Uroma (the leader of the largest of the liberation movements and with a power base derived from the backing of the Caran majority in the east of the country) came to power and immediately tried to cut all ties with France. He attempted to establish a communist system with the assistance of USSR and Cuba. With significant economic and military support, he successfully established his regime and suppressed all other liberation movement parties and opposition groups. During the first years of his government, Uroma received broad public support and enhanced powers. As a result of the deteriorating economic situation and the inability of the Uroma regime to establish effective governmental functions, public support declined and opposition to his leadership increased. In 1971, Uroma was expelled from power and killed. Christian Hakutu, the former Chief of the Caran dominated Army, replaced him. Hakutu re-established the links with France and promised massive social and economic reform. Even though he received intensive support from western countries, Hakutu was unable to solve the economic problems and stabilise the country. In 1975, Hakutu was removed from power by a coup and replaced by a military junta under Colonel Tarakoni, also Caran. The military government of Tarakoni was also unable to address the economic and humanitarian issues but was relatively successful in maintaining public order in the country, albeit at the expense of human rights.

In 1983, the economic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that only a massive injection of international aid could prevent the country from falling in to a humanitarian crisis. During the crisis opposition groups evolved and challenges to the Tarakoni regime became more frequent. After nine years of instability, and under international pressure, free elections were conducted in 1994.

The PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana) won the elections and Jackson Ogavo (PDC leader) became the first elected president of Carana. Initially the government was representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Caran, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1995 Constitution. During the early years some economic and social reforms were realised but over time, Ogavo’s focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 2001 he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo’s Caran tribe led to an increasingly repressive approach, administrative and economic inefficiency and corruption.

Since 2006, the previously growing economy has been in decline and regional humanitarian crises have occurred on a regular basis.

Current Situation
As a result of the economic situation and the discrimination of the Kori and Tatsi by the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the mid-2000s. The government suppressed most of these groups, resorting to the military and gendarmerie to suppress any attempt to challenge Ogavo’s
In 2006 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better organised rebel groups known as MPC (Mouvement Patriotique de Carana) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC achieved some local success in the west over the Caran dominated Carana Defence Force (CDF), gaining increasing support from the local population in the west of the country; in 2009 this culminated in the CDF losing control of significant parts of the western highlands. Though the MPC’s military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels lacked a coherent political strategy and failed to capitalise on their success; their only stated objectives were to remove Ogavo from power and to secure better representation for non-Caran ethnicities.

Low level but frequent MPC operations in the west increasingly tied down the CDF, leaving it with weak capability in the south of the country in Leppko province, and creating an opportunity for elements of the predominantly Muslim Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localised incidents but it quickly escalated into more radicalised activities including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Caran civilians. Realising that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves CISC (Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana).

Relations with Neighbouring Countries
The relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good. Even though the Caran make up only 10% of the population of Sumora they are strong politically. In the recent past, the government of Sumora has tended to support the position of President Ogavo.

The relations between Carana and Katasi are strained. Carana accused Katasi several times of supporting the MPC rebels with money, weapons and fighters; these allegations were not without foundation and have been corroborated by reports from a number of international organisations, although the scale of support remains unclear. Nonetheless it is sufficient to ensure that Carana lays the blame for its inability to deal with the MPC at Katasi’s door.

The relations between Carana and Rimosa are also strained. There is, a perennial civil conflict in Rimosa. Rimosa, has been in the grips of a civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi, who hold nearly all positions of power in the Rimosan government, and the minority and also Muslim Elassi, pastoralists who claim that they suffer ethnic discrimination and persecution. Most of the interethnic fighting in Rimosa has taken place in northern Rimosa, near the border of Carana. There, a shadowy rebel army calling itself the Elassi Liberation Front (ELF) has waged a guerrilla-style campaign against government forces and pro-government Tatsi militias.

Carana is a member of the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC). This coalition, consisting of the 12 countries of the continent, is focused primarily on improving the continent’s economic well-being. On occasions, however, the coalition has brought political and diplomatic pressure to bear when tensions arise between
some of the Member States of the CRC. Since early 2011 the CRC has attempted to mediate between the groups in Carana and in February of that year it did succeed in bringing the main groups to the negotiating table, only to see the opportunity for peace slip away when a member of the Sumoran government, which held the CRC presidency, was accused of arranging arms shipments to President Ogavo. The allegations were subsequently proven to be unfounded but too late to save the talks.

The rotating CRC presidency was assumed by Kazuri at the end of 2014. Being more distant from Carana, Kazuri has the advantage of not being seen to have any vested interest in the conflict, and has made renewed efforts to resume negotiations.

Political System

Government
Carana is governed under a constitution adopted by a referendum in 1995. It is a presidential republic with a president as head of state, elected for a five-year term. The head of the government is the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers and heads of the government departments.

A Parliament with 256 elected members has broad authority and was intended to be representative of the ethnic balance of the country. Under the Ogavo regime the oversight functions of the parliament as foreseen in the Constitution were merely ornamental and there was no actual institutional counterweight to the personal rule of Ogavo. The Commission on Defence and Security of the Parliament is weak and has limited power in the effective democratic control of the security sector.

Although the constitution supports a democratic political system President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and since about 2001 Carana has effectively been a one party state. Today the only legal political party is the Caran-dominated PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

Administration
Carana is administratively divided into eight provinces. The Capital is Galasi. The Province Capitals are Galasi, Maroni, Sureen, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Amsan and Corma.

The President appoints the governors who are the administrative heads of the provinces, and report directly to the President. The administrative system of Carana is a centre-orientated administration. The central government controls most governmental issues.

The provinces are divided into a number of districts. The political and administrative role of these districts is not defined in the constitution. Most district boundaries were established by the French colonial administration. Side by side with the formal administrative structure, there exists a traditional system built around chiefdoms. Chiefdom chiefs exercise considerable de-facto authority, particularly in rural areas, and preside over traditional courts applying unwritten
customary legal codes, which vary across ethnic and religious groups. Sharia law is prominent in Leppko province amongst the Tatsi people.

Judicial System
Carana’s judicial system is based around a Supreme Court, provincial courts and district courts. All politically sensitive cases are the responsibility of the Supreme Court or the provincial court. The government appoints judges in these courts. Governors appoint judges to the District Courts. Government control over the district courts varies, depending on the region. In some regions, local traditional authorities have considerable influence over the district courts.

Under the constitution, the judicial system is designed to counter the political weight of the government. However, as a result of the judiciary’s politicisation under the one party system, its independence is highly questionable. In addition, the judiciary sector has for years lacked institutional capacity and resources and suffered from limited territorial coverage and endemic corruption. Basic administrative tools are missing, and, as a result, the case management flow does not work properly and response times for cases are extremely long. Salaries of judicial staff often are unpaid for months, leading to absenteeism and corruption. Meanwhile, legislation remains outdated and often discriminatory against women, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups. There is no functioning juvenile justice system, and no public defence counsel service. The legal education system, centred on the University of Galasi Law School, has come to a standstill through a lack of government funding.

Media
There are approximately 20 daily newspapers, two radio stations and two television channels in the country. The radio stations are operated by state cooperatives while most newspapers are privately owned. The two largest newspapers are government owned and the Catholic Church publishes another. Additionally there are some low power, community radio stations and locally printed media with local and very limited distribution.

In principle, the Ministry of Information controls all media. The censorship is very limited in the case of the small, local media but nearly absolute in the case of the official radio stations and main newspapers.

Economy

Economic System
The economy in Carana is based on a free market system with free enterprise but with strong government participation and influence. The government controls the mining sector and all foreign trade activity; however, rebels control some major diamond mining areas.

Basic Economic Data (of 2009)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>$9.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>$520</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP composition by sector</td>
<td>Agriculture: 27%</td>
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<td>Manufacturing: 16%</td>
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</tbody>
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Mining: 32%
Services: 25%

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<tr>
<th>GDP growth</th>
<th>Mining: 32%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919 to 1997: average 3% per year</td>
<td>Services: 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006: -4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007: -2.5%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008: -2.8%</td>
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<td>2009: -6.9%</td>
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Country Comparison to the World

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<tr>
<th>Inflation rate</th>
<th>223rd</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>300%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: N/A</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In urban areas more than 30%</td>
<td></td>
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Currency

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<tr>
<th>CFr (Carana Franc) 100 CFr = 1.5 $</th>
<th>Mining: 32%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The budget for the Security and Rule of Law core sector amounts to only 10 percent of the total national budget. There is therefore limited fiscal space available for the sustenance and maintenance the security institutions. The majority of resources is being spent on salaries and allowances.

**Banking and Monetary Economy**

The Central Bank of Carana is responsible for the national currency reserve, the international currency exchange and all government monetary transactions.

Constitutionally the Central Bank is responsible for the currency value and economic growth. In reality, the Central Bank is more a government institution than an independent instrument for economic growth and stability. Corruption is widespread.

The government owned BEC (Banque Economique de Carana) is the only monetary institution operating on a countrywide basis. The BEC is represented in all provincial capitals and some of the larger towns.

Some private international banks have branches in the capital.

**Mining**

The mining of diamonds and copper is an important contributor to the GDP. Along with rare wood, timber and cotton, diamonds and copper are the main export of Carana. Coal is mostly used in the country for production of electricity.

Prior to 1996, the mining industry was controlled by private enterprise but since then the government has progressively taken control of the industry.

**Manufacturing**

Manufacturing contributes 16% to the GDP. The main activities in this sector are the food and fish industries, production of goods for local markets, and the processing of timber and textiles. The manufacturing sector suffers from a lack of infrastructure, skilled workers, an inefficient administration and widespread corruption.

**Agriculture**

Approximately 31% of the total land area of Carana is used for agricultural purposes. The goods produced, fruits, corn, and grain are sold mostly on the local market. Cotton is the only significant agricultural commodity that is exported.
Most of the agricultural land exists as small farm lots owned by the local population. Cotton is the only commodity produced on large farms using employed labour.

**Foreign Trade**
Carana’s main exports are timber, diamonds, copper, cotton and to a lesser extent fish, fruit and woodcrafts. Carana’s main imports are industrial products, vehicles, food, and petroleum products.

Carana has established trade relations with its neighbours, and with France. Until 1996, Carana had a positive trade balance.

**Infrastructure**

**Roads**
Carana had a well-developed road network, capable of supporting commercial traffic, with practically all major towns connected. However, the years of civil war, harsh weather, minimal investment and maintenance have degraded it significantly with the result that the road network is often impassable in the rainy season.

As well as the paved roads, there is an intricate network of unpaved roads and tracks. The bridges throughout this network are generally of wooden construction and are rarely capable of sustaining heavy vehicle movement.

**Railroads**
Carana has two railroad tracks with a total length of 280 km. The entire track system and loading facilities were built during the French colonial period. One track connects Galasi with the coal mining area east of Sureen. The second track connects Maldosa and Mia, and was built to transport copper to the harbour in Turen. A lack of maintenance has resulted in the rail system being in bad shape, although it is still periodically operational.

**Harbours**
Carana has three deep-water harbours with varying capacities. The harbour at Galasi is the most developed and best-equipped harbour in the country, with a Roll-on Roll-off (RoRo) capability and working cranes.

The harbour in Cereni does not have a RoRo capability but is equipped with loading systems for containers for heavy goods.

The harbour in Maldosa was originally built for the loading of copper. It has railroad access but limited facilities for loading containers and heavy equipment.

**Airports**
Carana has two international airports in Galesi and Corma. Both airports are operational, capable of taking wide bodied aircraft, and used by international airlines. However their cargo handling capacity is limited.

Additionally there are 25 airstrips around the country. Not all of these airstrips have paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airstrip varies considerably.
Electricity
Carana could be relatively self-sufficient in the production of electricity; this is generated by two coal power plants and two hydro-electric power stations. The weakness lies in the distribution network which is only able to support Galasi, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The rural areas have no access to the electricity system. Some small local water power plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and Sanitation
The capital and some larger cities have a water supply system but only to the central area of the city. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. The water quality in the rural areas is mostly satisfactory. However, the water quality of the crowded Galasi suburbs and the IDP camps, is problematic.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Carana, leading to permanent disease and health problems particularly in the heavy populated areas.

