United Nations
Civil-Military Coordination
Specialized Training Materials
(UN-CIMIC STM)

Integrated Training Service
Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training
Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support
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**PREFACE TO THE UN-CIMIC STM**

- **Background**

  ◊ The large numbers of multidimensional mandates of today’s UN Peacekeeping operations and the broad range of issues they deal with have made coordination among the various multifunctional actors a crucial element in the success of these missions. Unlike traditional CIMIC concepts in support of the Commander’s intent, UN Civil Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) supports the mandate implementation and overall mission objectives. Therefore, enhanced coordination is needed amongst the components of any UN peace operation as well as with international, bilateral and NGO actors, and with local authorities and parties to the conflict.

  ◊ Ultimately, the goal of civil-military coordination – a subset of mission coordination, whether integrated or non-integrated – is to enhance or improve overall mission effectiveness, among the three major components of any UN field mission: civilian, police, and military. Civil-military coordination enables more effective military support to civilian partners, in order to facilitate the effective resolution of the conflict, to achieve the mandate of the mission sooner and better, and reach what is commonly known as the “end state” of peacekeeping in compliance with the UN Transition strategy.

- **STM Development**

  ◊ The UN-CIMIC Training Modules development concurs with a greater demand for civil-military coordination in UN field missions. The UN-CIMIC Training materials are a response to a request made by the DPKO/OMA, and have been developed in full and close coordination with representatives from Member States and all relevant UN actors, notably with the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA).

  ◊ Those materials are based on the Policy on Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions issued by the USG DPKO on 1 November 2010 and fully comply with the 2008 *Capstone Doctrine*, in full complementary with the Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) course delivered by OCHA.

  ◊ The Timeline which has prevailed for the completion of those materials is as follows:
    - **Preparation** (MAY-AUG 2012): Conduct of the Training needs assessment (TNA - Questionnaire sent to Missions and in-situ visits)
    - **Drafting** (AUG - DEC 2012): Development and Drafting of the training modules
    - **Review** (JAN to MAY 2013): Desk review (review of draft materials and consultation with DPKO, DFS, etc.)
Consultation (JUN 2013): Consultation workshop with the TCCs and Field Missions representatives
Consolidation (JUL-SEP 2013): Internal Consolidation
Pilot course (OCT-NOV 2013): Pilot course/Training of Trainers Course in Entebbe
Finalization (DEC 2013-MAR 2014):
Approval (MAY 2014): UN process (Office of Legal Affairs)
Dissemination (JUN 2014 onward): Disseminate the training materials and assistance to Member States in integrating those STM in their training.

Aim

The aim of these training materials is to offer Troop-Contributing Countries a ready-to-use training package, UN-CIMIC Specialized Training Material (STM), including a set of scenario-based exercises, to help in enhancing integrated planning and better coordination of day-to-day business and challenging situations that require appropriate interaction between civilians and military.

This Training package is designed for application in pre-deployment training, but could also serve as background material to be used in an induction or an on-going training in the field if the necessary adaptations are made.

Target audience

The priority target audience is military officers who would be deployed to a UN Peacekeeping Mission at FHQ, SHQ and Unit levels and tasked to carry out a UN-CIMIC function.

Insofar as the material provides a broader understanding of UN-CIMIC applicable at the strategic (UNHQ), operational (Mission HQ), or tactical (Sector and Battalion HQ) levels, specific participant profile could also include:
- Military Experts on Mission (MEOMs);
- Police – FPU Commanders and above;
- Designated UNPOL liaison officers;
- Civilian – Senior Mission Leadership, Heads of Substantive Sections;
- And all appropriate substantive and administrative staff with civil-military coordination responsibilities, such as UN-CMCoord or Civil Affair officers.

Important considerations for Peacekeeping Training Institutes (PKTIs), Course Directors and trainers/instructors

Those considerations are meant for Course Directors and trainers/instructors of PKTIs

Electronic files of the UN-CIMIC STM can be downloaded at: http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx
The development of those materials has been driven by the training needs assessment and the increasing need to adopt a progressive, rational and modular approach in order to get officers acquainted with UN-CIMIC.

The UN-CIMIC STM are in the form of exportable and adaptable package, providing a progressive understanding of what UN-CIMIC is and how UN-CIMIC works, from understanding to evaluation level, from operational to tactical level.

In this perspective, it appears clearly that the UN-CIMIC STM are more a Training package than a course strictly speaking. It is understood that training package is comprised of different modules which could be used all together or separately, depending on the audience. It means that each PKTs/National trainers need to tailor those global materials to the necessities of their audiences.

In conducting training with those STM, it is essential to begin with the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) which are intended to provide all peacekeeping personnel (military, police and civilian) with a shared understanding of the basic principles, guidelines and policies of UN peacekeeping to ensure coherence in United Nations mandate implementation.

With regards to Mission Specific Training, trainers should be guided by the Pre-deployment Information Packages (PiPs) in aligning their courses to reflect the peculiarities of the mission. The PiPs are accessible on ITS Community of Practice (COP) website at https://pktcop.unlb.org

**Content Overview**

UN-CIMIC STM are organized in a balanced structure based on a progressive and modular series of four modules – which represent course outlines, plus one additional module.
- Modules 1 and 2 constitute the core of those materials and enable a progressive and deeper understanding of the concept of UN-CIMIC.
- Module 3 displays the fundamental tasks which pertain to UN-CIMIC officers; it will allow a day-to-day implementation, analysis and evaluation of UN-CIMIC related activities. It contains the core skills that should be understood and implemented by future UN-CIMIC Officers, as underlined by the Training needs assessment.
- The additional module contains topics pertaining to some areas that are of essence for the UN and where UN-CIMIC officers could have some extended interactions with Peacekeeping substantive areas.
  - Military support to Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is an area where UN-CIMIC will have a role to play, should a complex emergency occur.
  - DDR/SSR and POC do not directly fall into the hands of UN-CIMIC officers, but the delivery of those two training units could provide them with food-for-thoughts to implement a practical approach in order to better coordinate their activities in line with PK Mission priorities.
  - UN transitions unit aims at helping UN-CIMIC officers to raise awareness their role within the Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding nexus.
The last module includes scenario-based exercises (SBEs) designed to apply the knowledge gained in the previous modules at operational and tactical level, to enhance collaborative problem-solving capabilities and UN-CIMIC skills relevant to the mission environment and area of responsibility, covering a large spectrum of UN peace & security activities.

In parallel to those modules, a database composed of other documents that could significantly enrich the understanding and the delivery of the UN-CIMIC Course, including Official UN guidance, Missions proven-documents and other examples of learning activities, is accessible on ITS Community of Practice (COP) website (https://pktcop.unlb.org).

Some repetitions may occur on purpose with some previous courses already issued by DPKO/ITS (CPTM and MEOM course). The aim here is to place emphasis on contents that are of essence for UN-CIMIC officers and to shed light on those points of interest by putting them into a UN-CIMIC perspective.

**Detailed Course structure**

- **Module 1 – Overview of UN-CIMIC**
  - Unit 1: Introduction to UN-CIMIC
  - Unit 2: Principles and tasks
  - Unit 3: Structures and capabilities
  - Unit 4: Development of the CIMIC concept
- **Module 2 – UN-CIMIC in the Mission environment**
  - Unit 1: Key partners
  - Unit 2: Mission coordination
  - Unit 3: UN-CMCoord
- **Module 3 – UN-CIMIC Fundamental tasks**
  - Unit 1: Staff officers’ tasks
  - Unit 2: Sharing & Planning
  - Unit 3: Civil assistance
  - Unit 4: Communication
- **Additional Module – Some Substantive areas**
  - Supporting Humanitarian Action in Responding to Emergencies And Disasters (SHARED)
  - UN-CIMIC & Protection of Civilians
  - UN-CIMIC & SSR-DDR
  - UN transitions
- **Module “Scenario-based exercises”**
  - 8 scenarios for Operational/tactical level
Acknowledgements

ITS would like to thank the two consultants who laid the first stones, and the numerous training personnel from national peacekeeping training institutions and field missions who provided feedback during the drafting process, including the participation in a workshop and a pilot course. The content of these Specialized Training Materials was developed with the assistance of relevant substantive experts in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, with special support from the DPKO Office of Military Affairs (OMA), the DPKO&DFS/DPET, the DPKO/OROLSI, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA).

Contact person

Because the aim of the UN-CIMIC STM is to support pre-deployment training of military officers going to serve in UN Peacekeeping operations, ITS will ensure they are regularly updated to reflect changes in UN peacekeeping policies and guidance.

For any proposal of update or improvement, any inquiry or any question pertaining to the UN-CIMIC STM, please contact Lt-Col Richard Zabot: zabot@un.org or/and peacekeeping-training@un.org

Any relevant update will be posted and explained on the Peacekeeping Resource Hub website (http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org). Instructors are encouraged to check that site regularly.
PREPARATORY NOTES FOR INSTRUCTORS

- **Suggested methodology**

The following points provide a suggested methodology. Experienced instructors may choose to use alternative methods and activities to present the material and key learning points in this unit, as long as it meets Module aims and learning outcomes.

- **Method of delivery** is classroom lecture, including base slide presentation(s) and interactive discussion. In addition to a base presentation (with notes to each slide) for each Part, the instructor or instructor team may also download additional presentations, further references and reading materials, video presentations, and examples of best practices in order to build upon or modify the base presentation – all available through links in this document or the UN-CIMIC Community of Practice website (http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx).

- **Instructor(s) would also be able to modify the base presentations for the Parts of this Module in order to conduct an abbreviated version (e.g., total of 30 min.) or a version combined with other Modules (or Parts of Modules), depending on the situation, training requirement(s) and priorities, and time available.**

- **Instructor(s) should tailor their presentation remarks to the managerial and leadership level and work areas of the training audience, as explained above.**

- **Instructor(s) may choose to allow discussion during rather than after presentations.**

- **In order to maintain quality of training value-added, classroom size should not exceed 40 persons per session.**

- **Training sequences**

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<th>Questions/Assessment</th>
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<td>Between 40 and 80 min.</td>
<td>Between 30 and 50 min</td>
<td>10 min.</td>
<td>If any, around 20 min.</td>
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- **Instructors suggested profile**

This Module is best presented by an instructor who has personal experience in UN peacekeeping operations as well as civil-military coordination. He or she must also have a solid understanding of UN concepts of civil-military coordination (UN-CIMIC and UN CMCoord). As the focus of this STM is on military audiences, the Instructor should ideally have a military background; however, he or she may also be a civilian with demonstrated
knowledge and experience of military operations. The Instructor should also have undergone a formal training course on UN-CIMIC (and, ideally, UN CMCoord) through either one or a combination of: DPKO/DFS ITS (including this training); OCHA; a UN field mission; a non-UN course welcomed by the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34); or appropriate national education and training.

- **Instructors suggested preparation**

**Required Readings**

- *Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)*, DPKO/DFS, 14 October 2010.

**Additional Materials Reference in those STM**

- A comprehensive and consistent documentary base has been attached to those STM, including topics such as UN-CIMIC Policy and annexes, Planning, OCHA and UN-CMCoord, Force Headquarters, DDR, SSR, Civil affairs and examples of Good practices. This base must be used by instructors as they deem it necessary.

**General Preparations**

Equipment: Computer and PowerPoint slides, Projector and Screen, Flip Chart

Materials:
1. Slide hand-outs (printed – two slides per page), as appropriate, for note-taking
2. Printed and/or electronic copies of required readings (one per participant). For copies, please download electronic files at: [http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx](http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx)
3. Electronic copies of the base presentation(s), as modified by the instructor(s), and any additional material selected for the presentation.

**Mission Specific**

If this module is being presented to prepare participants for a particular UN peacekeeping mission, then gather mission specific information from the mission website (available at the UN DPKO internet website, through ‘current operations’: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp)). Additional mission specific information is available at the UN DPKO Policy and Training internet website: [http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx](http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx)
Symbols Legend

Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration)

Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor’s own words versus being read to participants)

Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)

Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)

Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)

Hand-out (Indicates a hand-out is provided to participants at this point)

Film (A film that is recommended as a core part of the training or an option)

Picture displayed as an illustration, including photo credit

Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)

Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit, section or part – as indicated in the text)

Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)
UNIT 1: INTRODUCTION TO UN-CIMIC

Learning outcomes
At the end of this unit, participants should be able to:
- Explain the overall concept of UN-CIMIC
- Describe some actions pertaining to CIMIC
- Recall essential basis of UN Peacekeeping and link it to UN-CIMIC
- Identify Guidelines Policies and documentation which drive UN-CIMIC

Structure of the presentation
- GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION
- ESSENTIAL BASIS OF UN PEACEKEEPING
- OFFICIAL UN GUIDANCE

This Unit is the “introduction unit” to the global overview of the UN-CIMIC that will be displayed in the 1st module. It aims at providing the audience with a smooth and progressive approach to a better understanding of UN-CIMIC, including concrete examples, recollecting essential principles of UN Peacekeeping that are of utmost importance for any UN-CIMIC Officer, and with some guidance regarding where to find appropriate documentation.

General understanding of the UN-CIMIC

Movie “Welcome to MINUSTAH”

In order to put the audience in the right mood, and to raise interest, it could be suggested to screen this movie (which could be found in the UN-CIMIC STM database). Any other short movie shall also be adapted, provided that it shows a breadth of UN-CIMIC activities in a nutshell, like a “trailer”.

The release of this movie, shot by a MINUSTAH battalion (South Korea Engineer battalion), has been authorized by the MINUSTAH PIO. It could be shown to participants as an introduction to the broad environment of an integrated Mission. In order to make the best out of the 10 min duration, it could be fruitful if instructors ask participants to identify specific UN-CIMIC activities that appear in that film.
Concrete examples of UN-CIMIC activities

Those pictures shown on this slide may also allow the instructor to present practical cases of UN-CIMIC activities as a concrete approach. This “diaporama” could be complementary of the movie previously shown and be displayed as a “Learning activities”. The examples displayed here are among many in UN field Missions (from left to right, top to bottom):

1. UN peacekeepers from Brazil rescue stranded Haitians from their flooded homes in Cite Soleil. Heavy rains from tropical storm Noel left thousands homeless. Port-au-Prince, Haiti. October 2007. (Source: MINUSTAH Photo/Marco Dormino)

2. Pakistani troops assist Liberian villagers in the repair of a flooded road on the outskirts of Voinjama. (Source: UN Photo #120801, Eric Kanalstein)

3. Members of the veterinary team of INDBATT2 provide on-the-job training to local veterinarians while providing services to the community of Bor, South Sudan. (Photo courtesy of Christopher Holshek)

4. The Liberian project manager of a youth agricultural training farm explains the pilot project to the UNMIL Chief CIMIC Officer (right) and staff officers of the resident Bangladesh peacekeeping battalion. (Photo courtesy of Christopher Holshek)
Definition of UN-CIMIC

United Nations Civil-Military Coordination refers to the coordination between civilian and military within the UN System, here in the context of a Peacekeeping operation.

- UN-CMC Coord is defined as the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies to protect and promote the humanitarian principles.
- UN-CIMIC refers to a military function which contributes to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, in order to support UN Mission objectives.

This slide shows the definition of UN-CIMIC as extracted from the UN-CIMIC policy of 2010. Note that this document will be detailed in the following unit. It draws also a light parallel between UN-CIMIC and CMCoord. Note that this latter concept will be detailed in the following module.

United Nations Civil-Military Coordination refers to the coordination mechanisms and procedures used by civilian partners and the UN military and within the UN System, here in the context of a Peacekeeping operation.

Whilst UN-CIMIC refers to a military staff function to support UN Mission objectives, UN-CMCoord refers more to a “dialogue” and interaction for Humanitarian purposes. The humanitarian civil-military coordination dialogue provides the necessary interface between humanitarian and military actors to protect and promote the humanitarian principles and achieve the humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies and natural disaster situations. The UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC functions should complement each other on the ground.
These general considerations, also extracted from the UN-CIMIC Policy, intend to heighten audience’s awareness regarding UN-CIMIC mainlines to be kept in mind during the entire course.

Civil-military coordination provides the interface between political and security objectives on the one hand, and humanitarian, development and peacebuilding objectives on the other. The civil-military nexus is at the locus of any complex peace operation, and it is critical to the ability of the mission to have a holistic impact on the conflict.

Two factors drive the need for better mission coordination and thus civil-military coordination. First, the complexity of the peace operations environment requires greater coordination among actors, programmes, and activities, because they have cross-cutting impacts and are ultimately interdependent. Second, limited resources – including donor funding and peacekeepers from troop contributing countries – and growing demand, means that we must do more with less, i.e. we must use our available resources more judiciously, efficiently, and effectively.

Quite simply, UN-CIMIC is the coordination between the military component of the peacekeeping mission and the range of civilian actors. UN-CIMIC, therefore, should be understood within the context of the role of the military component in the overall mission mandate. The primary role of the military component of a UN peace operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate in particular with respect to the safety and security of the mission and its personnel, the protection of civilians including IDPs and humanitarian personnel.

Scheme explaining UN-CIMIC

Even if this scheme is self-explanatory, instructors may ask participants to explain what they see and what they understand.
The legal framework for UN-CIMIC is quite simple and straightforward. Every UN-CIMIC officer should look for four major sources of references to determine the legal parameters by which the mission in general and the military in particular conducts its activities.

The first, of course, is the United Nations Charter. While “peacekeeping” does not appear in the United Nations Charter, peacekeeping missions have been authorized based on the provisions of Chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” stipulates that parties to a dispute should use peaceful methods of resolving disputes, such as negotiation and mediation, and Chapter VII, entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” empowers the Security Council to authorize enforcement measures not involving the use of force such as the imposition of economic and other sanctions. Should those measures prove inadequate, the Security Council may then, also acting under Chapter VII, “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

In its current practice, the Security Council refers to Chapter VII of the UN Charter when authorizing a peacekeeping operation to “use all necessary means” or “take all necessary actions” to achieve certain mandated tasks; this is generally understood as authorization to use force beyond self-defence up to and including the use of deadly force. The particular mission’s mandate is articulated in the relevant UN Security Council resolution or resolutions. These resolutions provide the political, security, humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding objectives of the peacekeeping operation which UN-CIMIC works to enhance and enable. They also usually provide a certain degree of coordinating instructions and divisions of responsibility among agencies and other actors with respect to these objectives, including special areas of interests such as protection of civilians (POC), humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and so on.

The third source of legal reference for UN-CIMIC officers is called “International legal standards”: 

- UN Charter
  - Chapter VI – “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”
  - Chapter VII – “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”

- UN Peacekeeping Missions
  - UN Security Council Resolutions - Mission mandates
  - SOFA/ SOMA: Status of Force/Mission Agreement

- International Legal Standards
  - International Humanitarian Law - Four Geneva Conventions and three Protocols
  - International Human Rights Law - Universal Declaration of HR and Treaties
  - UN Security Council Resolutions
UN peacekeeping operations are bound by customary principles of international law including, as and when applicable, international humanitarian law, also known as the “Law of armed conflict”, which is primarily comprised of the four Geneva conventions and their additional protocols. It deals with the law that is applicable during periods of both international and internal armed conflicts and deals, among other things, with soldiers’ behaviours towards civilians. The Secretary-General has expressed, in a Secretary-General’s Bulletin (ST/SGB/1999/13), that the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict such forces are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which sets the cornerstone of international human rights standards, emphasizes that fundamental freedoms and human rights are universal and guaranteed to everybody. Additional human rights instruments focus on particular areas, such as civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, the prevention of torture, the prevention of racial discrimination and the prevention of prejudice against persons with disabilities, to identify a few specific areas.

The Security Council has also adopted a number of resolutions, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, highlighting its concerns on key themes which are of particular relevance for peacekeeping. These resolutions condemn, in the strongest terms, all acts of violence or abuses committed against civilians in situations of armed conflict, in particular: torture, gender-based and sexual violence, violence against children, the recruitment of child soldiers, the trafficking of human beings, and the intentional denial of humanitarian assistance.

The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines of 2008 provide a contemporary understanding of the three basic peacekeeping principles.

All UN peacekeeping operation should be deployed with the consent of the host State and cooperation of all main parties (while the consent of other parties to the
Conflict is operationally desirable, it is not legally required. Consent ensures that the mission has the political and physical freedom of action needed to carry out its mandated tasks. In the implementation of its mandate, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation’s role is to move the peace process forward while maintaining consent of the host State and the cooperation of all the major parties to the conflict.

This means that all UN peacekeeping personnel and UN-CIMIC officers must have the capacity to assess and report on the evolving interests and motivation of the parties.

Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent of the host State and cooperation of the main parties. UN peacekeeping operations must implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any of the parties to the conflict. Impartiality, in the peacekeeping context, is not neutrality which requires non-interference. As such, if the UN mission is mandated to take action, for instance to protect civilians, it will intervene according to its mandate.

This means that UN-CIMIC officers must have the capacity to assess and report on the evolving interests and motivation of the parties and be sure that the rationale for action is well established.

Even if “Non-use of force” implies that UN peace operations will use the minimum use of force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, it is now understood that UN peace operations should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including those it has been mandated to protect. While use of force continues to be primarily defensive, it is now standard authorization to use force beyond self-defence.

- Something like, use of force primarily in self-defence and defence of the mandate would be more appropriate. It would also be advisable to confirm that self-defence is an inherent right which does not require any authorization from the Security Council.
- The capstone doctrine make use of the concept ‘robust peacekeeping’ to signify recognition that uses of force at the tactical level may be necessary, when authorized to do so by the Security Council, to defend the mission and its mandate from spoilers, and to protect civilians. The mission wide Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military and Directive on the use of Force (DUF) for the police components of the UNPKOs will clarify the different levels of force that can be used in various circumstances.

UN-CIMIC Officers should always be mindful of the need for a credible deterrence and an early de-escalation of violence and a return to nonviolent means of persuasion.
This diagram, displayed here from the Capstone doctrine as a refresher, shows the full spectrum of Peace support activities, given that this UN-CIMIC Training course mainly focuses on activities in the framework of Peacekeeping. The role played by UN-CIMIC in Peace-building will be detailed in Module 4, Unit 4 “UN Transitions”.

The UN definitions, according the Capstone Doctrine, are:

- **Conflict prevention** involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General’s “good offices,” preventive deployment or confidence-building measures.

- **Peacemaking** generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. Peacemakers may be envoys, governments, regional organizations or even a prominent personality working independently.

- **Peace enforcement** involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force where there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

- **Peacekeeping** is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

- **Peace-building** involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.
There is no official definition of what is a “Traditional Mission”, even if the term is used quite often in seminars or briefings and appears in the *Millennium Report 2000 “We the Peoples—the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century”* and also in CPTM, Unit 1 Part 1. Because traditional missions are mostly military in character, they may also be headed by military personnel. In contrast, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are headed by civilian personnel.

The tasks assigned to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations by the Security Council are essentially military in character and may involve observation, monitoring and reporting, supervision of ceasefire and support to verification mechanisms Interposition.

Some examples of non-integrated UN missions include:
- United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) between Israel and Syria
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) between Sudan and South Sudan

Even if the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East look like traditional missions insofar as they are headed my military personnel, they however carry a POC mandates and as such, should not be categorized as "traditional" missions which are usually categorized as those exclusively performing cease-fire monitoring and reporting. "Traditional mission" could mean "neither integrated nor multidimensional".

In “Traditional” Missions, UN-CIMIC officers may have a limited spectrum of action, but a greater freedom of manoeuvre and more specific responsibilities under the control of the HOMC (liaison with NGO's, confidence building with Locals, community outreach programmes).
Type of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Integrated Mission

One of the major recommendations of the 2001 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (otherwise known as the “Brahimi Report”) was to institute a more integrated approach to the multidimensional operations in post-conflict situations to better link the different dimensions of peace-building (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy.

An integrated approach requires: a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives: closely aligned or integrated planning and operations through common “frameworks” such as the UN Development Assistance Framework; a set of agreed outcomes, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace.

Usually, integrated operations are deployed in dangerous aftermath of internal conflict, to create a secure and stable environment, employ a mix of military, police and civilians to support implementation of a peace agreement and support establishment of legitimate and effective governance institutions and Rule of Law.

What is important here is to show here is the imperative necessity for UN-CIMIC officers to understand the “ins and outs” of the integration and the greater needs for an effective Pre-Coordination and Current-Coordination between all components.
Peacekeeping has become one of the main tools to manage complex crises. Beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through various processes.

The role and responsibilities of the UN-CIMIC function is articulated in the DPKO/DFS Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) policy of October 2010 (to be reviewed in 2014).

Other relevant policies, guidelines and documents

All those documents will be displayed later throughout this course.
Other relevant policies, guidelines and documents

Audience should be encouraged to register to the “Community of Practice” (http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org) in order to keep in touch with the greatest Peacekeepers Network and to have a better operational picture of peacekeeping issues. Once deployed in PK Missions, audience should also be encouraged to consult the Peace Operations – Policy and practice database that offers all official guidance as well as “After action reviews”, “End of assignment reports” and other references.

Note that the CIVIL-MILITARY Coordination concept that appears in most of the official guidance refers to UN-CMCoord, the civilian side of UN-CIMIC. Only a few numbers of documents mention the CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION as UN-CIMIC.

Summary

- Complexity/interdependency of the operations environment increases need for better interaction and effective coordination.
- UN-CIMIC is a military function facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components in order to support UN Mission objectives.
- UN-CIMIC is shaped by:
  - Peacekeeping principles
  - Legal international standards
  - DPKO/DFS UN-CIMIC Policy 2010
  - UN-CIMIC manages interaction and supports an enabling environment through core tasks:
    - Civil-military liaison and information-sharing
    - Civil assistance (mission support and community support)
UNIT 2: PRINCIPLES AND TASKS OF UN-CIMIC

Learning outcomes

- Understand the foundations of UN-CIMIC
- Explain the principles of UN-CIMIC
- Describe the two UN-CIMIC core tasks

Structure of the presentation

- Foundations of UN-CIMIC
- Principles of UN-CIMIC
- UN-CIMIC Core Tasks
  1. Civil-Military Liaison and Information-Sharing
  2. Civil Assistance: Mission Support and Community Support

This Unit displays the main principles and tasks assigned to UN-CIMIC. It aims at providing the audience with a deeper knowledge of UN-CIMIC by summarizing the UN-CIMIC Policy of 2010.

Foundations of UN-CIMIC

Wide range of functions

- UN missions can be mandated to deliver a wide range of functions under the authority of the HOM:
  - Support to the peace process
  - Facilitation of humanitarian and development assistance
  - Election assistance
  - Human rights monitoring
  - POC, DDR and SSR

This wide range of functions, regarding both the Mission mandate and the UN-CIMIC tasks, will be taught gradually to the audience all throughout this course.

Principles of UN-CIMIC

Reasons for UN-CIMIC

UN-CIMIC is fundamentally designed to:

- Support management of the operational and tactical interaction between military and civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operation.
- Support creating an enabling environment for the implementation of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors.

The effectiveness of delivery of all UN missions tasks is affected by how UN PKO forces are able to provide security and ensure stability.
Core principles

- Solid understanding of the civilian effort of the broader strategic, political and social context and of ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution
- Operational and tactical coordination by UN-CIMIC officers with the police and civilian components should be in support of the mission objectives
- Contribute to achieving a mandate driven common end state
- Coordination in accordance with humanitarian principles
- Planning and implementation of UN-CIMIC activities shall seek synergy in order to minimize duplication of efforts and enable the efficient and effective use of resources.
- Maximize and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners, especially the host nation government, to contribute to achieving the mission objective.

It is important that UN-CIMIC officers have a solid understanding of the civilian effort, of the broader strategic, political and social context within which it takes place, and of ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution. Conversely, the civilian and police components must similarly understand the role of the military and how UN-CIMIC serves as a mission coordination tool to leverage the capabilities of the military component in support of the overall mission effort.

Planning and implementation of UN-CIMIC activities shall seek to synergize and maximize the comparative strengths of military, police and civilian contributors in order to minimize duplication of efforts and enable the effective use of resources.

Maximize and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners, especially the host nation government, to allow the peace process to unfold, and contribute to achieving the mission objective.

UN-CIMIC Core tasks

- The two core tasks

Module 1: UN-CIMIC Overview—Unit 2: Core principles

UN-CIMIC Core Tasks

- Civil-military liaison and information-sharing
  - Management of civil-military interaction to implement the overall mission mandate.

- Civil assistance
  - Support to Mission
  - Support to the community

Pictures, courtesy of George Valappil
Liaison and Information sharing shall be implemented by UN-CIMIC officers to provide support in the management of civil-military interaction with the aim of assisting the HOMC’s efforts to implement the overall mission mandate:

→ They may act as the first point of entry to the military component of the mission for police and civilian partners, if no relation has been established previously.

→ They should ensure that their military components are aware of benefits and sensitivities when working with police and civilian partners, especially with the humanitarian actors (UN-CMCoord) based on their knowledge and training on key principles in interacting with these partners.

UN-CIMIC interaction with the police and civilian partners should be based on an agreed appropriate framework/process that would ensure the transparent flow of information, taking into consideration the confidentiality and care in handling sensitive information. In most cases, this collaboration will take place through integrated field coordination structures and will be formalized in the Mission-UNCT integrated strategic framework (ISF).
Civil Assistance is a support function that includes two types of related activities undertaken by the military component of a UN integrated mission:

→ **Mission support** refers to the support provided to ensure a coordinated mission response to requests for assistance from humanitarian and development actors, such as an armed escort for a humanitarian relief convoy. When mission support operations are undertaken, UN-CIMIC officers are typically responsible for planning, coordinating and facilitating the actions of the military units responsible for executing the task.

→ **Community support** facilitates the interaction between Mission and local civilian population and authorities. Community Support Projects are often related to physical infrastructure repair/rehabilitation projects that could be requested by any civilian organization or entity through appropriate mission coordination structures, or proposed by the military component through the appropriate civil-military process.

The techniques and procedures of both liaison and information-sharing and civil assistance, at both operational and tactical levels, are displayed in greater detail in Module 3.

### Optional Learning Activity and discussion: Visualizing UN-CIMIC

**Time Required: 20’**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>05 minutes</th>
<th>Activity introduction and instructions:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Sketch on the next slide, drawn by a former UNMIL G9 Chief, aims at illustrating the UN-CIMIC action in the overall Peace process.</em></td>
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<tr>
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<td>- <em>Could you try to explain it?</em></td>
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<td>- <em>What’s your point?</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- <em>Could you find, from your experience, a more generic draw to illustrate how the UN-CIMIC could help the mission?</em></td>
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<tr>
<th>05 minutes</th>
<th>Syndicate discussion</th>
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<td>05 minutes</td>
<td>Debrief in syndicates</td>
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<td>05 minutes</td>
<td>Debrief in the plenary group</td>
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</table>
This visualization of UN-CIMIC, depicted here, had been drawn by a former U9 Chief of UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The idea here is to move the military (in red) further and further to the rear of the overall peace process as the mission matures and moves from peacekeeping peacebuilding – and thus assuming an increasingly minor, less visible, and more indirect role – by working by, with, and through external civilian (yellow) and internal or local (green) partners in an enabling process of helping to build capacity and confidence. In other words, UN-CIMIC is about leading less from the front and helping more from behind. Mission support could be seen as “civilianizing” while community support could be more about “localizing”. Civil assistance, seen this way, invokes one of the more interesting mottos used in some field missions: “It’s not about us; it’s about them”. Civilianizing and localizing may be done simultaneously, but the most appropriate relationship, as depicted here, is to work by, with, and through civilian partners to improve local capacity and confidence. Last, while this general civil-military approach is ideal for transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it is also appropriate for support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as conflict prevention.

Summary

- The complex operating environment implies for the military actors to:
  - Take a lead role in providing security
  - Support civilian led mandated tasks
  - Have a solid understanding of the civilian effort to make a constructive contribution

- Civil-military liaison and information-sharing:
  - Ensure a mutual understanding between MIL, CIV & POL
  - Help implementing interactions based on an agreed appropriate framework

- Civil assistance refers to:
  - Support to any civilian component of a peace operation (Mission support)
  - Activities that help local communities to improve building capacities and confidence (Community support)
UNIT 3: STRUCTURES AND PERSONNEL

Learning outcomes

✓ Understand the UN FHQs structures and staff organisation in various missions
✓ Describe the specific UN-CIMIC liaison structures
✓ Identify the tasks that could be assigned to different categories of UN-CIMIC officers

Structure of the presentation

- UN MISSION HEADQUARTERS
- UN-CIMIC STRUCTURE
- UN-CIMIC PERSONNEL

UN Mission Headquarters

Example of a “Military Observers mission” HQs

This chapter is based upon the draft policy “Military Force Headquarters in Peacekeeping Missions" currently developed by DPKO/ OMA. This policy addresses the full range of peacekeeping operations in the field, from observer missions to multidimensional missions. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for future UN-CIMIC officers to understand these structures.

These organisational charts are examples, given that there are as many different HQs structure as there are different Peacekeeping Missions. The specific organization, staffing, and command relationships will vary based on the mission assigned, the environment within which operations must be conducted and the nature of crisis. Choice of the appropriate module will reflect the military operational requirements derived from the mandate, operational environment, size and span of control.
Example of an “Integrated mission” HQs

To recapitulate how an integrated mission is organized, here is an example which must be seen from a UN-CIMIC point of view, with a focus on the multiple agencies with whom UN-CIMIC will be functioning and reporting.

Standard U-Staff model

This slide and the subsequent ones are useful for the audience to remember the structure of a UN Mission HQs, especially the 9 functional units, U1 to U9, gathering common functions with the goal to optimize the span of control and promote coordination. This U-Staff model is designed for small to medium size Mission where military strength is below 6,000.

The instructors must particularly focus on the place of the UN-CIMIC function within these three different HQs structures.

In a small size Mission, the Planning section (U-5) can be combined with the Operations section (U-3) and/or the Engineer section (U-8) can be combined with either the
Operations section (U-3) or the Logistics section (U-4) depending on the operational requirements. Depending on the complexity of the situation and the anticipated threat, a standing “Operations Centre” may be established with enhanced capabilities as defined in the Policy.

- **Standard modified U-Staff model**

  ![Standard modified U-Staff model](image)

  This Organization of the FHQ is suitable with large military components (6,000 to 12,000 troops) includes the establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCOS Ops) in order to reduce the Chief of Staff’s (COS) span of control.

- **Standard Modular structure model**

  ![Standard Modular structure model](image)

  This FHQ is suitable in a multidimensional mission with a military component above 12,000 troops to perform a joint and multinational function within Mission HQ. The basic structure consists of three entities; Operations, Operations Support and Operational Service. The
functions of such a FHQ are arranged in order to provide the optimal response to mandated tasks and to generate synergies between functions and avoid stove-piping work.

**UN-CIMIC Structure**

- **UN-CIMIC generic branch**

  The diagram above depicts a generic UN-CIMIC (U-9) organization. The UN-CIMIC Unit is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning civil-military operations (the civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace). The UN-CIMIC has responsibility to enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the area of operations to ensure the success of the mission. Following are the areas and activities that are the specific responsibility of the UN-CIMIC. The responsibilities of the U9 are as follows:

  - Coordinate the military UN-CIMIC operations with other UN agencies; and nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations in the area of operations.
  - Plan positive and continuous community relations programs to gain and maintain host nation’s understanding and good will, and to support military operations.
  - Provide the U-2 operational information gained from civilians in the area of operations.
  - Coordinate with the U-3 on trends in public opinion.
  - Coordinate with the Military Public information and the U-3 to ensure disseminated information is not contradictory.
  - Provide guidance to TCC units in identifying, planning, and implementing programs to support the civilian populations and strengthen the host nation development.
  - Assist the U-3 with information operations.
  - Coordinate with humanitarian civil assistance and disaster relief (emergency food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians).

Additional information concerning UN-CIMIC can be found in DPKO/DFS Guidelines: Policy on Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) (October 2010).
situations, geography, and sector command capabilities and needs. Other liaison officers could include a UN-CIMIC liaison to integrated coordination centres (JMAC, JOC, etc.) if necessary.

At the tactical level, sector or battalion commanders may adapt this basic teaming structure and scheme, or modify, based on mission requirements – UN-CIMIC chief, deputy, plans, and operations officers, UN-CIMIC sergeants (or NCOs), and UN-CIMIC liaisons (for example, to the regional or local UN Joint Office run by the Head of Field Office, a UN Civil Affairs Officer). Likewise, this should be a consensus decision by the mission leadership at that level.

Example of UNIFIL chain of command

This diagram shows the 3 levels of the UNIFIL UN-CIMIC chain of command:

- In the **first level (regional level)** J9 CIMIC Branch is under Command and Control of the Chief of Staff (COS). The functional link between J9 CIMIC Branch and CIMIC units are depicted by dotted lines. There is also coordination between J9 and Civil Affairs unit.
- In the **second level (District-town level)** there is CIMIC Sector (G9) under Chain of command of the Chief of Staff (COS) Sector East and also in Sector West. Besides, there is coordination between G9 and Civil Affairs team.
- In the **third level (village level)** there are Battalions under Chain of Command of the Sector Commander.

It is also worth mentioning that independent units, such as those controlled at the operational level, including quick-reaction forces and logistical units may also have a designated UN-CIMIC officer. It is rare to find designated UN-CIMIC officers below the battalion level, but a commander may decide that his or her deputy or executive officer will have UN-CIMIC responsibilities. Regardless of the level of command, every commander has a UN-CIMIC responsibility inherent in his mission.
Operational & Tactical linkage

A common issue in particular with operational-tactical coordination is the provision of information on the larger UN-CIMIC operational situation and activities as well as the situation and activities of adjacent sectors and units. UN-CIMIC operational command and control structure is to disseminate assessments and other information downward, whilst demanding tactical level staff to supply reports, assessments, etc. to feed operational level situational understanding. “Common operational picture” needs to work both vertically as well as horizontally.

The UN-CIMIC staff structure provides the primary portal to the military component for humanitarian and development actors, as well as the local civilian population. The UN-CIMIC structure can also provide a key link to the civilian components of an integrated mission and other civilian partners for other military staff. It augments, but does not replace, appropriate established civil-military interaction structures, for example as part of the intelligence, plans, current operations, and logistics functions.

UN-CIMIC Personnel

Examples of required skills

In many respects, military officers with civil-military coordination responsibilities are the epitome of what is required of military officers in the 21st century. They must be among
the best of their kind, because they must not only possess certain skills which can come through training and education, but must also be selected by their commanders because of their unusual capabilities and talents. This is because civil-military coordination is more of a mind-set than a skill set. UN-CIMIC officers must therefore be among the best quality personnel found in a command structure. In addition to being good soldiers in a traditional sense, they must be able to think and act well beyond the normal scope of their military contemporaries in a complex, dynamic, and interdependent operations environment – keeping the big picture and long term always in mind, even day-to-day.

UN-CIMIC officers must be multi-talented. Their approach to their primary function of liaison and information-sharing goes beyond simply passing information and reports back and forth. Knowledge and information must be gained and used in a way that helps foster not just civil-military coordination, but mission coordination and transition management. UN-CIMIC officers must be particularly knowledgeable of a plethora of plans, assessments, and frameworks with respect to various aspects of the conflict or peacekeeping and peacebuilding concerns or objectives in order to plan adaptively. Their other major skill is that they must be good project managers, understanding that they are building psychological confidence as much as physical capacity.

It is important that UN-CIMIC officers are able to communicate effectively to two types of audiences – civil (including police) and military. They must be both effective speakers and writers. And they must have a minimum of skills in negotiation and mediation.

UN-CIMIC officers must be able to constantly understand, assess, and develop the situation in order to bring together what is needed at the right point in time. Even though they work at operational and tactical levels, they must employ a more strategic, collaborative style of leadership – able to understand the viewpoints of many actors and find often unusual ways and means to help bring together various efforts together in a supportive way. This is also known as “leading from behind”. A good way to describe this approach is also to “think globally and act locally” (or thinks strategically while acting tactically).

UN Photo/Martine Perret / http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about

Learning Activity and discussion: Drafting Terms of reference

Module 4: OVERVIEW OF UN-CIMIC – Unit 3: STRUCTURES & PERSONNEL

Learning Activity and discussion
Drafting Terms of references

Time Required: 20'

05 minutes
Activity introduction and instructions:
The goal of this LA is to take into consideration what has been seen previously in this Unit and to draft Terms of references for positions pertaining to UN-CIMIC:
• Chief of UN-CIMIC (U9)
• Operation Officer (U9)
• Plans Officer (U9)
• UN-CIMIC Operator (NCO)
• Sector/ Battalion Officer

Instructor may assign to each syndicate one position among others.

05 minutes
Syndicate discussion

10 minutes
Debrief in the plenary group
Examples of TORs

-module 1: overview of un-cimic – unit 3: structures & capabilities

**un-cimic personnel**

- **example of terms of reference: plans officer (U9)**

Under the direction of the (Deputy) Chief of UN-CIMIC (U9):

- **assists** the J9 in the preparation of UN-CIMIC plans, SOPs, and directives;
- **assists** the Deputy J9 in J9 UN-CIMIC project and task management;
- **assists** the Deputy J9 in Mission UN-CIMIC training and education management;
- **assists** the Deputy J9 in UN-CIMIC information and document management;
- **liaises and coordinates** with operational-level civilian with respect to UN-CIMIC plans functions;
- **provides input** to UN-CIMIC assessments and briefings as appropriate;
- **supervises** the UN-CIMIC Plans Sergeant.

-module 1: overview of un-cimic – unit 3: structures & capabilities

**un-cimic personnel**

- **example of terms of reference: UN-CIMIC Sergeant (NCO)**

Under the direction of the assigned UN-CIMIC officer:

- **executes** UN-CIMIC administrative and information management functions;
- **provides administrative assistance** to UN-CIMIC tasks, projects and trainings;
- **maintains accountability** of personnel, property and equipment readiness;
- **performs** physical or virtual CIMIC center operations sergeant tasks, as appropriate;
- **prepares** briefings and documents as directed;
- **performs** driver functions and other duties as assigned by the appropriate UN-CIMIC officer.

-module 1: overview of un-cimic – unit 3: structures & capabilities

**un-cimic personnel**

- **example of terms of reference: sector/ battalion officer**

Under the direction of the sector/unit commander or chief of staff:

- **liaises and coordinates** as appropriate with other partners at a Sector/ Unit level (CMCoord, Civil Affairs, MEOMs, UNPOL/FPUs, PIO, NGOs, and other local actors);
- **oversees** conduct of civil reconnaissance to provide the commander situational understanding of situation in the AOR and recommend UN-CIMIC courses of action;
- **provides** UN-CIMIC assessments in accordance with the Mission UN-CIMIC SOPs;
- **plans, coordinates, and oversees** execution of UN-CIMIC projects in-Sector/ Unit
- **synchronizes** Sector/Unit UN-CIMIC and AOR information operations;
- **provides training** and education for sector or unit UN-CIMIC officers and related civilian personnel.
Summary

There is no one-size-fits-all model; each UN-CIMIC structure should be adaptable to the situation and Mission.

UN-CIMIC is more an affair of Coordination that Command & control.

Operational and tactical levels are mutually supportive.

UN-CIMIC is more a mind-set than a skill-set.

Even if templates or models are proposed, there is no one-size-fits-all model; each Mission adapts its own structures and procedures. UN-CIMIC structure should be adaptable to the situation, mission, and “phase”.

Operational and tactical levels are mutually supportive – there is less “command & control” in UN-CIMIC than coordination. However, UN-CIMIC officers, even if they cannot order others, must provide input to all Force commanders’ orders and directive via the regular hierarchical link establish as per the Mission.

UN-CIMIC is more a mind-set than a skill-set – UN-CIMIC requires the right kind of people for the job. Sample terms of reference demonstrate the qualities required of such personnel.
UNIT 4: DEVELOPMENT OF THE UN CONCEPT OF CIMIC

Structure of the presentation

- HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
- CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT COORDINATION IN THE UN CONTEXT
- WHAT UN-CIMIC IS NOT
- LEARNING ACTIVITY/ DISCUSSION ABOUT YOUR OWN (NATIONAL OR REGIONAL) EXPERIENCE OF CIMIC.

Since the audience is now more familiar with the UN-CIMIC concept, it is possible to help them catching the get to grips with the history of this concept, with some considerations related to the differences between Coordination and cooperation. Then, a discussion of what UN-CIMIC is not will help the audience to avoid some misconceptions or stereotypes. Last, a Learning activity will invite audience members to present their own experience in terms of CIMIC.

Learning outcomes

- HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
- CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT COORDINATION IN THE UN CONTEXT
- WHAT UN-CIMIC IS NOT
- LEARNING ACTIVITY/ DISCUSSION ABOUT YOUR OWN (NATIONAL OR REGIONAL) EXPERIENCE OF CIMIC.

The idea of this Unit is to give an overview about historical perspective and considerations related to UN-CIMIC, so that instructors will be able to educate the potential UN-CIMIC officers to better grasp the situation on the ground and to respond to the daily-life interrogations that may occur.
### Historical perspective

#### A brief history of CIMIC

- Civil-military coordination = as old as warfare
- International Committee of the Red Cross
- Hague and Geneva Conventions
- Founding of the United Nations

#### Module 1: UN-CIMIC OVERVIEW – Unit A: DEVELOPMENT OF UN CONCEPT

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I. Civilian organizations like NGOs growing in number, variety, and capability, especially since the end of the Cold War

II. Parallel growing of military concepts and capabilities for civil-military coordination

III. “Security” trends: more than physical protection, having varying implications on both humanitarian action and development activities and programmes

IV. Increasing demand for comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated approaches – especially between military (security) and civilian (humanitarian and development) actors

As long as wars have been fought in and amongst civilian populations, as long as soldiers have come into contact with civilians in the course of military operations, civil-military coordination has existed. As far back as Caesar’s *Gallic Wars*, for example, the political and military were intertwined and military government became institutional. Similar situations appeared in ancient Persia, India, and China. Many aspects of the codes of chivalry in Europe and bushido in Japan during the Middle-Ages were rule-sets on how warriors were to interact with civilians, both politically and socially.

As war became deadlier and more complex on a mass scale, organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross were founded in the mid-19th century, first to deal with wounded warriors and then the consequences – intended as well as unintended – of battle on civilian populations. The international norms of military interaction, including military government and humanitarian responsibilities military commanders had toward populations in territories which they occupied, became codified in The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. World War I was the last major war in which the majority of casualties were military; World War II
was the first and greatest major war in which the majority of those who suffered were civilian. Since then, most of the victims of almost every conflict, large and small, are civilian.

As a result of World War II, the United Nations and many international organizations, especially non-governmental began to proliferate in number and in capability, especially after the Cold War. At the same time, military concepts and capabilities for civil-military coordination grew, as military forces began to see more frequent use in peace operations or “operations other than war”. NATO’s concept for CIMIC, for example, was developed and fielded first in the mid-1990s, with the deployment of NATO forces to replace UN forces in the Balkans.

The *Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* of 2004 explains that “security” has gone well beyond physical protection. Conversely, the security implications of humanitarian action and development became more readily apparent and consequential, as articulated by the concept of “human security” – a term defined by the United Nations Development Programme as far back as 1994.

All this time the impetus and demand increased for more comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated approaches in international interventions – especially between those mostly in the security business and those mostly in the humanitarian and development business. Civil-military coordination was now something other than incidental to the operations of either military or civilian actors.

### Progression of UN approach on CIMIC

Here are some milestones outlining the UN approach on CIMIC.

As a result of the recommendations of 2001 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (otherwise known as the “Brahimi Report”), DPKO began the development of a concept for civil-military coordination, the first attempt being in 2002 with the publication of the Civil-Military Coordination Policy of 2002.
As a result of a UN review of the global humanitarian system in 2005 that highlighted a number of gaps in humanitarian response, the UN’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) as its executive agency, instituted a more robust UN humanitarian response system, including a concept of humanitarian civil-military coordination and a revised definition of “CMCoord”, articulated in greater detail in the *Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets [MCDA] in Disaster Relief* (revised 2007), also known as the “Oslo Guidelines.”

With guidelines on meeting the “challenge of mission integration and coordination” in multi-dimensional peacekeeping in the “Capstone Doctrine” of 2008 and the recent experiences of a number of missions, DPKO was able to (finally) field a revised policy on UN civil-military coordination for peacekeeping forces for the “full-spectrum” of peace operations – the 2010 UN-CIMIC Policy.

### Considerations about Coordination

#### Definitions

- **Coordination** = Making things, people and parts function together efficiently in an organized way. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.
- **Cooperation** = Working together for a common purpose.
- **Co-existence** = Living in peace with another or others despite differences, especially as a matter of policy.
It is essential for UN-CIMIC officers to have a grasp of what is meant by “Coordination” in the UN integrated mission context.

The complexity of the peace operations environment demands greater coordination among actors, programs, and activities that have cross-cutting implications and are interdependent.

“Coordination” range on a scale from “coexistence” in its minimum state to “cooperation” in its maximum state. “Cooperation” is the stronger relationship where the partners agree to synchronize their policies and activities and undertake joint action. A lesser degree of relationship is preferred by the humanitarian agencies. This is referred to as “coexistence”. A minimum level of “coordination” is always required. In this relationship, exchange of information, coordination meetings and at times undertakes some form of joint activity, for instance a humanitarian convoy with a military escort.

Range of interfaces for humanitarian-Military liaison

- **Range of Interfaces for Civilian-Military Liaison**

At a minimum, the responding military and civilian actors must coordinate in critical areas in order to enhance cooperation and co-existence and minimize competition and conflicts: security, logistics, communications, transportation, information and health.

- Depending on the UN-CMCoord Strategy, different interfaces can be used between humanitarian and military actors.
  - In a complex emergency situation under the co-existence strategy, the default interface is conduit. This is where a liaison officer from the humanitarian organization/community (usually a UN-CMCoord Officer or a staff performing the UN-CMCoord function) becomes the “go-between” of the humanitarian and military communities. This drastically reduces the chance of humanitarians being seen (thence perceived) as working with the military.
  - Liaison Arrangements allow varying approaches to liaison activities depending on what is appropriate, doable and acceptable. This can be in the form of liaison exchange where liaison officers are “seconded” to the other party; this could also be liaison visits where liaison officers do regular visits to the other party for
information sharing; or limited liaison where liaison officers meet each other in a neutral place – this may be resorted to when the room for coordination becomes smaller.

- Co-location is the default interface under a cooperation strategy in purely natural disaster situations. There is less concern about being seen or perceived as working with the military.

### Coordination challenges

There are many factors that impede coordination.

- The sheer multitude of international and local actors involved, including the media that better informed public, and the number of institutions and agencies engaged in peace, security, relief and reconstruction actions.
- The wide-ranging scope of disparate activities representing as many interests.
- The high costs – especially human labour – of coordination: the interaction among this large number of actors and the interplay among the multiple dimensions explain this complexity.
- To these we can still add an infinite number of complicating factors including, amongst others: the language and socio-cultural gaps between the international peacekeepers and the local societies they are intended to assist; inherent conflicts between the values, principles and mandates of some of the actors involved in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development and humanitarian assistance.
- Coordination with internal actors (local government, recognized parties to the conflict, and the private sector and civil society) presents their own challenges. In principle, the host government and community must play the lead role in the reconstruction process, since it is indeed their own future that hangs in the balance. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that they are unable to fulfil this role.
There should be a clear distinction between management and coordination. Decision-making takes place in the management function, whilst the coordination function is used to, inter alia, exchange information.

This leads to perhaps the most important challenge – and thus most important insight – a UN-CIMIC officer can have: namely, the need to manage expectations: one’s own, those to whom one reports, those with whom one works, and those of whom one is trying to help. In many situations, the term “unity of effort” has been widely used. This assumes widespread agreement on ends, ways, and means to achieve overall success. It almost never happens. Those (such as military personnel) who tend to use this term are more used to a command and control environment where this could be expected; others, however, more used to a coordination environment might venture to use the term “unity of purpose” (which assumes only common goals and objectives), if that. Managing expectations may ultimately be the single most important contribution a UN-CIMIC officer makes.

### Clear Overview: Understanding Vs misconceptions

#### Misconceptions to be avoided

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- **NOT an Operations doctrine**
  - UN-CIMIC training will not be a substitute for doctrine, but it will help to operationalize the UN-CIMIC policy through policy-based guidelines
  - National CIMIC approaches may apply; however, only as they are compliant with UN-CIMIC Policy and mission mandate

- **NOT “Public relations”**
  - A common misconception of civil-military coordination
  - National contingents may conduct public relations activities within reason, but they cannot call them “UN-CIMIC” activities

- **NOT “Winning Hearts and Minds”**
  - Discouraged under the Capstone Doctrine
  - Counterproductive: short-term, limited in effect, and full of risks and dangers

- **NOT mostly a direct action (not a “only QIPS action”)**

- **NOT “Intelligence”**
These differences are critical in another way – because they help explain what perhaps more familiar techniques covered by these concepts cannot be applied under UN-CIMIC. Understanding what UN-CIMIC is not can be just as important as understanding what UN-CIMIC is.

First, UN-CIMIC is not a civil-military operations doctrine. It is a concept that can be operationalized through this Training Programme, but which is broad-based enough to allow for the application of national civil-military approaches – as long as they comply with the UN-CIMIC concept and the core principles and tasks.

Second, UN-CIMIC is not “public relations.” This is a common misperception of civil-military coordination in general. Recalling the principles and tasks of UN-CIMIC explained in Part 2, because UN-CIMIC is a mission coordination tool and with its focus is more on transition management, the emphasis is reducing dependency on the force and “civilianizing” and “localizing” through less direct involvement and building capacity and confidence. Again: “It’s not about us; it’s about them.”

Third, “winning hearts and minds” is discouraged. The Capstone Doctrine points out the danger this approach may present to other actors in the field, particularly humanitarian. A public-relations application of CIMIC is often counterproductive because it short-term and limited in effect – in other words, it is more tactical than strategic. In addition to the dangers and risks it could present to partners, this more tactical approach can: one, reinforce, rather than reduce, local dependency on the force for services which the military is inappropriate and cannot sustain (therefore setting the population up for disappointment in the force); and two, it could lead the force inadvertently in taking sides in the conflict, thus compromising the core peacekeeping principle of impartiality. Besides, there is plenty of evidence that such approaches simply do not work. Dangers and risks to humanitarian partners Reinforce rather reduce local dependency on the force for services Lead the force inadvertently in taking sides in the conflict = compromising UN principle of impartiality.

Unlike many civil-military concepts, UN-CIMIC emphasizes working by, with, and through especially external civilian actors, as will be explained later on. Therefore, UN-CIMIC looks to apply its assistance to the population more indirectly than directly.

UN-CIMIC is not Intelligence; it is about collection of information, assessment, and information sharing, nothing to do with hidden or covert actions. It is worth mentioning that suspicion of “Intelligence” may ruin the confidence-building process and harm relations with civilians.
Learning Activity: Presenting & Comparing CIMIC Concepts

Module 1: UN-CIMIC OVERVIEW — Unit A: DEVELOPMENT OF UN CONCEPT

Learning Activity and Discussion
Presenting & Comparing CIMIC Concepts

Time Required: 30’

Activity introduction and instructions:

Participants are invited to present some CIMIC concepts that they have experienced in their career, and engage a group discussion related to the Common points or Differences with the UN-CIMIC concept.

At this stage, this information sharing will also allow Trainers and participants to have a better picture of everybody’s experience.

Summary

- Even if Civil-military coordination is as old as warfare, it has become a UN priority those last 10 years.

- Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. In the UN context, it goes from co-existence to cooperation.

- Understanding what UN-CIMIC is not can be just as important as understanding what UN-CIMIC is.
== MODULE 2: UN-CIMIC IN THE MISSION ENVIRONMENT ==

UNIT 1: KEY PARTNERS

Learning Outcomes
- Identify the difference between Internal and External actors.
- Identify the key partners UN-CIMIC officers may work with.
- Understand the role and responsibilities of the key partners.
- Identify the interactions between UN-CIMIC officers and the key partners

Structure of the presentation
- Mission components partners
- United Nations Country Team (UNCT) / Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)
- National Partners
- Regional and International Partners

This Unit aims at presenting the different Partners that UN-CIMIC officers could be called upon to work with. It displays a little bit of the interaction, given that more detailed information will be given in the succeeding Units and Modules.

Mission components partners

Military Experts on Mission

According to the 2009 DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Roles and Training Standards for UN Military Experts on Mission: A UN Military Expert on Mission includes all military personnel engaged for UN peacekeeping service as a ‘Military Expert on Mission’ to undertake ‘observer’, ‘liaison’, or ‘advisory’ tasks in support of mission mandate implementation. These personnel may be categorized as UN Military Observers (UNMOs), UN Military
Liaison Officers (MLOs) or UN Military Advisers (MILADs). UN-CIMIC Officers should make sure their liaison activities are closely coordinated with those of MEOMs and vice-versa.

A United Nations Military Liaison Officer (UNMLO) is talking about the security situation with a family in Fatumean, Covalima district, Timor-Leste, June 2007. (Source: UN Photo #148110, Martine Perret)

- **Mission components partners**

  When the United Nations began to deploy civilian police officers in 1960, the role of police in UN peacekeeping missions was largely liaison and monitoring. That has since evolved to much more comprehensive and complex role. Depending on the mandate of the particular mission, the role of police in UN peacekeeping missions could include: support for reform, restructuring and rebuilding of national police and other law enforcement agencies; operational support to host State police and other law enforcement agencies; and interim policing and other law enforcement.

  Under the direction of the Police Commissioner its central area of focus is with respect to indigenous police force capacity building as part of rule-of-law development. It also works “in strong complementarity with UNDP to ensure capacity-development support to line ministries, police reform processes and governance and accountability structures of the police.” This has important implications for UN-CIMIC officers, who should not expect UNPOL to provide the same broad-based support to other mission components as can be expected from the military. Although not a requirement, it would be wise for UNPOL and FPUs to designate an officer in their staff to perform UN-CIMIC functions, as appropriate.

  Furthermore, their activities, particularly those involving the protection of civilians and those with some kind of capacity-building effect, can incorporate the UN-CIMIC principles for interaction between police and civilian actors. The military, in turn, should likewise work with police forces using the same principles, with an understanding of the special status and function of UNPOL and FPUs.

  For more on UNPOL and FPUs, go to: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/index.shtml

  UN police and military forces help provide security in Chad’s border region with Darfur where hundreds of thousands of refugees are located. Here, female United Nations police officers and their Chadian counterparts interview refugees. (UN Photo/Olivia Grey Pritchard, 24 February 2009)
Formed Police Units

- FPU are defined as cohesive mobile police units, providing support to United Nations operations and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and missions, primarily in public order management. FPU work in support of the establishment and maintenance of safe, democratic and human rights abiding communities by delivering professional, responsive and more robust policing in accordance with the mandate.
- They address internal security sector issues for which police forces are more appropriate than military forces, but they do not come under the same policies and rules for military forces, and thus represent a more politically flexible force option for the UN.
- Capacity-building is not one of the FPU’s core tasks. However, FPU may support the United Nations police capacity-building programmes in the development of the host state police, mainly in the area of public order management, on a case by case basis.
- First all-female UN Formed Police Unit (FPU) arrives at Roberts International Airport in Liberia on 30 January 2007. (Source: UNMIL Photo/Eric Kanalstein)

Civil Affairs

- Mutual understanding prior to establish ongoing liaison to identify and exploit opportunities for civil-military synergies.
- UN-CIMIC liaison with HN and coordination of “community support” is therefore, with, and through Civil Affairs.
- UN-CIMIC activities must be coherent, coordinated and consistent with mission objectives through Civil Affairs.
The three roles of Civil Affairs in support of the mission must be well known by UN-CIMIC officers.

- **Cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level.** Civil Affairs staff represents the mission and liaise with local actors on overall operations and on the full range of mission activities. Civil Affairs provide a channel for communicating the priorities and perceptions of different sectors of the population to the mission, concerning both the mission itself and the peace process – thus, *any military communications activities with the local population must be synchronized with Civil Affairs*. Data and knowledge is collected and conditions and developments at the local level are also monitored, as is progress with mandate implementation and possible unintended consequences of mission activities. Conflict analysis and early warning are also provided. *Thus, any information with respect to the civil situation must be shared and coordinated with Civil Affairs.*

- **Confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation.** Civil Affairs actively supports the development of social conditions conducive to sustainable peace through support to reconciliation and conflict-resolution activities at the local and/or national levels, and through efforts to support popular engagement and confidence in the peace process. These efforts include: convening or facilitating dialogue between interest groups; direct outreach to the population (working with other mission actors to design and deliver appropriate and consistent messages); support to the efforts of civil society groups seeking peace and reconciliation; the identification, implementation and monitoring of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs); and promotion or protection of the interests of excluded, threatened, marginalised or minority groups. *Thus, for UN-CIMIC officers, Civil Affairs officers are the main civilian interlocutor for military support to transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.*

- **Support to the restoration and extension of state authority.** Civil Affairs are the lead mission contributor to the restoration and extension of state authority. Civil Affairs components support the development of political space at the local level that will contribute to legitimate and representative governance. This may involve activities such as civic education, political assistance, responding to institution-building and governance support needs in post-conflict situations. Thus, UN-CIMIC officers must ensure that UN-CIMIC support is coordinated and consistent with the activities of UN Civil affairs officers.

Civil Affairs staff frequently head local or regional offices and are therefore the main partner for UN-CIMIC officers at the tactical level. At the operational level, the Head of Civil Affairs is a major civilian partner for the Chief of UN-CIMIC.

UN-CIMIC and Civil Affairs should establish ongoing liaison, as appropriate, and become familiar with their respective mandates and roles in order to identify and exploit opportunities for civil-military synergies.
Substantive components partners

There are also a number of special offices or staff with which UN-CIMIC Officers may find themselves working closely with.

- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security and Defence Sector Reform (SSR/DSR). As with the protection of civilians, DDR and SSR/DSR are not direct UN-CIMIC missions. However, UN-CIMIC – through its civil assistance function – can contribute decisively, particularly with respect to fostering a healthy civil-military relationship in the civil society of that country. Building a healthy, transparent, and trustful relationship between particularly the uniformed instruments of national and public security and the constituent population is often the key to sustainable peace and stability.

- UN Mine Action Service staff and Mine Action Centres also deserve close and robust UN-CIMIC support, mainly because of Mine Action’s large contribution to the protection of civilians, but also because of the need for interagency and multi-component coordination on mine action.

- Another special staff member with which UN-CIMIC should work closely is the Gender Advisor. The focal point for gender issues can support liaison with the mission gender unit and local women’s organizations on UN-CIMIC activities.

- Among many examples, UN-CIMIC can help leverage the diverse number of women in military uniform in the UN Force to help act as role models in encouraging greater roles for women in local national military and police forces as well as help train and mentor female leaders.

- United Nation Human rights Due Diligence Policy. This policy states that “UN cannot support non-UN security forces if there is a risk that these units would commit grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law.”

Photo courtesy of Richard Zabot.
United Nations Country Teams (UNCT) exists in 136 countries, covering all of the 180 countries where there are United Nations programmes. The UNCT encompasses all the entities of the UN system that carry out operational activities for development, emergency, recovery and transition in programme countries (Cf. example of the “ONE UN” initiative launched in 2007 to respond to the challenges of a changing world. Also known as the “Delivering as One” initiative, it required agencies in the UN family to provide development assistance in a more coordinated way: One leader, one budget, one programme, one office).
The UNCT ensures inter-agency coordination and decision-making at the country level. The main purpose of the Country Team is for individual agencies to plan and work together, as part of the Resident Coordinator system, to ensure the delivery of tangible results in support of the development agenda of the Government. The UNCT is led by the UN Resident Coordinator (RC), who is the designated representative of the UN Secretary-General. The RC reports to the UN Secretary-General through the Chair of the UN Development Group.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the lead agency for peacebuilding and development in the UN system – oftentimes, when a mission transitions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it also transitions to a UNDP-led UN presence for many years to follow Peacebuilding.

UNDP heads the implementation programmes, initiatives, and frameworks (e.g., UNDAF) in coordination with other UN agencies and offices, as well as donor development agencies, and under the general provisions of the Millennium Development Goals. Its eight goals make up UNDP’s mandate: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a partnership for development.
One interesting initiative for UN-CIMIC is UNDP’s programme to develop and coordinate civilian capabilities for development and capacity building, also called CIVCAP (https://www.civcap.info/home.html). This applies to internal as well as external actors.

UNHCR is the major UN agency with which UN-CIMIC officers may work, with regards to refugees and other displaced persons. UNHCR’s major activities include direct and indirect assistance, advocacy, protection, asylum and migration, capacity building, durable solutions for displaced persons, emergency response, related environmental issues, fundraising and preparation of the Global Needs Assessment. UNHCR sets the administrative, health, and logistical standards with regard to camp management for refugees and displaced persons.

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the United Nations system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to countries and monitoring and assessing health trends.
Since 1961, WFP has been the food aid arm of the United Nations system. WFP’s main aim is to promote food security, which is defined as access of all people at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. The policies governing the use of WFP food aid must be oriented towards the objective of eradicating hunger and poverty. The ultimate objective of food aid should be the elimination of the need for food aid. Consistent with its mandate, WFP uses food aid to support economic and social development; meets refugee and other emergency food needs, and the associated logistics support; and promotes world food security in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and its Food and Agricultural Organization. WFP activities also include assistance to refugees and other displaced persons in emergency situations; improvement of nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at critical times; and, building assets and promoting the self-reliance of poor people and communities, particularly through labour-intensive works programmes. WFP excels at emergency food aid logistics and complex distribution on a massive scale and the UN often calls upon it as the lead agency in this role.
Created in 1946 from the residual resources from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to secure the fate of Europe’s children, UNICEF focuses on issues, both in emergency response and peacebuilding, on children and youth, who are often disproportionally victimized and affected, in the areas of protection, health, nutrition, and education. One of UNICEF’s most outstanding innovations of later years are its global, 24-hour operations centre in New York, using state-of-the-art technologies for early warning of atrocities and other emergencies, information management, and global coordination and communication. UNICEF is also considered a leader among UN agencies in partnerships with private organizations, including corporate entities.

The World Bank Group, which finances many of the developmental and capacity-building initiatives in-country along thematic or economic sector or country or regional lines, consists of five financial development agencies:

- The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries.
- The International Development Association (IDA) provides interest-free loans—called credits—and grants to governments of the poorest countries.
- The International Finance Corporation (IFC) provides loans, equity and technical assistance to stimulate private sector investment in developing countries.
- The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides guarantees against losses caused by non-commercial risks to investors in developing countries.
- The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides international facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes.

The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) looks at expanding the capacity of the UN system and its partners to implement peacebuilding, humanitarian and development operations. UNOPS offers implementation support services to partners who have political, policy or substantive mandates. UNOPS focus areas are therefore demand-driven; such as census and elections; environment, health, physical infrastructure, etc.

UN Women is the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. Its mission, clearly states in its name, is one of the Millennium Development Goals. It merges and builds on the important work of four previously distinct parts of the UN system, which focused exclusively on gender equality and women’s empowerment: the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW); the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW); the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues.
and Advancement of Women (OSAGI); and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The main roles of UN Women are to support inter-governmental bodies, such as the Commission on the Status of Women, in their formulation of policies, global standards and norms; to help Member States to implement these standards, to provide suitable technical and financial support to those countries that request it, and to forge effective partnerships with civil society; and, to hold the UN system accountable for its own commitments on gender equality.

The mandate of the Food and Agricultural Administration (FAO) is to raise levels of nutrition, improve agricultural productivity, better the lives of rural populations and contribute to the growth of the world economy. Current focus areas include: early warning of food crises; detection and prevention of trans-boundary threats to food production, health and the environment; sustainable forest management; control of biosecurity risks to fisheries and aquaculture establishing global entities to cope with land and water scarcity; boosting national capacity for generating and analysing agricultural statistics, etc.

The World Bank defines a non-governmental organization (NGO) as "private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development". An international non-governmental organization (INGO) has the same mission as a non-governmental organization (NGO), but it is international in scope and has outposts around the world to deal with specific issues in many countries.

The difference between NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) is that:

- NGOs are autonomous, voluntary and non-profit based, and not associated with national or local governments. They are largely international, but local or indigenous NGOs will proliferate in increasing numbers as the mission and situation matures. They also tend to evolve from largely humanitarian NGOs to recovery, civil society, or development related organizations as time goes on.

- CSOs are non-state organizations composed of participants with shared interests, values and purposes, such as ethnic, cultural, political, or religious beliefs. CSOs may include non-governmental organisations, faith groups, think tanks etc. These
tend to be largely locally based, but may be associated with regional or international counterparts, who may provide funding and other capacity support.

- Both terms, NGO and INGO, should be differentiated from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), which describes groups such as the United Nations or the International Labour Organization. An INGO may be founded by private philanthropy, or as an adjunct to existing international organizations. INGOs could oftentimes sub-contract service to local NGOs.

These are examples displayed on this slide of International and national NGOs, with widely different capacities. Instructor can ask participants to list some other INGOs.

### National Partners

- **Host Nation Government**
  - Central Government Ministries
  - Provincial and Local Level Government

- **Security Sector**
  - Military and Paramilitary
  - Police

- **Community Leaders**

- **Local NGOs and Civil Society Organizations**

Internal actors are comprised of the government – at both the operational and tactical levels, the parties to the conflict, the security sector – military, paramilitary, and police, tribal leaders, and indigenous or local NGOs and civil society organizations in all their varieties. In principle, the host government and other internal actors should play the lead role in the reconstruction process to ensure national and local ownership of their own future. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that they are unable to fulfil this role in the early stages of peacebuilding operations. As a result, the international aid community, by default, often plays more of a leading role than would otherwise be desired. The critical role of UN-CIMIC, of course, is to help transform the conflict and transition this situation. The best way for UN-CIMIC to engage internal actors is indirectly – by, with, and through external partners who have more established relationships and greater depth of knowledge and understanding of the cultural and political nuances of the situation. It also enables the external actors (or “international community”) to speak more with one voice with these actors.

Pictures from the ITS-CPTM.
Dealing with National partners

Host government is most important non-UN actor with whom a PKO collaborates – has most at stake.