Telecommunications
There is no telecommunications system outside of Carana’s capital. The land-line telephone system covers less than 20% of the city and is unreliable. Consequently cellular telephone coverage is expanding and generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country, and some of the remoter border areas that can access nodes in neighbouring countries.

Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.

Security and Defence Sector

Security Overview
Regional security
Though there have been several conflicts with neighbouring countries in the past few decades, and while relations with Katasi and Rimosa remain strained, the likelihood of conflict with neighbouring countries is low. There is no current external military threat to Carana.

Internal security
Security in the country is volatile. The main internal security problems are around the ongoing conflict between armed groups and the government which is deteriorating and the high level of criminal activity, some of it organized in urban areas, resulting from the poor economic situation. In the North and West there is increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.

An estimated 12,000 people have been killed in the last six months and anything up to 200,000 forced to flee their homes as a result of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the north and the south. Many civilians have been abducted by armed groups, mainly by extremist rebel elements but also by
the CDF.

At the sector-wide level, there is no national security strategy nor policy. There is currently no national coordination mechanism in place to initiate the transformation of the security sector.

At the component-level, the security sector comprises:

**Military**

**Structure of the CDF**
The CDF has a total strength of approximately 10,000 troops (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). The chiefs of the services report directly to the President.

With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats the Navy plays a specialised but minor role in the Defence Force.

The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited strike capacity. This capacity allows the government to project its power over the entire country, but is insufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups.

The main service in the CDF is the Army, primarily but not solely recruited from the Caran people. Its senior leadership is almost wholly Caran. Structured in four areas of commands it represents the power of the central government all over the country. Their areas of responsibility do not match the administrative and provincial boundaries, but reflect the location of the headquarters and their troops.

Women’s participation in the armed forces is low, with female soldiers and higher ranking officers making up some 6% of the CDF in total. During the Uroma regime and on Uroma’s specific request, women were recruited and received substantial training abroad, which eventually led to positions as senior officers. A small but steady recruitment of female soldiers continued over the following decades, although their status has been continuously deteriorating due to lack of political support for women’s participation.

According to the Draft Law, 18 years is the minimum age for conscription and voluntary service, but in spite of this it is estimated that 15-20 % of the CDF soldiers are younger than 18 years old.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Command</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Assigned Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Maroni</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Airborne Bn, 1 Arty Bn, 1 Engr Bn, 1 AAA Btry, MP, Mil Band</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Alur</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Arty Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Folsa</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn, 1 Engr Coy, 1 Recce Coy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Corma</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Recce Coy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Major Equipment**
The French Government provided most of the existing military equipment during the 1980s and early 1990s. Since this time, equipment maintenance has often
suffered from a lack of spare parts and well trained mechanics. The level of equipment availability is estimated as low.

### Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMX 13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Light Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamba</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML 60/90</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>APC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>105 mm Artillery Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 mm Brandt</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 mm Brandt</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCL M 40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>106 mm Recoilless Launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhard M 3 VDA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L 60</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Air Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Jet C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ground Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker 100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 421</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F 33 C Bonanza</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospatial SA 330 H Puma</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospitale SA 316 Alouette</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Utility/Communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suscal A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150 to Coastguard Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC-84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>River Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Presidential Guard

The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions (about 1500 personnel) and is not part of the regular defence force. The commanders and most officers are Caran and recruited by President Ogavo. Members of the Presidential Guard have received intensive training and are entitled to several privileges. This unit is a loyal elite force with the task to protect the President. It is also used for special purpose tasks. In the recent past, the Presidential Guard was used several times, together with Gendarmerie units, to fight against the rebel groups, and has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

### Police and Gendarmerie

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. CNP are located in population centres and
are controlled by the Ministry of Interior via the provincial administration. The Gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of Defence and maintains the police presence in rural areas and is responsible for border security. However, in recent years the Gendarmerie has been used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, CDF units often undertake policing tasks in the internal security role.

In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, aging population, low morale because their salaries were not paid, lack of logistical and financial resources, and training. In addition, they have been plagued by heavy politicisation, corruption and mismanagement. Police presence in Carana is very low. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers amounts to 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,400 citizens. Out of this number, only 5% are female officers and they are in largely administrative roles.

Land and marine border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking as well as diamond smuggling have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials.

Crime rates particularly in population centres are high and there are numerous reports of human rights abuses and looting perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of their credibility and trust within the population.

Rebel Groups

**MPC**
The MPC is an avowed secular organization with broad appeal that has a total strength of 10,000 fighters, structured into groups of 700 men, with 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. The level of public support is high in the west and cuts across the different religions. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. While the groups have no internally defined military structure they are based on a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the sub-commanders is high and discipline is good.

The official HQ of MPC is in Alur but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. As a result of broad public support for the rebels, and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well-accepted by the largely Kori population in the west.

**CISC**
The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverse backgrounds. Some members are Tatsi deserters from the CDF, while others are refugees from the war in Rimosa. The total strength is estimated to be around 3000 fighters. Public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province. The movement has been successful in recruiting young men to its cause through a combination of government anti-Muslim excesses, religious zeal and the poor
economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is currently low, as is the standard of training, although lately there is increasing evidence of the presence of experienced foreign extremists who have upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations.

Civil society organizations
The civil society in Carana is weak and there are no groups with substantial influence outside of the party structure of the PDC. The PDC did have an affiliated social movement organising activities in sports and culture, but the organisation is elitist and not viable without party support. Non-affiliated organisations have been harassed and persecuted under the Ogavo regime. The trades union connected to the mines have some limited political influence, but are active only as single-interest organisations that have not challenged the political leadership. Women’s organisations are starting to form at grass root level but so far are poorly organised. Some local human rights organisations are becoming more active. There is also currently an increase in the social activity and level of organisation connected to the religious institutions. Traditional structures in the form of chiefdoms with some de facto authority exist, particularly in the rural areas.

Humanitarian Situation

Nutrition
Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the necessary food for sufficient nutrition. In rural area most people can compensate for inflation and unemployment through self-sufficient agriculture. However, severe nutritional problems exist in the urban areas and the IDP camps. A humanitarian emergency is forecasted to affect approximately 2 million people next year.

Health
Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. The rudimentary health system that exists in the cities is unable to provide basic medical support.

One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held south and west. Here there is a critical lack of emergency supplies required for displaced and vulnerable populations, particularly in the IDP camps.

If the situation in the large cities continues to worsen, the threat of epidemics will increase. The WHO (World Health Organisation) has already reported 70 cases of cholera in Carana to date.

Refugees and IDPs
As a result of fighting in the west and south many people have been displaced from their homes. An estimated 100,000 have taken refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (approximately 40,000 refugees), Katasi (approximately 40,000 refugees) and Rimosa (approximately 20,000 refugees). Another 100,000 have fled their homes but remained within Carana; most of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) have headed east to Galasi and other coastal cities, where they are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in or near urban areas. Conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene in these areas are dangerously inadequate and increasingly provide a breeding ground for extremist
discontent.

News of the arrival of a UN mission has buoyed the hopes to return home of the nearly 200,000 refugees and IDPs. UNHCR, however, has expressed concerns about whether the environment is sufficiently safe and secure for their return. All parties to the conflict are reported to have used mines.

Finally, the country of Rimosa, sharing a border of approximately 200 km with Carana, has suffered from civil conflict between the two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi and the minority Elassi. As a result, approximately 30,000 Elassi have taken refuge in southern Carana. Most of these Elassi refugees are sheltered in Camp Lora, near the village of Lora approximately 50 km from the Rimosan border, and are a source of potential instability within the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province. Camp Lora is maintained by UNHCR and two NGO implementing partners, Refugees International and Care for the Children.
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police

CARANA
Technical Assessment
Mission Report

UN Peacekeeping Training Material
CARANA
Scenario Base Exercise
Carana Technical Assessment Mission Report

DRAFT

June 2017
Background Notes

On 19 May 2015, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement (Kalari Peace Agreement) was signed between the country’s government and rebel forces. The agreement foresees that a United Nations mandated mission would assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire and in the stabilization of the country. The UN Security Council in Resolution 1544 of July 2015 authorizes the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

TAM Purpose, Scope, and Applicability

The purpose of the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) featured in this report was to facilitate mission start-up by providing options and recommendations (1) for the formulation of the prospective UN Security Council mandate; and (2) on the size, scope, tasks, and structure of a UN Field Mission in Carana. The principal audiences, for which this report is intended, include the UN Secretary-General, voting members of the Security Council, and mission planners who will be charged with prioritizing and sequencing interventions in Carana. However, the TAM findings also apply to the broader community of stakeholders in the peaceful resolution of conflict in Carana.

It is important to emphasize that this report represents the first iteration of a continuous assessment process wherein TAM team members will continue to observe relevant conditions and measure progress until mission termination.

Terms of Reference

The Secretariat initiated the TAM to Carana, and directed the TAM team to:
1. Observe, document, and analyze current environmental and/or situational conditions in Carana;
2. Identify significant problems;¹
3. Generate tentative prioritized list of actions and tasks;”
4. Create a tentative sequencing scheme;
5. Provide options and recommendations for the formulation of a UN Security Council Mandate;
6. Provide options and recommendations on the size, scope, tasks, and structure of a UN Field Mission and;
7. Deliver detailed report of TAM findings to the Secretariat no later than 15 September 20xx.

¹ We define “problem” as a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels some combination of political, economic, and/or military action to resolve it.
Political Overview

Despite the signing of the CRC-brokered Kalari Peace Agreement, and the presence of the CRC observer mission CRCAC, Carana remains a politically unstable country. The government has little control over the western and the southern provinces of the country. Even in government-controlled areas, the Ogavo administration’s real power is limited and its replacement, the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), has not yet been able to change these facts on the ground. An increasing level of popular resistance continues to challenge the limited resources of the government’s security forces. Governmental administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent. Spoiler groups, including religious extremist groups, continue to cause dissent throughout the territory. Issues with governmental and military corruption, returned IDP property rights and the protection of cultural and heritage sites are also prevalent and require governmental attention.

Government of National Reconciliation (GNR)

The Kalari Treaty called for the establishment of an ethnically representative Government of National Reconciliation pending the Presidential and national elections, which will elect a new government. The GNR is now in place and struggling with its responsibilities.

Under the provisions of the Agreement, effective power is in the hands of a consensus Prime Minister. Lucien Langata, or LL as he is known, was a member of the Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC) and Finance Minister until he took a stand against corruption in the mid-2000s. Narrowly escaping execution due to his popular following amongst the Caran, LL refused to leave Carana and President Ogavo had allowed him to live in relative obscurity. He is considered a popular and sensible choice for caretaker Prime Minister and enjoys sufficient support across the country. He has reasonable chance of pulling the GNR together and upholding the tenets of the Kalari Agreement.

While nominally still President, Ogavo has been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity and now by the GNR for corruption. Unfortunately, he has disappeared and was last seen in Sumora in late April. He is believed to be protected by a group of hard line former members of the Presidential Guard, most of whom still remain in Carana, based in the capital Galasi. Depending on the Guards’ loyalty, this nexus could potentially disrupt the peace process since there is neither the will nor the capability within the former security forces to locate and apprehend Ogavo.

Political Parties

Carana has been a de facto one party state represented by the PDC. Years of repression have destroyed any effective and legitimate opposition, or have driven it underground. Any remaining legitimate opposition is so fragmented that it is unlikely to be politically viable for the foreseeable future.

Those opposition groups that do exist tend to be relatively insignificant, ethnically-
based, and provincial. They include some communist groups in the capital and Maldosa, Kori ethnic minority groups on the coast, fundamental Islamists in the southwest mountains, and the Tatsi grouping in the South. However, these groups are poorly organized and have little importance because of their narrow interests and limited bases of popular support. Other groups having some political influence are the coal and copper miners trade unions, which are mainly single interest-based.