UN-CIMIC officers should keep contact, preferably via Civil Affairs, with:
- Other community and faction leaders
- Religious leaders, women and student associations, academics, professional organizations, and other parts of national civil society

Potential partnerships must consider impartiality, representation, inclusiveness & gender issues.

Regional and International Partners

The UN recognizes regional organizations as key stakeholders in international relations. Some of these regional organizations have been granted observer status at the UN General Assembly and have a permanent representation in New York. This is notably the case for:

- The African Union
- The Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
- The Central American Integration System (SICA)
- The Commonwealth
- The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)
- The European Union (EU)
- The International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF)
- The League of Arab States
- The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
Several other regional organizations, even if they don’t have a permanent representation in New York, benefit from observer status and actively participate in the UN’s diplomatic activities.

- The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
- The Andean Community
- The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
- The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
- The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
- The Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries
- The Community of Sahel-Saharan States
- The Council of Europe
- The East African Community
- The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- The Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB).
- The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)
- The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
- The Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA)
- The Latin American Integration Association (ALADI)
- The Latin American Parliament
- The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
- The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- The Organization of American States (OAS)
- The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
- The Pacific Island Forum
- The Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM)
- The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
- The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
- The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Some organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization do not have observer status but are critical UN partners. In the 1990s, we saw the enhanced role of NATO and the Organization of Security and Cooperation, as regional and other security arrangements in the UN missions in the Balkans. NATO, in fact, was the force provider for the UN Mission in Kosovo, while the OSCE formed the third pillar (institution building) of UNMIK and the European Union the fourth (economic reconstruction).

Regional and sub-regional organizations and peacekeeping: Chapter VIII of the UN Charter relating to regional agreements makes provision for the existence of regional entities whose role in the peaceful settlement of conflicts is recognized by the UN. The Charter enshrines the Security Council’s prerogative to authorize the use of force, except in self-defence. This authorization may however stipulate that the mandate be executed by a regional or sub-regional organization.

Modelled very much on the UN, including a Peace and Security Council and an Assembly, the African Union is looking to build its multilateral security presence, capabilities, and operations – as exampled by the UN-backed deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Cooperation with the UN is even better exemplified in the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur – UNAMID. AMISOM and UNAMID may be model for future operations for the UN in Africa. So much, in fact that the UN has established the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. For more on the African Union, go to: http://www.au.int/

Instructor could ask participants to list some other Sub-regional organizations.
Foreign governments sponsored actors

External actors and partners also include similar actors from foreign countries under the sponsorship of the embassy of a foreign country, sometimes referred to as “bilateral” actors (the UN being a multilateral actor). Although the peacekeeping mission may be involved in, for example, security sector reform (SSR), it is common for the actual training, transformation or establishment of new police and/or defence force to be supported by one or more bilateral partners. The SSR role of the U.K. in Sierra Leone or the defence sector reform efforts of the U.S in support of internationally-mandated SSR in Liberia are examples. Then there is the plethora of non-governmental or private sector actors and organizations, such as international organizations, international NGOs and civil society organizations, and corporations.

Those agencies are displayed as some examples:

- AFD (Agence française de développement) in HAITI is supporting Community support projects.
- JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) has been awarded by the UN for its Long-time contribution as a pioneer and promoter of South-South Cooperation.
- USAID was the largest provider of foreign aid to Sudan, largely focused on humanitarian aid.
- Etc.

Instructor can ask participants to list some other international cooperation agencies.
The name Red Cross generally refers to three entities: the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (National Societies).

- The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles.

- The Federation is one of three components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the other two being National Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross – the ICRC.

- National Societies embody the work and principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 186 countries. They act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief, health and social programmes. They also promote awareness of humanitarian values, speak and act on behalf of the most vulnerable in their country and assist the affected civilian population and support the army medical services where appropriate.

Summary

Remember the partners UN-CIMIC officers will have to work with: UN, components partners UNCT/HCT National Partners Regional and international partners

Act with them as if they were your partners...even if they are reluctant!

UN-CIMIC should always approach key partners with the idea of “what can I do to help enable my partners to perform their tasks rather than have the military fill those gaps?”
UNIT 2: MISSION COORDINATION

LEARNING OUTCOMES

✓ Describe the mechanisms of Coordination that underline the Peacekeeping Mission preparation and implementation
✓ Understand how the UN-CIMIC activities are integrated in a common strategy and aim at contributing to the implementation of the Mission mandate.
✓ Identify the different management and coordination structures in the development and humanitarian fields.

STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENTATION

THE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING
UN MISSION COORDINATION STRUCTURES
  ➜ Humanitarian Coordination Structures
  ➜ Steering Committees and Working Groups
  ➜ Joint Coordination Structures

This Unit aims at presenting the different Partners that UN-CIMIC officers could be call upon to work with. It displays a little bit of the interaction, given that more detailed information will be given in the following Units and Modules.

Integrated Assessment And Planning (IAP)

Integrated Assessment and Planning processes = Collective strategy to tackle crisis and consolidate peace

IAP has replace the former Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)

Integrated assessment and planning processes are intended to maximize the individual and collective impact of the context-specific peace consolidation activities of the UN system. While there are important systemic constraints to integration within the UN, it is crucial that, at a minimum, the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities of the organization share a common analysis and agree on a set of common strategic objectives for peace consolidation as a starting point for planning and implementing their responses in conflict and post-conflict settings.

IAP is essential to:
  o improve the quality of the situational analysis,
  o design interventions that are tailored to the requirements of each situation,
o support the effective management of integrated presences in line with mandates and the strategic vision of senior UN leadership,
o avoid gaps and overlaps between different UN activities,
o identify opportunities for closer cooperation across different parts of the UN,
o make the UN a more coherent and consistent partner with host governments and other national, regional and international partners.

Integrated assessment and planning processes should take into account relevant UN policies, including on human rights, gender and child protection.

A UN country-wide, Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) brings together the combined mandates of the UN Field Mission and the UN Country Team as well as their resources around an overarching framework of an agreed peace consolidation priorities. The ISF is a strategic plan for the UN Field Mission and UN agencies, funds and programs operating in the host country. It provides a vision of the UN strategic objectives for peace consolidation, with agreed results, responsibilities and timelines, and a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation. It is usually a multi-year plan. It is required in a country where there is both a UN Country Team and either a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or a special political mission. The UN ISF is linked to national strategies and plans, as well as other relevant UN plans such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP).

On the basis of an ISF, the Mission Concept is developed for the UN Field Mission. The Mission Concept translates the political intent of the Security Council and other mandates into strategic planning guidance for Mission components. The Mission Concept contains:
- Vision to capture and communicate the purpose of the mission;
- Strategy to promote coherence by sequencing and prioritization of tasks within the context of the conditions governing their achievement;
- Timely and detailed direction to guide and enable the planning and operational processes of each Mission component. It is a multi-year plan that covers the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission.

IMTF is essentially for early planning purposes. It is the coordination mechanism for DPKO-led Integrated Missions. ITF leads the Strategic Assessment, to determine whether or not an integrated Mission is required. It is HQ body for coordinating guidance and support.
This slide represents an idealized representation of the hierarchy of plans within a UN Field Mission. Note that not all UN Field Missions will have the full array of plans, particularly at mission start-up.

On the basis of the Mission Concept, the Concept of Operation (CONOPS) articulates strategic intent for the utilization of military capabilities to achieve an overall objective. The objective of a component CONOPS is to link the mission mandate to the execution of key objectives such as, strategic intent, organization and deployment (including timelines, security/force protection, terms of engagement/directions on the use of force, administration and logistics, and command and control. The CONOPS should be consistent with the overall Mission Concept, and drive the formulation of lower level, operational component-level plans. Note that sometimes, a “Campaign plan” could be attached.

On the basis of the Military CONOPS, it is a good practice for UN-CIMIC office (J9) to design an Action plan, including specific planning, such as quick-impact projects (QIPS), operational plans, specific events, and projects on specific issues.
UN Mission Coordination Structures

Note that in a country that is prone to hazards but without a UN Mission, the most senior UN official is the Resident Coordinator (RC) who usually is the UNDP Resident Representative (Res Rep). This RC can be designated, through the Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) which serves as the secretariat of the UN RC system, as Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Designated Official (DO).

Humanitarian Country Team

Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is comprised of the heads of UN humanitarian agencies, international humanitarian organizations, international NGOs and donor representatives, etc. (OCHA definition). That means that the HCT is the UNCT plus international and local NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and international financial institutions (IFIs). The HCT is the coordinating body that deals with emergency and/or humanitarian issues including response preparedness and humanitarian response operations.
The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) is the centerpiece of the new humanitarian coordination architecture established by Humanitarian Reform. Its objective is to ensure that the activities of such organizations are coordinated, and that humanitarian action in-country is principled, timely, effective and efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery.

An HCT is established in all countries with an HC position. In countries where there is no HC position, an HCT is established when a humanitarian crisis erupts or a situation of chronic vulnerability sharply deteriorates.

Do not forget that the overall purpose is to alleviate human suffering and protect the lives, livelihoods and dignity of populations in need.

The triple-hatted official DSRSG has different reporting lines depending on the function:
- As DSRSG, he/she reports directly to the SRSG;
- As RC, he/she reports directly to the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO);
- As HC, he/she reports directly to the ERC.

The Clusters

Operational coordination is done through the clusters. Here are the 11 cluster leads at the global level – note that in some clusters the Red Cross (IFRC), IOM and Save the Children are conveyor (IFRC) and co-leads.


The cluster approach is the mechanism used by international humanitarian actors since 2006 for responding to large-scale complex and natural humanitarian emergencies requiring a multi-sectorial response. It involves sectorial groupings – called ‘clusters’ – of international and national agencies/ NGOs coordinated by designated Cluster Lead Agencies (CLAs), to support and/or complement wherever possible the efforts of national authorities in key sectors of preparedness and response. The objectives are to strengthen overall response capacity and its effectiveness, to ensure effective coordination of
humanitarian and early recovery assistance, especially among international assistance organizations with and in support of national entities, and to enhance predictability, accountability and partnerships in international response.

Structure in a Complex Emergency

The triple-hatted official DSRSG reports have different reporting lines depending on the function:

- as DSRSG, this official reports directly to the SRS;
- as RC, this official reports directly to the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO);
- as HC, this official reports directly to the ERC.
Example of a functional structure

As the UN’s focal point for Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), OCHA may, in-country, establish a UN-CMCoord centre based on the coordination needs on the ground, the objective of which is to provide a coordination platform where information sharing, task division, and joint planning (if appropriate) can take place. This platform should complement existing coordination mechanisms such as the clusters and others.

In large integrated missions, the Mission Leadership Team is normally supported by the following structures that are called “joint” (meaning multi-component), which are designed to facilitate integration between the mission’s components:

- An integrated joint operations centre (JOC) to coordinate daily mission activities, including military, political, civil affairs, human rights, public information and other mission components. The JOC may even be used for coordination with elements external to the mission, such as other entities of the UN system.
• The mission should establish a structure and staff process that optimises civil and military information management and analytical processes through the mechanism of a joint mission analysis cell (JMAC). The JMAC is responsible for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and reports) of the mission’s civil and military information in order to support the SRSG’s and force commander’s decision-making process.

• A Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) to coordinate the provision of logistical support, in accordance with MLT priorities. The JLOC is able to reach into and coordinate requests and tasks, on behalf of the DMS, for mission-controlled capabilities that fall under the direction of an Integrated Support Service (ISS) that harnesses all logistical resources of the mission. The JLOC is what usually determines the availability and feasibility of support to non-mission entities using mission logistical assets.

• An integrated support services section under the authority of the mission’s chief administrative officer/chief technical services, which includes civilian and military logisticians.

For more information, instructors can consult the Handbook on “United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations” - Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Department of Peacekeeping Operations (December 2003)

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Great advances have been made in integrated mission development, and some regulars meeting are planned. However most coordination is still done informally and ad hoc. As with anything else in the area of “coordination,” UN-CIMIC officers should refrain from calling duplicative or redundant meetings unless there is an identified coordination gap that a consensus of parties have identified and which is best initiated or chaired by UN-CIMIC. For example, in earlier stages or during times of greater danger, UN-CIMIC may host coordination meetings to share security information, although a Humanitarian Agencies Security Meeting organized by a UN CMCoord Officer may assume this role.

Quick Impact Project Steering Committee will be developed in Module 3
Working groups such as Youth and Gender, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Gender, Rule-of-Law, DDR/SSR, are frequently set up with the full participation of UN-CIMIC officers.

IAP-related Working Groups, such as UNDAF – e.g., UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which describes the collective response of the UNCT to the national priorities) could be of interest for UN-CIMIC officers.

Example of UN-CIMIC in MINUSTAH

Summary

“Mission coordination” is the priority effort of support in UN-CIMIC

Relationship between Management and coordination Coordination

By now, participants should understand what is meant by “coordination” in the UN context, as well as that UN-CIMIC is a civil-military coordinating tool that, above all, supports the large objective of “mission coordination”. They should also understand, although there is a distinction between management and coordination, UN-CIMIC nonetheless has important implications for coordination management. They are separate, but related.
UNIT 3: HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION (UN-CMCOORD)

Learning outcomes

At the end of this Unit, participants should be able to:

- Identify the cultural and operational differences between civilian and military and recognize the need for coordination.
- Explain the UN-CMCoord function and how it relates to the UN-CIMIC function
- Explain the concept of humanitarian space and describe the humanitarian principles that guide humanitarian action
- Understand how UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC complement each other on the ground

This presentation explains why and how UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC work together.

Structure of the presentation

- NEED FOR COORDINATION
- HUMANITARIAN SPACE AND PRINCIPLES
- UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION SYSTEM
- UN CMCOORD DIALOGUE

Need for Coordination

Two parallel concepts for civil-military coordination in the UN System: UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC

⇒ UN-CMCoord is the OCHA (civilian) concept for humanitarian civil-military coordination
⇒ UN-CIMIC is the DPKO/DFS (military) concept for full-spectrum civil-military coordination

== Complementary ==
⇒ UN-CIMIC personnel must understand UN-CMCoord in order to perform UN-CMCoord function

Culture and the lack or absence of understanding of both is the most common challenge in facilitating the interface between humanitarian and military actors.

Within the United Nations system there are two recognized, parallel concepts for civil-military coordination. These are UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC. The humanitarian concept is UN Civil-Military Coordination, or UN-CMCoord, which refers to the humanitarian civil-military coordination function providing the necessary interface between humanitarian and military actors to protect and promote the humanitarian principles and achieve the humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies and natural disaster situations. Those approaches are complementary as they are compliant with the Principles and Guidelines as well as “Oslo Guidelines”. “While they do not go hand-in-glove, they go hand-in-hand”; for this reason, personnel undergoing training in UN-CIMIC must become familiar with UN-CMCoord in order to perform their functions.
This scheme, first seen in Module 1, could help participants to quickly visualize the place of UN-CMCoord.

### Humanitarian Space and Principles

A Humanitarian space is the first thing that humanitarians expect from military forces. Humanitarian space is a safe and secure environment (SASE), the aim is there to gain access and provide assistance. This space is not a “spatial term”. It is an enabling environment whereby humanitarian workers can safely and securely provide urgently needed services and beneficiaries receive these services in a safe and secure manner, protected from being subjected to harassment, plunder, looting and other forms of abuse. UN-CMCoord is essential in preserving humanitarian space, since humanitarian space can only be achieved and sustained through the acceptance by all parties.
These are the humanitarian principles guiding the UN-CMCoord function which makes it distinct and different from other civil-military concepts. These principles have been endorsed in international law, both in the Geneva Conventions (the law of armed conflict) as well as in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, which posits that humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality (originally adopted by the Red Cross in 1965).

- **Humanity**: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

- **Impartiality**: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

- **Neutrality**: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in political, religious or ideological controversies.

- **Independence**: Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

In addition to these four humanitarian principles, endorsed in General Assembly Resolution 46/182, which was passed in 1991 the United Nations, seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full respect for the sovereignty of states:

- "The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country."

- At the same time, military commanders must remain aware that the military provision of humanitarian assistance is not entirely optional. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 imposes strong legal obligations upon states and their military forces to provide and allow for the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians during periods of armed conflict.

UN Photo/Joao Araujo Pinto, extracted from OCHA website (www.unocha.org)
**Humanitarian Coordination System**

In pursuit of its mission, OCHA has five core functions that are inter-related and complementary. One of those five core functions is precisely dedicated to the Coordination of the Humanitarian response.

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**OCHA**

*OCHA’s mission*

- Mobilize and coordinate effective and humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order.
- Advocate the rights of people in need.
- Promote preparedness and prevention.
- Facilitate sustainable solutions.

**OCHA’s core functions**

I. Policy Development

II. Humanitarian Advocacy

III. Coordination of Humanitarian Response

IV. Information Management

V. Humanitarian Financing

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*OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.*
“Humanitarian military relations” is for OCHA one of the numerous “Coordination tools” used to bring together numerous humanitarian actors and to ensure effective coordination between them.

The display of this slide is aimed at convincing participants that OCHA Processes and tools are part of operational coordination in crisis situations. This encompassed needs assessment till funding mobilisation.

The CHAP outlines humanitarian action in a given country or region. It provides an analysis of the context in which humanitarian action takes place (needs, priorities, roles and responsibilities, long-term objectives and goals, etc.). The CHAP is the foundation for developing a Consolidated Appeal.

Consolidated Appeals present a snapshot of situations, response plans, resource requirements, and monitoring arrangements. If the situation or people's needs change, any part of an appeal can be revised at any time. Whenever crises break or natural
disasters occur, humanitarian partners develop a Flash Appeal to address people’s most urgent needs. Mid-Year Reviews are presented to donors in July of each year.

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) represents an important international multilateral funding instrument. It saves lives by providing rapid initial funding for life-saving assistance at the onset of humanitarian crises, and critical support for poorly funded, essential humanitarian response operations. Each year, CERF allocates approximately US$400 million to promote early and coordinated action and response to save lives, to enhance response to time-crucial requirements based on demonstrable needs, and to strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in under-funded crises.

The Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) is a tool to provide flexible and predictable financing to promote greater effectiveness, accountability and partnership in humanitarian action. The CHF is part of the pooled funding element of the humanitarian reform process and managed by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, with support from OCHA and UNDP.

For more information: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org

Integration of RC/HC and OCHA with Mission depends on:
- Perception (parties to conflict, beneficiaries, local populations) of UN in general, mission, humanitarian actors.
- Importance of Non-UN humanitarian actors (if they don’t perceive mission as neutral and OCHA is inside, they may distance themselves).
- Relationship with national authorities.

Three options related to OCHA Field presence:
- **Two feet out** – new missions in exceptionally unstable situations, where mission not accepted or not seen as neutral or impartial. RC/HC plus OCHA are outside mission (UNAMID, UNPOS)
- **One foot in, one foot out** – as stability improves, opportunities for better integration, though OCHA may remain outside (This is OCHA’s default – MONUC, UNOCI)
Two feet in – stable post-conflict settings means combined DSRSG/RC(/HC) with OCHA either embedded in ODSRSG (Timor-Leste 2008) or out altogether (Timor-Leste 2010)

Usually, OCHA has two options in the integrated mission concept, one foot in/one foot out, and two feet out. In both options, OCHA stays outside the mission. What would be the reason behind this? OCHA needs to be dissociated with the political side of the UN Mission to maintain its necessary neutrality and impartiality for accomplishing its mission.

**UN-CMCoord Dialogue**

**UN-CMCoord: Definition**

“The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals.”

- Key elements are information sharing, task division and planning
- Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training
- Basic strategies range from co-existence to cooperation.

Key elements are:

- Sharing of information between military and civilians: How the information is shared and what can be shared depends on the specific context of the situation.
- Task division between military and humanitarians: Who does better what?
- Joint planning between the different actors is encouraged whenever it is possible.

Coordination between humanitarians is a shared responsibility; UN-CMCoord depends on the initiative and continuous efforts from both sides. Liaison and common training facilitates coordination and mutual understanding.

The main difference between the two concepts is that UN-CIMIC is a military staff function in support of the overall UN Mission objectives and the Mission while the UN-CMCoord is purely a civilian function performed for and on behalf of the humanitarian community.
The UN-CMCoord function supports the humanitarian community and its coordination interface with military forces and other relevant actors. The primary tasks are carried out to support the objective of minimizing competition and avoiding conflict.

UN-CMCoord is administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); specifically, the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS), whose functions are, inter alia, to act as the focal point for humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) policy, training, operations, to deploy UN-CMCoord officers for short-term field operations and to mobilize foreign military and civilian defence assets (MCDA) in emergencies.

OCHA deploys UN-CMCoord officers who are responsible for humanitarian-military coordination on behalf of the humanitarian community in a given crisis. UN-CMCoord officers are the main coordinating partner for UN-CIMIC officers for humanitarian-military coordination. While their primary role is to advise the leadership of the humanitarian
community on UN-CMCoord, and facilitate the establishment, maintenance, and review of appropriate relations between the humanitarian community, they may also serve as liaison between the humanitarian community and the military forces, facilitating the interface between the humanitarian and military communities as a cross-cutting service for the Cluster System and the broader humanitarian community.

UN-CMCoord officers can normally be found in the humanitarian staff structure in the local OCHA office, from where they support the work of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC). (Cf. previous slides “OCHA field presence”).

Complementary to UN-CIMIC officers, these civilian officers may be budgeted as part of the integrated mission budget, but placed in the humanitarian staff structure under the DSRSG Resident- or Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) in UN integrated missions. Like UN-CIMIC officers, they are advisors and facilitators; however, they may not have the same responsibilities or authorities as their military counterparts, who work primarily under a command and control structure (versus) coordination environment. They advise the leadership of the humanitarian community on civil-military issues and facilitate the establishment, maintenance, and review of appropriate relations between the humanitarian and military forces present. This includes issues relating to the possible use of MCDA in support of humanitarian operations.

For further information regarding UN-CMCoord officers, below are displayed some examples of terms of reference or functions of Humanitarian Affairs Officers. In any given situation, a UN-CIMIC officer can expect his UN-CMCoord counterpart to operate based on these terms of reference, as defined in the UN-CMCoord Field Officer Handbook. The Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) may prioritize these differently, depending on the mandate and situation. These terms of reference or functions are further explained in the succeeding paragraphs.

- Serve as an adviser to the HC/RC for humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) matters; advise on overall policy direction on specific issues; and, more generally, review and provide advice on a diverse range of policy issues related to UN-CMCoord and the safeguarding of humanitarian principles.
- Serve as primary focal point for all matters, including policy, related to civil-military coordination, in close consultation with the HC/RC.
- Ensure that the country-specific guidelines and, if necessary, the generic guidelines mentioned above are properly disseminated and understood by both the humanitarian actors and the military forces present, as well as by local actors, as appropriate. Promote and ensure adherence to the above Guidelines within the entire humanitarian community and advise on potential consequences if these principles are compromised.
- Establish and maintain dialogue and coordination with the military forces in the area of responsibility. Identify, establish and maintain contact with the appropriate military counterparts and ensure mutual exchange of information about ongoing humanitarian assistance issues. Advise the military forces in the area of responsibility on international humanitarian coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms may include the UN Country Team, UN Security or Disaster Management Teams, UN Joint Logistics Centre, Humanitarian Information Centre, Humanitarian Clusters, etc.
- In parallel, establish and maintain contact with civilian humanitarian actors in the area of responsibility and serve as an information channel and advocate for their issues with relevant military systems.
Work in close cooperation with UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) in Geneva to support the UN-CMCoord training programme as appropriate. Identify and coordinate with OCHA/CMCS regarding potential candidates for inclusion in the UN-CMCoord Training Programme.

In coordination with UN OCHA/CMCS, establish and maintain contact with actors involved in military exercises in area of operation and advice on which events should be monitored and/or supported. Support planning for and execution of exercises, lessons learned workshops, seminars, and training events with military participation, as appropriate.

Monitor, analyse and report on any major accomplishments and progress as well as identify any difficulties in relations between the humanitarian and military communities.

Participate in working groups, meetings and consultations with other UN agencies and humanitarian partners; organize meetings with Heads of Agencies on UN-CMCoord matters.

Support logistics and operations personnel in the area of responsibility on all issues connected to civil-military relations.

Establish, if appropriate, an information exchange forum for stakeholders and interested parties in civil-military relations and participate in relevant meetings.

Prepare or provide input to requests for MCDA assets.

Provide situation reports on ongoing civil-military activities and the overall civil-military relations situation in the country in question in agreed formats and timeframes. Upon concurrence with the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, these reports should be disseminated to the UNCT, UN OCHA Office in [country], UN OCHA/CMCS, relevant CRD Desks, and PDSB/PHA. Reports may also be disseminated to other agencies if relevant and appropriate.

Perform any other duties as may be requested by the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator.

Below are some modi operandi (“rules of engagement”) between UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC Officers.

UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC officers have a complementary relationship. It also allows for a great deal of flexibility between the civilian and military components regardless of the level of integration. In order to work well together, UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC Officers should be familiar with the mission, terms of reference, and ways of working – as well as the interests, capabilities and limitations they each represent.

As explained in the UN-CIMIC policy, where appropriate, feasible and agreeable by both the humanitarian and military actors, UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC officers may be physically co-located as part of a mission “joint staff” approach in order to enhance mission
coordination and its interface with the humanitarian community. However, it may be often deemed not appropriate or not possible (e.g. as a result of concerns in the humanitarian community on neutrality and independence of humanitarian action). One or more UN-CIMIC liaison officers may also be located in the DSRSG RC/HC office (this could be a possible option in cases where no UN-CMCoord officers are deployed). Co-location options either in the office of the DSRSG RC/HC, Force Command, and joint staff depends on the needs and mission sensitivities, and do not change respective reporting channels.

Current examples of co-location are UNMISS composite support base and MINUSTAH co-location in the aftermath of the earthquake proved that co-location is more often neither agreeable (difficulties of cohabitation) nor suitable (problem for NGOs representatives to enter the compound, lack of minimum privacy).

Regardless of whether UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC officers are physically collocated or not, UN-CIMIC officers, in integrated and non-integrated missions, should actively seek out and establish a close working relationship with their UN-CMCoord counterparts – cooperation at best; coordination at least.

Trainer(s) should invite discussion, ideally if there are both UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC representatives in the same room. Here are some other concrete advice that should benefit UN-CIMIC officer in their daily interaction with UN-CMCoord Officers:

- By and large, it is reasonable for UN-CIMIC to follow the lead/example of their UN-CMCoord counterparts – be the supporting partner – when coordinating military support to humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, with respect to all other aspects UN civil-military coordination – in particular, transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding – both officers should look at working as equal partners.
- Communications, as a minimum, should be a co-education process in making sure the other partner is well advised on other component’s mission, capabilities, and limitations – again, with the intent of doing no harm, avoiding false assumptions, and averting misunderstandings.
- Work together to manage expectations – each other’s, your respective chains of command and authority, and especially other partners and benefactors.
- Transparency is the key to building trust and a good working relationship, and currency of that exchange is information.

Summary

- UN-CMCoord - UN-CIMIC relationship is complementary. UN-CIMIC Officers and Humanitarian affairs officers are partners.
- UN-CIMIC function cannot be carried out well without coordination with UN-CMCoord officers.
- Knowing and understanding the Humanitarian principles and system, as well as establishing a modus operandi with UN-CMCoord officers allows ensuring a better coordination.
UNIT 1: UN-CIMIC OFFICERS’ ROLE AS STAFF OFFICERS

Learning outcomes

On completion of this Unit, participants will be able to:

✓ Globally understand the role of UN-CIMIC officers at the FHQ/SHQ
✓ Understand the different phases of the operational planning process and the tasks that may be assigned to UN-CIMIC Officers
✓ Identify various operational documents and the inputs that may come from UN-CIMIC Officers
✓ Describe the different operational briefings and the contribution that could be made by UN-CIMIC Officers
✓ Explain the UN-CIMIC SOPs

Structure of the presentation

- PLANNING PROCESS
- OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS
- OPERATIONAL BRIEFINGS
- UN-CIMIC STANDARDS OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPs)
- LEARNING ACTIVITY: DRAFTING UN-CIMIC PLANS

Planning Process

Hierarchy of plans in UN Field Missions

- SC/GA MANDATE
- UN country-wide ISF
- MSN CONCEPT
- MILITARY COMPONENT CONOPS
- OPLAN/OPORDER
- UN-CIMIC ACTION PLAN

This slide, as a refresher from Module 2 Unit 3, represents an idealized representation of the hierarchy of plans within a UN Field Mission. Note that not all UN Field Missions will have the full array of plans, particularly in the start-up phase.
A UN country-wide, Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) brings together the combined mandates of the UN Field Mission and the UN Country Team as well as their resources around an overarching framework of agreed peace consolidation priorities.

On the basis of an ISF, the **Mission Concept** is developed for the UN Field Mission. The Mission Concept translates the political intent of the Security Council and other mandates into strategic planning guidance for Mission components. The Mission Concept contains a vision to capture and communicate the purpose of the mission; a strategy to promote coherence by sequencing and prioritization of tasks within the context of the conditions governing their achievement; and timely and detailed direction to guide and enable the planning and operational processes of each Mission component. It is a multi-year plan that covers the lifecycle of the UN Field Mission.

On the basis of the Mission Concept, the **Concept of Operation (CONOPS)** articulates strategic intent for the utilization of military capabilities to achieve an overall objective. The objective of a component CONOPS is to link the mission mandate to the execution of key objectives such as, strategic intent, organization and deployment (including timelines, security/force protection, rules of engagement/directives on the use of force, administration and logistics, and command and control. The CONOPS should be consistent with the overall Mission Concept, and drive the formulation of lower level, operational component-level plans.

On the basis of the Military CONOPS, it is a good practice for UN-CIMIC office to design an **Action plan**, including specific planning, such as quick-impact projects (QIPS), CIMIC operational plans, specific events, and projects on specific issues.

This slide depicts the various steps in the Military Component Planning Process (MCPP) and the steps in which the inputs of the UN-CIMIC Officer (U9) is required. Participants/students are to be referred to Module 6 of the UNDPKO Specialised Training Material Military Staff Officers for more details.

On receipt of the Msn by the FC from UNDPKO Mission Concept, the Military Component starts with the MCPP as explained in the two previous slides. The AOE is adjacent placed on the side of all the steps, because at any point in time in the MCPP or CONOPS
development and planning process, Staff Officers will continue with the AOE. This aspect of the process is very fluid and changes without any notice/warning.

UN-CIMIC officers should be involved in the operational coordination and planning to support humanitarian and development plans. This ranges from Humanitarian and development strategies from common assessment leading to Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CAP), Common Country Assessment (CCA), UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) or a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). UN-CIMIC must follow the frameworks, standards, and benchmarks agreed to by the host government, the UN mission and the UNCT. Do not forget that the Chief of UN-CIMIC represents the HOMC to key mission civilian staff under the SRSG/DSRSG structure for the planning and coordination.
On the basis of the Mission concept, the CONOPS articulates Strategic intents for the utilization of military capabilities to achieve an overall objective; to link the Mission mandate to the execution of key objectives, such as strategic intent, organisation and deployment.
The CIMIC Initial Estimate provides basically an assessment and some recommendations concerning the Civil Military situation.

It is primarily the product developed by the CIMIC Staff Section during the first stage of the Planning Process, result of CIMIC information gathering and basis for issuing CIMIC guidance and making recommendations.

It could also be used for all subsequent stages of the continuous Planning Process by the U9 chief to:
- Propose some recommendations when there are substantial changes that could affect personnel, funds, time, process and conduct of operation;
- Carry out any kind of assessment which can impact the CIMIC activities; the CIMIC Estimate could be also attached to the CIMIC assessment/report, or could constitute the CIMIC contribution to J3 Assessment.
Military Daily and Weekly Situation Report (SITREP): Military specific report, provided on a daily and weekly basis, to the UN Military Adviser, particularly in field missions that involve significant or critical military operations or activities. For field missions that involve less significant or critical military operations or activities, it is sufficient to include a military specific report within the mission level daily or weekly SITREP that is submitted to the DPKO/DFS Situation Centre (SITCEN) in UN Headquarters. SITREPs should never include names of sources or victims of human rights violations.

Special Incident Report (SINCREP): (also called “Flash Report”) is used to provide short and operationally focused information in case of a crisis or rapidly deteriorating situation. Flash Reports are required in all cases of casualties among UN personnel (including serious accidents), hostile action targeting UN personnel, and incidents significant enough to affect the mission’s ability to implement its mandate.

Military Monthly and Annual Reporting: Technical military report provided regularly to the UN Mil. Adviser, including statistical data concerning Mil. Component and its operations.

Specific Reports: POC incidents, Status of IDPs, Status of repatriation and resettlement, Status of humanitarian situation, Humanitarian aid assistance (assistance requested, given and needed), IO/GO/NGO activities (projects, overview and assessment, security issues).

### Operational Briefings

During the Msn Analysis Brief, all Staff Officers will brief the Commander on their respective areas specific to the Mission including the U9 brief on UN-CIMIC estimate.
Staff Conference Briefing could be also called “commander’s daily update brief”. The aim is to inform staff personnel, to coordinate the workflow and update planning process.

### UN-CIMIC Standards Operating Procedures (SOPS)

Even though, the organization of SOP should be as above, the option of Volumes/Parts or Sections can be exercised by the headquarters. For example, large forces may require a separate Operations Volume with subsidiary parts and sections.
**Learning Activity: Drafting UN-CIMIC Plans**

### Module 3: Fundamental Tasks — Unit 1: UN-CIMIC Officers’ Tasks as Staff Officers

#### LEARNING ACTIVITY: CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF COMPLETE PROCESS

**Drafting of UN-CIMIC Mission for UNMISS**

- **Time Required:** 50'
- **Activity Introduction and Instructions:**
  - Given the UNMISS documents package including:
    - UNMISS task from the UNSCR
    - DPKO Intent
    - Force Mission statement
    - Force Commander Intent
  - Participants are asked to draft:
    - the UN-CIMIC Chief’s intent (UN-CIMIC mission statement)
    - UN-CIMIC areas/lines of effort
    - A display of foreseen UN-CIMIC activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syndicate discussion and drafting</td>
<td>25'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation in plenary</td>
<td>15'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### UNMISS Tasks From initial SC/Res/1996

- Support for peace consolidation and thereby fostering long-term state-building and economic development
- Support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians
- Support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors

#### DPKO Intent

The military strategic intent is to assist the Republic of South Sudan to maintain a stable and secure environment in order to prevent a return to civil war and avoid insurrection, limit and prevent the impact of direct attack against civilians, and support capacity building in South Sudan.
LEARNING ACTIVITY: CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF COMPLETE PROCESS

**Force Mission**

The UNMISS military component, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN is to support and assist the creation of a safe and secure environment that will facilitate the implementation of the UNMISS Mandate in order to create conditions for the stabilization of South Sudan and eventual drawdown of the Mission.

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**Force Commander’s Intent**

To conduct integrated operations between all military components and substantive sections that achieve UNMISS mandated tasks, particularly the protection of civilians, and enhancing the UN relationship with the RoSS/SPLA and the civil population. This is to be conducted while maintaining UN Force Protection levels and effectively transitioning the Force to a new structure, mandate, and deployed locations.
UN-CIMIC Chief’s intent

Coordinate military component operations, activities and actions with other mission components, United Nations agencies, civilian organizations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations; engage the Government of South Sudan and Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) on civil-military issues; coordinate the use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) for civil support operations and humanitarian assistance.