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of the MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it could become an effective political force. It enjoys broad crosscutting public support in the west due to its perceived responsiveness to popular concerns and needs, and the delivery of essential services that the government has failed to provide.

In contrast the CISC currently lacks the structure or organization that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the excesses and religious discrimination of the Ogavo administration and, longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Caran minority in Leppko province. The CISC has never made an attempt to realize its potential, nor has it articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated and radicalized when it sees itself marginalised.

Carana has no political diaspora or organised groups in exile.

**Elections**

While the Kalari Treaty calls for elections within 12 months, the current highly unstable security situation could threaten the credibility and legitimacy of such an ambitious electoral process.

After years of human rights violations, sectarian discrimination, despotism, civil war and corruption, the public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost non-existent. Potential political opposition groups will be hard pressed to organise themselves in time to conduct an effective election campaign. This could result in calls to delay the elections or attempts to subvert the electoral process itself. Nevertheless, the timeline for elections was a crucial element in the peace negotiations. There will be considerable pressure on the Government of National Reconciliation to manage this process.

Another significant factor is the absence of an accurate census, the last national census having taken place in 1994. When combined with the large scale displacement of the population voter registration will be a long, complex and costly exercise.

If all parties honour the commitments of the Kalari Treaty, it can be hoped that the MPC will participate in future elections and evolve into a legitimate political party. The long-term political role of the CISC is uncertain. A further uncertainty is the potential emergence of hitherto unidentified, potentially extremist groups, who are not signatories to the Kalari Treaty. Whether they join the political process or oppose it, there is a real danger of further political instability, leading to an increase in violence and the ensuing security risks to the elections.
**DDR**

The requirement for all parties to the conflict to disarm is stated in the Kalari Agreement. It can be assumed that the MPC will honour this commitment if all parties adhere to the Agreement especially in view of its political aspirations and its expectations for its fighters to be included within the restructured national armed forces.

There are no indications that CISC will not disarm in accordance with the Kalari Treaty. However, the lack of a proper organizational structure and an inherent lack of discipline within the various splinter factions will make disarmament a higher risk process. It is evident that some factions have become radicalized by Islamist extremists, and probable that some factions will see themselves being disadvantaged, leading to freelance military activity, which may have sectarian, political, or criminal motivation. Many of these CISC soldiers have also been involved in systematic sexual violence against non-Muslim women, girls and young boys and men, in reprisal for similar and historical CDF excesses against the Tatsi Muslim population. It is therefore difficult to determine how the integration of these armed groups will be perceived by the population in the affected areas. In the CISC group, there is also a high percentage of women and girls who have been abducted and who now live with the militia. In effect, these women and girls also constitute the logistics and healthcare of the CISC military structure. A further complication is that these women are not welcome back into their original villages.

By extension, the most difficult part in the DDR process will be the disarmament and reintegration of any other armed groups who have no allegiance to any group, are not signatories of the Kalari Treaty and whose focus is largely extremist or criminal.

**SSR**

The 1995 Constitution includes some oversight and management functions by the parliament, including a Defence and Security Commission for civilian oversight. During the Ogavo regime all of these functions were merely ornamental. The police and CDF leadership reported only to Ogavo and were largely self-governing. The GNR has so far been unable to activate the system provided for in the Constitution.

In terms of military and police reform, the CDF and police are likely to demand train-and-equip measures exclusively, while the GNR may be more open to a holistic SSR process through support to the oversight and management functions. Any attempts to strengthen these functions are likely to encounter strong opposition with the CDF and Police leadership. However, good governance and respect for human rights are essential factors for successful and sustainable SSR and need to be promoted.

The Kalari Agreement requires the GNR to establish a DDR/SSR National Commission to oversee the transformation of the security sector, including the reform of military and internal security forces. It is essential that the GNR be encouraged to establish an inclusive National Commission as soon as possible, to build on the political momentum created by the Kalari Agreement. The transformation of the security sector should start with the elaboration of a nationally-owned vision of the future security sector clearly delineating the role...
and responsibilities of each security sector actor. The Commission is expected to coordinate these efforts.

Officially the major stakeholders support the establishment, despite grievances voiced for the composition and the future work of the commission. There is however a real risk that this is only lip service, at least on the part of the PDC. The MPC is likely to push for this process to begin without delay, as it is a prerequisite for their political commitment to the peace process. It can be assumed that the MPC will expect the integration of their fighters into the transformed security forces. The MPC will be motivated to commit because of the political aspirations and them being in a position where they have everything to gain.

Support for the Kalari Agreement among PDC members and other Caran elites is superficial at best. Former Ogavo administration representatives who are integrated within the new administration, other Caran hardliners and representatives of the CDF are likely to try to sabotage the reform process. They can be assumed to resist losing their current domination of power in the security structures, and to harbor ethnic bias based on the racist practices of the former regime. Objection to the possible inclusion of CISC fighters could be a stumbling block for both CDF and MPC, and a possible objection to be raised, as there is little political support and less trust between the parties regarding the position of CISC in the restructured armed forces. The leadership of all parties can be expected to emphasize national or military security aspects and to resist integration of the human security perspective including gender responsiveness.

The further success of the reform process hinges on the parties staying committed. The National Commission will likely need to conduct broad stakeholder consultations and set short-term achievable goals, while allowing for a generous timeframe for longer term goals to achieve a critical level of consensus and support, within the Caranian population as well as the parties to the peace agreement. Strategic SSR advice to the GNR on the establishment of the Commission and further capacity building and advice to the members of the Commission could be constructive and feasible UNAC contributions. A key task will be to support the inclusion of the population in the process to ensure that the underlying causes of insecurity are properly addressed and that trust between the population and security institutions is reestablished.

Given the widespread corruption and the high level of external intervention, it will also be important to focus on the sustainable financial management of the security sector.

**Constitution and Judicial System**

The Constitution and judicial system in Carana is based on modern democratic principles. Violations of human rights and other legal shortcomings stem from a systematic abuse and exploitation of the existing rules by the Ogavo regime.

Under the “State of Emergency” (see below) a system of mixed civilian/military courts, with very limited rights of appeal, has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crimes.
A number of human rights organisations have issued reports outlining arrests, detentions and executions without due legal process. There are also reports of torture, including sexual abuse and rape, and uninvestigated deaths in the prisons. Many of the detainees are members of opposition political groups. Prison conditions generally give cause for concern. Official records of who is being held are impossible to obtain and the ICRC has limited access and only to the main prison in Galasi. There are reliable reports of children being detained with adults as well as men and women being held in the same facilities. Some of the women have their infants with them. In general, prisoners are treated harshly, conditions are inhumane, nutrition is inadequate and there is little or no medical assistance. No information is available regarding the identity of prisoners held in CDF military holding facilities. Equally, the rebels are known to be holding many detainees.

**Human Rights**

Carana has ratified the following human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention Against Torture. It has also ratified the Statute of the ICC.

The Constitution states that all laws must be consistent with Carana’s international human rights obligations. It underlines that these rights should be upheld regardless of gender, ethnic group or creed. In reality, Carana legislation contains many laws inherited from the colonial period, which are incompatible with international human rights standards – for instance the Carana criminal procedure code. The Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights, which refers mostly to civil and political rights. It is silent as regards to other rights such as economic, social and cultural rights.

Currently, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Carana government has declared a “State of Emergency” which permits it to override the constitutional provisions, including its human rights elements. In 2013, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Carana. The Special Rapporteur has visited the country on a number of occasions and has sharply criticised all parties to the conflict for human rights abuses perpetuated against civilians generally, and women in particular. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict has also visited and highlighted the disturbingly large number of children used in combat roles by rebel elements as well as by the national army.

The Carana Government does not have a human rights ministry – instead the lead responsibility for human rights is vested in the Minister of Justice. In 2008, the National Human Rights Commission was established. The commission is not compliant with the international standards for a national human rights institution as set out in the “Paris Principles”. Carana has a number of active human rights NGOs, including women’s, youth groups, whose freedom to operate has been inhibited by the fear of reprisals, but with the change in the situation they are becoming increasingly vociferous. A number of international humanitarian NGOs...
are also represented in the country.

**Gender Specific Considerations: Women**

Carana holds 130th place in the Gender Development index ranking of Gender Development index and has high mortality rates in childbirth and has low literacy rates for women. As many men are working in the mines or manufacturing industry as well as being forcefully recruited to the military organizations, women are largely left with responsibility for small-scale farming to support extended families. This distribution of labour, which leaves many women vulnerable to threats, has resulted in their increased political awareness.

In parliament, however, women represent only 8% of members, which makes it difficult for their concerns to be heard. In public life women have held posts generally associated with assistance i.e. women’s affairs, health, etc. and have not been in decision-making positions. The only official women’s organization is the women’s wing of PDC which has advocated a return to traditional roles for women and men.

With the new political situation, women are mobilizing at the grass-root level. In the past, the State used abduction and rape to stigmatize, and undermine, female political involvement. The only women’s organizations that could operate addressed less overt political issues such as children’s issues (i.e. education, nutrition). However, there were women’s organizations in the conflict-affected areas helping victims of sexual violence. These women’s groups report high levels of domestic violence, including sexual abuse especially in the IDP camps.

Systematic sexual violence was used in some of the war-effected areas. The CISC is one of the main perpetrators of violence resulting from their poor command and control structures. The CDF and law enforcement agencies National Police are also responsible for sexual violence against civilians of the Kori and Tatsi ethnic groups. The conflict seems to have exacerbated the trafficking of women and children both internally and to neighboring countries. Trafficking in humans is related to the trafficking of weapons and drugs, all three of which have been used by the warring parties to continue the conflict.

**Gender Specific Considerations: Men**

Given the high crime rates, a large number of young men are being killed in crime related violence such as riots or gang fights. Men’s health is also negatively affected by the working conditions in the mines and manufacturing industry. Trade unions have not been able to address this situation effectively, partly because of their political involvement in the conflict. Sanitary conditions in the shanty towns where many men live are poor with high levels of alcoholism and drug addiction as well as HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. In the southern and western areas affected by the war there is often forced recruitment of men, particularly the very young, but also a social pressure to volunteer as a result of prevailing militarized norms of masculinity. As a result, many men are leaving the country with their families being left behind. Men involved in the political struggle can be subjected to violence with reports of sexual torture and rape being used
against political prisoners. In the southern region, civilian men of the Caran minority are the main target of violence by the CISC, including sexualized violence. Similarly, civilian men of the Kori and Tatsi are targeted by the CDF in their campaigns.

The Situation with Regard to Girls and Boys

The political conflict along with a deteriorating economy has had a grave impact on the young population, of which 44% is under the age of 15. Both girls and boys leave school to help support their families. Forced genital mutilation of girls in their early teens, though illegal, is practiced extensively by both the Kori and the Tatsi. There has been extensive abuse of both boys and girls throughout the conflict by all parties. The CISC are the main culprits for abductions but also sections of the CDF have been reported to be responsible. This high degree of violence toward girls, boys and women has prompted public discussion about the need to fight violence against women in the society at large.

Security

Overview
The level of general security in Carana is very low as a result of the intense fighting between government and rebel forces, the poor economic situation, the sectarian tensions, the high number of displaced people, the low police presence outside of the capital and the widespread dissatisfaction with the government. Civil unrest is widespread and occurs on a regular basis. The level of crime is high and there is evidence that much of it, especially in the sectors of diamonds and narcotics is both organized and transnational. In general, the security situation in Carana must be assessed as "Medium Risk". But some areas, such as the territory around Galasi, as well as Hanno and Leppko Provinces, have to be assessed as "High to Very High Risk". Male abductees of all ages are often coerced into the fighting forces and girls and women are used as what amounts as slaves, including being forced to become "wives" of combatants. These women are also at times forced to participate in outright fighting. If they refuse they are killed. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse are commonplace and are used to intimidate.