UN-CIMIC Axes/Lines of Effort

- Capacity Building
  - SPLA Engagement
  - Military Liaison Officer Training
  - TCC Unit CIMIC Indoctrination
- Community Engagement
  - Quick Impact Projects (QIP)
  - TCC Unit civil assistance activities
  - Key leader engagements
- Liaison and Information Sharing
  - UN OCHA Civil-Military Advisory Group (CMAG)
  - Logistics cluster participation
  - IOC representation
  - Public Information operations

UNMISS UN-CIMIC Activities

- SPLA General Headquarters Partnership
- CIMIC Training at SPLA Unit Headquarters
- OCHA Civil Military Action Group
- MCDA Support to Humanitarians Agencies
- Contingents/Units Partnership Programs
- Monitoring of Civil Information Requirements
- Nomination and Review of QIP
- Information Engagement
UNIT 2: LIAISON, INFORMATION SHARING, PLANNING AND REPORTING

Learning outcomes

- Understand the UN-CIMIC role in the Civil-Military Liaison core function
- Understand the UN-CIMIC role in the information sharing core function in UN Mission.

STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENTATION

- Civil -Military Liaison
- Information sharing

Civil -Military Liaison

The aim and purpose of Civil-Military Liaison function is to provide coordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of activities and operations of all agencies in the Mission area.

Civil-Military Liaison is a fundamental part of UN-CIMIC core functions!

Module 3: Fundamental Tasks – Unit 2: Civil Military Liaison and Information Sharing

Generic Key Points

UN-CIMIC officers should:

- obtain, use and manage civil and military information to enhance both the UN-CIMIC objectives and that of the mission.
- Should be supportive rather than duplicative.
- Obtain valuable inputs from Civil Affairs Officers on the overall political and social dynamics.
- Maximize opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations, partners and the host nation government.
- Contribute to achieving the mission objectives.

The essential goal/aim of liaison and coordination is to maximize and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners, especially the host nation government, to allow the peace process to unfold, and contribute to achieving the mission objectives. These will finally contribute to unity of effort in achieving a mandate driven common end state and.

Civil Military Information Management is an important facet of the work of UN-CIMIC. Civil Military Information Management will have direct effect on the effectiveness of the Force and all the mission components. The acronym UN-CIMIC ends with coordination. In fact, the core function of UN-CIMIC is liaison and coordination. Coordination is a key function in any large organization.
Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing: This function shall be carried out by the UN-CIMIC officers to provide support in the management of civil-military interaction with the aim of assisting the HOMC’s efforts to implement the overall mission mandate. To facilitate the implementation of this function, the following should guide the UN-CIMIC officers:

- They may act as the first point of entry to the military component of the mission for police and civilian partners, if no relation has been established previously.
- They should ensure that their military components are aware of benefits and sensitivities when working with police and civilian partners, especially with the humanitarian actors (UN-CMCoord) based on their knowledge and training on key principles in interacting with these partners.
- UN-CIMIC interaction with the police and civilian partners should be based on an agreed appropriate framework/process that would ensure the transparent flow of information, taking into consideration the confidentiality and care in handling sensitive information. In most cases, this collaboration will take place through integrated field coordination structures and will be formalized in the ISF.
Proper management of Public Information by UN-CIMIC can give a boost to effort by the Force to achieve mission mandate. The functioning of UN-CIMIC personnel is communication oriented and hence need to be fully aware of the key aspects of civil military communication. Communication in a peacekeeping operation environment is challenging and the people involved in it should be professional in their approach. UN-CIMIC officers will be required to communicate with a host of agencies and local authorities regularly on professional matters. Every UN-CIMIC officer needs more communication and negotiation skills than the average military officer. The key to successful communication and negotiation in peacekeeping operation context is situational awareness and preparation.

**Module 2: Fundamental Tasks – Unit 2: Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing**

### CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON

**Core tasks**

1. Gathering information from open sources
2. Collecting relevant information on the civilian organisations (IO/NGOs) working in AOR and be prepared to disseminate this information to those who need them
3. Receiving and passing requests submitted to the Force by locals and international agencies and personnel
4. Monitoring and evaluating the civilian and humanitarian situation: “Early Warning”
5. Promoting force protection through positive contacts with all the actors, even antagonists
6. Within operational security limitations, providing the civilian organisations with information on the Force, activities and the security situation
7. Acting as the Force’s representative in certain official events and meetings

UN-CIMIC Officers are mandated to provide information, within operational /security limitations, to the civilian organisations on the Force activities and the security situation. Another task is the co-ordination and co-operation with the civilian players necessary in the planning and conduct of operations. It is important to communicate appropriately the Force Policy: decisions, orders and directives to the local leadership. Receiving and passing requests submitted to the Force by locals and international agencies and personnel are to be done by UN-CIMIC. UN-CIMIC officials have to represent the Force in certain official events and meetings.
Liaison is conducted through many ways; these could be meetings (regular, ad hoc, official or informal); engaging with multiple agencies in the mission area; interacting with the local population and even UN-CIMIC patrols.

While functioning as a UN-CIMIC officer, dealing with liaison, certain requirements will have to be kept in mind. He/she should be well informed on the mission mandates, objectives, capabilities, limitations and operational concepts and aware of present Mission priorities. He/she should be clear as to the correct position of the Force in relation to a request. He/she should have clear communication skills (language, terminology, common concepts and understandings). UN-CIMIC officers should be friendly and outgoing. Finally there is no substitute for good preparations. They should be prepared for their tasks at all times. Unprepared, you hurt your own reputation as well as your mission’s.
From the Force point of view, UN-CIMIC has a major role in this. This will involve (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and ensuring accountability; (4) organizing a functional division of labour; (5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities; and (6) providing leadership. Many factors that frustrate coordination, but two deserve particular attention. The first is the sheer number of international and local actors involved, and the second is the wide-ranging scope of disparate activities undertaken by these actors. The interaction among this large number of actors and the interplay among the multiple dimensions explain the complexity inherent in operations. To this end, we can still identify an infinite number of complications:

- As in any other complex structure, efforts to integrate across different components tend to run against differences in institutional culture and incentives.
- Recent trends within the UN and among its many partners have been towards greater fragmentation, with a substantially larger number of actors active in the conflict and post-conflict space than ten or more years ago.
- Integration in active conflict situations tends to be particularly challenging.
- A continuing lack of understanding and knowledge and uneven implementation of integration policies, both at HQ and in the field.
- Diverging expectations, perceptions and institutional differences among Secretariat departments, missions, UN agencies and Member States, sometimes resulting in friction and cynicism.
- Support related issues, including different administrative, personnel, and finance rules and systems for missions and UNCT members are consistently identified by field colleagues as one of the major obstacles to effective integration.
- Inherent structural limitations that are beyond the remit of the ISG (and the Policy Committee) and unlikely to change in the near or medium term.

The instructor should note that, there are various counterparts with whom UN-CIMIC officer will be dealing with as shown above. He/she should explain to participants/students that the UN-CIMIC office should endeavour to be in constant communication with all these elements.
While respecting and maintaining humanitarian principles, to maximize opportunities for mission synergy and mitigate operational friction, the DSRSG/RC/HC ensures arrangements are put in place to share with the military component appropriate details of humanitarian and development plans and current operations.

Outside the area of Civil Assistance (in any event requiring SRSGHOMC approval) if information security permits, UN-CIMIC will share all relevant detail of military plans and current operations with police and civilian actors through any joint staff structure available (e.g. JOC, JMAC, or JLOC), or through Civil Affairs and UN-CMCoord officers.

At the tactical/sector or local level, civilian liaison and information gathering is carried out by various components under the leadership of the Head of the Field Office. The UN-CIMIC officers at the tactical/sector and battalion levels:

- can provide a very useful force multiplier effect in support of this work, and close cooperation is needed between UN-CIMIC officers, police and civilian partners to ensure unity of effort and consistency of approach.

Civil Affairs Officers are mandated:

- to ensure consistency of mission effort at the local level,
- to provide advice to UN-CIMIC officers on the overall strategic, political and social context of mandate implementation,
- to give key messages to focus on in dealing with local interlocutors and key information gathering needs.

Civil Affairs Officers are mandated to ensure consistency of mission effort at the local level, and as such can provide advice to UN-CIMIC officers on the overall
strategic, political and social context of mandate implementation, as well as key messages to focus on in dealing with local interlocutors and key information gathering needs.

A great deal of knowledge and information is exchanged at meetings, working group sessions, and other coordinated events. What UN-CIMIC offices need to keep in mind is that, beyond that, decisions if not taken early are shaped at such events. As with anything else, UN-CIMIC officers should refrain from calling duplicative or redundant meetings, unless there is an identified coordination gap. For example, in earlier stages or during times of greater danger, UN-CIMIC may host coordination meetings to share security information with other key players.

UNMIS in 2005

**Summary**

- Information sharing, liaison and coordination are the core functions of UN-CIMIC.
- Liaison is the bedrock of the other core functions.
UNIT 3: CIVIL ASSISTANCE

Learning outcomes

- Understand the principles, challenges and opportunities associated with civil assistance.
- Identify the importance of creating a safe environment by the military for the operations of humanitarian agencies in a conflict area.
- Identify and understand UN-CIMIC contribution to Community Support including Quick Impact Projects.

Structure of the presentation

- CIVIL ASSISTANCE (and related military support)
- MISSION SUPPORT (to Humanitarian and Development actors)
- COMMUNITY SUPPORT (to local communities)

Military support related to Civil assistance

Civil Assistance is a support function that includes two types of related activities undertaken by the military component of a UN integrated mission. These activities are to be undertaken as appropriate and within mission capabilities:

- **Provide support** to ensure a coordinated mission response to requests for assistance from *humanitarian and development actors*. Support to humanitarian and development actors, is the most common activity undertaken by UN-CIMIC officers in steady state missions. Mission support is cooperation extended to any civilian component or agency by the military component of a peace operation.

- **Facilitate the interaction** between the Mission and the local civilian population and authorities, in relation to Community Support Projects undertaken by the military components. Community Support Projects are often related to physical infrastructure repair/rehabilitation, and are designed to help fill gaps in partner...
UN-CIMIC officers are responsible for planning, coordinating and facilitating actions of military units responsible for executing the given task.

The key to successful mission support operations depends on the relationship-building by way of civil-military liaison and knowing each other. Frequent rotations of military come in the way. Many UN civilians stay longer in the mission area. Understanding of each other’s mandate and role in the peacekeeping operation is not a one-time activity but an ongoing process. One the tasks of UN-CIMIC officers at Force HQ is to brief tactical units on the role and mandates of their civilian partners as well as on the UN-CIMIC principles they need to observe during mission support operations. The overall command, management and decision-making structure of a mission support operations need to be clearly defined. It may be useful to have a lead agency in operations, for example, UNHCR in a refugee-related crisis. Mission support could be security or logistical support related. Military forces should be used as a last resort. The most common form of security provision is the armed escort humanitarian convoy.

or local capacity that would otherwise risk the loss of public confidence in the peace process. UN-CIMIC ensures these supporting projects take place within joint and collaborative frameworks and processes, such as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). QIPs are small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population. These projects are funded through the mission budget and are used by UN peacekeeping operations to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation.
In the hierarchy of humanitarian tasks for the military; military forces’ capability can best add value to the process by focusing on indirect assistance and infrastructure Support; direct assistance is best undertaken by humanitarian actors. However, in the event that there are no humanitarian actors on the ground during the critical life-saving period, and failure to deliver urgently needed good and services could result in unacceptable loss of lives, suffering and injuries, the military, as a last resort, may be used to fill that gap.

- **Infrastructure Support**: General services that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to, or solely for, the benefit of the affected population - repairing infrastructure, operating airfields, providing weather info, ensuring access to communications networks, etc.

- **Indirect Assistance**: At least one step removed from the population - transporting relief goods, building camps and shelters, providing water sources, clearing mines and ordinance, etc.

- **Direct Assistance**: Face-to face distribution of goods and services - handing out relief goods, providing first aid, transporting people, interviewing refugees, locating families etc.

According to the Humanitarian community, the Military could add value in infrastructure and indirect support. To simplify this:

- Direct Assistance is the “cookie” that is handed out directly to the beneficiary
- Indirect assistance is the “truck” that carries the “cookie” for it to reach the beneficiary
- Infrastructure Support is the “bridge” that was repaired and allowed the “truck” to pass and made the “cookie” reach the beneficiary

Military forces’ capability can best add value to the process by focusing on Indirect Assistance and Infrastructure Support; direct assistance is best undertaken by humanitarian actors. However, in the event that there are no humanitarian actors on the ground during the critical life-saving period, and failure to deliver urgently needed good and services could result to unacceptable loss of lives, suffering and injuries, then the military, as a last resort, may be tapped to fill that gap.
The existing UN-CMCoord Guidelines identify situations where MCDA could be used to support humanitarian operations. The grey areas indicate situations where judgment call has to be made by actors on the ground, looking at the need, the life-saving aspect of the specific activity, and the implications for such activity.

Here, instructor can ask participants to explain a little bit over this graphic. Some elements are below:

- In time of Robust peacekeeping, military component may have some other duties to perform pertaining directly to its skills and role.
- Military are not expert in delivering direct support, the primary actors must remain the humanitarian actors.
- The military’s involvement in relief claim could be seen as inefficient, inappropriate, inadequate and expensive, contrary to humanitarian principles and driven by orders/operational imperatives rather than humanitarian need.
- Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Sustained humanitarian access to the affected population is ensured when the receipt of humanitarian assistance is not conditional upon the allegiance to or support to parties involved in a conflict but is a right independent of military and political action.
- It may be better not to blurry the lines between soldiers and humanitarians.
The SRSGs guidelines on the subject of “effective approval and coordination mechanisms” should be followed for provision of Civil Assistance. Relevant mission components and substantive areas would implement these guidelines. In addition to relevant mission components, UN-CIMIC, UN-CMCoord and liaison officers representing other humanitarian entities should participate in Civil Assistance coordination mechanisms. Civil Assistance tasks proposed by military contingents should first be submitted to the UN-CIMIC structure for review and forward for processing in accordance with established mission guidelines. In order to ensure UN resources are most effectively used, the Director of Mission Support / Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) must also be consulted prior to Civil Assistance tasks being implemented. The exception to the requirement for prior approval of Civil Assistance is provision of immediate support in extreme situations to prevent loss of life, serious injury or significant loss of property. In these cases, all assistance must be reported to the Mission HQ, through the UN-CIMIC structure. The UN-CIMIC shall maintain records of Civil Assistance and security assistance requests and tasks in detail.

## Support to the Mission

Mission support is cooperation extended to any civilian component or agency by the military component of a peacekeeping operation. UN-CIMIC officers are responsible for planning, coordinating and facilitating actions of military units responsible for executing the given task.
The most important aspect of mission support is creation of safe and secure environment in order to allow humanitarian and development actors to operate. Mission support refers to cooperation extended to any civilian component or agency by the police or military component of a peacekeeping operation. When mission support operations are undertaken, UN-CIMIC officers are typically responsible for planning, coordinating and facilitating the actions of the military units responsible for executing the task. Mission support could have potentially negative and unintended consequences. These need to be carefully considered and planned properly with all stakeholders.

The UN-OCHA refers to humanitarian space as the **Humanitarian Operating Environment** for relief organizations. The Humanitarian Space is a conducive environment where the receipt of humanitarian assistance is independent of military and political action. (MCDA Guidelines).
International humanitarian law has sought to build on this distinction between the military domain and the non-military domain, seeking to create what is now sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian space’. In seeking to consolidate this humanitarian space, the use of armed or military escorts for humanitarian convoys has generally not been appropriate.

Creation of safe environment for all agencies and UN personnel to function and have freedom of movement is the primary task of Military component.

However, there is a kind of dichotomy here: Military are mandated to create freedom of movement and operational latitude to all actors in the mission....and at the same, humanitarian actors would appear as totally independent from the military. That is why correct profile, balanced posture and useful coordination are important aspects for military to achieve this task.

Example of discrete and efficient cooperation: In MINUSMA, July 2013, there was a fine-tuned coordination between the BTL CDR in Timbuktu and the HUM & DEV UN actors based on daily short UN-CIMIC briefing and mutual understanding – Invention of the “By chance” coordination, which means that the BTL CDR knew where the HUM & DEV actors were, and he sent there some patrols just to implement a distant and discrete protection.

The IASC Non-binding guidelines on use of armed escort for Humanitarian convoys stated that Humanitarian convoys will not use armed or military escort”. To enable “humanitarian space”, use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys is an exception and a “Last resort”.

The use of military escorts may compromise the perception of the impartiality of the humanitarian agency. Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its international and multilateral character.
Alternatives to the Use of Escorts:
- Cultivate greater acceptance
- Humanitarian negotiations (incl. access arrangements)
- Low profile approach
- Area security
- Innovative program design and monitoring
- Suspend or cease operation

Exception could be granted when all of the following criteria are met:
- **Humanitarian Need and Programme Criticality.** The level of humanitarian need is such that the lack of humanitarian action would lead to unacceptable human suffering, yet the transport of essential personnel and relief supplies cannot be undertaken without the use of armed escorts.
- **Responsible Authorities.** State authorities or local non-State actors are unable or unwilling to permit the movement of humanitarian supplies or personnel without the use of armed escorts.
- **Safety and Security.** The armed escorts being used are to be capable of providing a credible deterrent necessary to enhance the safety of humanitarian personnel and capacity to provide assistance to the beneficiaries without compromising their security or that of the affected people.
- **Sustainability.** The use of an armed escort will not irreversibly compromise the humanitarian operating environment or the longer-term capacity of the organisation(s) to safely and effectively operate in the future. The humanitarian agency in question has conducted a thorough stakeholder analysis to determine the potential consequences of using an armed escort, and has put in place all possible measures to reduce the likelihood of any negative impact of such consequences.

The UN Designated Official (DO) makes a decision on a case-by-case and based on a structured security risk assessment: no blanket adoption of armed escorts as a modality for humanitarian operations (geographically limited, time-bound and with specific purpose).
Humanitarian convoys generally move without military or police escorts; the use of military escorts may compromise the perception of the impartiality of the humanitarian agency. The primacy of humanitarian principles should be observed; before commencing any military escorted convoy, all personnel involved must be fully briefed of the convoy rules and must strictly adhere to command and communications procedures.

Major highlights of the policy issues on use of military assets should be known by UN-CIMIC. Decisions to accept military assets will be made by humanitarian organizations and based solely on humanitarian criteria. Military assets should be requested only where and when there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military should be a last resort. A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organization.
This technical slide could be skipped, depending on the audience.

Some points to be kept in mind:

- **Last resort:** The military asset is unique in nature and timeliness of deployment, and its use should be a last resort.

- **Primacy of humanitarian organizations:** Humanitarian work is done by humanitarian organizations. Military units are in supporting role to humanitarian work in the area of provision of a secure environment and/or in the provision of logistics support when requested.

- **Primacy of humanitarian criteria:** Decision to request or accept military or armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organizations, based solely on humanitarian criteria.

- **Humanitarian identity:** Humanitarian convoys must retain their civilian nature and character. Armed personnel should remain in separate vehicles. Military personnel should respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organization. Involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance should be avoided. Humanitarian operation should retain its international and civilian-led character.

### Lessons learned for the Use of Armed Escorts

- Problems multiply when humanitarian actors remain in conflict zone after the departure of military.
- A few agencies may not use military escorts to protect convoys.
- If unwilling to use escort and unable to provide humanitarian services, military forces are likely to fill the gap.
- As per The Red Cross, “as a general principle, any armed protection for any component of the Movement is in conflict with the following Fundamental Principles: humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality.”
- Many organizations have no such policy objections.

Some “food for thought” for instructors: Problems could be exacerbated when humanitarian actors remain in a conflict zone after the departure of external military forces. Some humanitarian organizations that, for reasons of broader principle, will not use military or armed escorts to protect their convoys. This position may contribute to a general trend towards direct provision of humanitarian services by military forces. When humanitarian organizations are unwilling or unable to provide humanitarian services, military forces are increasingly likely to fill the gap. The United Nations system has adopted policies which recognize the need for armed or military escorts in exceptional circumstances. Within the community of humanitarian organizations outside the United Nations there is a spectrum of policies. The Red Cross Movement holds that, “as a general principle, any armed protection for any component of the Movement is in conflict with its fundamental principles of “humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality.” Some other organizations, including especially implementing partners of United Nations agencies, have no such policy objections.
Logistical support occurs in the forms of providing transport (road, air or water); recovery of accident vehicles or providing other specialized equipment to civilian agencies; or coordination of logistical services.

To provide equipment, Mission Own-Equipment could be considered before the Contingent-Owned-Equipment (COE).

Mission support for DDR and SSR can be undertaken; this includes DDR activities assistance; host country military capacity building assistance, leadership mentoring and development; training of host nation security forces in civil-military coordination.

The guidelines on mission support operations, both from the military and from civilian agencies, should be followed. Logistical support could be in the form of providing transport (road, air or water); recovery of accident vehicles or providing other specialized equipment to civilian agencies; or coordination of logistical services. In priority to provide equipment, the mission owned ones could be considered before the Contingent-Owned-Equipment (COE). Military and police personnel may participate and support joint assessment missions with civilian external actors. In these types of activities, the military unit responsible is likely to provide security, transport and specialist personnel. UN-CIMIC activities in support of DDR and SSR could include, host country military capacity building assistance, leadership mentoring and development; training of host nation security forces in civil-military coordination.
As an optional Learning activity pertaining to this chapter, instructors can display a “Request form” and ask participants to fill in in order for them to be acquainted with this task.

Hand-out: Examples of Request form from MINUSTAH
Community Support

Community support refers to UN-CIMIC activities that help local communities to improve and normalize their lives. Community support projects are often related to physical infrastructure repair/rehabilitation projects that could be requested by
any civilian organization or entity through appropriate mission coordination structures, or proposed by the military component through the appropriate civil-military process. Both types of activity could be implemented as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) which are small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects and of benefit to the local population. These projects are funded through the mission budget and are used by UN peacekeeping operations to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation. They aimed at building capacity and confidence in the peace process and creating a positive relationship between the host community and external actors. These projects are often related to physical infrastructure creation, repair/rehabilitation and can be proposed by any mission component and processed through established practices. The main aim is to provide basic amenities or assist in improving livelihood opportunity by reviving economic activity of the local community.

These supports vary from mission to mission, time to time, and region to region. UN-CIMIC should conduct community assistance projects with external and internal actors and never alone. These should be based on the needs and priorities of local communities and advice of civilian agencies. Community support initiatives include wide variety of projects like; building of infrastructure projects, rehabilitation of buildings, revival of economic activities; vocational training; reconstruction or maintenance of roads and bridges; reconstruction of water and sanitation services and rehabilitation of electricity supply. Socio-cultural activities, youth empowerment, support for gender and environmental initiatives come under valuable community support projects.

Picture: MINUSTAH – Handover ceremony Ecole Emmanuel Cion de Turbe, Haiti. Project led by the JAPAN BATT (courtesy of Richard Zabot)
Community support by UN-CIMIC is mostly delivered through civil-military projects. Some of them come in the form of Quick impact projects. UN-CIMIC personnel are key functionaries in planning and implementation of QIPs. It is a major involvement of most UN-CIMIC personnel and a high expectation area in mission.

Troop participation in UN-CIMIC community projects (and QIPs) also has the effect of boosting morale because it gives them an opportunity to get out of the compound and interact with the local population in a meaningful way. It makes them feel good about the contribution they are making to rebuild the country where they are deployed.

The DPKO/DFS Policy Directive on QIPs specifies that missions shall set and regularly review priorities for geographic and thematic focus, taking into account the unique nature and mandate of the mission, and in line with the overall mission plan and broader strategies for community outreach. UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord
officers should work with Civil Affairs to ensure that Civil Assistance support activities are consistent with these priorities.

Requests for Civil Assistance in support of a humanitarian or development nature should be submitted through the mission approval process and mechanism established by the DSRSG/RC/HC. In order to ensure UN resources are most effectively used, the Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) must also be consulted prior to Civil Assistance tasks being implemented.

The Project Review Committee (PRC) is responsible for evaluating proposals and selecting projects for funding, as well as for approving any changes to the project budget, outputs or scope of work during implementation.

The QIP Management Team (QMT), usually within civil affairs, composed of substantive areas, MIL and POL representatives, is responsible for ensuring effective budget forecasting, monitoring overall allocation of funds and spending according to geographical and thematic areas, reviewing and screening proposals before submission to the PRC, and ensuring timely allocation of funds over the course of the fiscal year. The QMT or Programme Manager is responsible for ensuring full records for each project are maintained and are available for auditing purposes.

Project focal points are individuals assigned to monitor and shepherd each project through the entire project cycle. Project focal points may assist implementing partners in proposal development and are responsible for monitoring implementation, liaising with the implementing partners throughout the process, collecting and checking financial documentation before submission to the mission, evaluating impact and reporting on the project.

Just as any mission component can submit QIP proposals, project focal points can come from any mission component.
It is important to follow the DPKO guidelines on QIPs. Each mission will have its own guidelines and SOP. QIP cycle will follow the sequence as shown in the slide. Normally, the QIP project cycle involves seven stages.

The modalities of how a project is identified, selected/approved, implemented and closed tend to differ from mission to mission, but the DPKO/DFS Policy and Guidelines on QIPs provide clear guidance and useful templates to each of the stages. UN-CIMIC Officers are encouraged to read these policy guidelines to familiar with them.

The monitoring, evaluation and reporting process should be seen as an opportunity to ensure that work is progressing according to plan as well as a way to interact and talk with implementing partners and local community representatives/beneficiaries. Monitoring and evaluation should include assessment of progress and impact from both the implementing partner and the mission representative (usually the project focal point), based on observation and feedback from the implementing partners and project beneficiaries.

Agencies responsible should constantly monitor projects. Progress report on the project should be sent and a final documentation, once the project is completed is mandatory.

Some Lesson learnt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Based on mission and context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-confliction is essential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regularize Coordination Dialogue

| Regular meetings/information exchange |
| Transparent and open dialogue |

Information Sharing as foundation

| Unclassified and open |
| Pre-identify types of info to share |

Military Tasking and Validation

| Military effort on indirect assistance and infrastructure support |
| Need for Prioritization – Sector/Area |
| Focus on “Pull” not “Push” |
From Haiti and many other experiences, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has identified a number of lessons that both UN CMCoord and UN-CIMIC officers should heed. Some of these include:

- The constant need for better coordination (versus cooperation, which is too strident, and coexistence, which is insufficient) in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, for the benefit of both stakeholders and beneficiaries, within the context of the mission and situation.
- The need to regularize the relationships among players – even in crisis response, relationship-building is important: before, during, and after.
- The need to share and manage information in a generous and open manner – this evokes the UN-CIMIC core task of civil-military liaison and information-sharing. It is especially important to avoid “classifying” information needlessly. Remember what the mission is here.
- With regard to military tasking and validation of support, it’s important to apply adaptive planning techniques so that the military can minimize its direct assistance role and only provide assistance when it is called forward (“pulled”) rather than just simply “pushing” support forward without consideration of impacts and effects.
Case study 1: A Battalion commander received one day a request for assistance from an Orphanage in Haiti. (For information, the “Chambre de L’Enfance Nécessiteuse Haitienne” indicated that it has received during a year requests for assistance from nearly 200 orphanages from around the country for more than 200,000 children). Very concern by the abandoned Childs, and interested by doing something related to Community support, the commander decided to accept helping this orphanage by raising funds to buy equipment and support them. Unfortunately, this was a fake orphanage meant to extort money. The fact is that the Battalion Commander (and UN-CIMIC Officer) did not coordinate with HUM and DEV actors from the Mission.

Case study 2: Military Contingent provided support to a village in a remote area by digging a well just in the centre of the village. This project has been undertaken as a QIP in full coordination with locals. The sustainable aim was to help them developing their village, to avoid having women and their daughters walking during hours to seek water and to allow young girls to attend school. Unfortunately, women of the village and their daughters kept on going to the very remote well, several hour walking from the village. The fact is that if ladies had been consulted in the development of the project, they would have said that they need some quiet hours together to speak about the village life and resolve internal conflicts. As a matter of fact, the well was dug just between the mosque and the café so they did not feel confident enough to speak freely about the social life of the village. It means that the women should have been consulted and allowed to express freely their point of view during the development phase of this project.

Instructors may ask participants if they already experienced the same type of cases and beg for their own Lessons learnt.

Summary

- Civil assistance consists of support to humanitarian and development actors and Community support
- Creation of safe environment for all agencies and UN personnel to function and have freedom of movement is the primary task of the military component of the Mission. UN-CIMIC role is to enhance this.
- Military assets should be only employed by humanitarian and development actors as a last resort.
- Quick impact projects are short term, small scale projects that are designed to have immediate positive impact.
UNIT 4: UN-CIMIC COMMUNICATION

Learning outcomes

✓ Understand how cultural awareness facilitates UN-CIMIC
✓ Explain the relationship between UN-CIMIC and public information
✓ Identify the techniques in working with language assistants
✓ Recognise basic principles of negotiations

Structure of the presentation

- Cultural Awareness and UN-CIMIC
- Public Information and UN-CIMIC
- Working with Language assistants for UN-CIMIC
- Negotiation/conflict resolution and UN-CIMIC

Cultural awareness and training

Reflections over the Dimensions of Culture

✓ Culture is the collective belief, behavior and practice a community, developed over a long period of time
✓ In multi-cultural and sensitive environment, Mission’s success depends on ability to understand local culture, maintain respectful relationships and communicate effectively with others
✓ Respect for Diversity is one of the UN Core Values

UN-CIMIC personnel like all peacekeepers should always remember the cultural dimensions while dealing with a large number of multi-cultural people including the locals.

The copyright-free drawing displayed here is extracted from the website Mali.net, and aims at showing that humour or smile could, to some extent, help understand and promote respect for diversity. Translation of the cartoon captions: “Blue man of the desert?” “Blue helmet!”
Culture is the collective beliefs, norms, faith and practice of a community, developed over many years. Culture translates to collective behaviour of a community. It consists of languages, faith, food, clothing, behaviour, customs, taboos, ceremonies etc. It is generally passed on to next generation and is acquired through the process of socialization. Interference or non-observance of culture is generally resisted and questioned by the people. Peace keeping environment being multi-cultural, all dealings including those by UN-CIMIC will have to handle such cultural sensitivities carefully.

- **Relationships**: The degree to which a culture values the importance of personal relationships as opposed to adherence to schedules and the ability to focus on more than one task.

- **Time**: The significance placed on completing a job versus devoting time to building relationships among business associates.

- **Communication**: The way people in a society communicate, including the use of nonverbal gestures.

- **Hierarchy**: The way individuals interact with one another within an organizational hierarchy.

- **Status Attainment**: The importance of personal achievement and accomplishment to an individual’s overall sense of well-being.

- **Space**: How individuals use space to define themselves, including spatial distances used when speaking and the amount of space needed for comfort in business and living environments.

- **Group Dependence**: The importance of the individual vis-à-vis the group in diverse social and business situations.

- **Diversity Receptivity**: How roles, power and authority are associated with each gender as well as individuals of different races, religions, nationalities, etc.

- **Change Tolerance**: Group responses to change, the need for rules and the ability to take risks. Also includes the perception of how much control individuals have over their destiny.

As indicated, the material here is based on the Windham International Cultural Model.
Understanding the country and cultural context for peacekeeping operations and especially UN-CIMIC is equally vital. If you don’t understand the country and culture that you’re operating in, then you don’t understand the problems you’re dealing with. And if you don’t understand the problems you’re dealing with, you won’t be able to help resolve them, transition them to local ownership in a sustainable way, and thus facilitate the end state of the mission.

UN-CIMIC works in the spaces between cultures; thus; between the international or UN culture and the host nation or local culture, as well as between your own national culture and the local culture. That is why in order to be sensitive to other cultures we must; thus first need to recognise our own culture, i.e. that we have our own prejudices and that we need to be aware of the limitations, lenses and interpretations our own cultural context place on us. Then we can start to understand how difficult it is for people from different cultures to communicate so that they understand what the other person is trying to convey. In order for the peacekeeping mission to be respected, and have a positive impact on the host population, we need to first earn their respect and appreciation. Learning to undertake UN-CIMIC in such a way is a prerequisite.

“Actions speak louder than words“: Behaviour and the behaviour of the troops have more do with how well the peacekeeping force can work within the spaces between cultures than anything else. One cannot simply “talk the talk” but must “walk the walk”. This is what makes UN-CIMIC integral to military operations in the contemporary peace operations environment.
UN-CIMIC and Public information

UN-CIMIC officers and public information should go hand-in-hand in the information-intensive peacekeeping operations which are always under the full glare of the media. Understand the importance of media relations and how the media affect the success of peace operations. Know the kind of information that can be released to the media and how to handle a simple interview. Communication in a peacekeeping operation environment is challenging.

UN-CIMIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Developing positive media relations and managing interviews can favourably influence the outcomes.

- Be a reliable source of information
- Be informed about how to work with Public Information Office (PIO) of the mission and the mission Spokesperson(s).
- All peacekeepers must understand that their conduct will have an impact on the mission...

...whether on duty or “off-duty”!

UN-CIMIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Impacts of Media Reporting

- News media work 24/7, often reporting in real time
- News, including photos and videos, can be disseminated around the world almost instantaneously- Media is looking for sensational news

- Positive behaviour can help make good news and prevent negative reporting
- Negative behaviour and images can have negative effects on the Mission and the Peace process

Adverse consequences are to be prevented by proactive and professional public information practices
Proper management of Public Information by UN-CIMIC can give a boost to the combined efforts of the various components of the peacekeeping operation to achieve mission mandates. The functioning of UN-CIMIC personnel is communications oriented and hence need to be fully aware of the key aspects of civil military communications. Communication in a peacekeeping operation environment is challenging and the people involved in it should be professional in their approach. UN-CIMIC officers will be required to communicate with a host of agencies and local authorities regularly on professional matters. Every UN-CIMIC officer needs more communication and negotiation skills than the average military officer. The key to successful communication and negotiation in the peace operation context is situational awareness and preparation.

UN-CIMIC officers like public information officers, should proactively engage with the media and project mission views. The PIO will manage the mission’s communications strategy based on guidance of senior leaders and ensure that the target audience gets the appropriate opinion of the mission. UN-CIMIC officers
should work with the PIO. The military public information unit and military public information officers need close working relationship with UN-CIMIC for a coherent communication strategy and practice. UN-CIMIC activities being mostly “good news stories” on mission’s effort should be leveraged for the mission. Civil-military liaison, information-sharing with external as well as internal actors at the tactical and operational level makes UN-CIMIC activities important elements of Public Information. Every UN-CIMIC plan, activity or project should have a public information plan.

Refer to the Policy for Public Information in UN PK Operations of 2006 (Cf. Documentation)

UN-CIMIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

**DOs**
- Refer to your superiors or PIO if you don’t know answers
- Be factual and positive
- Speak with respect about local people
- Be polite and professional
- Be brief and precise

**DON Ts**
- Give personal opinions about the situation or the peace process
- Answer questions that are speculative
- Reveal information related to security matters or combatants
- Favor one side over another

UN-CIMIC officers should engage with media and communicate on own domain subjects in a professional, factual and impartial manner. Diplomacy, tact and principles of peacekeeping are to be adhered to. Care should be taken and provide only authorized information and no opinion on matters not directly responsible be explained. Remember the global media reach with all its ramifications. As a general rule; UN-CIMIC Officers will not interact with media without proper training and prior approval.

Pictures taken UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Specialized Training Material for Military Experts on Mission 1st Edition 2010
Working with Language Assistants

The trainer can ask the participants to determine the differences between an Interpreter and a Language assistant (next slide give some clue).

Here is a real incident that occurred in MONUSCO a few years ago to a UN team, and that could be useful to display here as a “Lessons learned” when it comes to working with Language assistant (TA). A Team composed of civil affairs and MILOBS officers was trying to make an inquiry about an ambush where some people had been robbed and some of them killed. The UN Team was tasked to find out any relevant information about this drama and decided to meet with the toughest rebel group stationed in the area. As they were from another place, the UN Team needed three LAs: UN-Team leader was speaking in English, the 1st LA was translating in Arabic, the 2nd LA was retranslating in a local dialect and the 3rd one was translating in the local language spoken by the rebel group. The UN Team started progressively, with greetings and small talks. After one hour of socialisation, the Team leader put the question on the table for which they came. “You are the strongest group in the area. For sure, you can help us by telling us who perpetrated the crime”. After the three LAs finished their translation, the atmosphere suddenly changed, no more smiles, closed expressions on their faces. To top it all, the Team leader felt the cold barrel cold of a gun behind his head. After one long minute of frozen situation, the chief of the rebels started to laugh and to talk with the others. As he knew a little bit of Arabic, he pointed out that the 1st LA mistranslated the UN sayings; instead of the original meaning, he translated “I know you did perpetrate the crime”.

Advantages & challenges

Peacekeepers may not have linguistic ability to communicate:

- Working with **Interpreters or Language assistants** is the option.
- Proper interaction and supervision of interpreters offer **benefits for UN-CIMIC** and the mission

However, challenges are huge:
- Misunderstandings/Misinterpretations,
- Lack of time,
- Incomplete interpretation, etc.

**True story of misinterpretation in MONUSCO:**

“I saw you know who did it” translated into “I know you did it”
Working with interpreters/language assistants is the only option when UN-CIMIC officers lack the linguistic skills in local language. Proper interaction with interpreters can facilitate good communication with other individuals. Most interpreters/language assistants in peace operations are not professionally trained as interpreters. Interpreters/language assistants should be reasonably educated native speakers, familiar with culture, customs and have awareness of the conflict/related dynamics. Gender, age and race of the interpreters/language assistants are factors to be considered before engaging them. Language assistants should preferably be briefed before any meeting.

Be aware of the possibility of compromising your or language assistants’ safety in the course of work. Take into account their personal safety and not expose them to situations that may result in reprisals.

This slide could be displayed after the instructor has asked to the participants what could be good tips for effective interpretation.
Brief language assistant before the meeting about the situation, who are coming for the meeting, what you are planning to do and what is expected of him. During the meeting, be enthusiastic, use gestures and correct tone of voice. Avoid side comments or whispering to the language assistant. Do not give too much leeway to your language assistant for injecting his own personality, ideas, and opinions. Language assistant should never attempt to answer a question from the audience. From time to time, summarize the content of the conversation to make sure there is no misunderstanding.

Some guidelines to make the work of a language assistant easy are speak deliberately, loud enough, use simple and short sentences; give reasonable time to translate; encourage language assistant to clarify issues in case of doubt than translating wrongly. Technical terms, abbreviations and jargons are to be avoided. The location of the language assistant in relation to you and the target audience must be appropriate. Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience and do not talk to the interpreter/language assistant. Address the subject or audience in the first person without considering the presence of the Interpreter/language assistant.

**Conflict Resolution/ Management, Negotiation**

UN-CIMIC officers must be equipped with negotiation and mediation skills as necessary when employed in a UN peacekeeping operation. As neutral third party, they can be required to manage conflict through communication and negotiation. They can also be designated focal point for communication with host community, civil society, government representatives and fellow external actors.

**Purpose of a Negotiation:**
- Identification - isolation of areas of conflict/disputes
- Prevention of escalation
- Reduce differences in areas of conflict/disputes
- Resolution of conflict/disputes
- Preventive action against recurrence of conflict/disputes
Mediation is the intervention in a dispute by a mutually acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power. Focus should be on identifying the other parties’ real underlying interests and not stated positions. Depending on the progress, change negotiation style. Conflict of interests and likely breakdown should be identified in time and corrective action taken.

In Peacekeeping, successful negotiation depends on the awareness of Mission objectives and interests, understanding the interests of other parties and ability to arrive at acceptable way forward.
Take time to understand mission’s interests, interests of other parties, and the context in which negotiation is taking place. If there has been a previous meeting, use the result and the status of what has been implemented.

As a host: Ensure arrangements are proper; reception; sanitize the negotiation location; plan snacks and drinks. Appoint a note taker/recorder.

Nothing can substitute thorough preparations to clinch success in negotiations. Take time to understand mission’s interests, interests of other parties, the context in which negotiation is taking place and your objectives. Each negotiation requires intelligent thought process to arrive at intended outcomes.

Following basic communication techniques should be observed during negotiations: Listen attentively and understand the viewpoint, even if you do not agree, what is being said. Encourage the other party to speak by your willingness to listen; show genuine interest in solving the problem at hand.

Negotiations and conflict management are specialized soft skill subjects which need study, good understanding and experience based expertise. In Peacekeeping,
negotiations and conflict management are routine events. UN-CIMIC personnel will be required to undertake these events. Hence, this part will cover these topics.

- Negotiation is a necessary and prepared logical process, hoping for a favourable outcome. Negotiation is communication with the aim of reaching an agreement. To implement mandate, Peacekeepers as neutral third party, will be required to manage conflict through communication and negotiations.

- UN-CIMIC officers may routinely become the focal point for communication with host community, civil society, government representatives and fellow external actors. This may be formal or informal negotiations, often in the form of meetings. Similarly, it could be formal or informal conflict resolution attempts.

## Learning activity: “Colonel Zed”

### Preparing for Negotiations: A guideline Check List

1. **Question 1:** How will you and the UNAC team prepare to make this negotiation a success?
   
   It is essential for the team to be mentally prepared and each member understands the acceptable official position. A few questions given below can be discussed and consensus position arrived at by the negotiators team members.

   - What is the dispute about? What are the underlying causes?
   - Why did it come up now? Immediate triggers?
   - What is the background/history? Who are the persons/parties involved?
   - What are their characteristics?
   - What is the History of previous attempts to solve the dispute? What was the outcome?
   - What was the previous UN involvement and how does it relate to the current situation? Is it still relevant?
   - What are your options, limitations, time frame and mandate?
   - What is the outcome expected from this meeting? (Ideal and minimum)
   - What are likely to be the other party’s position, demands?
   - How much can be conceded? What cannot be?
   - How to move forward? (Proposals, time frame)
   - Who will handle what issue?

2. **Question 2:** What are the other aspects which can be discussed amongst the negotiators and for better preparation? The following aspects can be discussed and prepared.

   - **Conflict Management Planning during Negotiations:**
     - Identify potential violent dispute
• Make an appraisal of the situation
• Design a response
• Undertake the intervention
• Evaluate the outcome/feedback

■ Success depends on:
  • Understand the mandate and role of the UN (your interest)

■ Prepare your approach:
  • Understand the interest(s) of the other party(s) Anticipate their approach
  • Understand the cultural/historical context

■ Delegation:
  • Who is going to do the talking?
  • Who is going to take minutes?
  • Need for an observer?
  • Cross-cultural sensitivity?
  • Role of interpreter(s)
  • Need for specialists/advisers?
  • How do specialists/advisers do their work at the meeting?

■ Venues (If not your own venue, carries out reconnaissance of the proposed venue and clarify these details before arrival):
  • Arrive in due time, good shape and well dressed
  • Prepare seating, security, parking, communications
  • Consider refreshments (smoking?)
  • Prepare maps, stationery, etc.

■ Preparing the Agenda:
  • Consult prior to formal negotiations
  • Agree on objective of the meeting
  • Agree on agenda or issues for discussion
  • Agree on process (time, venue, speaking rules, interpreters, security, etc.)
  • Prepare contingency in case meeting goes off the agreed agenda

■ Opening and Welcome:
  • Welcome and open according to proper custom and protocol (follow local practice)
  • Introduce delegations
  • Explain role of the Mediator
  • Outline the objective of the meeting
  • Outline process agreed for the meeting
  • Present Agenda

■ Substantive Negotiation:
  • Opening statements
  • Responses to opening statement (seek interests)
  • Identify & agree on key points for further discussion (those issues that each party want to be addressed before agreement is reached)
  • Define priorities/sequence
  • Break/ caucus/Joint & Private Sessions
  • Generate options for settlement
  • Reduce number of options
  • Agreement
  • Implementation and monitoring
  • Agreement in writing – all languages
  • Information to media/public – agreement on what will be said
  • Summarize agreement & next steps
- Formal adoption/signing of agreement (local custom & protocol)
- Next meeting (time, venue, agenda, documents)

- Follow up on Negotiation:
  - Short SITREP for higher HQs and UNHQ
  - Short statement for media/public (agreed to by parties)
  - Prepare minutes and copies of agreement
  - Prepare comments & future expectations
  - Add observations that may assist others to deal with this or other similar disputes in future
  - Establish mechanism to monitor implementation of the agreement (agreed to by parties)
  - Carry out the Negotiator/Mediator’s undertakings in the agreement
  - Progress reports
  - Prepare for next meeting

- Negotiation with Interpreters:
  - Brief interpreters on their role
  - Mediator provide interpreter
  - Negotiation – you/yours & them/their's, Anticipate misunderstandings
  - Agreement
  - Implementation and monitoring
  - Agreement in writing – all languages
  - Information to media/public – agreement on what will be said

- Closing Session:
  - Summarize agreement & next steps
  - Formal adoption/signing of agreement (local custom & protocol)
  - Next meeting (time, venue, agenda, documents)

- Follow up on Negotiation:
  - Short SITREP for higher HQs and UNHQ
  - Short statement for media/public (agreed to by parties)
  - Prepare minutes and copies of agreement
  - Prepare comments & future expectations
  - Add observations that may assist others to deal with this or other similar disputes in future
  - Establish mechanism to monitor implementation of the agreement (agreed to by parties)
  - Carry out the Negotiator/Mediator’s undertakings in the agreement
  - Progress reports
  - Prepare for next meeting

**Summary**

- Understanding the local cultural context and different perspectives is linked to peacekeeping operations success factors and of essence for UN-CIMIC Officers.
- The combination of UN-CIMIC and Public Information can give impetus and synergy to the Mission.
- Proper interaction and supervision of interpreters can derive benefits for UN-CIMIC and the Mission.
- Thorough preparations are crucial to successful negotiations, as well as taking time to understand interests of other parties and the context in which negotiation is to take place.
== ADDITIONAL MODULE: UN-CIMIC AND PEACEKEEPING SUBSTANSTIVE AREAS ==

SUPPORTING HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN RESPONDING TO EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS

- Learning outcomes
  - Understand the differences between natural disasters and complex emergencies
  - Describe the role of UN-CIMIC in anticipating and coordinating with counterparts in disaster relief efforts
  - Identify military support in natural disasters and complex emergencies

- Structure of the presentation
  - Natural Disasters
  - Complex Emergencies
  - Military Support in Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies

This presentation is the first presentation of the additional module and is an in-depth discussion of military support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

- Natural Disasters

Natural disasters refer to the consequences of natural hazards events, seriously disrupting the functioning of a community/society by causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses. (Definition given by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee - IASC).
Additional Module: UN-CIMIC and PK substantive areas – Unit 1: SHARED

NATURAL DISASTERS

Characteristics

- Minimum of 96 hours of chaos: Critical time for decision making
- Water: most likely the highest priority
- Food: Short term priority (Earthquake) or Long term (Floods/Hurricanes)
- Humanitarian infrastructure: Key to transition
- Establishment of a control line between all actors: key to coordination

> Haiti: Earthquake, Tropical storm Isaac, Hurricane Sandy

Additional Module: UN-CIMIC and PK substantive areas – Unit 1: SHARED

NATURAL DISASTERS

OCHA Response Tools

Emergency Monitoring
- OCHA Regional, Country Offices
- HQ Desk Structure
- HQ 24/7 Duty System

Alert, real-time info exchange, mobilisation, long-term monitoring
- Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS)
- Virtual on Site Operations Coordination Centre (V - OSOCC)
- Relief web: http://reliefweb.int

Additional Module: UN-CIMIC and PK substantive areas – Unit 1: SHARED

NATURAL DISASTERS

Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System

http://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo
GDACS is a cooperation framework under the United Nations umbrella. It includes disaster managers and disaster information systems worldwide and aims at filling the information and coordination gap in the first phase after major disasters. GDACS provides real-time access to web-based disaster information systems and related coordination tools.

Why is GDACS so important? During the first days after major sudden-onset disasters, the affected country and a vast number of international actors collect and analyse information in order to plan their response. This activity is typically carried out simultaneously with varying speed, relevance and accuracy, using multiple information channels and applying different procedures. During the initial planning phase, there is usually little or no information exchange between international responders. Decisions are often based on patchy information, inaccurate sources or assumptions. The planned or mobilised assistance of other organisations is rarely drawn into consideration. This often results in duplication, gaps, overlap or even inappropriate response, occasionally associated with high costs. GDACS services aim at facilitating information exchange among all actors in support of decision-making and coordination. GDACS services build on the collective knowledge of disaster managers worldwide and the joint capacity of all relevant disaster information systems.

The On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) concept was originally developed by OCHA and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group network. It was designed to assist affected countries in coordinating international search-and-rescue efforts following an earthquake. However, OSOCC's emergency management principles make it a valuable tool in any sudden-onset disaster involving international relief resources. Over the last decade, the OSOCC concept has been used during numerous disasters including floods, hurricanes, tsunamis and complex emergencies.

An OSOCC is set up to help local authorities in a disaster-affected country to coordinate international relief. Following a disaster, the OSOCC is established as soon as possible by the first arriving international urban search-and-rescue team or United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team deployed by OCHA.
An OSOCC has three primary objectives:
- To be a link between international responders and the Government of the affected country.
- To provide a system for coordinating and facilitating the activities of international relief efforts at a disaster site where the coordination of many international USAR teams is critical to ensure optimal rescue efforts.
- To provide a platform for cooperation, coordination and information management among international humanitarian agencies.

The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) is a network of disaster-prone and disaster-responding countries and organizations dedicated to urban search and rescue (USAR) and operational field coordination. INSARAG was established in 1991 following initiatives of international SAR teams that responded to the 1988 Armenia earthquake. The United Nations was chosen as the INSARAG secretariat to facilitate international participation and coordination.

The OSOCC will plug into and complement existing UN coordination structures and government, if any.

Requests for military assets are made by the DSRSG/RC/HC, not political authorities, and based on humanitarian criteria to the HOM that could order the FC...according to the Mission guideline
**NATURAL DISASTERS**

1. Example of a Preparedness phase for UN Chief

- **Contact** your UN-CIMCoord counterpart and get a risk assessment of any potential ND
- **Participate** in the Humanitarian contingency planning process, and identify the likely support needed
- **Contribute** to the Mil Contingency planning process well ahead, including possible forms of military support, and potential issues on coordination (MIL-MIL, CIV-MIL)

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**NATURAL DISASTERS**

2. Possible Military Support

*Life-Saving Phase (Day 1-10; Critical in first 72hrs)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian Needs</th>
<th>Possible Military Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement of arriving USAR teams from airport to OSOCR Base of Operations and subsequent tasked area of operations</td>
<td>Land Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel for USAR teams' own vehicles or locally-provided transport, in case of shortage</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid air assessments by UNDAC team &amp; partners (extent of impact, key infrastructure constraints, priority needs and areas)</td>
<td>Air Assets or preliminary intra assessment results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security for USAR teams travelling to/working in high-risk/insure areas</td>
<td>Armed escorts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed maps (1:50,000 or bigger) for USAR team tasking of areas to cover/prioritise</td>
<td>Maps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate set up of Airport Reception Centre by UNDAC/USAR teams upon arrival</td>
<td>Facilitation/Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**NATURAL DISASTERS**

Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief - The Oslo Guidelines

**Scope of use:**
- Natural, technological and environmental disaster (peacetime)

**Key concepts:**
- Last resort
- Complementarity
- At no cost
- Consent of the Affected State
- Avoid dependence on MCDA
- Perception
- Critical areas for coordination

**Key principles (common to Oslo and MCDA Guidelines):**
- Humanitarian principles / Sovereignty of states / Humanitarian Imperative
Complex Emergencies

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines a “complex emergency” as:

A humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the on-going UN country programme.

The list of the existing guidelines and references in slide 20 are provided by OCHA for field work in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These are required guidelines and references for UN-CMCoord officers; as such; UN-CIMIC officers should also have and be familiar with their contents.
In the hierarchy of humanitarian tasks for the military, military forces’ capability can best add value to the process by focusing on indirect assistance and infrastructure support; direct assistance is best undertaken by humanitarian actors. However, in the event that there are no humanitarian actors on the ground during the critical life-saving period, and failure to deliver urgently needed good and services could result in unacceptable loss of lives, suffering and injuries, the military, as a last resort, may be used to fill that gap.

The existing UN-CMCoord Guidelines identify situations where MCDA could be used to support humanitarian operations. The grey areas indicate situations where judgment call has to be made by actors on the ground, looking at the need, the life-saving aspect of the specific activity, and the implications for such activity.
The Guidelines on Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), which is also in line with the Oslo Guidelines, are important reference tools for both planning and operations of military support. The UN humanitarian-military guidelines for the use of military assets can be summarized in the following six operating principles for the use of military assets in support of humanitarian assistance:

- Requests for MCDA to support UN agencies must be made by the HC/RC, in consultation with the Affected State, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.
- MCDA should be employed by UN humanitarian agencies as a last resort, that is, only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required.
- A UN humanitarian agency using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While MCDA may remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets.
- Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. The peace operation should only provide direct assistance in life-saving emergency situations and as an option of last resort. The peace operation can provide indirect support and infrastructure support, on request, and according to the UN-CIMIC principles and the humanitarian-military guidance. The aim of these principles and guidance is to ensure a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders.
- Any use of MCDA should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel.
- Countries providing MCDA to support UN humanitarian action should ensure that they respect the UN Codes of Conduct and the humanitarian principles.

Strict compliance of the UN-CIMIC principles will minimize inevitable frictions between the military; whose main concern is security and humanitarian organizations; whose main concern is alleviating the suffering of people affected by conflict or natural disasters.
disasters. It is important to recognize that both the peace operation and humanitarian community, while acting independently of each other, are also interdependent; in the sense that their respective mandates and missions, when appropriately executed, improve the environment for the achievement of the others’ missions. The more successful the humanitarian actors are in executing their task, the closer the community comes to normalcy, and the higher the likelihood that they will be able to sustainably manage their own peace process without lapsing into violent conflict.

The MCDA Guidelines provide guidance in regard to the humanitarian application of the important criterion of “Last resort”. Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged “humanitarian gap” between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. Therefore, foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need.

OCHA has developed humanitarian coordination mechanisms that have had increasingly positive impact on the ability of the international community to respond to crises. These mechanisms have gone a long way to addressing the “Brahimi Report” on the disjointedness and low effectiveness of humanitarian response in the past years. These mechanisms and capabilities have minimised the military lead role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. However, the military still plays a critical support role in these activities, especially with respect to the provision of overall security and logistics for such relief efforts. During disaster relief efforts or operations, UN-CIMIC Officers should not look for humanitarian coordination centres or persons to be co-located with military coordination centres as the humanitarian agencies would like to abide by their humanitarian principles to retain their humanitarian nature. UN-CIMIC Officers should therefore work closely with, and through the UN-CMCoord Officer in such situations to ensure smooth operations and success.

OCHA staff member Andrew Alspach facilitates an inter-cluster meeting at the airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Credit: OCHA/Akiko Harayama
From Haiti and many other experiences, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has identified a number of lessons that both UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC officers should pay attention to. These include:

- The constant need for better coordination in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts; for the benefit of both stakeholders and beneficiaries; within the context of mission and situation.
- The need to regularize the relationships among players. Even in crisis response, relationship-building is important, before, during, and after.
- The need to share and manage information in a generous and open manner. This evokes the UN-CIMIC core task of civil-military liaison and information-sharing. It is especially important to avoid “classifying” information needlessly.
- With regard to military tasking and validation of support, it is important to apply adaptive planning techniques (IMPP) so that the military can minimize its direct assistance role and only provide assistance when it is called forward (“pulled”) rather than just simply “pushing” support forward without consideration of impacts and effects in full.

**Summary**

- Coordination between Humanitarian agencies and the military is very crucial in ensuring the success of disaster and complex emergency relief efforts.
- UN-CIMIC Officers and UN-CMCoord Officers are to work closely and share information during disasters and complex emergencies.
- Military assets and capabilities should be used in supporting role to the humanitarian community rather than lead role in such efforts.
**PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS**

- **LEARNING OUTCOMES**
  - Understand the UN Concept of Protection of Civilians
  - Identify the main actors and partners in Protection of Civilians
  - Identify and understand the roles of UN-CIMIC in Protection of Civilians.

- **STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENTATION**
  - Concept of UN Protection of Civilians
  - Main Actors and Partners in Protection of Civilians
  - UN-CIMIC Support to Protection of Civilians

- **Concept of UN Protection of Civilians**

  In the aftermath of the Genocides in Rwanda and in Srebrenica, the international community struggled with the concept of protection of civilians, raising tremendous awareness that the essence of Peacekeeping must be to protect civilians. The UN has accordingly developed a strong doctrinal framework, including the DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians. ITS has further developed Specialised Training Materials on both Operational and Tactical Level in order to provide guidance on the implementation of POC in the field.

  - POC involves today 100,000 soldiers and is increasingly coming to define the reputation of UN missions. As said before, expectations are high when a field mission is deployed in a post-conflict environment and does not deliver its protection tasks, especially the protection of civilians from physical threat. It severely affects legitimacy and credibility.
  - As a whole of mission activity, POC requires that all peacekeepers – whether civilian, military or police – promote protection of civilians throughout their operational functions pursuant to a mission-specific POC strategy. Unfortunately, civilian, military and police components have tended to work in a compartmented fashion when approaching protection related tasks.
This is the conceptual framework for the development of mission POC strategies.

- **Tier I - Protection through Political Process**: Support to political processes (including peace negotiations and agreements, support to reconciliation, development of governance institutions, etc.) which seek to establish a safe, secure environment where human rights are respected.

- **Tier II - Protection from physical violence**: Taking pro-active actions to reduce the vulnerability of civilians through heightened human rights monitoring, political dialogue, conflict mediation and pressure and engagement with potential aggressors, as well as the establishment of physical defensive positions or cordons and joint protection teams.

- **Tier III – Establishing a Protective Environment**: Creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and sustainable protection (Promotion and protection of human rights, creation of conditions suitable for return, SSR, DDR, etc.)

The DPKO Operational Concept lays out the four phases of the protection response. These phases may not be sequential, but rather should be understood as four
categories of activities which might operate simultaneously depending on the nature of the threats. These phases are part of the Tier II of the POC concept, which deals with physical protection.

- **Phase 1 – Assurance/Prevention**: The measures in this phase are aimed at reassuring the local population of the mission’s intent to protect them, mainly through routine, passive measures.

- **Phase 2 – Pre-emption**: Where measures under Phase 1 prove insufficient, or when heightened risks are detected, more active, pre-emptive measures may be required.

- **Phase 3 – Response**: When the threat of physical violence to civilians is apparent, more active measures aimed at deterring potential aggressors from conducting hostile acts may be necessary. At this stage, the violent behaviour is already underway and steps must be taken to compel the aggressor to comply. Direct military action should be considered as an option.

- **Phase 4 – Consolidation**: This range of activities addresses the stabilization of a post-crisis situation. The aim is to assist the local population and host authorities to return to a state of normalcy, and create the conditions in which a return to crisis is diminished.

 Rwandan peacekeepers of UNAMID escort IDPs on their return from the IDP camp in Aramba to their original village in Sehjanna, near Kutum, North Darfur. (UN Photo #480079 by Albert Gonzalez Farran, July 2011)

These concepts should be integrated into military and police planning processes of contingents whatever are the national peculiarities or different planning processes.

Military tactical tasks as patrolling, observation and liaison, amongst others are basic tools to understand the environment. Most of the times rightly conducting these actions permits units to prevent or timely pre-empt a threat to develop. In other situations, due to a lack of proper capabilities as communications, intelligence and mobility, a straightforward response must be delivered. In all cases, good information sharing and coordination with other actors deployed in the area of operations is highly necessary. HUMINT (human sources) is normally the
main source of information and remains decisive to have an accurate picture of the situation.

Although the mandates, principles, and processes generated from UNHQ have consistently evolved, the ways in which different missions have implemented these mandates have varied. Because missions operate within differing contexts, each mission is required to develop a unique strategy through which to achieve the common principles and aims of protecting civilians in conflict situations according to the unique setting in which it operates.

Main actors and partners in POC
POC is the responsibility of the whole mission actors:

- **Host State as the first and foremost POC actor and specify that the Host State has the primary responsibility to protect** its civilian population and the mission’s responsibility enters into play where the host state is unable or unwilling to protect its population.

- Many international Organizations, NGOs, and Regional Organizations may play also an important role in POC – due to the overlapping implications for security of their organizational and functional area mandates.

The coordination especially special mission staff is, of course, to find ways and means by which UN-CIMIC and the military component it represents can assist and support mission initiatives dealing also with issues related to POC.

It recommends, that “a military gender advisor should be appointed at mission headquarters in the Office of the Force Commander to support mission-wide efforts to implement mandates on women, peace and security and combat SGBV and SEA. The focal point can also support liaison with the mission gender unit and local women’s organizations on UN-CIMIC activities.”

Among many examples: Related to its support of SSR, UN-CIMIC can help leverage the diverse number of women in military uniform in the UN Force to help act as role models in encouraging greater roles for women in local national military and
police forces as well as help train and mentor female leaders. UN-CIMIC should maximize the use of female military personnel in support of gender initiatives, e.g., leadership mentoring and development for gender mainstreaming in host nation security forces.

Druze pilgrims walk past a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) military police checkpoint in Syria. (UN Photo #454364 by Arnold Felfer, September 2010)

### UN-CIMIC support to POC

- **Comprehensive mission POC strategy**
  - The Protection of Civilians is not a direct UN-CIMIC mission.
  - UN-CIMIC contributes to Mission Support and Community Support includes humanitarian support and support to peacebuilding
  - UN-CIMIC should take an active part in POC-related activities at both Mission level (POC working group) and Force level
  - Constant consultation with UN Police, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Legal Affairs and Rule-of-Law must be sought

As the UN-CIMIC Policy states: “Delivery of a secure environment is primarily a military function, while support to the political process and long-term social stability (including through delivery of rule of law, governance, humanitarian assistance and development) are primarily civilian functions.” Thus, POC is a priority peacekeeping mandate.

The Protection of Civilians is not a direct UN-CIMIC mission. However, it is a mission that UN-CIMIC clearly supports, with both mission support and community support implications, including in respect of humanitarian and peacebuilding support. For example, UN-CIMIC could facilitate the prevention of armed groups’ presence in IDP camps by supporting civil assistance initiatives such as constructing water bladders adjacent to IDP camps in order to reduce IDPs exposure to attacks including sexual violence and maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps.

UN-CIMIC could provide support a) to local security institutions as a measure to build local capacity and public confidence as well as to share good practices; b) to strengthen traditional protection mechanisms and community-based security measures.

UN-CIMIC officers should be part of the mission (or multi-component) and military planning team for POC operations, advising on civil-military opportunities and risks as well as implications for civilian and local partners and entities. In both planning and execution of POC, UN-CIMIC can also liaise with key community leaders in
UN-CIMIC also supports the protection of civilians through support of DDR and SSR.

In any case, UN-CIMIC officers should understand how POC applies in their AOR. As this is a highly sensitive, political issue, in addition to UNPOL, UN-CIMIC Officers should constantly consult with Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Rule-of-Law as well as the J3/G3 and Legal Affairs officers on the military staff.

There are numerous ways UN-CIMC can enhance and enable more robust, comprehensive and collaborative mission POC response. The majority of these are with respect to UN-CIMIC’s civil-military liaison and information-sharing function. UN-CIMIC should exploit its strong networks and working relationships with MEOMs, CMCoord, Civil Affairs and other partners to identify and anticipate civil threats and vulnerabilities.

Mission and community support and coordination
- Enhanced coordination with Mine Action, DDR/SSR, Gender, etc. to ensure comprehensive responses
- Enhance host nation/community participation in POC

With respect to its general “mission coordination” role and, more specifically, civil assistance, UN-CIMIC can enhance and enable especially civilian external and internal partner responses. As a matter of mission support, it can lend directly or coordinate Force intelligence, security, and logistics support to Mine Action, DDR/SSR, Gender and other substantive and special mission staff involved in POC.

UN-CIMIC can help coordinate and build the capacity of joint (external and internal actor) security sector responses, such as has been done with mobile Joint Protection Teams in MONUC and “firewood” patrols at UNAMID. It can also assist with enhancing community-based actions such as Community Alert Networks (CANS) and Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Because the implementation of the protection of civilians by the mission is based on a comprehensive mission-wide strategy, the military operational details to protect civilians will be derived from such a strategy and the planning and management of such operations would be undertaken primarily by a military command and operations/plans staff functions. This includes UN-CIMIC.

The planning and management of military operations will also entail joint planning with other mission components. Within this context, the involvement of trained UN-CIMIC staff, in addition to the police and civilian mission components, may provide the necessary information to the operations/planning staff for the implementation of the protection of civilians mandates and provide the necessary linkage to other protection actors, including with FPUs. Additionally, they may also act as a liaison with the police and civilian partners to facilitate the information flow from the military that maybe of relevance for the partners’ protection activities. More specifically, the Chief UN-CIMIC should be or appoint a UN-CIMIC focal point to facilitate communication with UN agencies, funds and programs, NGOs, local partners, and to actively participate in the Joint Protection Framework, whenever applicable.

With regard to coordination with internal actors, again per the UN-CIMIC Policy, UN-CIMIC should include national civilian staff officers and translators from the host country, in particular females, to serve as a link between the military component and the local communities, provide the military with the much needed understanding of the local culture, situational awareness, and information at the grassroots level.

UN-CIMIC could provide support: a) to local security institutions as a measure to build local capacity and public confidence as well as to share good practices; b) to strengthen traditional protection mechanisms and community-based security measures.
As a community liaison function, UN-CIMIC should also facilitate access by local population to mission premises and to expedite the mission’s response to complaints made by local population against mission personnel, where appropriate.

- **Challenges**
  - Understanding the whole POC mission strategy
  - Maintain close coordination with the local actors from host country
  - Perception of humanitarian action

- **Summary**
  - UN-CIMIC has very important roles to play in supporting POC mandate
  - Liaison and information sharing at all levels are very crucial to ensuring POC
  - To ensure effective POC, UN-CIMIC officers need to coordinate all activities with all actors and partners
SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS & DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION (SSR & DDR)

Learning outcomes

☑ Understand global aspects of SSR
☑ Understand global aspect of DDR
Identify the UN-CIMIC support that can be provided to implementation of SSR and DDR

Structure of the presentation

☑ Security Sector Reform (SSR)
☑ Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
☑ UN-CIMIC support to SSR & DDR

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Security Sector Reform:
Process of assessment, review, monitoring and implementation led by national authorities to the enhance effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples with full respect for HR and RoL.

While DDR and SSR are linked, SSR is a much more comprehensive and complex undertaking, as the definition of the “security sector” by the 2008 Report of the Secretary General on SSR (A/62/659) clearly suggests.

The security sector is “a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society...
groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered as part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.”

- **sector-wide approach to SSR**

This illustrates the sector-wide approach to SSR at the UN field mission or operational level.

- **Additional module: UN-CIMIC and Substantive areas – SSR & DDR**

**SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

- **UN SSR at Field Mission Level**

- Right-size Security services

- Train and equip uniformed personnel – effectiveness and accountability

- Facilitate national SSR dialogues

- Develop national security and defence policies, strategies and plans

- Strengthen oversight, management and coordination capacities

- Monitor and evaluate programmes and results

⇒ SSR is a form of transition management from PK to PB

Sector-wide security sector support goes beyond critical yet narrow exercises like “right-sizing” the security services or “training and equipping” uniformed personnel. In addition, sector-wide assistance addresses the combination of effectiveness and accountability in all security structures and processes. To that
end, the SSR Unit assists Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions in support of efforts by national authorities to:

- facilitate national SSR dialogues
- develop national security and defence policies, strategies and plans
- strengthen oversight, management and coordination capacities
- articulate security sector legislation
- mobilize resources for SSR-related projects
- harmonize international support to SSR
- monitor and evaluate programmes and results.

Defence sector reform is an essential part of the SSR because the defence sector has the potential to protect a state and its population, but that same sector – or components of it – can threaten a state and its population. The defence sector should be a source of stability instead of instability.

DSR is generally understood as part of the process inherent in SSR that strives to transform security institutions into professional and accountable institutions. The end result is a national defence establishment under democratic and transparent control that possesses the full spectrum of capabilities and capacities required to be responsive to the defence needs and wishes of the population of a state, thus guaranteeing lasting peace and stability at home, as well as regional and international stability.
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

The objective of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic aspects.

DDR stands for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The objective is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims at dealing with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support male and female ex-combatants and men, boys, women and girls associated with armed forces and groups, so that they can become active participants in the peace process.

"The DDR of former combatants and those associated with armed groups is often a prerequisite for post-conflict stability and recovery. Of course, there can be no substitute for national leadership and the political commitment of warring parties to disarm and demobilize. But in a peacekeeping environment, a successful DDR programme depends highly on the ability of the United Nations system to plan, manage and implement a coherent and effective DDR strategy." The Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)

A DDR programme is an integral component of the overall international effort to immediately stabilize a fragile post-conflict security situation. It is also an important part of the overall peace-building effort, which includes reform of the security sector, establishment of the rule of law, a functional economy, and workable political institutions.
### Definitions

**Disarmament**
Collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

**Demobilization**
Formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces/groups. Reinsertion = support package provided to the demobilized.

**Reintegration**
Process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Repatriation - process dedicated to foreign former combatants, if any.

Instructors can insist on the signification of the acronym DDRRR (DD triple R).
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

DDR Challenges

- Political will/fostering national ownership
- Adapting programmes to the dynamic nature of peacekeeping environments
- Linking DDR with other peace-building process
- Linking DDR to economic recovery
- Ensuring seamless flow of all phases of the DDR
- Sustainable Reintegration
- Availability of trained DDR personnel

DDR is highly dependent on political developments in the country. The critical factor for timely implementation of DDR is therefore the existence of political will to do so among relevant national authorities. It is also critical that national actors take meaningful responsibility for the implementation and results of DDR.