Since March, at the invitation of the GNR, there has been an emergency deployment of a French force “Opération Intrépide” along the Rimosa border in the South West mountains. Their stabilizing effect is still uncertain. Of limited duration (6 months) the operation is designed to neutralize the emerging threat of extremist Islamic activity operating either side of the Carana/Rimosa border. The question remains, however, whether the stability they can bring to this region can be sustained once they withdraw. Additionally, unsubstantiated reports concerning alleged disciplinary infractions of the French forces taking part in the operation have begun to circulate.

Galasi
In Galasi the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi gangs of male youngsters, of up to 100 in number, rule the streets. These gangs pose a threat even to unwary military formations. There is increasing evidence that their activities are organized and are funded by trafficking in goods, narcotics and women throughout the region and across the border into Sumora. Within the IDP camps there is a high level of crime, mostly as a result of poverty and hopelessness, but this has been on the decline.
recently since the appearance of vigilante groups who dispense their own form of summary justice.

**Akkabar**
In Akkabar the coal mine workers went on strike in May 2015 as they had not been paid for four months. These men live in shantytowns in poor conditions, separated from their families. What started as an industrial dispute soon escalated into open conflict after excess use of force by the police resulting in the death of several miners. In reaction, some miners have subsequently attacked a number of government institutions, particularly police stations, and banks. Much of this may well be inspired by the criminal cartels. Activity is sporadic and often spontaneous but it has increasing local support.

**Leppko**
The breakdown of government authority in Leppko province has resulted in an increase in the number of uncontrolled armed groups that together with CISC combatants, have preyed on the Kori and Caran elements of the local population. Much of this violence is radicalized and sectarian in nature. Many of these groups are former Elassi rebels from neighbouring Rimosa who have taken advantage of the unstable situation in Carana. Links between the CISC and these groups are strongly denied by the CISC but several independent reports indicate such links exist. These groups are involved in the organised smuggling of weapons and drugs as well as the trafficking of women. It is hoped that Opération Intrépide will bring a needed degree of stability to the mountainous border areas.

**Military**

**General Situation**
Following the signing of the Kalari Agreement the armed groups party to the Agreement have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made, and each fearful that the other side might renege on its commitments. This has resulted in an unstable stalemate in a number of areas, and while no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Therefore disengagement, separation and a start to the disarmament process are high priorities. Less predictable is the increasing presence of extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.

**Carana Defence Force (CDF)**
The CDF have remained in their positions after the ceasefire. Four infantry battalions remained deployed along the separation line between CDF and MPC, and an additional three deployed in the South in Corma, Maldosa and North Leppko. The Airborne Battalion, in conjunction with Gendarmerie units, is deployed in the city of Maroni to handle the riots of the coal miners. The engineer units and the Reconnaissance Company are co-located in the northwest with the Infantry units. The locations of the Artillery Battalion and Air Defence units are unknown.

The five Alpha Jets of the Carana Air Force are assessed as non-operational. The
helicopters have been used frequently for air patrols. All aircraft are stationed on the military Air Force Base adjacent to the Galasi International Airport.

According to our own observations, the logistic situation for the CDF appears poor. Spare parts seem to be a particular problem.

The CDF has a reputation of not respecting international humanitarian law, with reported cases of sexual violence. This is primarily true of the CDF elements positioned in the South, where historically there has been a sectarian element to their human rights violations.

**MPC**

Original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6,000 to approximately 10,000. Approximately 5,000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary. It is assessed that the remaining 5,000 MPC rebels are sufficient to balance the presence of the CDF on the separation line and maintain the status quo, especially when backed up by the knowledge that they can quickly be reinforced. It is assessed that the underlying reason for this redeployment is to ensure that the front line MPC troops are logistically sustainable, and they certainly appear better prepared than many of their CDF counterparts.

The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 mainly male soldiers (including their families and dependants) from whence they conduct patrols west of the separation line. While this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to act as a trigger for other action whether by mistake or by design.

Following the formal cessation of fighting, the official HQ in Alur increased in importance and has become a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in Alur.

The MPC strictly enforces public order but has repeatedly demonstrated that they respect human rights, especially those of children and other vulnerable segments of the population. Coupled with the considerable dissatisfaction with the central government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the West.

**CISC**

During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels are living in their home villages and group only occasionally.

The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that their number has not changed and remains in the region of 3,000 active male fighters.

Hitherto the CISC has focused its attention on the CDF and has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support. However, recently there have been reports of several instances of extremist violence against ethnic minorities in the south of Leppko adjacent to the border with Rimosa. It is not
clear whether members of the CISC have been involved, which would violate the Kalari Agreement, or if these acts were perpetrated by radicalized splinter groups that are not signatories. In any case, civilians from the Caran and other minorities in the region are the primary target.

Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by the use of force. Their tactics are particularly brutal and indiscriminate; and demonstrate disregard for the rights of non-combatants.

**Police**
The concept of community policing is almost non-existent. In government-controlled areas the police, both National Police and Gendarmerie, are seen as a means of enforcing government policy and protecting government interests. In the remainder of the country the police are targeted as they are so closely identified with the repressive Ogavo regime. Consequently, many have been killed, and others have either fled or changed allegiance. As a result, law and order is either maintained, or not, by the dominant militia group in any given area. In some areas, such as those in which the MPC has asserted control, a moderate level of law and order exists. In others, mainly in the south, there is none at all. Certain crimes – such as domestic violence or Gender Based Violence – are not addressed at all by the police. Reporting sexual violence to the police entails the risk of renewed attack by the police itself, as the victim is sometimes considered as guilty as the perpetrator.

Where police do exist they are ill-trained, poorly paid, or not paid at all, with low morale. The result is that corruption remains endemic. Police stations have little equipment and that which they do have is of military origin and entirely unsuitable for a democratic police force. Police training, especially human rights training, has virtually ceased. To compound the problem the existing police structure is so identified with President Ogavo that no member of it would be accepted in the MPC or CISC controlled areas. Effectively this means that the South is essentially lawless, with the one exception being the area that French forces are operating in the southwest.

**Domestic and Transnational Crime**
There is reciprocal and positive feedback between the long-running civil conflict in Carana and substantial criminal activity and networks, both domestic and transnational. Governance failures and endemic violence have created favourable conditions and/or opportunities for criminal organizations to flourish. Moreover, Carana’s maritime access, geography, and porous borders make it a natural hub for the global flows of weapons, forced/bonded labor, and illicit and/or contraband goods.

**Drug Trafficking, Production, and Use**
Carana is a major transit point for international drug and drug precursor flows, including cocaine, opiates and opioids, methamphetamine, illegally obtained or manufactured prescription medications, and various other blends and synthetics. A large proportion of Afghanistan-produced opiates pass through Carana en route to Europe. Carana is one of two major waypoints for South American cocaine bound for Asia. Methamphetamine flows from and to virtually every direction. Carana itself is
becoming a significant methamphetamine exporter due the fact that meth or “shaabu” is relatively easy and inexpensive to manufacture. Domestic methamphetamine production has increased more than 300% over the past five years. While many aspects of the drug trade fuel conflict in Carana, organized gang violence and the sharp increase in methamphetamine abuse are the most worrying trends.

**Trafficking in Persons**

The other major external driver of criminal activity in Carana is human trafficking, which encompasses the range of activities—recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining—involves when criminals use force or physical threats, psychological coercion, abuse of legal processes, deception, or other coercive means to compel someone work, perform commercial sex acts, or serve involuntarily as child combatants.

**Economy**

Prior to the civil war, the Caranian economy was already suffering from decade-long negative growth due to excessive governmental control, corruption and a lack of efficient public administration. It continued to deteriorate during the war which brought the production of copper to a halt and saw much of the diamond production hijacked by a number of groups. The flow of foreign currency reduced to a trickle, and what did exist was mostly used to buy weapons or was misappropriated. Fighting in rural areas meant that the timber industry was reduced to approximately 20% of its pre-conflict capacity and agricultural production fell to approximately 40-50%. The net result has been an inflation rate that has been running somewhere around 300% and a significantly reduced supply of basic commodities. Armed conflict in the countryside has also affected the small-scale farming used to support many women who are heads-of-household. This concerns widows as well as wives of men who are working in the mines or the manufacturing industry.

The budget for the Security and Rule of Law core sector amounts to only 10 percent of the total national budget. There is therefore limited fiscal space available for the sustenance and maintenance the security institutions. The majority of resources is being spent on salaries and allowances.

The result is an increasingly dire humanitarian situation, which has only been prevented from becoming a major crisis by external aid and reliance on a subsistence economy. Inevitably the consequences are most acute in the major towns where increasing social dissatisfaction frequently erupts into violence.

**Infrastructure**

**Roads**

Carana has an adequate road network with paved routes connecting most parts of the country, and key urban centres. In the west and the north, these roads also link to the networks in neighbouring Katasi and Sumora. A few paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season, but the majority are in need of significant maintenance. Carana has also a comprehensive network of secondary (unpaved) roads and tracks, which often become impassable during the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which
can carry trucks and heavy vehicles up to 20 tons. Those along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and need to be assessed individually before they can be used by UN traffic.

**Railways**
There are two railway lines running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia. Both are partially operational but are in poor condition and in dire need of repair. Currently the Galasi to Akkabar line can go no further than Maroni as the main railway bridge was destroyed by flooding in 2010 and has yet to be repaired.

There are rail yards at Galasi, Maroni, Akkabar and Maldosa capable of handling containers, vehicles and other goods. The station in Mia is specialised for the transport of copper and has no freight handling facilities.

In common with the road network there has been little or no maintenance over the past few years, consequently the tracks are deteriorating and are likely to be subject to increasing restrictions both in terms of speed and capacity.

**Harbours**
In Carana there are three deep-water harbours, and a number of smaller fishing ports. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.

The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped, can handle large ships and has a roll-on/roll-off (RoRo) and container capability. This harbour will not cause any limitations for deployment and support of a potential UN Mission.

The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo or significant container capability but is equipped with operational cranes and can take break-bulk ships up to approximately 600 ft in length. However, there is only limited dock space without disrupting regular trade; this effectively limits capacity to no more than two ships over and above the routine shipping.

The harbour in Maldosa in the South is geared to specialised handling for the export of copper but has a similar capacity to Cereni for the handling of regular transport ships. Only two wharves are equipped with cranes which will limit capacity, and there is very limited parking or storage space due to the harbour being in the town; this being said there is ample space on the western outskirts. Currently, the French Opération Intrépide has its main supply routes coming through Katasi, where they have a colonial legacy and several permanent military bases. The UN will need to find alternatives to this arrangement.

**Airports**
The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports have runways suitable for heavy transport aircraft.

The airport in Galasi is well equipped for handling heavy material and has ample ramp space in excess of its routine requirements. Space for storing equipment and assembling vehicles in close proximity to the airport is limited, but generally it meets most requirements for the deployment of personnel and equipment. The CDC Air
Force’s main base is located on the southern side of the runway.

Limitations on ramp space and cargo handling capacity restrict the capacity of the airport at Corma, however it has almost unlimited space close to the airport for storage / parking, and there are no significant limitations to the deployment of personnel. The French have a small logistic presence at Corma in support of Op Intrepide.

The airstrips in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo.

All other airstrips are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft without additional construction work. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airport</th>
<th>Paved Runway</th>
<th>Runway length</th>
<th>Paved Apron (Sqm)</th>
<th>Instrument Approach System</th>
<th>Loading Equipment</th>
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</table>

**Electricity**

There are three power plants, the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and a coal power plant in Galasi. In recent years, Carana was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season. During the fighting most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The instability in the Hanno area, caused by the miners’ unrest, has led to a shortage of coal and has limited the production of electricity.

Since the power supply system is not designed as a network with redundancies, but organised on a regional oriented star pattern, the damage of one main line can cut supply to a large area. Accordingly, most of the country is currently without regular power supply.

**Water**

Potable water is available in most parts of the country but the quality of water varies. In the more arid areas south west of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water is drawn mostly from small ponds and slow flowing brooks and is of poor quality and a source of various water borne diseases. Daily collection of water is time-consuming and onerous, particularly for women. The drinking water close to the coal and copper mining areas is highly polluted, causing health problems for the men living in the surrounding shantytowns. These poor hygienic conditions are connected with a high infant mortality rate. Near the major rivers there is ample water supply but it still needs purification.
Humanitarian

**Refugees and IDPs**

The refugee and IDP situation remains unchanged for the information provided in the UN Country Team Report. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are mainly women and their children and they mostly headed east to the capital and other coastal cities, where most are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in, or near, urban areas. The crime rate—such as murder, rape, domestic violence and theft— is high in the camps. The situation concerning health and sanitation is poor.

There is considerable fear among the refugee/IDP women that the already agreed DDR process will lead to the reintegration into their villages or areas of the men who sexually abused them.

Moreover, much of the property abandoned by IDPs—homes, vehicles, land, and/or livestock—has been looted or seized by various belligerent, criminal, and/or opportunistic elements. Repatriating IDPs, reclaiming property, and compensating victims presents a formidable challenge in terms of verification, accounting, and logistics, let alone conflict resolution and reconciliation.

### List of IDP Camps and Responsible Agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP Camps</th>
<th>Camp Administration</th>
<th>Road Access</th>
<th>Rail Access</th>
<th>Warehouse / Distribution Points</th>
<th>Clinics</th>
<th>CMR</th>
<th>Water Supply</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
<th>Shelter</th>
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### Refuge Camps

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<th>Warehouse / Distribution Points</th>
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<th>Water Supply</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
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*Crude Mortality Rate in Camp
Nutrition
As consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price of food and basic goods increased dramatically. Even though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased during the last years.

The most affected areas are the north of Hanno, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni where the situation has already reached a crisis.

Landmines
During the conflict between CDF and rebels, landmines were used intensively by all parties, yet the nature of the conflict and the forces involved meant that very little documentation was maintained. Consequently mines pose a major and unpredictable threat to the population at large, aid agencies and any potential peacekeeping mission. There is an immediate need to identify the areas of highest risk, many of which are in the west of the country, and begin action to reduce the threat.

Cultural and Natural Heritage in Danger
Carana is home to two UNESCO World Heritage sites, both of which are under threat. The first site is the Ruins of the Sabian Temple in Hanno. In addition to the
damage sustain over years of fighting, the temple has been stripped of virtually all of its priceless artifacts, the illicit sale of which is a crucial source of revenue for multiple actors.

The second World Heritage site is the Southern Plains, an expansive and rich grassland ecosystem that once hosted the second largest terrestrial mammal migration in the world. However, a combination of increasingly frequent droughts, poorly managed monoculture, overgrazing, and soil erosion threatens to render a formerly diverse ecosystem barren and inhospitable.

The UN Country Team and Non-governmental Organisations in Carana

Despite the troubles in Carana, the United Nations has maintained a presence in the country through several relief and development agencies. Additionally, a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operate in Carana. In many cases, these agencies and organisations have been on the ground working in Carana for at least 5-10 years. However, despite the Kalari Agreement the continued level of background violence has meant that large tracts of Carana have restricted access for international humanitarian organizations. There is a reduced Country Team presence in Hanno and Leppko provinces, due to the high levels of violence, The situation of UN CT offices in these provinces remains dynamic.

The UN Country Team in Carana consists of the following organizations:

- **World Food Program (WFP)**
  Responsible for food distribution programmes and maintains offices in Galasi, Maroni, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, and Alur.

  The lead agency for programmes helping children; it has offices in Galasi, Cereni, Maldosa, Folsa, and Alur

- **The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**
  Protects and assists refugees; it has offices in Galasi, Alur, and Maldosa.

- **The World Health Organisation (WHO)**
  Coordinates international health programmes; it has an office in Galasi.

- **The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**
  A small team based in Galasi, who are responsible for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues throughout the country.

- **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**
  Responsible for UN development activities. The UNDP Resident Representative
is also the UN Resident Coordinator and chairs weekly UN country team meetings in Galasi, attended by the heads of all the agencies above. She is currently the Designated Official for Security in Carana, but this will pass to the SRSG once UNAC is deployed.

**International and bilateral organizations**

Several other international and bilateral organisations have maintained or established presence in Carana. In the wake of the French “Operation Intrépide”, the EU is deploying the EUTC (European Union Training Mission in Carana) with a mandate to supply training and advice to the CDF primarily focused on building capacity and improving the capability of the CDF to conduct military operations in order to “reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups”. The EU also has a planning team on the ground preparing for a civilian police mission, EUPOL Carana.

Bilateral partners include France, Switzerland, USA and Canada, involved in various development projects, including donating equipment such as computers, phones and cars to the National police and gendarmerie.

The Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) will maintain presence with CRCAC but under a reduced mandate once the UN mission is deployed. The World Bank has a country office in place and is starting to implement various programmes, including a comprehensive Public Expenditure Review of the rule of law and security sector.

**Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)**

A total of twelve international and eighteen local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children’s issues and women’s issues. International NGOs include such organisations as MSF (Médecins sans Frontières), Danish Refugee Council and World Vision International. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), mandated to assist victims of war, is present in Galasi, Corma and Alur.

**Public Information**

In Carana, radio, TV and the major newspapers have been rigorously controlled by the government. There is no press freedom. Editors and journalists who have opposed the PDC have been imprisoned or have fled. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. Government approved national newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For the past several months, the MPC has produced a regional newspaper and operates one radio station out of Alur.

As a result of the war several radio and TV transmission stations were destroyed, effectively leaving large areas of the country without access to information or TV and radio programmes.

**Education**

Prior to the civil war, Carana had one of the best developed education systems in the region from primary through to tertiary levels. The effects of war and a declining
economy have seriously degraded the system, reducing the overall number of schools, particularly at the primary level, and resulting in a general decline in the number of students, particularly female. The decrease in the number of female students and therefore female literacy is particularly acute, the causes of which are the levels of violence as well as cultural discrimination.

Support

Availability of Goods and Services

Notwithstanding the poor economic situation in Carana, most basic goods and supplies are still available, although both quality and availability can be erratic. Local purchase to meet UN mission requirements is therefore uncertain.

Fuel, construction material and food can be purchased, or contracted, in country, although the rampant inflation rate and the potential of a UN deployment is already leading to escalating prices.

Fuel and rations can be purchased in Galasi, Cereni, and Maldosa from international contractors.

There is an ample supply of timber which can be purchased from local dealers in the larger towns, but concrete and steel are only available in Galasi, Maroni, Corma and Maldosa. Basic construction work can be contracted in all larger towns.

Specialised construction materials such as plumbing parts, windows or doors are hard to get on the local market. In addition, furniture of adequate quality is largely unavailable. Technical goods such as IT equipment, vehicles and spares are generally unavailable in country.

Transport services can be contracted in the Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa although a series of truck driver strikes during the last year has meant that service has become unpredictable. There are no vehicle or aircraft rental companies currently in Carana.

Local Labour

Given the increased levels of unemployment following the war, there is no shortage of unskilled or semi-skilled labour. Availability of skilled labour has reduced as many professional people left the country during the war. In the former two categories only approximately 30% have any English, the remainder uses either French or local dialects.

Banking

The banking system is only operational in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa and it does not support electronic cash transfer in any location. In some provincial capitals and in some other towns, rudimentary banking functions do exist but these are of little practical significance.

Availability of Real Estate

In all towns over 50,000 inhabitants, office and accommodation is available for rent,
although much is sub-standard and suffering from a lack of basic maintenance and facilities, particularly water, sanitation and power.
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police

UN DPO Assessment and Planning Directive

UN Peacekeeping Training Material
CARANA Scenario Base Exercise
DPO Assessment and Planning Directive

Planning for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Carana

SITUATION

1. The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the Government can no longer control significant portions of the country and increasingly armed and extremist elements have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the west, an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the MPC while the south is increasingly fragmented, lacking any structure and reverting to control by individual local leaders splintering away from the CISC. No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and the ethnic and religious tensions have been increasingly evident with atrocities being committed in a number of areas.

2. The worst-case scenario would see the current stalemate sliding into a state of general anarchy, or see a *de facto* breakup of the country under individual factions; while the latter may be a viable option in the eyes of the MPC, it is not so in CISC areas, which would witness a further deterioration of law and order. The just-concluded Kalari Peace Agreement offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict.

3. The CRC has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward including its efforts to promote the Kalari Peace Agreement. The functions of its light observer mission (CRCAC) will be folded into the UN peacekeeping operation and most of the observers will be re-designated. So long as the French force ‘Operation Intrépide’ remains in South Carana, the peacekeeping operation will need to establish clear lines of cooperation and liaison.

4. Key aspects of the new agreement include:

1. The establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation;
2. Commitment to the longer term establishment of a democratically elected government;
3. Mechanisms for disengagement, implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire;
4. Confidence building measures, including the release of prisoners;
5. Respect for human rights;
6. Transforming the Security Sector

United Nations Security Council Resolution xxx of 3 June xxxx confirmed the Council’s readiness to establish a UN peacekeeping operation to support the implementation of the Kalari Agreement and a long-term political settlement.
5. DPO has assumed lead responsibility for planning of an UN operation and an Integrated Task Force (ITF) has been established.

6. The operational imperative is to ensure that the UN system is prepared to act quickly and deploy an integrated mission to support the new Kalari agreement. The conditions to deploy are generally good but any delay will create an opportunity for disaffected groups to undermine the process and result in a renewed cycle of violence with consequences both for the long-term political situation and the immediate humanitarian problem.

7. The plan produced under DPO’s leadership must synchronize the immediate stabilization objectives within the overall framework of recovery, reconstruction and development, which is essential for long term stability in Carana.

**STRATEGIC DIRECTION**

(a) The strategic direction, as derived from the Secretary-General and the Security Council, will be as follows:

“The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where the rule of law is upheld, human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk.”

(b) This constitutes the UN system’s objective for Carana, the achievement of which will include:

(a) The provision of advice and assistance to a transitional government to enable it to:

(a) Re-establish rule of law;
(b) Address the demands of re-establishing the 1991 Constitution;
(c) Prepare for elections on whatever timescale is established by a peace agreement;
(d) Address the economic needs of Carana;
(e) Address the need to reach an inclusive and nationally-owned agreement on a vision for the transformation of the security sector,
(f) Rectify the damage to the education system resulting from the conflict.

(b) A peacekeeping force with the capability:

(a) To monitor the ceasefire, report violations and take appropriate action to prevent breaches;
(b) To provide protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, including all forms of sexual and gender based violence;
(c) To provide protection to UN personnel and facilities;
(d) To provide assistance in support of programmes to disarm armed groups;
(e) To provide support to humanitarian assistance, which is defined as providing physical protection when necessary or requested, and ensuring that the general environment is conducive to conduct humanitarian assistance;
(f) To plan to support an election process to include the provision of logistic assistance and security during registration, campaigning and voting.

(c) The provision of humanitarian assistance to address:
(a) Immediate needs arising from shortages of food, shelter and basic commodities;
(b) The needs of 200,000 IDP and refugees and to support their return;
(c) The shortcomings in the provision of basic services such as medical care, water and sanitation;
(d) Proper coordination and execution to ensure resources are appropriately utilized

(d) The re-establishment of acceptable standards of human rights to include:
(a) Recognition of individual rights;
(b) Recognition of the rights of children;
(c) Recognition of the rights of women.

**STAKEHOLDERS**

(c) Achieving the objective will require a concerted effort by all stakeholders. At HQ, the full involvement of the agencies, funds and programs in the work of the ITF is critical from the outset.

(d) In the field, it is essential to ensure that:

(a) The Government of National Reconciliation is included and that its responsibilities are clearly understood by all parties;
(b) The needs of the Caranian population are guiding the peace process;
(c) The implementation of the peace agreement is inclusive;
(d) The CRC remains engaged as a full partner in the process;
(e) Individual Member States, international and regional organisations and donors, who are prepared to support the reconstruction effort, are encouraged to do so, and engaged at an early stage in a coordinated manner.
ASSUMPTIONS

(c) The cooperation of the Government of National Reconciliation is required for meaningful planning to take place, and that all parties agree not to put obstacles in the way of a UN deployment.