No two DDR programmes are identical because the contexts, in which DDR is implemented, vary from one country to another. Therefore it is important that DDR planners analyse the country in which they operate and adapt their programme. Integrated DDR Standards describe options available to policy makers and planners. Further development of DDR is called “Second generation DDR” (Cf. next slide).

DDR coexists with a large number of stabilization or peace-building processes. It is important to be aware how those processes interact and how they may impact on one another.

A classic example is the linkage between DDR and elections. In some peace/political agreements the conduct of elections was made conditional on the delivery of DDR programmes. This was later used by political actors to delay elections by slowing down delivery of DDR programmes.

DDR processes oftentimes result in the “reintegration to the poverty” of the post-conflict environment. While options offered to ex-combatants must be comparable to what is available to the population at large, opportunities offered to them must be based on “real economy” and not simply their aspirations and hopes.

While Disarmament and Demobilization are relatively simpler to implement and fund (Regular Mission budget), Reintegration is not only a longer process, but funds for it have to be separately raised.

La Flamme de la Paix (Flame of Peace) monument commemorates the ceremonial burning of 3000 weapons in March 1996, in honour of the end of the Tuareg rebellion in Timbuktu (Mali). Many of the old guns are embedded in cement at the base of the monument. (Photo Richard Zabot)
Second generation DDR

- Preconditions for traditional DDR do not exist (cease fire, all-inclusive agreement, political will of parties to the conflict, minimum security)
- Same strategic aims as traditional DDR but deals with different types of armed groups (e.g. militias, gangs, self-defence groups) which may have some non-political motivation
- Umbrella term for innovative programmes – not a sequential progression of discrete components but a wide range of options

- MINUSTAH: Community violence reduction (CVR) in Haiti
- UNOCI: Implementation of “Micro-Projects” in Abidjan

The term “Second Generation DDR” (which could be also called “Interim stabilization”) is used to describe evolving practices. To facilitate better understanding of the Second Generation concept, the study contrasts this new approach with “traditional DDR”, which shares the same strategic aims as Second Generation DDR (to support the peace process, create political space and contribute to a secure environment). Whereas traditional DDR focuses mainly on combatants that are present within military structures, the focus of Second Generation programmes shifts away from military structures towards the larger communities that are affected by armed violence.

Second Generation programmes include a number of different types of activities that can be implemented when the preconditions for traditional DDR are not in place in order to support the peace process, build trust, contribute to a secure environment and help build the foundation for longer term peacebuilding.

The recent report on Second generation DDR offers further options for situations where IDDRS may not fully apply, including community violence reduction (CVR) in Haiti or Micro-projects conducted in Ivory Coast.


UN-CIMIC Support to SSR & DDR

Nexus SSR-DDR

- “SSR and DDR are integrally interconnected” – planned, resourced, implemented and evaluated in parallel
- Natural point of intersection is the reintegration phase – helps ensure long term success
- DDR helps SSR by bringing ex-combatants into the new security force and civil society
- SSR helps DDR by consolidating DDR and preventing a return to violence
- DDR and SSR together promote development:
  - Preserving resources and infrastructure
  - Freeing and managing labour
  - Supporting reconciliation that encourages investment
  - Promoting interests of women, minorities, ex-child soldiers, etc.
DDR and SSR should be conceived as one because both share the same objective: consolidation of the state’s monopoly of force so that it may enforce the rule of law. DDR and SSR programs rise or fall together. Additionally, DDR and SSR should be planned, resourced, implemented and evaluated in parallel, not serially. This mutually reinforces both programmes by rapidly transitioning qualified ex-combatants into the new security sector, controlling spoilers, and containing violence. In addition, former combatants can benefit from security sector programmes that provide for their welfare so they do not become a chronic source of instability.

The natural point of intersection for DDR and SSR is in the reintegration phase, as many ex-combatants find employment in the security apparatus that SSR creates. DDR helps ensure the long-term success of SSR, as it shifts ex-combatants into the new security forces, where they no longer threaten the state’s monopoly of force. If done properly, this reinforces the peace settlement by fostering mutual trust between former enemies, encouraging further disarmament and transition into civilian life.

SSR, in turn, helps ensure the long-term success of DDR by consolidating it, as security-sector governance includes ministry programs that provide for the welfare of former combatants. This focus prevents ex-combatants from becoming insurgents or joining criminal gangs. At the same time, effective SSR produces professional security forces that can control spoilers and contain violence.

DDR and SSR together promote development by preserving resources and infrastructure, freeing and managing labour, and supporting reconciliation that encourages investment and entrepreneurship. They also promote the interests of women, minorities, former child soldiers, youth, and others who should be supported in a consistent manner between the two programmes.

### Military contribution to SSR & DDR

- Security of DDR sites
- Information gathering (joint analysis)
- Information dissemination
- Registration of combatants
- Weapons and ammunition expertise
- Logistic support
- Joint armed group analysis (e.g. “hot spot assessments” in with JMAC; harmonized database management)
- Joint development of SOPs on DDR operations
- Joint Recce/patrols with civilian DDR staff

### Global UN-CIMIC support

- Fostering a healthy civil-military relationship in the civil society
- Helping legitimacy of national security institutions in civil society and promoting civil-military dialogue
- Building/Enhance trust – between the UN and the Host Nation
- Promoting Dialogue & Reconciliation to facilitate Political process
- Delivering as One” (SSR and DDR)

Even if SSR is a mission directed by the civilian leadership of the mission, UN-CIMIC – through its civil assistance function – can contribute decisively, particularly with
respect to fostering a healthy civil-military relationship in the civil society of that country.

UN-CIMIC can support the broader intent of helping to coordinate Host Nation and community security institutions in civil society through promotion of the civil-police/military relationship and dialogue as well as helping to instil a public service ethos among those uniformed groups.

As part of its overall transition management support process, UN-CIMIC must conscientiously develop ways and means by which the trust can be transitioned from the UN forces to indigenous forces as part of the overall security transition plan. This is where UNPOL and FPU civil assistance with respect to local police forces can be decisive.

The last two points, “Facilitate political process by promoting Dialogue & Reconciliation” and “Delivering as one” are indeed facilitating transition from Peacekeeping toward Peacebuilding. This would be seen in details in the specific module “UN Transition”

At this stage of the presentation, participants get acquainted with global knowledge about SSR and DDR, and could accordingly determine which UN-CIMIC activities can efficiently support them. Examples and explanations are proposed in the next slides as instructors’ guidance notes

UN-CIMIC support to SSR

Examples

- Support to civil-military liaison and civil assistance, including humanitarian support and support to peacebuilding
- Contribution to mission and military staff planning for DDR
- Support to POC through DDR
- Coordination with DDR Section, UN Police, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Legal and Rule-of-Law on DDR related issues
- Civil-military liaison and information sharing for disarmament and demobilization
- Civil assistance for reintegration – e.g. vocational training
Some examples of specific UN-CIMIC activities that support SSR include:

- Assist with on-the-job training and capacity and confidence building assistance to the local security forces. Gradually expand involvement local security forces in UN security missions on behalf of the government (e.g., joint patrols, cash transport, VIP escort, border security, etc.) in order to facilitate eventual transition of these tasks.

- Assist these forces in the development and implementation of their own civil-military capability in order to promote the civil-military relationship, to include UN-CIMIC staff officer training, attendance of UN-CIMIC courses in-country, and their gradual involvement in UN-CIMIC projects as on-the-job training and public confidence building opportunities.

- Assist with security sector infrastructure and capacity development, to include QIPs improving police stations train-the-trainer of local police in order to enhance their public service and outreach capability, thus promoting community policing, etc. Examples of such legitimacy enhancement include: Red Cross first aid training; public education and outreach on, e.g., gender mainstreaming, sexual exploitation mitigation and rape prevention, HIV/AIDS and other public health awareness; environmental awareness, etc.

- Assist local security force gender mainstreaming through uniformed women personnel involvement in leadership mentoring and development, public education, and recruiting.

- Assist in building the capacity of local civil society organizations promoting the civil-military relationship and civil dialogue. This could include supporting seminars and discussions, ideally at universities and other established institutions of public learning and discussion, aired through UN and other media, to incite discussions on the role of the security forces in that society, human rights, community policing, gender mainstreaming, reconciliation topics, youth outreach, and so on.

- At the operational level, the Chief of UN-CIMIC (J9) should maintain an ongoing dialogue with Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, DDR Office, and the Security Sector Advisor at the mission HQ to determine the parameters and timing of such UN-CIMIC support, as well as with the Force Command Group in general and Chief Operations and Plans Officers (U3 and U5) in order to articulate and update guidance on UN-CIMIC support to DDR and SSR/DSR.

**UN-CIMIC support to DDR**

- Support to civil-military liaison and civil assistance, including humanitarian support and support to peacebuilding
- Contribution to mission and military staff planning for DDR.
- Support to POC through DDR
- Coordination with DDR Section, UN Police, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Legal and Rule-of-Law on DDR related issues
- Civil-military liaison and information sharing for disarmament and demobilization
- Civil assistance for reintegration – e.g. vocational training

UN-CIMIC support to DDR could be twofold: for Disarmament and Demobilization activities supported by the military force, most UN-CIMIC activities are in the first
UN-CIMIC core task of civil-military liaison; whereas, for Reintegration, the main effort shifts to the second core task of civil assistance, especially in coordination with peacebuilding offices and groups.

At this stage, it could be of interest to ask the participants what could be the risk of overly emphasizing ex-combatants for civil assistance activities – especially if they come largely at the expense of or are in gross disproportion to activities for civilians.

- **Example of good practice: the “I drive, you drive” method**

  ![Additional module UN-CIMIC and Substantive areas - SSR & DDR](image)

  **UN-CIMIC SUPPORT TO SSR & DDR**

  **Good practice: The “I Drive, You Drive” Method**

  _“I drive, you drive!”_

  An interesting technique in UN-CIMIC is using the same method to teach a person how to drive a motor vehicle.
  - The teacher demonstrates to the student how to operate the vehicle.
  - After a while, they switch seats, and the student, coached by the teacher, takes the wheel and drives.
  - The student can progressively operate the vehicle alone, gaining confidence as well as competence.

  This same method can be employed in UN-CIMIC, in particular with the transition of security-related tasks under security sector reform (SSR) initiatives. Whether police or military, the UN force can have local security forces participate jointly on missions that will ultimately go over to local actors, first as observers and then as participants, gradually taking the lead in these missions over years more than months. Such tasks could include joint patrols, escorts of civil service payments to banks, humanitarian convoy escorts, personal security escorts, border security, and area and static security missions. This not only helps build the capacity of these forces, it likewise transfers public confidence from the UN forces to local forces over time. This transition process should begin as early in the mission as possible. Four other important points:
  - Be present throughout the whole process, starting with assessment and planning.
  - Concentrate on having them present for starters – don’t worry about whether local partners have full capabilities they are supposed to initially have for this task.
  - Well-publicize these efforts in close coordination with public information.
  - Allow a certain degree of failure in this process – better they make mistakes now while you are still here, lowering the risks of such transitions.

- **Summary**

  - Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are inter-linked
  - SSR and DDR can benefit from an active involvement of UN-CIMIC
  - SSR and DDR are continues activities undertaken in both peacekeeping and peacebuilding
UN-CIMIC IN UN TRANSITION

Learning Outcomes
- Understand Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding nexus
- Identify the key players and the role of UN-CIMIC in early Peacebuilding

Structure Of The Presentation
- Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding nexus
- Key players and the role of UN-CIMIC in early Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.

In recent times, not only is there greater emphasis on conflict prevention and bringing them to an end as quickly as possible, but equally importantly, is transforming the conflict once it has become manageable enough for peacekeeping and especially peacebuilding. For these reasons, the core nexus for UN-CIMIC is between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It is therefore important to understand how peacekeeping and peacebuilding are interlinked and the key role UN-CIMIC plays in transition management from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

Although you cannot have development without security; you cannot also have security without development. Peacebuilding and the transition to peacebuilding begin during peacekeeping. Peacekeepers are also peacebuilders; and the most capable among them in military uniform must be UN-CIMIC Officers.

Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding nexus

UN Security Council Resolution 2086 – Mission integration

UN SCR 2086, 21 January 2013 - Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping
- Landmark UN policy on full-spectrum peacekeeping
- Expanded range of peacekeeping
- More comprehensive, coherent, and integrated approach
- Greater emphasis on conflict prevention in peacekeeping as well as linkages to peacebuilding
- Role of peacekeeping to create an enable environment and implement early peacebuilding tasks
- More integrated action to improve the coherence of UN missions and activities
- UN-CIMIC is a framework to operationalize this more robust view of peacekeeping and “early peacebuilding”
UN Security Council Resolution 2086 of January 2013 reinforces the concept of mission integration in the Capstone Doctrine and “multi-dimensional peacekeeping” from a full-spectrum perspective.

All of these points are major reinforcement of UN peacekeeping policy in such a way that further elevates the importance of strong working civil-military relations as well as transition management in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. UN-CIMIC provides a framework to operationalize this more robust view of peacekeeping and “early peacebuilding.”

Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal states five key principles:

- Early planning: Planning for UN transitions needs to begin early, take into account different potential scenarios, and remain flexible throughout.
- UN integration: UN transitions involve the reconfiguration of the overall UN presence and objectives, not only the drawdown and withdrawal of a mission.
- National ownership: The success of UN transitions hinges on national ownership, leadership and political will in the host country, which should be secured through high-level political engagement, as well as support from a broad and representative range of national stakeholders.
- National capacity development: The existence and development of relevant national capacities is critical to ensure an effective and sustainable handover of mission responsibilities to national partners.
- Communication: UN transitions can cause anxieties and diverging expectations among national and international stakeholders, including mission staff and UNCT members.

Roles, responsibilities and coordination mechanisms lies upon Mission and UNCT leadership plus UNHQ, which are in charge of planning UN transition in close coordination with national and external partners.

Management of UN Transitions

- Political process and stakeholder expectations:
  - Building consensus with key stakeholders
Managing the political process and stakeholder expectations requires building consensus with key stakeholders and managing expectations through clear and consistent messaging insofar as it represents a highly political process.

National capacity development is a central tenet of peacebuilding and a consistent priority for both UN missions and UNCT partners, and may require a generational effort beyond the withdrawal of UN missions with the support of UNCT and non-UN partners.

The continuity of peacebuilding efforts throughout and beyond UN mission transitions requires the sustained political and financial commitment of national and international actors.

Mission support aspects of UN transition will include Staff management and national staff capacity development.

### Transition Management PK-PB

- **Success Factors:**
  - Legitimacy
  - Local Ownership
  - Credibility
- **How Peacekeeping Facilitates Peacebuilding:**
  - Create a Secure and Stable Environment
  - Facilitate the Political Process by Promoting Dialogue and Reconciliation
  - “Delivering as One”

In terms of this transition management aspect of peace operations, the Capstone Doctrine stresses three success factors: legitimacy, local ownership and credibility. The legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations is derived from its unique position in international law, the UN Charter and UN Security Council authorization. This legitimacy is rightly seen as one of the key assets, and comparative advantages, of UN peacekeeping operations. UN operations can lose legitimacy when perceived to be serving national or regional interests, and when it fails to secure local ownership. A peace process cannot be consolidated if it is not locally owned, and if the host-nation cannot assume responsibility for its own governance. It is challenging, but important, to also maintain the third success factor, namely credibility, throughout the lifetime of a peacekeeping operation.

Whilst UN peacekeeping operations are meant to support a peace process, it cannot deliver peace on its own. Within this larger context, it argues that the core business of UN peacekeeping is firstly, to create a secure and stable environment, including strengthening the capacity of the state to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and for human rights. UN peacekeeping operations should, secondly, facilitate the political process by promoting and facilitating dialogue and reconciliation and support the establishment of legitimate and efficient governance institutions. Thirdly, UN peacekeeping operations should provide a framework for ensuring that the UN family as a whole, and other international actors, pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner. This has been referred to as “delivering as one.” “Delivering as one” applies to the full spectrum of peace and security activities; including...
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as well as security sector reform (SSR).

**Role of Peacekeepers in early Peacebuilding**

**ROLE OF PEACEKEEPERS IN EARLY PEACEBUILDING**

- Assist host countries in developing critical peacebuilding priorities and strategies.
- Help to create an enabling environment for relevant national and international actors to perform peacebuilding tasks.
- Implement early peacebuilding tasks themselves.

As stated in the Resolution 2086 (2013), those points are important roles played by multidimensional peacekeeping missions in early peacebuilding.

**External and Internal Actors**

- **External Actors – International**
  - Civilian, police, and military mission components
  - UN agencies and organizations
  - Foreign embassy sponsored actors
  - International organizations, NGOs, corporations
- **Internal Actors – Local National**
  - Host Nation government
  - Parties to the conflict
  - Tribal and local leaders
  - Local NGOs and civil society organizations

Peacebuilding is also highly cognizant of the difference between external and internal actors, which is a categorization UN peacebuilders make. Moreover, it is also about managing the relationship between the two.

There are, of course, some grey areas between external and internal actors. The best way to keep track of the relationships among these actors is the “follow the money” – i.e., observe the project funding or contractual process from an international or external government office to an international NGO to a local or indigenous NGO. In some cases, international NGOs will execute programmes for which they have obtained their own funding, whilst in others they may act as implementing partners for UN agencies like UNHCR (refugees) or WFP (food distribution). Or they may act as implementing partners for aid agencies such as the European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC/ECHO), and bilateral donor agencies like JICA (Japan), USAID (US), DFID (UK), GTZ (Germany), NORAD (Norway), SIDA (Sweden), CIDA (Canada), and GOAL (Ireland). Most of these donor agencies are represented at the country level, usually through their embassies or diplomatic missions. Oftentimes, these actors engage internal actors such as indigenous or local NGOs and civil society organizations as those partners proliferate and improve in capability. In this sense this process helps to “localize” efforts at filling gaps in civil society that public institutions might otherwise fill. There is another reason to follow the money – the activities and projects these actors are involved more times than not reflect
the interests and objectives of those who are funding and assisting them. This is most helpful in assessing the civil situation and knowing whom to assist and how

- **UN Civil Affairs**
  - **Representation, Monitoring, and Facilitation**
    - Coordinate any civil-military communications with local actors first with Civil Affairs
    - Share any information on the local or military/security situation with Civil Affairs
    - Ensure any UN-CIMIC activities are coherent, coordinated and consistent with mission objectives through Civil Affairs
  - **Confidence-Building, Conflict Management, and Reconciliation**
    - Identification, implementation and monitoring of QIPs
    - Civil Affairs is the main partner in transition to peacebuilding
  - **Support to State Authority**
    - Follow the Civil Affairs lead in “localizing”

Out of the key partners for UN-CIMIC in transition management from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, the most important in the civilian component in the mission is Civil Affairs. The three major roles of Civil Affairs in support of the mission mandate are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs; as well as their critical implications for UN-CIMIC officers.

**Cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the local level.** Civil Affairs staff represents the mission and liaise with local actors on overall operations and on the full range of mission activities (except where a mission component covering a particular activity is also represented locally). Civil Affairs provide a channel for communicating the priorities and perceptions of different sectors of the population to the mission, concerning the mission itself and the peace process — thus, any military communications activities with the local population must be synchronized with Civil Affairs. Data and knowledge is collected and conditions and developments at the local level are also monitored, as is progress with mandate implementation and possible unintended consequences of mission activities. Conflict analysis and early warning are also provided. Thus, any information with respect to the civil situation must be shared and coordinated with Civil Affairs. As part of the overall UN effort, Civil Affairs takes account of existing UN resources at the local level and, where appropriate, may also facilitate the work of United Nations partners not represented at the local level. Civil Affairs can play an important role in supporting coordination, cohesion and political consistency among local mission actors (including United Nations military and police components) by advising on the broader context of mandate implementation or on specific aspects of relations with civilians.

**Confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation.** Civil Affairs actively supports the development of social conditions conducive to sustainable peace through support to reconciliation and conflict-resolution activities at the local and/or national levels, and through efforts to support popular engagement and confidence in the peace process. These efforts include: convening or facilitating dialogue between interest groups; direct outreach to the population (working with other mission actors to design and deliver appropriate and consistent messages); support to the efforts of civil society groups seeking peace and reconciliation; the identification, implementation and monitoring of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs); and promotion or protection of the interests of excluded, threatened, marginalised or minority groups. Thus, for UN-CIMIC officers,
Civil Affairs is the main civilian interlocutor for military support to transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

**Support to the restoration and extension of state authority.** Civil Affairs are the lead mission contributor to the restoration and extension of state authority in a number of ways, as identified in the Capstone Doctrine. Civil Affairs components support the development of political space at the local level that will contribute to legitimate and representative governance, as well as providing operational support to the activities of state institutions, where appropriate. Support to the development of political space at the local level may involve activities such as civic education, the organization of pre-election political meetings, and assistance with structuring or supporting dialogue between different sectors of the population (including civil society actors) and the government. Civil Affairs work is often focused on supporting participation while representative democracy is being established. The provision of operational support to the activities of state institutions may take a variety of forms, as deemed necessary for mandate implementation and taking account of ongoing United Nations system-wide capacity for responding to institution-building and governance support needs in post-conflict situations.

**Civil Affairs staff frequently head local or regional offices and are therefore the main partner for UN-CIMIC officers at the tactical level.** At the operational level, the Head of Civil Affairs is a major civilian partner for the Chief of UN-CIMIC. Because of Civil Affairs’ central role in mission coordination and numerous mission initiatives, their representation of the SRSG and/or HC/RC, and the potential co-multiplier effects of UN-CIMIC and Civil Affairs cooperation and coordination, UN-CIMIC and Civil Affairs should establish ongoing liaison, as appropriate, and become familiar with their respective mandates and roles in order to identify and exploit opportunities for civil-military synergies.

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**Additional module: Peacekeeping Substantive Areas – UN-CIMIC and UN Transitions**

**UN-CIMIC IN EARLY PEACEBUILDING**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>UNDP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP is the lead UN agency for peacebuilding and development – heavy UN-CIMIC transition management implications</td>
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</table>

- Millennium Development Goals
  - Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger
  - Achieving universal primary education
  - Promoting gender equality and empowering women
  - Reducing child mortality
  - Improving maternal health
  - Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
  - Ensuring environmental sustainability
  - Developing a global partnership for development

- “CIVCAP” – developing and coordination civilian capacity building capabilities (internal as well as external)

**With regards to UN agencies, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the lead agency for peacebuilding and development in the UN system. Oftentimes, when a mission transitions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it also transitions to a UNDP-led**
UN presence for many years to follow. The DSRSG RC/HC is often from UNDP. Because of the heavy transition management implications, UN-CIMIC Officers would do well to establish good working relations with the UNDP offices.

UNDP heads up the implementation programmes, initiatives, and frameworks (e.g., UNDAF) in coordination with other UN agencies and offices, as well as donor development agencies, and under the general provisions of the Millennium Development Goals. Its eight goals make up UNDP’s mandate: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and, developing a global partnership for development.

One of the most interesting initiatives for UN-CIMIC is UNDP’s programme to develop and coordinate civilian capabilities for development and capacity building.

Internal actors comprise of the host nation government; at both the operational and tactical levels, the parties to the conflict, the security sector – military, paramilitary, and police, tribal leaders, and indigenous or local NGOs and civil society organizations in all their varieties. In principle, the host government and other internal actors should play the lead role in the reconstruction process, since it is their own future that hangs in the balance. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that they are unable to fulfil this role in the early stages of peacebuilding operations. As a result, the international aid community often plays more of a leading role than would otherwise be desired.

UN-CIMIC in the Complex PK-PB environment

- Greater coordination is driven by a more complex, dynamic and interdependent mission environment and by limited resources
- UN-CIMIC is the coordination between the military component of the peacekeeping mission and the civilian actors
- UN-CIMIC should be understood within the dual role of the military component in the mission mandate:
  - Ensure a safe and secure environment
  - Make resources available to external and internal actors in support of overall mission objectives
  - A key tool in the mission coordination toolbox

The larger strategic environment also explains how UN-CIMIC plays into the peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding nexus:

- As part of the key nexus of civil-military coordination in complex peace operations, UN-CIMIC is a UN military staff function that facilitates the interface between the military and police and civilian components of a UN mission, as well as between the military force and all other civilians in the mission area, including humanitarian and development actors, local authorities, donor agencies, non-governmental organizations, host nation government, and civil-society organizations, etc. UN-CIMIC is thus conducted by military staff and contingents at operational (Mission HQ or host nation government) and tactical (sector HQ and units, or provincial and local) levels – across the full spectrum of UN peace and security activities. UN-CIMIC, therefore, should be understood within the context of the dual roles of the military component in the overall mission mandate – first, ensure a safe and secure
environment within which civilian actors can operate; and second, make resources available to these actors in support of overall mission objectives.

- Because it serves the overall mission mandate, UN-CIMIC should be understood as a key tool in the mission coordination toolbox. The more meaningful the coordination, the more efficient and effective the overall effort will be; and the less likelihood of unnecessary friction among civil and military players. This is why the mission leadership in general and police and civilian leaders and personnel should have an understanding of UN-CIMIC. From the mission perspective, UN-CIMIC is the concept and method by which the mission leadership; especially civilians; can leverage the capabilities of the military component to further the objectives of the mission mandate.

### UN-CIMIC Support

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding – Coherent, Coordinated, Complimentary</th>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination has been a major challenge</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Civil-military coordination at the nexus of peacekeeping-peacebuilding transition management</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Peacebuilding and thus UN-CIMIC are support activities</td>
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<td>- Peace cannot be built from the outside</td>
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<td>- UN-CIMIC principles help balance between external and internal actors</td>
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<td>- Local ownership</td>
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**Peacebuilding** is a holistic concept that provides for simultaneous short, medium and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. It requires a coherent, coordinated, and complementary (sometimes known as the “3C” model) multidimensional response by a broad range of role-players including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies.

In the short term, peacebuilding is designed to assist the peace process and prevent a relapse into violent conflict, but its ultimate aim is to address the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace. Civil-military coordination is therefore at the locus of one of the central problems of complex peace operations because it contributes to the interface between peace and security objectives on the one hand, and humanitarian and peacebuilding objectives on the other, by managing the interface of the military component with the police and civilian dimensions of peacebuilding. The civil-military nexus is critical to achieving a holistic impact on the conflict the peacekeeping operation is attempting to transform. Civil-military coordination is thus a critical element in any peacebuilding process, without which it would be impossible to achieve an appropriate level of coherence among the different policies and actions of the various agencies engaged in a given peacebuilding operation.

**UN-CIMIC** needs to be understood as a support activity. It is in support of the people and societies that are undergoing transition. Peace cannot be built from the outside. The most important drivers and influences in any peace process is thus the degree to which the parties to the conflict, and the people affected by the conflict, are ready and committed to the peace process. The transition from conflict to peace can be supported from the outside, and such support can be crucial to the success of the peace process as it is only
natural that the parties to the conflict lack trust in each other and can benefit from external guarantees and facilitation, and need assistance with post-conflict reconstruction. However, it is extremely important to keep the appropriate balance in mind, namely that the local actors are responsible for their own future and thus the management of their own peace process. The role of peacekeepers and peacebuilders is thus to support that process.

Peacebuilding is about employing a wide range of dimensions and tools to prevent a lapse into violent conflict, by supporting the emergence of local capacity and civil society and transitioning from conflict to self-sustainable peace. The key dimensions or sectors of peacebuilding are security; political, governance and participation; socio-economic; and human rights, justice and reconciliation.

Summary

- Take a principled approach: The UN-CIMIC principles are fully supportive of the civil-military relationship in the process of transition management
- Work by, with, and through key peacebuilding partners
- Focus UN-CIMIC on a peacebuilding-driven approach that assists more indirectly than directly
Module
Scenario Based Exercises on UN-CIMIC

== MODULE SCENARIO BASED EXERCISES ON UN-CIMIC ==

INTRODUCTORY NOTES

◊ Module 5 is entirely dedicated to Scenario Based Exercises (SBEs), based on the DPKO/DFS “Carana” generic scenario. The SBEs, The main intent of the SBEs is for UN-CIMIC specialists to apply the knowledge and skills gained through the first package (Modules 1 to 3 and additional module) and enhance their collaborative problem-solving capabilities and critical thinking skills in anticipation of likely situations to be encountered in the upcoming mission.

◊ The SBEs can be tailored to mission, situation, and national capabilities – instructors and PKTIs will be able to leverage a repository of information and references from the Peacekeeping Best Practices System (PBPS).

◊ The pack provides overall guidelines to run the scenario-based exercises as well as specific guidance on each of the scenarios to be given during the de-briefing sessions. The guidance notes have been produced for each scenario as broad guidelines only. They are intended to bring out some learning points from the exercise and emphasize certain issues. They are not intended to be an all-encompassing comprehensive check list. Hopefully more issues and points will emerge during the discussion amongst the participants themselves.

◊ The scenarios are shown to be taking place in the fictional country called Carana, but they draw on real incidents from different countries and missions. The UNAC mission is in place since 2009. It may be appropriate to assume that the events are taking place now unless otherwise specified. The trainer/facilitator should select those which are most likely to match the type of issues that participants are likely to face in their country of deployment.

◊ Module 5 comprises 8 scenario-based exercises which aim to provide a broad range of situations that might confront UN peace-keeping mission personnel any way linked to UN-CIMIC. These scenarios are intended to provide realism and practical value. The core themes and ideas for these scenarios have been taken from actual incidents that have happened in Peacekeeping missions. The trainer/facilitator should encourage interactive discussion amongst the participants and encourage them to reflect on learning points that have come out of the modules rather than adopt a directive approach.

◊ The innovativeness and imagination combined with the knowledge of Instructor on all related subjects will add value to the exercise.
- **Global overview of the scenario-based exercises**

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<th>Exercise Description</th>
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<td>HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY - OPERATIONAL PLANNING</td>
<td>OPERATIONAL (U9- FHQ)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian situation and necessity to establish IDP camp</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Coordination set-up</td>
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<td>SUPPORT TO TREPPEK</td>
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<td>Locals dissatisfied with the way UNAC is conducting QIPs</td>
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<td>- Preparation of a meeting for the locals</td>
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<td>Worsening situation in Treppek</td>
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<td>SBE 6</td>
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<td>SBE 7</td>
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<td>Breaches in the Kalari Peace agreement and risks of inter-ethnic violence</td>
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<td>SBE 8</td>
<td>MINERS STRIKE AND POC CHALLENGE</td>
<td>TACTICAL (SECTOR level)</td>
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<td>Major strike with risk of an escalation into inter-ethnic violence</td>
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<td>- Drafting of a communiqué</td>
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Scenario 1: By way of introduction, this first scenario contains a huge humanitarian problem facing the country (Carana) and the mission (UNAC). This mandated task of the mission will be undertaken by civilian agencies supported by Army and Police. The role of military as a major assisting agency will involve the UN-CIMIC actors in this situation. The operational level roles of UN-CIMIC could be exercised with this scenario.

Scenario 2: Participants are asked to carry out an analysis of the situation of Treppek village and to implement a QIP in order to help inhabitants within a challenging social and environmental situation.

Scenario 3: The theme of this scenario has been taken straight from an unfortunate aviation accident in a UN mission. It has been suitably modified to bring home certain lessons for UN-CIMIC personnel. Complex emergencies and disaster relief are challenging situations for any UN mission. Multiple agencies working in such situations demand proper coordination and sensible information management. This scenario will provide adequate opportunity to UN-CIMIC personnel, commanders and staff to be gainfully exercised at operational and tactical level.

Scenario 4: Credibility and legitimacy of the mission should never be at stake. Perceived injustice or alleged unfair practices can create functional problems for the Mission. Adverse media publicity can snowball into bigger challenges and hurdles. These should be addressed quickly and settled early. UN Peacekeeping Missions undertake QIPs as community assistance projects. UN-CIMIC is involved in QIPs as one of the functions of the Force. Since it involves resources and community expectations, UN-CIMIC and other stakeholders should be familiar with all aspects of QIPs. Any deviations from procedures and guidelines can create problems. This exercise consolidates the knowledge of all officials connected with QIPs. This is also a Public Relations and Information Campaign exercise, dealing with local leaders who have grievances about QIPs and are planning to tarnish the image of UNAC.

Scenario 5: This scenario is dealing with a case of local complex emergency insofar as the situation in Treppek has deteriorated: armed clashes between Fallins and Koris have taken place in the village and its surroundings. It becomes a tactical operational challenge. This is a scenario for training UN-CIMIC in aspects of coordination, as also the linked tactical situation.

Scenario 6: There are guidelines to the Humanitarian agencies and other aid providers for usage of military assets and seeking assistance. Circumstances force aid agencies to seek such assistance from army. This scenario depicts such a situation wherein WFP seeks assistance and army provides it. However, ambush of the convoy, casualties and hijacking of a few vehicles are to be collectively handled by WFP and the army. A tactical level exercise for field level UN-CIMIC officers.

Scenario 7: This scenario is a mix of a challenge to the Mission mandate and POC. Despite a Peace treaty, Security Council mandated presence and SOMA/SOFA, many times the presence of UN personnel are questioned by even major parties in conflict. In this scenario, the CDF has threatened to attack MPC positions. In the process has asked UN to vacate its positions, telling it cannot guarantee safety. UNAC will have to try and diffuse the situation. In the meanwhile do adequate contingency planning to defend the mandate and protect UN personnel and assets.

Scenario 8: This scenario is another complex POC challenge starting with a miners’ strike. Standoff is between the Government of Carana and the miners. UNAC is caught up with twin challenges; POC of different categories of people and safety of UN Personnel. As the complexity of this scenario unfolds, like in actuality of many missions, UNAC will have its hands full dealing with multiple issues and agencies. UN-CIMIC can play an active role in such crisis situations.
• **Objectives of the exercises**

   The objectives of the exercise are to assist Peace keepers to function effectively when faced with challenging situations in complex operational scenarios of a Peacekeeping mission. The aim of the exercises is to train personnel dealing with the subject of UN-CIMIC in any capacity. The participant could be military, police, civilian peacekeepers or a unit. They could be senior officials, staff, commanders or personnel functioning in the field. Exposure to this exercise will help the participants to understand the nuances to plan, coordinate and implement actions in a given situation with the ultimate objective of effective functioning. They are intended to consolidate the learning points from the four modules and reinforcing some of key take away points. The exercises are intended to help participants evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of a number of possible courses of action and then be able to decide on the most appropriate or acceptable course of action. The UN-CIMIC personnel should understand the impact of the decision within the overall context of the whole UN operation and be able to coordinate with other actors in order to ensure a synchronized response. This will involve both pro-active and reactive planning and a number of the scenarios have a ‘real-time’ element, in which participants need to be able to adjust their original plans to take into account new developments.

   It is recommended that the Carana scenario be given to the student well in advance so that adequate time is available to the participants to familiarize themselves with the pre-reading material on Carana and begin to evaluate the situation from UN-CIMIC point of view. The exercises will help participants to develop a thorough understanding of the field mission environment, day to day challenges, multiple actors and resources/options available to the UN mission.