(f) Other assumptions:

(a) That military and police personnel required for a possible United Nations operation in Carana will be forthcoming from troop and police contributing countries, and will be deployed as per SCR XXX.

(b) That only those tasks that are clearly indicated by this directive will be included in the planning; any additional tasks should be the subject of a separate recommendation and approved by DPO.

(c) That the Kalari Peace Agreement will be the basis for meaningful change in Carana and that it will receive full and timely international support.

(d) That bilateral and regional partners as well as local stakeholders support the process of transformation of the security sector in Carana including the integration of ex-combatants in the security institutions to reflect the geo-political structure of Carana as provided in the Kalari Peace Agreement.

(e) That the humanitarian operation currently taking place in Carana will continue.

(f) That the CRC will support UN efforts to ensure that Carana’s neighbours do not interfere in the internal affairs of Carana.

CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

☐ The following targets represent what we need to achieve:

  o Deployment of a peacekeeping mission within 90 days of a Security Council resolution;

  o Stabilisation of the current humanitarian crisis within six months from the adoption of a Security Council resolution. Stabilisation will occur when it is no longer necessary to provide emergency relief;

  o Cessation of hostilities as specified by the Kalari Peace Agreement;
- Implementation of the terms of the peace agreement as specified by that agreement;
- Commencement of a programme of disarmament and demobilization of armed groups within three months of the peace agreement, and completion within 12 months;
- Development of a nationally-owned vision for the future security sector, including oversight and accountability mechanisms, within the framework of the National Commission as set out in the Peace Agreement, within 12 months of the adoption of a Security Council Resolution.
- Completion of planning for support to an election process within 12 months from the adoption of a Security Council resolution;
- Return of all IDPs and refugees within two years, and provision for displaced voters to participate in the election should it occur before they are able to return.

CONSTRAINTS

- The general state of the Caranian infrastructure presents significant operational and logistical challenges and road movement can become a major problem in the rainy season, particularly in the more remote parts of the country; this will require that the movement of goods and personnel be carried out by air, particularly by helicopter at certain times of the year.
- The timeline that has been established by the Kalari Peace Agreement envisages elections within 12 months; this will place us and the Government of National Reconciliation under significant pressure. On one hand we will need to have our plans to support the electoral process in place in good time, and on the other we must be prepared for a contingency should the date for the elections slip.
- The scenario described in the previous point is likely to be complicated because the Government of National Reconciliation will initially lack the capability to undertake its own responsibilities, both in preparing for elections and also potentially in other areas such as disarmament and security sector reform.
- The state of Carana economy puts financial restraints on the ability of the government to initiate and sustain necessary transformation of the security sector. A transformation that would include proportionate and sustainable financing in the security sector is needed but the GNR will need support in assuring sustainability. Continued reliance on external aid is likely in the short term but might not last. This will require close donor coordination and dialogue with the Carana government and the donor community to ensure sound public financial management of the security sector.

PROCESS
Planning for the deployment of the peacekeeping operation will be led from United Nations Headquarters, under the direction of the Carana Planning Team that has been established for this purpose.

The process will be guided by the Integrated Assessment and Planning process (IAP), whose major benchmarks and outputs include:

- The Mission Concept and the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF);
- The Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council;
- Security Council resolutions;
- Establishment of an Integrated Mission Headquarters;
- Assumption of operational planning responsibilities by the Mission HQ; and
- Validation and endorsement of the Mission Concept.

**TIMELINE**

- Draft Mission Plan: one week prior to technical assessment mission,
- Technical Assessment Mission: Within 21 days of the signing of a peace agreement,
- Secretary-General submits a report to the Security Council: three weeks after return of technical assessment mission,
- Mission Concept: 21 days after Secretary-General’s report to Security Council,
- Integrated Strategic Framework: 100 days after the establishment of the mission,
- Establishment of the mission headquarters, augmented by the temporary deployment of the ITF within five weeks of the Security Council resolution.

**RESPONSIBILITIES & DEADLINES**

**DPO / ITF:**

- The head of the Carana Planning Team and DPO chair of the ITF is responsible to the USG and is to lead all UN planning activities during the foundation and operational planning phases until a USG Directive to the SRSG is issued to guide an integrated peace support operation in Carana. S/he is also responsible for ensuring the substantive integration of all relevant dimensions of UN system involvement.

- The DPO chair of the ITF is to provide the USG with an initial presentation for the Security Council on options for an integrated peace support operation in Carana immediately on the return of the technical assessment mission.

- S/he is to lead a technical assessment mission to Carana at the earliest opportunity.
S/he is to produce recommendations for the Secretary-General on the
structure, size and concept of an integrated peace support operation in
Carana to the Security Council within 21 days of return from the technical
assessment, or as directed by the USG.

S/he is to present a final draft for an integrated peace support operation in
Carana within 28 days of return from the technical assessment mission, or as
directed by the USG.

She/he is to ensure that throughout the planning there is full compliance with
Decision No. 2008/24 of the Policy Committee of 26 October 2008 on human
rights in integrated missions.

SRSG

Once a SRSG has been appointed and the USG DPO has issued a directive,
s/he will assume the lead for planning for the mission in Carana.

INTEGRATION OF ALL UN EFFORTS IN CARANA

A critical function of the Mission Concept is to integrate the work of all Mission
components behind clearly-established mission-wide priorities to ensure
maximum coherence and unity of effort. Individual components of the Mission
- substantive, military, police and support - will be expected to align their
respective Concepts of Operation on the basis of the Mission Concept.

The UNCT will participate actively in, and contribute to, the planning process
in order to ensure proper alignment, coordination and consistency in the
development of the UN system-wide response. This involvement is in addition
to that of the UNDG and ECHA planning capacities and individual agencies
represented on the ITF.

A comprehensive strategic communication strategy will be developed in
consultation with UN partners as soon as possible. This strategy should be
implemented well in advance of the UN mission assuming responsibility. The
strategy will have the objective of promoting an understanding among local
communities, the parties to the peace process and the public at large, with
regard to the role of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Carana.
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police

Statement of the UNSC President

UN Peacekeeping Training Material

CARANA

Scenario Base Exercise
Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 5917th meeting of the Security Council, held on 26 M 20xx, in connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled “The question concerning Carana”, the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

“The Security Council commends the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) for its role in mediating between the parties and urges it to use its influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

“The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 1991 constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.

“The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the sub region that are affected by the Caranian crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations.”

“The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict.

"The Security Council affirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with the CRC, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict."
“The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains seized of the matter.
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police

Directive on the Use of Force

UN Peacekeeping Training Material

CARANA

Scenario Base Exercise
DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Authority and mandate

1. This Directive, including its Annexes, constitutes the "Directive on detention, searches and use of force for all individual police officers on assignment with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC)" (hereinafter “Directive”).

2. This Directive provides the authority for the detention, searches and use of force by individual police officers (IPOs) on assignment with UNAC while carrying out their mandated tasks without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Carana law enforcement agencies for the maintenance of law and order.

3. The Directive is issued by the USG-DPO and sets forth the principles, parameters and conditions under which UNAC IPOs are authorized to detain, search and use non-lethal force in carrying out their mandated tasks in accordance with applicable Security Council resolutions. The specific tasks and responsibilities assigned to IPOs are stipulated in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the police component in UNAC.

Command responsibility

4. Implementation of this Directive is a command responsibility. In accordance with the DPKO/DFS Directive for Heads of Police Components of Peacekeeping Operations (Ref. 2006/00122, dated 21 November 2006); the DPO/DOS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Ref. 2019.23), the DPKO/DFS Policy for United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (Ref. 2014.01, dated 1 February 2014), primary and overall command is vested in the Police Commissioner.

5. The Police Commissioner and those to whom he/she delegates command and control functions shall ensure that all IPOs under their respective command understand and comply with this Directive, as well as any further directives issued by the Police Commissioner.
**Principles of the use of force**

6. At all times, use of force by UNAC IPOs shall be consistent with the principles of necessity, proportionality/minimum use of force, legality and accountability as set forth in this Directive, and consistent with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the United Nations Centre for Human Rights International Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement.

**Police Equipment**

7. IPOs may only carry and use police equipment as listed in Annex A of this Directive.

8. It is the personal responsibility of every IPO to keep his/her police equipment secure. He/she must be able to account for the whereabouts and condition of his/her police equipment at all times. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed directives regarding the carriage, care and storage of these item(s) of police equipment.

**Training and qualifications**

9. Every IPO must be fully familiar with this Directive and understand the rules that it contains. To this end, he/she must receive a full briefing on this Directive as part of his/her induction training package and refresher briefings on a regular basis thereafter.

10. Every IPO must have received current and proper training on the care and use of the particular police equipment he/she carries. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed directives regarding the required training and the documentation that must be submitted to prove that the specific training has been satisfactorily completed.

11. An IPO may only carry police equipment if the Police Commissioner has certified that he/she has received and meets the required briefing and training expertise stipulated in the above directives.

12. IPOs while on duty, who carry police equipment are required to carry in their breast pocket an *Aide-Mémoire* (Blue Card) attached as Annex C of this Directive, which summarizes the rules contained in this Directive.

**AUTHORITY TO STOP, DETAIN AND SEARCH**

**Authority to stop and detain**

13. IPOs are authorized to stop, search and detain individuals in their areas of deployment, in all situations where use of force is authorized as set out in paragraph 21 of this Directive. They shall not deprive anyone of
his/her liberty except on this basis, and in accordance with the procedures as prescribed in this Directive. IPOs do not have any lawful authority to arrest persons whom they stop and detain and may only hand over those individuals who are detained to the national authorities (or release them) in accordance with the ISOP.


**Authority to search and seize**

15. IPOs are authorized to search persons stopped or detained under paragraph 14 for illegal and prohibited items identified and to seize such items as may be used to cause harm, as well as any item found in the person’s possession or control which may evidence a hostile act or intent to cause harm, including arms, ammunition, weapons and explosives, as well as illegal substances or other illegal items. IPOs may not confiscate other items that they may find in the possession of the detained person.

16. The following principles must be observed during any stop and search:

   a. Stop and searches are not to humiliate or embarrass persons being searched;

   b. Search procedures must take into account gender, and be sensitive to other factors such as race, religion and cultural practices;

   c. The purpose of the search must be clearly stated to the person who is to be searched before he/she is searched;

   d. The search must be conducted in the presence of another IPO/FPU member.

17. Weapons and other dangerous goods found/recovered during searches will be documented, inventoried and stored according to the Mission’s established procedures. Necessary coordination shall occur between IPOs and the Mission’s other components for the inventory and safekeeping of the found/recovered items.
USE OF NON-LETHAL FORCE OR ITEMS OF POLICE EQUIPMENT

18. IPOs are authorized to use force solely for the reasons or purposes and in the circumstances specified in paragraph 20.

19. In using force, IPOs must AT ALL TIMES, act in accordance with international Human Rights norms and standards, including the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and this Directive.

20. As recalled in paragraph 6, the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity are to be observed at all times in the use of force. If force is required, it must be graduated and the minimum required to achieve a legitimate objective. The use of force is the last resort and all possible steps must be taken to avoid the need to resort to force, including in the preparation phase of an operation. There must always be accountability in respect of any use of force.

Use of force, excluding deadly force

21. IPOs are authorized to use force, excluding lethal force, or items of police equipment as per Annex A:

   a. To protect, deter or defend themselves against a hostile act or a hostile intent;
   
   b. To protect other United Nations and associated personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent;
   
   c. To prevent and stop any person or group, who intends to limit, or limits, their freedom of movement or the freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

Gradation of Force

22. IPOs shall, as far as possible, use dialogue and mediation and other non-violent means before resorting to the use of physical force with or without police equipment. They may use non-lethal force with or without authorized police equipment only if other means remain ineffective for the purpose of achieving an authorized objective, as specified in paragraph 21 of this Directive.