• **Which scenarios to run?**

   The exercises involve a range of different scenarios from which the trainer can pick the most suitable for the needs of the particular group of participants. The exercises are covering both operational and tactical level scenarios. Complexity of expected responses is accordingly different. Some of the scenarios involve primarily a military response and some primarily multi-agency response. Some are aimed at mission headquarters of a mission, some at the sector level and battalion level. Most of these situations require civilian, military and police elements of the UN mission to cooperate closely to tackle the challenges satisfactorily. A few scenarios are pitched at the higher level which will demand strategic vision, awareness of the political fallouts and professional operational response. Based on the above inputs appropriate SBE could be selected.

• **Mode of Conduct of Exercise**

   There is no standard format suggested for conducting the scenarios. Each scenario will need different mode of conduct based on the level of participant and time available. Ultimate aim should be comprehension and assimilation of the subject by the participants. The endeavour should be to make this exercise as interactive and interesting as possible. Flexibility should be with the facilitator to plan, conduct and adjust the timings depending on the progress and allotted time. Broad headings under which exercise can be conducted are given below (as per planning steps may be skipped or more added):
- Issue of papers, on relevant SBE well before the conduct day
- Introduce the scenario in a Plenary Briefing
- Discuss requirements
- Division of work, team making and allotment of appointments for role play
- Planning and discussion time for Participants
- Attempt Staff Officers tasks, if the Exercise has incorporated
- Presentations by team or individual appointments
- Plenary Discussion and Checking of staff Officers work
- De-brief on the exercise and lessons learnt

Scenarios can be selected as per the need. The groups can be split into groups of five or six participants, after initial briefings. Endeavour should be to have a mix of varied expertise in each team. After the stipulated time, the teams should report back with the solutions. Following the presentations, the facilitator should lead them through a guided discussion, one SBE after the other.

### General Guidance Points

- Two important points to emphasise during the debriefing sessions are the importance of working in partnership with other actors and the larger objectives of the mission. The humanitarian actors that the mission personnel are likely to encounter (both UN and non-governmental) would have in this country before the establishment of the mission, and will continue their functions after departure of the mission personnel. Considerable experience of these actors needs to be relied upon for organisational benefits. They can also play critical bridging role between the mission and external agencies including civil society and NGOs. It is important for military actors to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance, which includes international organizations and local, national and international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. Humanitarian action is also largely dependent on acceptance by the parties to the conflict.

- Understanding local dynamics, sensitivities and adherence to the principles of peacekeeping are important. The principles and parameters of functioning of humanitarian agencies should be known to UN-CIMIC.

- Most of the situations will demand coordination and integrated planning between the civilian, military and police elements of the mission and the groups should be reminded of this before the start of the exercise. This will be particularly important if the participants are exclusively military, civilian or police and in these cases the trainer may wish to suggest that some members of the groups take on these roles. This does not need to involve role-playing, but is simply intended to ensure that the participants think about all elements of mission planning rather than simply their own professional discipline.
CARANA SCENARIO (ABRIDGED VERSION)

ABRIDGED CARANA SCENARIO

- Since 2002, humanitarian crisis occurred on a regular basis
- By mid 2000, evolution of political opposition groups and rebel movements
- By 2006, MPC offered a well structured, frequent MPC operations in the West tied up CDF, leaving the South in Loppo Province vulnerable
- CISG emerged from elements of the TATS II minority to attack govt institutions and ethnic FALIN

HISTORY

- 1894 - Founded as a European colony
- 1951 - Civil unrest due to movement for national liberation
- 1954 - Autonomous State of CARANA
- 1962 - Gained independence
- Joseph URGMA came to power with backing of FALIN majority,
- Expelled and killed in 1971
- Former Chief of Army, Christian HAKUTU took over
- 1975 coup led by Col. TARAKONI removed HAKUTU
- Elections of 1986 saw Jackson OGAVO, leader of PDC, elected as first President

POPULATION

- 14 million, growth rate of 3.6% per annum
- Fertility rate of 5.1 children per woman
- Average life expectancy 42.5 years (male 42.1yrs, female 47.9yrs)
- More than 20 dialects spoken, but French is the official language.
- More than 15 ethnic groups, but dominant groups:
  - FALIN (40%) - East and Centre of Carana
  - KOR (30%) - dominate provinces of Territory and Kodoli
  - TATS II (13%) - in the South
== Country Study Overview ==

Background Notes

On 19 May 2009, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement (Kalari Peace Agreement) was signed between the country’s government and rebel forces. The UN Security Council Resolution 1844 of July 2009 authorised the establishment of the United Nations Assistance in Carana (UNAC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Geography
The Republic of Carana has 120000 sq. km of land mass with 300 km coastline. There are two major areas; the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. Rainy season is from early October to December. Carana is rich in natural resources, but are unevenly dispersed. Diamonds are found along the Kalesi River in the provinces of Mahbek and Barin. Copper is mined around Corma. Coal is mined in the province of Hanno. Total population is 14 million, more than half of whom are under the age of 18 years. Life expectancy is 45 years and the infant mortality rate is nine deaths per thousand live births.

Ethnic Distribution
Carana is mainly inhabited by three tribes: the Falin, Kori and Tatsi. Koric (38 percent) mainly live in the west and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. Falins (49 percent) are the ethnic majority in the country and mainly live in the east and centre of Carana, also present in the west and south. The Tatsi (17 percent) mainly live in the south.

History
Carana gained its independence in 1962. Joseph Uroma, Falin from the east of the country, came to power after independence. He was overthrown in a military coup in 1971. There was another military coup in 1975. Free elections were conducted in 1986 and Jackson Ogavo, became the country’s first elected President. The government was dominated by Falin and had no representations from Kori and Tatsi communities. Since 1998, the economy has been in decline and humanitarian crises occurred on a regular basis. In 2003 a rebellion by the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) began in Tereni province. The MPC achieved success in the west over the Carana Defence Force (CDF), and, by 2009, it effectively controlled the western highlands. Although the MPC is multi-ethnic and describes its goal as the restoration of democracy throughout Carana, it draws much of its support from Koric who are the dominant ethnic group in the west. With the bulk of the CDF tied down in the west, Tatsis in the southern province of Leppko agitated and attacked government institutions. A number of these small rebel groups united and called them-selves the Independent Combatants du Sud Carana (ICSC).

Relations with Neighbouring Countries
Carana’s boundaries are the result of the colonial past and do not represent the ethnic distribution in the region. Falins are 10 percent of the population of Sumora, Koric constitute 38 percent of the population of Katasi and the Tatsis constitute 45 percent of the population of Rimosa. The relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good. Even though the Falin make up only 10 percent of the population of Sumora they are politically well connected. The relations between Carana and Katasi are strained. Carana has accused Katasi of supporting the MPC and these allegations have been corroborated. Rimosa has been in the grips of a civil war between two rival ethnic groups.

Political
The Constitution of the Republic of Carana provides for a President, elected for a five-year term. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President and in turn appoints the ministers and heads of government departments. President Ogavo has gradually suppressed effective opposition and since 1996. Carana has effectively been a one party state. System built around chieftains exists in rural areas. The main rebel group is the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC). It has the potential to become an effective political force. The Independent Combatants du Sud Carana (ICSC) lacks structure and
organisation. The government can no longer control significant portions of the country. In the west an alternative structure is evolving under the MPC. The on-going Kalari peace process offers the only real option for sustainable peace.

**Economy**
The conflict and unbridled corruption have worsened Carana’s economic problems. The production of copper is practically halted and diamonds industry is suffering due to extortion by a number of groups. Fighting in rural areas hit both agricultural production and Carana’s timber industry. The net result has been an inflation rate of around 300 percent, mounting debts and almost 60 % unemployment among the youth, who are induced to crimes.

**Social issues**
Carana has high mortality rate in childbirth, low literacy rates and high prevalence of HIV. Crime is high and gang violence takes place on ethnic basis. A high level of unemployment is a cause for many social evils. Alcoholism and drug addiction rates are high amongst both males and females. Young boys are often abducted to be child soldiers. Girls are also abducted by military groups to serve as sex slaves.

**Infrastructure**
Carana had a well-developed road network; however, the years of civil war and minimal maintenance have degraded it significantly. Rural areas have no access to power grid, hence there is no electricity. Only the capital and some larger towns have water supply system. There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal. There is no telecommunications system outside of Carana’s capital.

== Military Police, Rule of Law and Rebel Groups ==

**Carana Defence Force**
The CDF has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). The navy has a small number of coastal and river patrol boats. The air force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited strike capacity. The main military force in the CDF is the army. The equipment is very old and mostly need repair. The air force is effectively grounded due to lack of spare parts.

**Presidential Guard**
The Presidential Guard, two infantry battalions, are the loyal elite force. It is well trained with the task to protect the President. It has a reputation for brutality.

**Carana National Police**
The CPN are located in population centres and are controlled by the provincial administration. Officially, the CPN has 8,500 officers. It has critical shortages of qualified personnel, logistical and financial resources. It is a poorly trained and lead force with little motivation.

**Movement Patriotique De Carana**
The MPC has a total strength of around 10,000 fighters. The MPC is structured into groups of 700 men, each group led by a field commander. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. As a result of the broad public support for the rebels, and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well accepted by the population in the west.
Independent Combatants du Sud Carana
The ICSC is an unstructured formation of rebels of diverging backgrounds, whose total strength is estimated to be around 2,000 fighters. It has a weak command and control structure and discipline and internal cohesion is low, as is the standard of training. Some members are deserters from the CDF, while others are from the civil war in Rimosa.

Landmines
Land mines were used extensively by all parties to the conflict and there are no reliable records as to their location. Consequently mines pose a major and unpredictable threat to the population at large, aid agencies and any potential peacekeeping mission.

DDR
The requirement to disarm is clearly stated in the KPA, which also envisages a restructuring of the defence and security forces. It can be assumed that MPC will honour this commitment if all parties adhere to the Peace Agreement, but the complicated dynamics of rebels make it a more difficult process.

Human Rights
Human rights situation in Carana is of grave concern. The police and the army (CDF) are responsible for both opportunistic human rights violations, politically and ethnically motivated violence, in a climate of total impunity. The presidential guard is an additional threat to the population. ICSC has been responsible for forced recruitment including of children. Impunity is rampant due to lack of judiciary capacity and political/military interference with judicial processes.

Humanitarian Situation
Prices of all basic food items are beyond the reach of most of the population. The World Health Organisation has reported 70 cases of cholera to date. An estimated half a million people have fled the country, taking refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (approximately 200,000 refugees), Katasi (approximately 200,000 refugees) and Rimosa (approximately 100,000 refugees). Another half a million are internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Carana.

Security
The MPC controls the province of Tereni and much of Mahbek and Koloni. The CDF has put most of its forces immediately to the east and this area, although currently peaceful, would become the front-line of a conflict should the KPA break-down.
- Galasi: The primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and IDP camps around the capital. Murder, rape, domestic violence and theft are very high in the camps and the conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene continue to worsen.
- Akkabar: The coal mine workers went on strike as they had not been paid for four months. These men live in shantytowns in relation to the mines in very poor conditions and separated from their families.
- Leppko: The breakdown of government authority in Leppko resulted in an increase of uncontrolled-armed groups that, together with ICSC combatants, have preyed on the local population.
Annexe - UNSC RESOLUTION

Security Council

S/RES/XXXX (2009)

RESOLUTION 1844 (2009) Selected Extracts

Adopted by the Security Council at its XXth meeting on 22 July 2009, the Security Council,

Expressing its utmost concerns at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Stressing the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Carana population,

Deploring all violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread abduction of men, women and children, the use of land-mines and sexual violence against women and children,

Determining that the situation in Carana continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, to stability in the 8th Continent sub-region, and to the peace process for Carana,

Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission Carana (UNAC), for a period of 6 months and further decides that UNAC will consist of up to [6,800] United Nations military personnel, including up to [200] military observers and [160] staff officers, and up to [1250] civilian police officers including formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component;

2. Decides that UNAC shall have the following mandate:

Support for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement:

(a) to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;

(b) to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties military forces;

(c) to develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution, in cooperation with relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and woman; and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;

(d) to carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme;

(e) to provide security at key government installations, in particular ports, airports and other vital infrastructure;

Protection of Civilians, United Nations’ personnel and facilities:

(f) Ensure effective protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within their capabilities and without prejudice to the efforts of the government,

(g) to protect United Nations facilities, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel;

Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:
(h) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;

(i) to monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, abductees, women, children and demobilised child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

(j) to ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities;

Support for Security Sector reform:

(k) to assist the new Carana transitional government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;

(l) to assist the new transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

(m) to assist the new transitional government in conjunction with other international partners, in reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;

(n) to assist the government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;

(o) to assist the new transitional government in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than end 2009;

(p) to assist the new transitional government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

3. **Demands** that the parties cease hostilities throughout Carana and fulfil their obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and cease fire agreement;

4. **Calls upon** all parties to co-operate fully in the deployment and operations of UNAC, including through ensuring the safety, security, and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, together with associated personnel, throughout Carana;

5. **Authorizes** UNAC to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out the tasks listed in paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) to (p);

6. **Emphasizes** that the protection of civilians, as described in paragraph 3, subparagraph (f), must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks described in paragraph 3.

7. **Demands** that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Caranan population, in particular gender-based violence,

8. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annexe - KALARI PEACE AGREEMENT

Article I
A ceasefire is hereby established throughout the territory of Carana, between the belligerents as defined. The ceasefire shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be effected as soon as possible. Cessation of hostilities covers all warlike acts by air, land and sea, as well as all acts of sabotage and incitement of ethnic hatred, and requires disengagement of opposing forces as defined hereafter. The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within seventy-two hours after the signing of the ceasefire.

Article II
2.1 The disengagement of forces shall mean the immediate breaking of tactical contact between the opposing Military Forces of the Parties to this Agreement at places where they are in direct contact by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.
2.2 Where immediate disengagement is not possible, a framework and sequence of disengagement is to be agreed by all Parties through the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC).
2.3 Immediate disengagement at the initiative of all military units shall be limited to the effective range of direct fire weapons. Further disengagement to pull all weapons out of range, shall be conducted under the guidance of the JCC.
2.4 CDF forces will withdraw all armoured vehicles and weapons larger than Calibre .50in from Tereni, Koloni, Mahbek and Leppko provinces.
2.5 All resupply of weapons, ammunition or other lethal logistical supplies will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement. A complete ban on any mine-laying operations will come into effect by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.
2.7 Any attempt to hinder or prevent operations to remove mines will be considered a breach of the terms of the ceasefire agreement.
2.8 Upon the cease-fire taking effect, all Parties shall provide ICRC/ with relevant information concerning their persons detained in relation to the conflict. They shall subsequently accord assistance to the ICRC/ representatives to enable them to visit the prisoners and detainees and verify any details and ascertain their condition and status.
2.9 On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall release persons detained because of the war or taken hostage within three days of the signing of the Cease-fire Agreement and the ICRC/Red Crescent shall give them all the necessary assistance including relocation to any provinces within Carana or any other country where their security will be guaranteed.
2.10 All domestic and external propaganda between the parties and any other action aimed at inciting ethnic hatred will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire agreement.
2.11 All acts of violence against the civilian population will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement. This includes acts of revenge; summary executions; torture; harassment; detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or political affiliation; arming of civilians; use of child soldiers; sexual violence; sponsoring or promotion of terrorists or genocide ideologies.

Article III
3.1 The verification and control of the ceasefire will be overseen by a United Nations mandated Mission will include the establishment of a Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) chaired by the UN, and Joint Liaison Teams (JLTs) at national, provincial and local levels.
3.2 The JCC will be composed of appointed representatives of all parties and the UN. It shall be established immediately upon signing the Peace Agreement.
3.3 All parties will provide details to the JCC giving the strength and locations of their forces. In view of the sensitivity of such information the head of the JCC is to make provision for its appropriate handling. All CDF soldiers and MPC and ICSC members shall be registered.

3.4 The JCC shall be based in Galasi and shall be headed by the UN, which will define its tasks and duties. Rules of procedure will be drafted in consultation with the parties and these will be promulgated through the JCC.

3.5 The JCC will establish the JLTs and make appropriate arrangements for reporting and dealing with issues that they bring to its attention, specifically any issues requiring arbitration between the parties or violations of the ceasefire.

3.6 The Joint Liaison Teams will be composed of representatives of all signatories, and led by officers of the UN. The Joint Liaison Teams will be responsible to the JCC.

3.7 The JLTs will facilitate communication between parties in order to reduce the likelihood of violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and to clarify alleged violations of the agreement.

Article IV

4.1 A Government of National Reconciliation will be set up immediately following the ceasefire to ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring the administration and public services and rebuilding the country.

4.2 The Government of National Reconciliation will be led by a consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a candidate.

4.3 The Government of National Reconciliation will undertake to conduct free and fair elections within 12 months of the signing of this agreement.

4.4 The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately set up a National Human Rights Commission to ensure protection of rights and freedoms in Carana. The Commission will be made up of delegates of all parties and be chaired by a person accepted by all.

4.5 The Government of National Reconciliation will endeavour to facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the conflict throughout the country. Based on the report of the National Human Rights Commission, it will take steps to compensate and rehabilitate victims.

4.6 The Government of National Reconciliation will establish a National Commission to oversee disarmament of former combatants and restructuring of military and police forces.

Article V

5.1 The Government of National Reconciliation will, immediately upon taking office, attend to rebuilding an army committed to the values of integrity and republican morality. The government will restructure the defence and security forces and may, for this purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers.

5.2 In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the Government of National Reconciliation will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders.

5.3 Those ex-combatants of the CDF, MPC and ICSC who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria, and that the armed forces reflect the geo-political structure of Carana within the established strength, which shall not exceed 10,000.

For the CDF - For the MPC -For the ICSC 19 May 2009
Annexe - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT / selected extracts

1. General: This document contains the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Assistance mission in Carana (UNAC). It provides the authority for the use of force and directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which force may be used. While remaining predominantly defensive in nature, the ROE allow for use of force, including deadly force if necessary, in order to ensure the implementation of the authorised objectives of the military component of UNAC.

2. Authority: The powers and authority of UNAC derive from SCR 15844 (2020) of 22 July 2020. They must be exercised in a manner consistent with UNAC’s mandate. In accordance with this resolution, the right of UNAC to use force otherwise than in self-defence is accordingly limited to the circumstances listed in paragraph 3 (I) below.

3. Execution of RoE
   a. General: The conduct of peacekeeping operations is governed by the purposes of the Charter of the UN and relevant principles of international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict. Throughout the conduct of military operations, where armed force is to be used, UNAC military personnel must comply with international legal principles of proportionality, the minimum use of force and the requirement to minimise the potential incidental harm.
   b. Self-Defence:
      (1) Nothing in these ROE negates a commander’s right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence. All UNAC personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.
      (2) Pre-emptive self defence against an anticipated attack must be supported by credible evidence or information that justifies a reasonable belief that hostile units or persons are about to launch an immediate attack.
      (3) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals, or by individual units that are under attack, or in danger of being attacked, as well as by other United Nations Forces, that are able to assist those individuals, or individual units. Potentially hostile forces, which are beyond the range of their known weapon systems, or which are not closing on friendly forces, are not to be attacked without authority from a superior officer or clear and credible evidence or information that justifies a reasonable belief that a hostile act from those forces is imminent.
   c. Military Necessity.
      The principle of military necessity authorises the use of only that force which is required to achieve the authorised objective. Military necessity does not authorise acts otherwise prohibited under International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict.
   d. Alternatives to the Use of Force.
      Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort must be made to resolve a potential hostile confrontation by means other than use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance from local authorities). Force may be used only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the immediate objective.
   e. Duty to Challenge and Warn.
      Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter any person or group from demonstrating a hostile intent or committing a hostile act.
   f. Duty to Observe Fire – Target Identification.
      Positive identification of hostile parties or persons is required before opening fire. All fire must be aimed and controlled, and only the minimum number of rounds necessary is to be fired.
   g. Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force.
      (1) Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the authorised objective. In some circumstances, operational urgency may require the immediate use of deadly force.
(2) The use of force must be proportional to the level of the threat. However, in some cases the force used to respond to a threat may have to be higher in order to minimise United Nations casualties and civilian casualties.

(3) Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of physical force, such as, psychological methods, information operations, negotiations and other non-lethal means, including the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate resolve and intent.

h. Avoidance of Incidental harm.
When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding and in any event minimising incidental harm.

i. Duty to Report.
Any confrontation involving the use of force or detention is to be reported to the chain of command immediately upon occurrence whether it results in casualties or not.

j. Right to Maintain Position.
UNAC military personnel may maintain their position, personnel or equipment when confronted with a hostile act or intent. In such circumstances, they may also use such force as is necessary to maintain their position and equipment as authorised in these ROE.

k. Use of Force beyond Self-Defence
(1) Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as provided in SCR 18544 (2009) of 22 July 2009, the security Council has authorised UNAC to take the necessary action and to make full use of its authority and capabilities, within the areas of deployment of its military component, including by using force beyond self-defence, to achieve the objectives listed below subject to the conditions set out in these ROE:

(a) To protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment.
(b) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian and development actors.
(c) Without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Carana, to protect civilians provide improved security to the civilian population under imminent threat of physical violence, including the protection of refugees, displaced persons, returnees, and other civilians with regard to the activities of militias and armed groups.

(2) The Force Commander, or the Commander to whom the authorisation has been delegated, retains direct control over use of force in these circumstances.

SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC:

Rule 1 — Level of Force
a. Use of Force, up to and including Deadly Force:
1.1. To defend oneself, or other UN personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorised.
1.2. To defend humanitarian and development actors and other personnel as designated by the HOM in consultation with the FC, against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorised.
1.3. To resist attempts to abduct or detain one-self, or other UN personnel, is authorised.
1.4. To resist attempts to abduct or detain humanitarian and development actors and other personnel as designated by the HOM in consultation with the Force Commander is authorised.
1.5. To protect United Nations facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods designated by the HOM in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury, is authorised.
1.6. To protect key facilities, installations, areas, equipment, or goods designated by the HOM in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury, is authorised.
1.7. To protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance, is authorised.
1.8. Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of use of armed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of members of UN personnel, is authorised to ensure their freedom of movement. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

1.9. Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of use of armed force limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of humanitarian and development actors and other personnel designated by the HOM in consultation with the Force Commander, is authorised to ensure their freedom of movement. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

b. Use of Force, excluding Deadly Force:

1.10. To protect United Nations facilities, installations, areas, equipment, or goods designated by the HOM in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that does not involve a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury, is authorised.

1.11. To protect key facilities, installations, areas, equipment or goods as designated by the HOM in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that does not involve a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury, is authorised.

1.12. Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of use of unarmed force, intends to limit the freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, is authorised to ensure their freedom of movement.

1.13. Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of use of unarmed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of humanitarian and development actors and other personnel, is authorised to ensure their freedom of movement.

1.14. To prevent forcible passage by an individual or group through a roadblock, checkpoint or cordon whose establishment has been authorised by the Force Commander is authorised.

1.15. To prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities, is authorised.

**Rule 4 – Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm**

4.1. Detention is authorised in all situations where the use of armed force or unarmed force is authorised.

4.2. Searching, including of detained person(s), for weapons, ammunition and explosives, is authorised.

4.3. Disarming of individuals or groups, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorised.

**Rule 5 – Duty to Hand-over Detained Persons**

5.1. All detained persons are to be handed over to the appropriate local authorities as soon as possible. However, hand over will not be carried out if there are substantial grounds to believe that he or she runs a risk of being subjected to certain violations of his or her fundamental rights, in particular torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary deprivation of life (including as the result of a death sentence pronounced without fundamental guarantees of fair trial); persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
SCENARIOS 1-8

SBE 1 - HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY

=OPERATIONAL=

Situation

1. The spiralling violence and blockades have seriously affected the availability and prices of all basic food items. Food articles are now beyond the reach of high percentage of the population. Basic sanitation and drinking water availability are badly affected. The Health Cluster lead by World Health Organization has reported increasing number of cholera cases in all areas affected by violence. An estimated half a million people had fled the country, taking refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (200,000 refugees), Katasi (200,000 refugees) and Rimosa (100,000 refugees). Another half a million are internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Carana. There are numerous human rights violations reported every day. The recent turmoil and worsening security situation have brought a sense of impunity among the perpetrators of human rights violations and complicated the Humanitarian situation. Extremists amongst Falins have started targeting Koris in and around Galasi. Hard core Koris have become rebels and are giving nominal fight to the CDF and Falins.

2. Thousands of helpless Kori men, women and children have started fleeing from Galasi towards Maroni and Sureen. They are heading towards Tereni and Coloni in the West to get the protection of MPC and be amongst their own tribe. The unfortunate part of this exodus is lack of food, water, shelter and the distance to cover, especially by the young, elderly and women. To add to their woes is the perpetual threat of Falins and CDF committing rape and brutal massacres.

3. The SRSG has decided to establish an IDP camp in Sureen. The SRSG has also desired that the Mission and the UNCT provide maximum assistance to these helpless victims of humanitarian tragedy. UNDP, OCHA, WFP and MSF are present in Sureen.

4. As the U9 Chief, you have been tasked to do necessary coordination with all agencies to provide maximum help to the fleeing populace and in the IDP Camp.

Questionnaire

1. How does the humanitarian assistance coordination take place?
2. What are the roles of UN-CIMIC and guide lines based on which UN-CIMIC is expected to be involved to provide Humanitarian Aid?
3. What can UNAC do to improve the worsening Human Rights situation in Carana?
4. How does the information sharing between UN-CIMIC, the police, UN-CMCoord and other civilian components take place in UNAC?
5. Draft a UN-CIMIC assessment / commander’s orientation assessing the situation, thus facilitating the planning process.

Extract of the FC’s intent to develop Estimate and the Guidelines for Estimate are given below:

- FCs Intent: The Mission Force component of UNAC will assist the Humanitarian and Human Rights agencies in providing humanitarian aid and Human rights to the people of Carana.
- **UN-CIMIC Assessment:** The UN-CIMIC input to overall estimate is the product developed by the UN-CIMIC Staff during the first stage of the Planning Process. It is the result of collating and assessing information collected for the UN-CIMIC Study into actionable information. It is the basis for issuing CIMIC guidance and making recommendations to the Operations Officer. The UN-CIMIC Initial Estimate is the base document for all subsequent stages of the Planning Process.

**STEPS:**

1. **CRISIS**
2. **ORIENTATION BRIEF TO UNAC WITH ALL STAFF (U CELLS) / ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION/ RECOMMENDATIONS**
3. **COMMANDER GUIDANCE TO THE STAFF**
4. **PLANNING BY THE CORE PLANNING GROUP (U9-LED)**
5. **COAS DEVELOPMENT BY THE STAFF/ (ESTIMATE INCLUDING COAS**
6. **DECISION BRIEF**
7. **CONTINGENCY PLAN AND ISSUE OF FRAGO**

**UN-CIMIC ESTIMATE STRUCTURE :**

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Treppek, south of Faron, is a village located at the edge of the demilitarized zone and composed by a majority of Koris living within the Fallin community.

The Koris population has been fully integrated into the community, and relations with surrounding Fallin populations are not very problematic, though tensions sometimes occur.

The main cause of tension has always been access to the village well which is being controlled by a Fallin family leaving there. About 500-700 people depend on the well for drinking water and everyday use. Some families, mostly Koris, who are into crop-raising also, rely on the well to water their crops.

At the moment, the food supply is adequate. This is partly a result of more villagers getting into backyard and small-scale farming to supplement their food sources. The key challenge is sustaining this activity as during the dry season, the main water well seems to dry up easily. The lack of sources of water makes it problematic for farmers as they are competing with other families for access to water. To avoid further tension, farmers give way to others. This makes crop-raising unsustainable, which could potentially result to shortage in food supply.

**Questionnaire:**
As the UN-CIMIC officer of the Battalion deployed in Faron:

- What is your initial analysis of the situation?

- In order to draft a UN-CIMIC estimate, which information will you request, and from whom? What will be the structure of your assessment and the points you would like to enlighten? Who are the other actors that you need to coordinate with to ensure that there will be no duplication and that the agreed minimum standards are well understood? How will you approach this in such a way that any proposed activity/project will not create “harm” or “problems” in the future?

- Battalion commander asks you to design a QIP: what will be your approach in fulfilling this task (Working plan, points of contact, project management, measures of effectiveness, etc.)?
Situation
1. To tackle the worsening security situation in Carana, it was decided by the Senior Mission Team that there is an urgent need to boost up the UN military presence in Galasi. It took considerable diplomatic effort to convince the Leadership in Galasi to allow a few UN flights to land in Galasi airport, in the pretext of humanitarian access. After a detailed review of the security situation and commitments of troops, the FC was tasked to air lift two COYs from Leppko province and to move a BTLN by road from Mahbek province. The first UN flight (7 officers, 43 soldiers and 4 air crew on-board) took off from Corma at 0600 hrs to carry out preliminary reconnaissance and arrangements in Galasi.

The Accident
2. At 0700 hrs the air traffic control element of Movcon reported to the Mission HQ the missing UN flight. The FHQ was asked to carry out search in the area of Guthar and Fellari provinces along the general area of cleared flight path. All contingents and FPUs were ordered to carry out search. Before even the units could move out, the tragic news of the air accident reached Galasi: it was reported that a UN aircraft has crash landed in a village near Amsan town (Guthar province). The sketchy information only conveyed that the aircraft was trying an emergency landing on a short airstrip and it has crashed on the out skirts of Amsan. The nearest military units are the Sector HQ at Folsa and a small UN Naval unit at Cereni.

2. The Mission HQ swung into action and had a Senior Leaders meeting to take stock of the tragedy and decide on the relief measures. The enormity of the tragedy came to light when the Cereni Naval Unit reached the crash site and reported that the aircraft ploughed through the village, burst onto flames, practically destroying most of the village. The casualties were likely to be high among villagers and UN personnel. It was decided in the Mission HQ to launch a massive rescue and relief operation. All key appointments were asked to contribute in this moment of enormous tragedy.

Questionnaire
1. As a senior functionary in UNAC or the Mission UN-CIMIC Chief, assess the situation. What all need to be done by the Mission?

2. Which agencies are likely to be involved in this crisis?

3. What need to be done and which aspects can be coordinated by the UN-CIMIC staff at all levels?

4. What should be done for better information management?

5. What are the follow up actions in case of such accidents?

6. Prepare a “Commander's Emergency Brief on the Accident”.
**Situation**

1. UNAC has been able actively involved in community support roles since the mission started. The local communities always demand more QIPs without understanding the budgetary and other constraints of the Mission. Moreover, there are some misconceptions and rumours in the local communities about QIPs undertaken by UNAC.

2. Faron Sector HQ had to face a challenge related to QIPs. A delegation led by a prominent leader of Mahbek Province along with some village chiefs came to the SHQ. The delegation took an audience with the SC to convey that the local populations perceived partiality of UNAC in allotting projects to areas where Falins are in majority. They also complained of the poor quality of QIPs due to lack of procedures and supervision, and blamed the UNAC for its lack of interest. They believe that UNAC military is misappropriating the funds insofar as, in their view, funds for QIPs are provided by Government of Carana to UNAC and it is their right to demand quality and equitable distribution.

3. These leaders are now planning to organize a huge demonstration in the near future against UNAC. They want to highlight to the world media the discrimination and corruption in projects undertaken by UN with Carana tax payer’s money. They also plan to involve the MPC rebels who are themselves convinced of the UN wrong doings and game plan. The SC tried to tell the delegation that these are baseless allegations and untrue. After some more attempts, the SC realized that this delegation is not in a position to change their views. He placed an offer to the delegation: He told them that after two days the SHQ would like to host an event in which all the leaders including village chiefs and media persons can attend. He said that in this event, after a comprehensive briefing by the Sector UN-CIMIC officer on QIPs, they can raise their specific complaints. In case not satisfied, they could go to the FHQ or go ahead with their plan. The political leader accepted the offer and was able to convince the village chiefs. The delegation went away after the leader conveyed that they will come with a bigger delegation after two days.

The SC called you, as the Sector UN-CIMIC officer, and asked to organize this meeting. He wants you to prepare a detailed briefing on QIPs; and also coordinate other aspects relevant for the meeting. The issues covered should be able to convince the local leaders about UNAC fairness and professionalism in QIPs.

**Questionnaire**

1. Which are the perceptions and allegations of the leaders that need to be addressed?
2. What should you include in the detailed briefing on QIPs? Prepare a briefing outline to organize the topics that need to be addressed to the delegation. (UN-CIMIC personnel are mostly involved in QIPs, hence all aspects pertaining to QIPs should be known to UN-CIMIC personnel and most of the Military Commanders in the chain of command).
3. What other aspects should be considered to make this meeting a success?
SBE 5 – Local complex emergency in Treppek =TACTICAL=

- The situation in Treppek has deteriorated. Armed clashes between Fallins and Koris have taken place in the village and its surroundings in the last seven days. Koris have been constantly harassed by stoning, burning crops or firing small arms from vehicles passing along the road Xalska-Faron. The Carana government did not react, neither did the CDF authorities.

- Up until yesterday UNMAC has hardly succeeded to defuse the tension. Yesterday evening, some mobile paramilitary forces/spoilers composed of almost 20 deserters and dismissed soldiers-policemen from Xalska entered the village and committed lootings and human right violations against the Koris community. Some unofficial reports indicate that villagers were murdered (claimed to be of ethnic nature with mainly Koris victims). This morning, the Koris population was again stormed by these uncontrollable armed groups. Small arms fire and explosions have been heard in the village. Smoke covered the village and the church was seen on fire as well as some houses. Around 100 villagers have fled their homes in panic and are now hiding in the bush for fear of their lives. The others have been blocked inside the village by the armed group.

- Your battalion assets have been totally deployed around Treppek to protect civilians. Reinforcements have already been requested. The village leader (with whom you are quite familiar) manages to reach you to describe the situation from his point of view. He asked your battalion to protect the village and to evacuate at least the children, women and elderly (total population in the village is 300 persons).

Current Humanitarian situation (as of this morning):

- UNHCR has relief items available in their warehouse in Fallon, but due to safety hazards their convoys are unable to move.
- Your BTLN has water trucks available, some limited stocks of rations and medicine.
- There is an enormous pressure on the UNMAC to establish temporary safe havens for Koris either outside or inside the military camps.

UNHRC: Cluster Lead Agency for IDPs (in conflict situations) and Protection – Fallon
WFP: Cluster Lead Agency for Food – Xalska
CARE: Women and children – Sureen
MSF: Medical care - Fallon
Carana National Red Cross Society - Fallon and Xalska

Questionnaire

1. As the UN-CIMIC officer of your Battalion, what could be your role and actions in term of:
   a. Liaison and information sharing during the crisis, taking into account information requirement and information sensitivity?
   b. Civil assistance (Support to the Mission, Community support) during the crisis and after the fighting has been stopped

2. What could be your advice regarding Treppek’s protection/evacuation?
   a. If evacuation is needed, who will do it and where to accommodate the evacuees? Who should you coordinate with?
   b. What other considerations should you think of?

3. In case of a large influx of escaping villagers seeking a safe haven in your battalion’s units camps:
   a. Should they be let in? Why?
   b. Where is the best venue/location for UN-CIMIC and other coordination activities?