23. If there is no practical alternative to the use of force, with or without police equipment in order to achieve objectives specified in paragraph 21 of this Directive, IPOs must, whenever the operational circumstances permit, observe the following gradated procedures:
a. Identify themselves in English and in the language(s) spoken in the location to which the IPOs are deployed as members of the UNAC Police component;

b. Give a clear warning of their intent to use force or police equipment;

c. The following warning shall be used in English and the primary languages spoken in the region:

« UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL USE FORCE »

d. Following such warning, IPOs intending to use force, with or without police equipment shall give reasonable time for that warning to be obeyed, unless doing so would,

   i. unduly place themselves at a risk of death or bodily harm;

   ii. create a risk of death or serious bodily harm to other persons;

   or

   iii. clearly be inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances

24. The Police Commissioner has a duty to ensure that IPOs know the warning to be given verbally in English and the primary languages spoken in the region to which the IPOs are deployed.

25. Whenever the use of force, with or without any police equipment, is determined to be required under paragraph 20 of this Directive, IPOs shall understand and follow the following principles:

   a. Non-violent means are to be attempted first;

   b. Act with restraint and only use the minimum degree of force that is proportional to the seriousness of the threat and necessary to achieve the authorized objectives;

   c. Respect and preserve life and cause minimum injury to persons;

   d. Cause minimum damage to property;

   e. First Aid should be provided as soon as possible to anyone who is hurt.

26. IPOs shall not use police equipment other than in the circumstances and to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 20 of this Directive.

27. Handcuffs and restraints may only be used in accordance with the ISOP by IPOs who have satisfactorily completed the necessary training as stipulated in para 9-12 of this Directive.
28. No IPOs shall use force or police equipment against women with obvious signs of pregnancy, elderly persons, or persons with signs of severe disability, and minors, except in cases where there is a hostile intent or hostile act that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury to United Nations or associated personnel.

**REPORTS AND INVESTIGATIONS**

29. Immediately upon any incident involving the detention of any person pursuant to paragraph 13 of this Directive, the Police Commissioner shall be notified of such detention. Within twelve (12) hours the IPO who carried out the detention must submit through the chain of command to the Police Commissioner a detention details form (Annex B). The copy of the duly completed forms in Annexes A to C of the ISOP will be submitted to the Police Commissioner upon detained person(s) detention, release or hand over, as appropriate. Immediately after any incident involving the use of force, with or without police equipment, the IPO concerned must inform the Police Commissioner through the chain of command. The IPO must submit a written report within twelve (12) hours of the time of the occurrence of any such incident through the chain of command to the Police Commissioner with the following information:

a. The date, time, location and circumstances which led to the use of force with or without the police equipment;

b. The name(s) of the IPOs or other UNAC personnel involved including those who used force with or without the police equipment;

c. The name(s) of person(s) against whom the force/equipment was used;

d. The name(s) of witnesses, if any;

e. Injuries and/or damage of property caused by use of force with or without police equipment;

f. The events leading up to the use of force with or without police equipment;

g. The reason(s) for the use of force with or without police equipment;

h. The results of the use of force with or without police equipment;

i. A diagram of the incident scene where appropriate;

j. Any corrective actions taken to reduce the possibility of a similar incident.

k. Type of force used by IPO.
VIOLATIONS

30. IPOs are advised that obedience to supervisor’s orders shall not preclude a violation of this Directive or of the rules that it contains from being considered an act of serious misconduct if the IPO concerned knew that an order to use non-lethal force with or without item(s) of police equipment resulting in the injury of a person or damage to property was manifestly in violation of this Directive and the rules contained herein and he/she had a reasonable opportunity to refuse to follow it. In any case, responsibility also rests on the superiors who gave an order in violation of this Directive and the rules contained herein and shall be considered as serious misconduct.

31. Any violation of this Directive, as well as of the rules contained herein, shall be considered as an act of serious misconduct under the Directive for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers and other applicable directives and will be investigated in accordance with the SOP for the UNAC Police component.

RELATED DOCUMENTS

32. The following references (policies and normative), although not exhaustive, are relevant.


m. Implementation of the Note of Guidance to UNAC on Security of the IDP population in the POC sites of 24 April 2014.

n. UNAC Standing Order on the integrated response to security incidents in and around UNAC POC sites of 18 March 2015.

o. UNAC Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategy, Ref. 2014/PoC/1 of 15 March 2015.


r. SOP on Weapons Free Zones of 29 November 2016.

s. Ground rules for UNAC POC sites.

**DEFINITIONS**

32. The definitions in Annex C of this Directive shall form an integral part of this Directive.

**MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE**

32. The SRSG shall monitor compliance with this document.
ENTRY INTO FORCE

33. This Directive is adopted without prejudice to the Directive on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for Formed Police Units on Assignment with UNAC or the Rules of Engagement for the Military Component of UNAC.

34. This Directive enters into effect immediately upon approval. It may only be abrogated or amended in writing by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.
(signed)
Hervé Ladsous
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
ANNEX A

AUTHORISED ITEMS OF POLICE EQUIPMENT FOR IPOs ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNAC

1. Pepper sprays
2. Police Shield
3. Helmets with face shield
4. Gloves (abrasion and puncture resistant)
5. Stab/cut/ puncture resistant Vest
6. Vest Trauma Plates
7. Safety Glasses/UV protective
8. Duty Belts (with proper holtering for approved equipment)
9. Hand cuffs
10. Metal Scanners
11. Flexcuffs

The carriage and/or use of any firearms, ammunition or related items of police equipment that does not appear on this list is strictly prohibited.
ANNEX B

DETENTION DETAILS

DETAINED PERSON’S DETAILS

FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME, MAIDEN NAME, ALIAS AND LAST NAME

ADDRESS

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

GENDER

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP

NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

DATE, TIME AND PLACE DETAINED:

REASON FOR DETENTION

WITNESS DETAILS

(NAME, SURNAME AND ADDRESS)

DID THE DETAINED PERSON MAKE A STATEMENT?

(If so, attach a copy of that statement)

WAS THE DETAINED PERSON SEARCHED?

IF SO, WHY?
WERE ANY ITEMS CONFISCATED OR SEIZED FROM THE DETAINED PERSON?

IF SO, PROVIDE A COMPLETE INVENTORY

PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE DETAINED PERSON, INCLUDING ANY VISIBLE OR ALLEGED INJURIES...

(Was medical assistance provided? If so, provide details)

OFFICER DETAILS:
Name and Surname .................................................................
United Nations Identification Number ...........................................
Contingent: .................................................................
Signature .................................................................
Date and Time .................................................................
ANNEX C

DEFINITIONS

1. **Use of Force.** The use or threat of the use, of physical means to achieve an objective authorized in this Directive.

2. **Hostile Act.** An attack where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated property.

3. **Hostile Intent.** The threat of imminent force, which is demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the presence of hostile intent is required before detention or the use of force is authorized.

4. **Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).** Protective clothing, helmet, googles, or other equipment designed to protect the wearer’s body from injury.

5. **United Nations.** The United Nations, including its offices programmes and funds.


7. **Stop and detain.** To hold a person so that he/she cannot leave.

8. **Carana police and law enforcement agencies.** All duly recognized police and other law enforcement agencies operating in Carana including the National Police.
### Annex D

**Blue Card**

#### Use of Force or Other Items of Law Enforcement Equipment

Members of IPOs are authorized to use force or other items of police equipment to protect or defend themselves, other United Nations personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent that involves serious bodily injury or to prevent or stop incidents that jeopardize public safety within UNAC premises.

**Gradation of Force**

Members of IPOs shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use either of physical force or other items of police equipment. They may use force or other items of police equipment only if other means remain ineffective for the purpose of achieving an authorized objective. If there is no practical alternative to the use of force, or other items of police equipment in order to achieve an authorized objective, members of IPOs must, whenever the operational circumstances permit, observe the following graduated procedures:

A. Non-lethal force must be used, if at all possible;
B. If non-lethal incapacitating weapons or tear gas are possessed by members of a IPOs who are trained to use those equipment, and where they would be an effective means to bring a threat to an end, then they must be used, if so allowed by the on-scene authorized commander;
C. If the preceding measures remain ineffective or are without any promise of achieving an authorized objective, an attempt should be made, if possible, to make use of the visual and audible effect of preparing for use of force;
D. If the preceding measures remain ineffective or are without any promise of achieving an authorized objective, force can be used in manner that avoids causing of personal injury or collateral damage to property;
E. If the preceding measures remain ineffective or have no real likelihood of achieving the authorized objective, escalation of the incident to the next level will be necessary.

If members of IPOs intend to use force against other persons, they must first:

A. Identify themselves in the language(s) spoken in the location to which the IPO is posted as members of the UNAC Police component; and
B. Give a clear warning of their intent to use force.

If members of IPO intend to use force, the following warning shall be used in English:

« UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL USE FORCE »

C. Give enough time for that warning to be obeyed,

Unless to do so would:

a) Unduly place themselves at risk of death or serious bodily harm;
b) Create a risk of death or serious bodily harm to other persons; or
c) Clearly be inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances.

#### Principles of Use of Force

At all times, use of force shall be consistent with the principles of gradation and last resort, minimum necessary and proportionate use of force as well as legality, and accountability in accordance with the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping operations and Special Political Mission, and Basic Principles of the use of Force.

**Use of Force, excluding Lethal Force**

Members of IPOs are authorized to use force or items of police equipment, excluding lethal force:

A. To protect, deter or defend themselves against hostile act or intent;
B. To protect other United nations and associated personnel;
C. To prevent or stop the commission of a crime that does not involve a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury;
D. Against any person or group who limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of the IPO or its members, or the freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, or the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers.
XX XXXX 2017

DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR FORMED POLICE UNITS ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)
DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR FORMED POLICE UNITS ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

GENERAL

Authority and Mandate

1. This Directive, including its Annexes A-J, constitutes the "Directive on detention, searches and use of force for all members of Formed Police Units (FPUs) in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC)" (hereinafter "Directive").
2. This Directive provides the authority for the detention, searches and use of force by members of FPUs in their areas of deployment in UNAC.
3. This Directive is issued by the USG-DPO and sets out the principles, parameters, and conditions under which detention, searches and use of force may be used by members of FPUs in UNAC while executing their mandated activities within the limits of their capacities and areas of operation, in accordance with Security Council resolution (SCR) 214X of XX XX 201X. The Police Commissioner may issue more detailed directives to his commanding staff and the FPU commanders.

Command Responsibility

4. Implementation of this Directive is a command responsibility. In accordance with the DPKO/DFS Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, dated 1 January 2017 ("FPU Policy"), which forms an integral part of this Directive, primary and overall command of the FPUs is vested in the Police Commissioner who can delegate his/her command functions to the Deputy Chief of Operations/FPU Coordinator, responsible for all matters related to FPUs.
5. Each FPU Commander is responsible for the effective command and control of the Unit under his/her command, and shall ensure that all the FPU members under his/her command understand and comply with this Directive as well as with any directives issued by the Police Commissioner.
**Principles of Use of Force**

6. At all times, use of force shall be consistent with the principles of gradation and last resort, minimum necessary and proportionate use of force as well as legality, and accountability in accordance with the FPU Policy.

**Training and Qualifications for the Use of Force**

7. Every member of a FPU who carries a firearm or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment must be fully familiar with this Directive and understand the rules it contains. He/she must have received current and proper training on the care and use of the particular weapon or item(s) of law enforcement equipment assigned to him/her. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed directives regarding induction training and briefings on this Directive, including the documentation that must be submitted to prove that they have been received. A member of a FPU can only carry a firearm or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment if the Police Commissioner has certified that he/she has received the required briefings stipulated in the aforementioned directives.

8. Members of FPUs who carry firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment are required at all times while on duty to carry in their breast pocket an Aide-Memoire (Blue Card) provided by UNAC, which summarizes the rules contained in this Directive.

**Equipment and Weapons**

9. Members of FPUs may only carry and use the firearms and other items of law enforcement for the exercise of their functions during the time of their mission listed in Annex A of this Directive. Detailed directives regarding the precise specifications of such items listed in that Annex are contained in the UNAC Force Requirement for FPUs. Members of FPUs may only carry and use firearms and other items of law enforcement that conform to the specifications in the UNAC Force Requirement for FPUs.

10. It is the personal responsibility of every member of a FPU to keep his/her firearm, ammunition and other item(s) of law enforcement
equipment secure. He/she must be able to account for their whereabouts and condition at all times. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed directives regarding the carriage, care and storage of firearms, ammunition and other item(s) of law enforcement equipment.

**DEFINITIONS**

11. The definitions in Annex B of this Directive shall form an integral part of this Directive.

**USE OF FORCE, FIREARMS OR OTHER ITEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT**

12. Members of FPUs are authorized to use force or firearms or other items of law enforcement equipment to protect or defend themselves, other United Nations and associated personnel, civilians including humanitarian workers, and key sites, equipment or goods designated by the SRSG, in consultation with the Police Commissioner, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.

**Gradation of Force**

13. Members of FPUs shall, as far as possible, apply de-escalation/non-violent means before resorting to the use either of physical force, firearms or other items of law enforcement equipment. They may use force, firearms or other items of law enforcement equipment only if other means remain ineffective for the purpose of achieving an authorized objective specified in paragraphs 11 and 12 of this Directive, or are without any promise of achieving such an authorized objective. Section D.2.2 of the FPU Policy, governing Gradation of Force, shall apply at all times.

14. If there is no practical alternative to the use of force, firearms or other items of law enforcement equipment in order to achieve an authorized objective specified in paragraph 11 and 12 of this Directive, members of FPUs must, whenever the operational circumstances permit, observe the following graduated procedures:
a. unarmed force must be used, if at all possible;
b. if non-lethal incapacitating weapons or tear gas are possessed by members of a FPU who are trained to use those weapons, and where they would be an effective means to bring a threat to an end, then they must be used, if so allowed by the on-scene authorized commander;
c. if the preceding measures remain ineffective or are without any promise of achieving an authorized objective, an attempt should be made, if possible, to make use of the visual and audible effect of preparing a firearm for use;
d. if the preceding measures remain ineffective or are without any promise of achieving an authorized objective, warning shots should, if circumstances allow, be fired at a safe point of aim that avoids the causing of personal injury or collateral damage to property;
e. if the preceding measures remain ineffective or have no real likelihood of achieving the authorized objective, the use of armed force against persons is authorized.

15. If members of FPUs intend to use force or firearms against other persons, they must first:
   a. identify themselves in the language(s) spoken in the location to which the FPU is posted as members of the UNAC Police component; and
   b. give a clear warning of their intent to use force or firearms.
   c. If members of FPU intend to use force, the following warning shall be used in English:

   « UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL USE FORCE »

   ; and

d. If members of FPU intend to use firearms, the following warning shall be used in English:

   « UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL SHOOT »

;and
e. give enough time for that warning to be obeyed, unless to do so would:

   i. unduly place themselves at risk of death or serious bodily harm;
   ii. create a risk of death or serious bodily harm to other persons; or
   iii. clearly be inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances.

16. The Commander of each FPU has a duty to ensure that his officers know the warning to be given verbally in English and the primary language(s) spoken in the region to which the FPU is deployed.

17. Whenever the use of force or firearms or any other item of law enforcement equipment is determined to be required under paragraph 11 or 12 of this Directive, members of FPUs shall:

   a. act with restraint and only use the minimum degree of force that is proportional to the seriousness of the threat and necessary to achieve the authorized objective;
   b. respect and preserve human life and cause the minimum of injury to people;
   c. cause the minimum of damage to property;
   d. as soon as practicable, help anyone who is hurt and ensure that medical aid is rendered if needed; and
   e. as soon as practicable, ensure that relatives or friends of people injured or affected by the incident are notified.

18. No member of a FPU shall point a firearm or a non-lethal incapacitating weapon in the direction of any person other than in the circumstances and to achieve the objectives set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 of this Directive.

**REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION**

19. Immediately after any incident involving the use of force or firearms or other item of law enforcement equipment and regardless of whether or not such use resulted in death or injury to people or damage to
the member of the FPU concerned must verbally inform the Office of Police Commissioner and record the details of the incident, including:

a. the date, time and place of the incident;
b. the name(s) of the UNAC personnel involved;
c. the name(s) of any members of the Caran law enforcement agencies involved;
d. the events leading up to the use of force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment;
e. the reasons why he/she used force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment;
f. who was subjected to the use of force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment;
g. the apparent results of the use of force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment; and
h. a diagram of the incident scene, where appropriate.

He/she must submit a written report with those details within twelve (12) hours of the time of the incident through the chain of command to the Police Commissioner. The Police Commissioner will, without delay, investigate the incident and present a report on it to the SRSG who will transmit that report to United Nations Headquarters. All members of FPUs are required to cooperate fully and actively with any such investigation.
**CONTRAVENTION**

20. Members of FPUs are advised that obedience to superior orders shall not preclude a violation of this Directive or of the rules that it contains from being considered an act of serious misconduct if the member of a FPU concerned knew that an order to use force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment resulting in the death, injury of a person or damage to property was manifestly in violation of this Directive and the rules contained herein and he/she had a reasonable opportunity to refuse to follow it. Responsibility shall, in any case also rest on the superior(s) who gave an order in violation of this Directive and the rules contained herein, and shall be considered as a serious misconduct under paragraph 21.


**ENTRY INTO FORCE**

22. This Directive is adopted without prejudice to the rules of engagement for the military component of UNAC.

23. This Directive shall enter into force on 7 April 2014.
(signed)
Hervé Ladsous
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

[Signature]
ANNEX A

LIST OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT RELATED TO THE USE OF FORCE, INCLUDING LETHAL FORCE AUTHORIZED FOR MEMBERS OF FORMED POLICE UNITS (FPUs) ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNAC

1. Police Armoured Protected Vehicles APVs / APCs Infantry Carriers
2. Water cannon
3. Crowd control vehicles
4. Rifles and ammunition
5. Side arms and ammunition
6. Machine guns and ammunition (up to 15 mm)
7. Electric baton / Taser (advanced pistol)
8. Launcher for tear gas grenades (single/multiple barrel)
9. Tear gas/smoke hand grenades
10. Tear gas/smoke grenades/canisters (37 mm and above)
11. Flash-bang / stun grenades
12. Smoke grenades (coloured)
13. Soft-Kinetic Projectiles (SKPs) as per UN specifications
14. Illumination flares
15. Signal pistol
16. Pepper spray canisters (OC Mace)
17. Spike strip /Traffic spikes
18. Police baton / Tonfa
19. Rigid handcuffs
20. Disposable restraints

The carriage and/or use of any firearms, ammunition or related items of law enforcement that does not appear on this list is strictly prohibited
ANNEX B

DEFINITIONS

1. **Armed Force.** The use of weapons, including firearms, non-lethal incapacitating weapons and tear gas.
2. **Civil unrest.** The commission, perpetration or instigation of acts of violence which affect public peace or order.
3. **Force.** The use, or threat of the use, of physical means to achieve an objective authorized in this Directive.
4. **Hostile Act.** An action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated property.
5. **Hostile Intent.** The threat of imminent use of force, which is demonstrated through an action or behaviour which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the presence of hostile intent is required before detention or the use of force is authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:
   a. The capability and preparedness of the threat.
   b. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack
   c. Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Responsibility (AOR)
6. **Caran Police and other law enforcement agencies.** All duly recognized law enforcement agencies operating in Carana.
7. **Prevent.** To take action for the purpose of ensuring that an event or activity which one has a reasonable belief, supported by credible evidence or information, will soon occur does not in fact take place.
8. **Reasonable belief.** A belief which a reasonable person would sensibly hold on the basis of facts as they are known to the commander or individual officer at the time.
9. **Unarmed Force.** The use of physical force, short of the use of "Armed Force".
10. **United Nations.** The United Nations, including its offices, programmes, funds.
11. **United Nations and Associated Personnel.** The following persons are considered "United Nations and Associated Personnel" for the purpose of this Directive:
   a. Members of UNAC (including locally recruited personnel while on duty);
1. b. Officials of the United Nations and of its specialized agencies and related organizations;

c. Experts on Mission for the United Nations and for its specialized agencies and related organizations;

d. United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) on assignment or mission in Carana;

e. Other personnel designated by the SRSG in consultation with the United Nations headquarters (UNHQ), including:

   i. Persons engaged by the Secretary-General or by one of the specialized agencies or related organizations of the United Nations to perform functions on behalf of UNAC or the United Nations;

   ii. Persons assigned by a Government or an intergovernmental organization operating with the authority of the Security Council or General Assembly to carry out activities in support of the fulfilment of the mandate of UNAC or of programmes of the United Nations, including programmes of its offices, agencies, funds, and programmes;

   iii. Persons deployed by authorized humanitarian non-governmental organizations or agencies under an agreement with the Secretary-General or with a specialized agency or related organization of the United Nations to carry out activities in support of the fulfilment of the mandate of UNAC or of programmes of the United Nations, including programmes of its offices, agencies, funds, and programmes.

12. **Stop and detain.** To hold a person so that he/she cannot leave.
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police

Structure of CARANA Law Enforcement Agencies

UN Peacekeeping Training Material

CARANA

Scenario Base Exercise
Carana features three law enforcement agencies, which address the field of internal security, i.e. the Carana National Police, the Gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard.

**Carana National Police**
The Carana National Police (CNP) has an estimated strength of approximately 7200 police officers. Precise numbers cannot be aggregated due to the high fluctuation in the regional personnel bodies.

The CNP operates mainly in densely populated areas. The CNP’s first operational pillar concerns public order and safety. In fulfilling this task, the CNP is also tasked with traffic safety. Its second main objective is the investigation of criminal acts. In doing so, the CNP is expected to conduct major investigations outside its area of responsibility, i.e. in rural areas. The CNP find itself within the command structure of the Carana Ministry of the Interior. However, oversight relating to operational matters of criminal investigation cases is carried out by the Ministry of Justice.
The CNP has a history of being underfinanced, understaffed and being insufficiently organized. As a consequence, the organization is lacking basic administrative mechanisms and routines. One example is the lack of a functioning education and training pillar. The CNP does not command a centralised educational facility such as an academy.

**Carana Gendarmerie**
The Gendarmerie of Carana has a strength of close to 2900 officers. The Gendarmerie is tasked with upholding public order in rural areas. The gendarmerie is further authorized to conduct military police duties.

The Gendarmerie is under the control of the Ministry of Defence. Operational control of units which engage in public order operations is transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. However, this mechanism has been widely disregarded, as the Gendarmerie was utilized as a governmental strong-arm.

Traditionally the gendarmerie is closely connected to the Carana Defence Force (CDF). Its organisational structure, the operational approach and its self-understanding are strongly influenced by the CDF’s customs and
culture. The Gendarmerie has benefitted from its strong ties to the CDF and to the presidential guard. As a consequence, it is better funded and staffed than its civilian counterpart, the CNP.

**Carana Presidential Guard**
The Carana Presidential Guard has a strength of almost 1500 personnel. The guard mainly consists of two infantry battalions, but also features additional units (see organisational chart).
The presidential guard was created to carry out representative tasks. It is also responsible for the close protection details for the president and close relatives, support of military and of public order operations as well as special assignments from the president.
It is not part of the regular defence force. The presidential guard reports directly to the president of Carana. The guard possesses ties to the gendarmerie of Carana which were created through the frequent joint deployment in operations.
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians for UN Police

Library of CARANA Maps

UN Peacekeeping Training Material

CARANA

Scenario Base Exercise