4. On a broader scale, what are the options in dealing with the overall humanitarian situation in Treppek and regarding the use of Military (and civil defence) assets in supporting the Humanitarian actions?
SBE 6—AID FOR THE NEEDY =TACTICAL=

Situation

1. Recently a ship load of much awaited aid items, mostly food has arrived at the sea port of Cereni. The WFP office in Galasi contacted the UN-CIMIC Chief in the Mission HQ and requested for military assistance. He has conveyed that necessary documentation for formal request to the mission is being done. The WFP want these consignments to be transported safely to Folsa, Faron and Sureen storage places for further distribution. To overcome the shortage of available civil transport, WFP has requested for twenty military trucks and adequate protection. He is worried about the hijacking of vehicles by miscreants which are not uncommon.

2. The Mission HQ has cleared the request for assistance. The Force HQ has been asked to provide all assistance. The UN-CIMIC will do necessary coordination with WFP at all levels.

Questionnaire

1. What are the conditions, restrictions and roles in which Military can be involved while providing Humanitarian Aid?

2. Where local capacities are overwhelmed, a variety of international actors may become involved. UN-CIMIC may have to deal with these organizations. Which are these organizations?

3. There are three main ways of delivering humanitarian services. Which are they? Which one is likely to function in the present scenario?

4. What will be the procedure to follow and conditions for such military assistance?

5. What are the implications for WFP in using Armed Escorts? What all actions and coordination need to be done to provide the required assistance?

6. You are a WFP official; you are required to fill the Escort Request form. Sample format will be given by the instructor.
Violations of the KPA, by both the CDF and the MPC have become routine. Following clashes in the town of Faron, both sides began to mobilize their forces in western Hanno, near to the town of Karo, which is under MPC control. The MPC, which had demobilized half of its combatants, has issued a general command for all soldiers to re-join their units. The CDF has accused the MPC of preparing to use Karo as a base for an eastern offensive. It has declared that unless the MPC verifiably withdraw all of its forces from the town, it will have ‘no option’ but to attack.

If the CDF were to seize Karo, their forces could then advance on the provincial capital Sureen. This would be a major blow to the MPC, which could be expected to defend Sureen vigorously. The MPC has responded by accusing the CDF of ‘Destructive Aggression.’ It claims that it is prepared to allow a JLT\(^1\) to verify the number and position of its troops in Karo, which will prove that they are only there for defensive purposes.

UNAC has a small garrison in Karo of 50 peacekeepers, with a further 150 stationed in Sureen. Both garrisons have faced increasing restrictions on their freedom of movement by the MPC. The CDF has demanded that UNAC withdraw its garrisons from both towns and has stated that it ‘cannot guarantee their protection’ if they remain. Its forces are advancing on Karo from three different directions and are expected to arrive in a few hours. UNAC has begun a high level diplomatic and political lobbying campaign with all parties to the KPA. In response to this, MPC has offered to withdraw its forces from Karo if UNAC peacekeepers create a demilitarized zone and prevent the CDF from occupying it.

The CDF have rejected this overture and announced its intention to launch an all-out attack, with three columns of a thousand soldiers each. Tens of thousands of civilians have fled from their homes and are gathering around the UNAC base in Karo. As the CDF move into MPC controlled territory there are reports of clashes between rival groups of fighters. The CDF is using tanks and heavy artillery, in contravention of the KPA. The MPC are using civilians as ‘human shields’ and taking up positions near to hospitals, churches and other ‘protected’ areas, in contravention of International Humanitarian Law. Some civilians are reported to have been killed in the clashes.

**Questionnaire**

You are the UN-CIMIC Chief in the UNAC Headquarters in Galasi.

1. What needs to be done in the UN locations of Karo and Sureen? What can be coordinated to face the situation?
2. What are your considerations in preparation of a contingency plan for the entire mission?
3. Do you recommend any possible re-deployment of UN positions and troops and change of priorities from other mandated tasks?
4. What are your proposals to the Government of Carana, the CDF, the MPC, the UN Security Council and DPKO, indicating what action you would like them to take?

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\(^1\) The UNAC-led Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) established after the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA) is composed of representatives of all signatories to it.
1. Carana was a major exporter of Copper, during the colonial period, which was mined around Mia and Corma and then transported by railway to Maldosa from where it was shipped abroad. Copper production all but ended during the conflict although the mines are now functioning again, at a reduced capacity. Corma has an international airport. The railway line from Corma to Maldosa is also open, although it needs considerable maintenance. The Maldosa harbour is still functioning.

2. Neither Corma nor Maldosa were directly affected by the conflict, although around 1,500 Tatsi IDPs fled to Maldosa to escape the fighting elsewhere in Leppko. Both towns are overwhelmingly Falin, but there is a small Tatsi neighbourhood in Maldosa where the IDPs are staying with host families and in two disused warehouses.

3. Moreover, workers have seen the value of their wages eroded by inflation and there is considerable dissatisfaction with the failure of the government to provide basic social services. The arrival of the Tatsi IDPs in Maldosa has also caused some tensions as there were fears that they will under-cut wages of the unionised workers, which are higher than for those of other workers. The Tatsis live in the poorest part of Maldosa and suffer from high rates of poverty and unemployment.

4. The Copper Miners’ Union is particularly strong and it has been organizing protests against the government – which owns the Copper Mines. Negotiations for this year’s pay-round have broken down, with the government claiming that it cannot afford the union’s demands. The union has responded with a threat of a general strike in the region. It has strong links with the railway workers and dockers’ union in Maldosa – all of which are aligned with the Carana Communist Party (CCP) – and has demanded an across the board increase in wages to compensate for inflation.

5. The government has responded by sending units of the Carana Defence Force (CDF) to reinforce the Carana National Police (CNP) in Maldosa. It is also preparing a contingency plan to hire non-union workers to keep the mines, railway and port open. There is a fairly generalised discontent amongst the regular units of both the police and the army, who suffer from bad pay and poor conditions. Many have not received any wages for several months. The government has therefore supplemented both forces with detachments of the Gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard, who had previously been deployed in the west and south of Carana as part of the counter-insurgency campaign. Most of the police in Maldosa were recruited locally, although the CDF units are drawn from across the country.

6. There is an UNAC/OCHA office in Maldosa and three WFP warehouses, but no military personnel. There are also three international NGOs based in Maldosa carrying out food distribution projects in the south-east of the country. UNAC’s regional headquarters is in Muka, which is three hours’ drive away, and communications with UNAC headquarters in Galasi are good. The strike date has been set.
Questionnaire

You are the UN-CIMIC Chief of the UNAC Regional Headquarters in Muka.

1. What is your contingency plan for the protection of the union workers and other civilians?

2. What proactive measures could be taken to defuse the tension?

3. What supports do you recommend to be given to the UNAC/OCHA office?

After Planning and discussion

1. The strike was widely observed for the first week. Copper production stopped. The railway and ports shut down and the international airport also closed as workers there joined the stoppage. Several large demonstrations took place and passed off peacefully. However, there have been reports of several clashes between members of the local police force and the Presidential Guard. In one case the police intervened to prevent the arrest of a strike leader by members of the Presidential Guard. Both sides brandished weapons, although no shots were fired. The atmosphere changed dramatically on the second week when 400 non-union workers arrived at the two main copper mines near to Corma and re-started production.

2. These were guarded by Gendarmerie, who violently dispersed a protest killing three union activists. CDF soldiers took over the railway line and began transporting the copper to Maldosa from where it is due to shipped out. The port remains closed, but it is rumoured that a non-union workforce has also been recruited to break the strike. It is also reported that many of the non-union workers are Tatsis and some are believed to be IDPs. The police are on full alert and the army is patrolling the town. The miners have called a demonstration to protest against the attempts to break the strike.

Questionnaire

What will you include in an official communiqué outlining your response? This should outline the course of action that you intend to take, issues you will prioritize and assistance you need to give to the UNAC/OCHA office in Maldosa. It should also include proposals to the Government of Carana, the UN Security Council and DPKO.
GUIDANCE NOTES FOR INSTRUCTORS ON SBES

Guidance Notes on SBE 1 – Humanitarian and Human Rights Tragedy

As an introduction, this scenario contains humanitarian aid challenges and worsening Human rights situation facing the country and the mission. These being core mandated tasks for UNAC, these will be undertaken by humanitarian/ human rights agencies supported by military and police. The role of military as a major assisting agency will involve the UN-CIMIC actors in this situation. They would be sharing information, coordinating with multiple agencies for mission support and community support. The operational level roles of UN-CIMIC could be exercised with this scenario.

Military Undertaking Humanitarian Activities: Aid agencies are principally responsible for undertaking humanitarian activities to help relieve human sufferings. This is not to say that other actors, including the military, cannot contribute to the Humanitarian effort, as long as they act in accordance with humanitarian principles. Peace operations are often confronted with a humanitarian imperative like the situation in Carana. In comparison to aid agencies, Military can have the capacity to implement certain projects that humanitarian operations sometimes find difficult. Military and humanitarian actors agree that in complex emergencies, and where 'general circumstances' apply, the military should not undertake humanitarian activities. For 'exceptional circumstances' where the military may contribute to humanitarian efforts, guidelines have been drawn up. When there is a desperate humanitarian need, as a last resort when there are no alternative options, only if the military acts in accordance with civil direction. Military involvement in humanitarian activities is circumscribed because of problems of impartiality. There have been concerns amongst humanitarian operators that the military's underlying motivation for carrying out certain humanitarian activities is to achieve their military objectives, rather than to address a specific humanitarian concern.

A number of tasks undertaken by the military are humanitarian in nature and for the military commander they are activities to alleviate the sufferings of the local community and thereby improve confidence in the Force and in the overall mission. The question is whether military and humanitarian outcomes can be reconciled? From a peace building perspective there is an indirect impact on the conflict if the military undertakes humanitarian activities and undermines impartiality. There have been examples of such instances in recent complex emergencies. It is surprising that, although the main objection to military involvement in humanitarian activities has been on the basis of principle (i.e. impartiality), the guidelines established are based more on practical considerations. This is no doubt because it would be extremely difficult to establish with certainty criteria related to the degrees with which impartiality could be compromised.

Reference Material for SBE 1

Some of the recommended reference material for reading to attempt SBE 1 are given below:-
• Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC), 2010
• Mission Support including creation of safe environment and provision of Armed Escorts
• Module 2 – UN-CIMIC in the Integrated Mission Environment
• Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and UN-CIMIC. (Session 1- Module 3)
• Module 2 UN-CIMIC and Mission Coordination

**Role Play for Scenario 1**
The Following Appointments could be nominated (depending on the Type and level of course) for role Play:
- DSRSG/HC/RC
- Force Commander
- DMS
- Police Commissioner
- Chief J9
- Mission Head OCHA
- Mission Head Human Rights
- Mission PIO

**Question 1:** How are the Humanitarian Activities coordinated including in Carana?

This question is framed to improve the understanding of UN-CIMIC personnel about the humanitarian agencies who are actively involved in the mission area. UN-CIMIC being a coordinating agency should be fully conversant with the coordination mechanisms of other agencies.

**Coordination at the Global level:** The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is the highest-level body for humanitarian coordination. It includes the heads of all seven operational humanitarian agencies in the UN system and three other offices within the UN Secretariat. It also includes representatives of the International Federation of the Red Cross, the Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response, a group of 8 of the largest international NGOs, Interaction, a coalition of 170+ international non-governmental organisations, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, a network of 70+ international non-governmental organisations. The UN’s highest-level official is the Emergency Relief Coordinator / Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. This senior official chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The Emergency Relief Coordinator is supported by the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a part of the UN Secretariat. OCHA support development of country-level strategy, provide leadership in the UN system on humanitarian policies, evaluations and best practices, advocate and raises awareness on humanitarian issues at global level.

**Coordination at the Country Level:** Carana government has the presumptive right and responsibility to coordinate humanitarian assistance. Here it may look unlikely. The exact
structures put in place will vary from country to country. Common approaches in major emergencies include:
(i) Setting up a special coordination unit or ministry at the central government level.
(ii) Giving coordinating authority to specific senior officials in regional areas.
(iii) Attending or chairing coordination groups in specific sectors, e.g. Ministry of Health personnel may attend Health cluster meetings.

The UN uses three major mechanisms to complement government coordination. These are:
(i) Humanitarian Coordinator system,
(ii) OCHA field missions, and
(iii) Humanitarian clusters

In addition, non-governmental organisations sometimes set up parallel structures for coordination. There is no command and control system among humanitarian actors. Coordination in each case usually depends upon consent and consensus-building. It will accordingly depend heavily on interpersonal relationships: trust and goodwill between the different actors.

**Humanitarian Coordinators:** At the start of a major emergency, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator normally appoints a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). The person appointed as HC is usually the Resident Coordinator, the senior Humanitarian UN official in the country. The HC is a facilitator and works by consensus building. There is no direct management line between the Humanitarian Coordinator and the heads of agencies that sit on the Country Team. The HC works with the UN Country Team, which comprises the heads of every UN agency and programme present in the country. In “integrated” peace-keeping missions, this official is brought inside the mission as a Deputy to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). There is then a “triple hatted” DSRSG / Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator S/he coordinates UN efforts on the following tasks:
- Negotiation and advocacy with host government
- Strategic planning: division of responsibility between agencies
- Contingency planning
- Cooperation with actors planning rehabilitation and reconstruction

The Humanitarian Coordinator’s office can also request access to the following resources, which are shared across the UN agencies in-country:
(i) UNDAC – Disaster Assessment and Coordination team – stand-by team that can be flown in within 24 hours to assist with rapid needs assessment and coordination of first responses. Usually used for “sudden-onset” disasters such as earthquakes or floods.
(ii) HIC – Humanitarian Information Centre – a space where the Humanitarian Coordinator’s office and humanitarian agencies can share information such as needs assessments, maps and contact lists.
(iii) UNJLC – UN Joint Logistics Centre – a Common Service to facilitate information-sharing, mapping and pooled logistics capabilities.
(iv) HAS – Humanitarian Air Service – a Common Service for movement of civilian personnel and supplies.
(v) CERF – Central Emergency Response Fund – a pool of funds that can be used for rapid response if other sources of funding are not yet available.

**OCHA field missions:** The Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) may establish a field office for major emergencies. Usually when a Humanitarian Coordinator is appointed an OCHA mission will also be established. The field office then facilitates and supports the main tasks of the Humanitarian Coordinator. This will sometimes include UN Civil Military Coordination Officers to facilitate relationships between the humanitarian community and the peacekeeping mission and/or other military forces. OCHA will often also establish regional sub-offices to help coordinate humanitarian activities at the local level. In “integrated” missions where the Humanitarian Coordinator is part of the mission, the OCHA office will often remain outside the mission. This is sometimes called the “one foot in one foot out” approach. The goal is to help the HC coordinate with other agencies who might not want to deal directly with the peacekeeping mission.

**Humanitarian clusters:** The “cluster system” for humanitarian coordination was introduced in late 2005. A “cluster” is a group of all humanitarian agencies who are working in a particular sector. In major emergencies, there will be clusters in some or all the following sectors: Agriculture, camp management, early recovery, education, health, logistics, nutrition, protection, shelter, telecommunications and water and sanitation. In each cluster, one agency will be designated as “lead agency”.

**Question 2:** What are the guidelines based on which UN-CIMIC is expected to be involved to provide Humanitarian Aid?

Humanitarian activities aim to save lives, protect human dignity and alleviate suffering. This involves two main kinds of work:

(i) **Assistance:** Ensuring access to the minimum requirements to sustain life with dignity. Activities include supplies and services related to water, sanitation, food, nutrition, health care and education.

(ii) **Protection:** Ensuring respect for basic human rights. This includes, for example, advocacy with governments and armed groups, legal assistance, and helping communities organise to reduce violence against civilians.

Humanitarian services must be delivered according to the following principles:

- **Humanity:** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. Relief groups pay particular attention to the most vulnerable populations, such as children, women, and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims is respected and protected.

- **Neutrality:** Provide humanitarian assistance without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious, or ideological nature.

- **Impartiality:** Provide humanitarian assistance without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race, or religion. Relief of the suffering is guided solely by needs and priority is given to the most urgent cases of distress.
The General Assembly has stated that these principles must be followed by agencies within the UN system. Outside the UN, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have developed a Code of Conduct which includes these principles (among others). This Code has been signed by many of the largest humanitarian organizations. Sometimes, organisations will act to save lives or provide other basic service to needy populations but do not follow these principles. Many humanitarian organizations do not like to refer to such activities as “humanitarian”, and prefer terms like “relief activities” or “emergency assistance”. For UN missions, this is reflected in guidance for Quick Impact Projects. This states that QIPs, “hearts and minds” activities and community support projects should not be described as “humanitarian” in nature so as to avoid confusion and antagonism.

The host government has the first responsibility in Humanitarian Assistance: It has “the primary role in the initiation, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory”. Local community-based organisations and private individuals may respond at the same time. The majority of all humanitarian assistance – and certainly the fastest response – is provided locally.

**Question 3:** What can UNAC do to improve the worsened Human Rights situation in Carana?

Taking account of UNAC mission mandates, the optimal promotion and protection of the human rights of all of the people in Carana will be a core goal. That goal is unchanged regardless of the phase of a conflict or a peace process- the different phases or situations simply determine how the goal is best addressed. In the present circumstances this goal becomes a priority objective for UNAC. Normally the goal is achieved by means of empowering and assisting national/local institutions and authorities so that they can eventually be in a position to sustainably promote and protect human rights. However it is not looking a viable option at the moment. Now the responsibility for human rights promotion and protection will have to be focused and shared by all civilian, police and military components of UNAC. The climate of impunity needs to be questioned and changed. The consequences of violation of international laws and perpetuating HR violations need to be communicated by all possible means. Dialogue, negotiations, diplomatic pressure and even the threat of economic sanctions could be resorted to.

Human rights components and other civilian staff (e.g. political affairs) should step up their monitoring and feed the senior leadership with real time information on the developments on the ground. If they cannot be deployed or they have to be withdrawn because of security reasons, they can at least engage in active information gathering through their civil society sources including local human rights NGOs. UNAC Headquarters in Galasi needs to be fully briefed on this preparedness planning and should engage with the Government of Carana to ensure that the Carana Defence Force (CDF) and Carana National Police (CNP) do nothing against public security. In fact they should be coaxed to protect citizens from all communities impartially.

**Question 4:** How does the Information sharing between UN-CIMIC, the police, UN-CMCoord and other civilian components take place in UNAC?

This activity shall be done within the existing coordination structures in the mission. Across the full spectrum of peacekeeping operations, coordination between military, police and
civilian actors is an integral interaction in UNAC. There are existing structures developed to facilitate mission coordination, liaison, and information-sharing with a view to achieving mission objectives. Such structures at the mission HQ level: the Strategic Policy Group (Mission and UNCT), Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (Mission and UNCT), Senior Management Group (SMG); the (JOC); the (JMAMC); and the (JLOC). The expertise from UN-CIMIC officers provides the greatest utility where they can meaningfully contribute to liaison and information exchange between the military and civilian actors, which would be expected to contribute to enhancing the opportunities to advance the mission’s mandate and to avoid situations where the lack of coordination/cooperation between these actors may compromise the successful implementation of the mandate. At the local level, civilian liaison and information gathering is carried out by various components under the leadership of the Head of the Field Office. UN-CIMIC officers at the local level can provide a very useful force multiplier effect in support of this work, and close cooperation is needed between UN-CIMIC officers, police and civilian partners to ensure unity of effort and consistency of approach. Civil Affairs Officers are mandated to ensure consistency of mission effort at the local level, and as such can provide advice to UN-CIMIC officers on the overall strategic, political and social context of mandate implementation, as well as key messages to focus on in dealing with local interlocutors and key information gathering needs. Information sharing between UN-CIMIC and humanitarian and development actors: While respecting and maintaining humanitarian principles, to maximize opportunities for mission synergy and mitigate operational friction, the DSRSG/RC/HC should ensure arrangements are put in place to share with the military component appropriate details of humanitarian and development plans and current operations. This could include prioritization of tasks that may be suitable for completion by the IMPP Guidelines for the Field indicate that integrated field coordination structures between the Mission and the UNCT are required and that military components should be actively engaged at the strategic, coordination, and planning levels. Although the terminology and composition for these fora will vary, the IMPP guidelines suggest that a Strategic Policy Group be formed at the senior level, an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team at the senior working level, and thematic working groups (either standing or ad hoc) exist around key priority areas (e.g. Rule of Law, Protection of Civilians). The minimum standard is for these coordination bodies to exist in Mission HQs, but provincial bodies may also be established.

**Question 5:** Draft a UN-CIMIC Assessment, facilitating the planning process.

At this stage the UN-CIMIC officer should assess the situation and generate an Orientation Briefing for the Military Commander. This briefing takes into account the situation and the factors affecting it, as it provides the possible tasks for the military component in assisting the humanitarian crises and in supporting the reduction of violation of human rights. The multifaceted emergency implies that all relevant branches of the command should put their feed in the estimate. Hence, the first recommendation should always be (according to scale and complexity of the events) to setup a Crisis Planning Team (CPT) within the Force HQ, at least initially led by UN-CIMIC. This CPT will then develop the likely COAs for the Military component in accordance with Commander’s Guidance. Conversely, the Initial Estimate is normally developed through the initial, overall planning cycle, and rarely does
apply to this type of events. Nonetheless, UN-CIMIC is always called upon providing assessment or providing specific quick assessments over particular aspects. These documents result from transforming the "raw data" collected for the UN CIMIC Country Study into viable and actionable information. On general terms, their main aim is to provide the CIMIC input to the operational estimate.

Templates may vary according the nature of the operation. The UN-CIMIC Initial Estimate is the product developed by the UN-CIMIC Staff during the first stage of the Planning Process. It is the result of collating and assessing information collected for the UN-CIMIC Study into actionable information. It is the basis for issuing CIMIC guidance and making recommendations to the Operations Officer. The UN-CIMIC Initial Estimate is the base document for all subsequent stages of the Planning Process.

Suggested headings are as under:

1. **Mission.**
   - Analyse the Force Commander’s intent.

2. **Task Analysis**
   - What all are the tasks to be undertaken?
   - Who will undertake what?

3. **Constraints and Challenges assessment.**
   - What are the constraints and challenges for the Force and the Mission?
   - What have the current regimes policies been towards the civilian population?
   - What are the likely responses of the regime when the proposed operation becomes known to them?
   - What limitations can be imposed on UN-CIMIC operations: monetary, material, time?

4. **Time Available.** Establish a timeline with critical timings for Assessment to be completed, Initial Estimate completed, input to the Initiating Directive due, earliest anticipated initiation of the proposed operation.

5. **Troops Available.**
   - What UN-CIMIC elements and troops are currently available for deployment?
   - What type and numbers are required to support this operation? How to overcome the shortage?
   - Is there a need of field visit for UN-CIMIC Assessment? Who all should be the members? What time frame?

6. **Terrain and infrastructure.**
   - Location of area for operation/ assistance
   - Physical Features, Waterways and ports, Road and rail networks
   - Airfields and capabilities
   - Local natural resources
   - Level of industrial development
   - Climate.
7. Civilian Situation. These questions are designed to stimulate thought about the civil situation in the proposed area of operation. This is a critical area for the UN-CIMIC planner.

- What is the current political state of the civilian population?
- What is the current social state of the civilian population?
- What recognized elements of the civilian sector could assist during the proposed operation?
- Which authority in the host nation would, be responsible for ensuring successful civil military co-operation?
- What are the critical cultural attributes which need to be disseminated if troops are introduced into the proposed operational area?
- What is the current attitude towards our presence?
- Who else is working in the area? What coordination needs to be carried out?

8. Additional issues for Assessment.

- Regional information.
- Reports from previous contingents.
- Reports from previous contingents.
- Information from other civil agencies.
- Reconnaissance reports,
- Information through liaison elements
- Reports from open sources (e.g. the Internet, media),
- The situation regarding the disposition of forces, boundaries (e.g. political, religious and ethnic), other control and coordination lines of relevant military and civilian stakeholders as well as information of the situation of the civilian population, critical infrastructure and sensitive areas.

9. Recommendations. Based on the above detailed analysis, recommendations could be made for the UN-CIMIC and the mission operations.

10. Format for the Participants could be given for this assessment. A sample format is included in SBE 1 and a Rapid Village Assessment format is given below.
# RAPID VILLAGE ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>MGRS Grid Ref</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Name of assessor</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of information (give as much detail as possible – give a telephone of someone in the village if possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROAD ACCESS IN SUMMER</th>
<th>Car</th>
<th>4WD</th>
<th>Light Truck</th>
<th>Heavy Truck</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROAD ACCESS IN WINTER</th>
<th>Car</th>
<th>4WD</th>
<th>Light Truck</th>
<th>Heavy Truck</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CURRENT POPULATION</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BREAKDOWN</th>
<th>Locals</th>
<th>Returnees</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

# INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)

– One record per village of former residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of IDPs</th>
<th>from MUNICIPALITY (NAME)</th>
<th>from VILLAGE (NAME)</th>
<th>WHAT'S PREVENTING THEIR RETURN HOME? (See constraints to return box below for possible issues)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

CONTRAINTS TO RETURN: Transport / house damaged / house occupied / village empty / insecurity / fear of other ethnic groups / access to food and basic needs / healthcare / education / water / electricity / etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITY LEADERS PRESENT</th>
<th>MTS ACTIVIST</th>
<th>TEACHER</th>
<th>HEALTH WORKER</th>
<th>IMAM/PRIEST</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSISTANCE DISTRIBUTION</th>
<th>Who is responsible for distribution? (circle or specify)</th>
<th>Local warehouse / storage facilities?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>UCK</td>
<td>Y / N Type Size (m2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor's Office</td>
<td>Mosque/Church (specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO (specify)</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION</th>
<th>Is this village used for secondary distribution?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>If so, which villages receive assistance from this village?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAMAGE TO HOUSES</th>
<th>Total Houses in village</th>
<th>Category 1 (Undamaged / unfinished)</th>
<th>Category 2</th>
<th>Category 3</th>
<th>Category 4</th>
<th>Category 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category 1 (Undamaged / unfinished)</td>
<td>Category 2</td>
<td>Category 3</td>
<td>Category 4</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category 2</td>
<td>Category 3</td>
<td>Category 4</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Category 3</td>
<td>Category 4</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
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<td>Category 4</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Category 5</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
<td>Category 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Was there any new war damage to buildings since JANUARY 1999? Y / N
Was there any new war damage to buildings since NATO arrived? Y / N

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAMAGE TO COMMUNITY BUILDINGS</th>
<th>MTS WAREHOUSE</th>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>MOSQUE/CHURCH</th>
<th>SHOPS</th>
<th>BAKERY</th>
<th>HEALTH FAC.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None / Category</td>
<td>None / Category</td>
<td>None / Category</td>
<td>None / Category</td>
<td>None / Category</td>
<td>None / Category</td>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Broken windows, door locks and hinges, roof tiles
- Cut-off from electricity, water
- Up to 30% roof damage
- Light shelling or bullet impact on walls
- Over 30% roof damage
- Severe fire damage
- Need for replacement of floors
- Destroyed
- Needs reconstruction
- Cannot be repaired
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELECTRICITY</th>
<th>Working?</th>
<th>Yes / No / Intermittent</th>
<th>If intermittent, approx. hours working per day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>School functioning?</th>
<th>Yes / No</th>
<th>Number of classrooms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WATER &amp; SANITATION</th>
<th>% of Households using</th>
<th>CURRENT STATUS*</th>
<th>PERCEIVED WATER...</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Conflict</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>QUALITY</td>
<td>QUANTITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells</td>
<td>Good / Bad</td>
<td>Adequate / Inadequate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springs</td>
<td>Good / Bad</td>
<td>Adequate / Inadequate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piped distribution</td>
<td>Good / Bad</td>
<td>Adequate / Inadequate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Pumps</td>
<td>Good / Bad</td>
<td>Adequate / Inadequate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*STATUS (more than one if necessary): (W)working / (D)amaged / (C)ontaminated / (D)estroyed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEALTH</th>
<th>TYPE (see above)</th>
<th>Daily Consultations</th>
<th>Working Personnel (number)</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Number:</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>_____D _____N _____M</td>
<td>A / I</td>
<td>A / I</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shhteja e Shendetit (DZ)</td>
<td>Number:</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>_____D _____N _____M</td>
<td>A / I</td>
<td>A / I</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Ambulanta: MTS / S / P</td>
<td>Number:</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>_____D _____N _____M</td>
<td>A / I</td>
<td>A / I</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOOD &amp; COOKING</th>
<th>% of dairy cattle remaining</th>
<th>% of farms expecting to harvest this summer</th>
<th>% of families with cooking facilities:</th>
<th>Is there a bakery?</th>
<th>Is it operational?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCES OF FOOD AVAILABLE IN VILLAGE</th>
<th>Food Item</th>
<th>AVAILABLE</th>
<th>PRICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian distribution</td>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>DM / Din Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household garden / farm</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>DM / Din Litre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household stores</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>DM / Din Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shops or market</td>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>DM / Din Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearest village with market</td>
<td>Fruit &amp; vegetables</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>DM / Din Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>Y / N</td>
<td>DM / Din Kg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| REMARKS |
Guidance Notes on SBE 2 – Support to Treppek

Reference Material for SBE 2

Some of the recommended reference materials for reading to attempt SBE 3 are given below:

- Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), DPKO/DFS Policy, 2013
- Civil handbook / Chapter 12: Quick Impact Projects – a tool for confidence-building peacekeeping
- UN-CIMIC and Quick Impact Projects – Module 3

This scenario should be related to the case study 2 seen in Module 3 “Fundamental tasks” Unit 3 Civil assistance/ QIPs”. The purpose of this scenario is to exercise participants to have a global thinking of projects related to civil assistance and to take into consideration needs from population and proposals from a wide-range of actors, while trying to some extent to think “out of the box” when it comes to ideas for QIPs.

- Situation analysis

  Analysis of the situation first requires a pertinent Information gathering process. To do so, all the available means (and actors) must be taken into account:

  - JMAC assessments: JMAC optimizes civil and military information management and analytical processes and is responsible for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and reports) of the mission’s civil and military information in order to support the SRSG’s and force commander’s decision-making process.
  - Patrols reports: UN-CIMIC Officers should make sure their liaison activities are closely coordinated with MILOBS and vice-versa, insofar as Military observers constitute the “eyes and ears” of the Mission. (Cf. below the example of MINURCAT)
  - Frequent meeting with HUM & DEV actors: A great deal of knowledge and information is exchanged at meetings, working group sessions, and other coordinated events. Information sharing, liaison and coordination are the core functions of UN-CIMIC. Liaison is the bedrock of the other core functions.
  - And direct contact with population: Internal actors are comprised of the government – at both the operational and tactical levels, the parties to the conflict, the security sector – military, paramilitary, and police, tribal leaders, and indigenous or local NGOs and civil society organizations in all their varieties. UN-CIMIC officers should keep contact, preferably via Civil Affairs, with community and religious leaders, women and student associations, academics, professional organizations, and other parts of national civil society. Internal actors should play the lead role in the reconstruction process to ensure national and local ownership of their own future. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that they are unable to fulfil this role in the early stages of peacebuilding operations. This entails that Local population will be the beneficiary, but must also be considered as an actor.
Conducting an information gathering could respect the Information gathering process, and notably the phases 2 and 3 of the Military information cycle:

- **Phase 2 – Collection:** the most relevant sources of Information here are Human Information (HUMINF) and Open sources information (OSINF), like media, reports, other agencies, NGOs, IOs,
- **Phase 3 - Analysis:** Is it timely? Is it relevant? Is it Accurate? What seems irrelevant to you may not be to the rest of the team – collaborate in analysis. Record, Collate, Evaluate/Validate, Analyse, Review.

The UN Mission in Central Africa and Chad (MINURCAT) required specific information in relation to the villages being visited around the mission area. To give the information collectors clear guidance on what information is sought and where and whom to focus on to get it, an Information Gathering Template was developed.
Example of Information gathering template (provided in Staff Officers STM/Info gathering)

| Information on the natural environment: | • Country/countries of deployment;  
| | • Terrain. |
| Information on the parties in conflict: | • Conflict;  
| | • Population;  
| | • Armed actors;  
| | • Infrastructure;  
| | • Support for reforms. |
| General information: | • Political and governmental leadership;  
| | • Religion;  
| | • Economy;  
| | • Mutual support capabilities of the parties in presence;  
| | • Role of the media. |

Quick Impact Project

Community support by UN-CIMIC is mostly delivered through civil-military projects. Some of them come in the form of Quick impact projects. UN-CIMIC personnel are key functionaries in planning and implementation of QIPs. Since it is a major involvement of most UN-CIMIC personnel, it is important for them to understand all aspects of QIPs. This is a high expectation area in missions. Once the participants came with a relevant situation analysis, having kept in the loop a wide-range of actors and identified beneficiaries, they must come with a project. Irrespective of the QIP they have selected (Well digging, irrigation system, water cisterns, rainwaters tank, even agricultural projects, etc.), instructors must make sure that those projects match the QIP criteria:

- Quick Impact Projects are small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population. QIPs are small-scale, rapidly implementable projects. They should benefit maximum local community. The aim is to facilitate mission efforts in improving the lives of local community, confidence building in peace efforts, establish cooperative relations with the locals to achieve Mission mandate and operations. These are short term projects that are designed to have visible and immediate impact. They provide great benefits to the military by increasing force visibility, facilitates situational awareness, information gathering and acceptance of own presence by locals.

- Criteria for QIP Development:
  - Promote acceptance of the mandated tasks
  - Support the credibility of the mission
  - Contribute to building confidence in the peace process
  - Address the immediate needs of the population

- Participants should keep in mind that Potential partnerships must consider impartiality, representation, inclusiveness & gender issues.

- Participants must come up with an initial planning matching the QIP cycle (Cf. QIP Cycle, Module 3 Unit 3). The monitoring, evaluation and reporting process should ensure that work is progressing according to plan as well as a way to interact and talk with implementing partners and local community representatives/beneficiaries.

- To conclude, instructor may point out that troop participation in UN-CIMIC community projects (like QIPs) also has the effect of boosting morale because it gives them an opportunity to get out of the compound and interact with the local population in a meaningful way. It makes them feel good about the contribution they are making to rebuild the country where they are deployed.
Reference Material for SBE 3
Some of the recommended reference materials for reading to attempt SBE 2 are given below:

- Civil- Military Guidelines and reference for Complex Emergencies- 2008
- UN-CIMIC situation monitoring, assessments and reporting. (Session 2- Module 3)
- Military Support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
- Module 3 community support
- Key Partners in UN-CIMIC- Module 2

Role Play for Scenario 3
The Following Appointments could be nominated (depending on the Type and level of course) for role Play:

- DSRSG
- Force Commander
- Mission Head, OCHA
- Mission PIO
- Chief G9 Brigade
- Sector/ Brigade PIO
- The Sector/ Brigade commander
- The Head of office
- ICRC, Local Head
- Battalion Commander
- Local community leader
- Local government official.

Question 1: As a senior functionary in UNAC or the Mission UN-CIMIC Chief, assess the situation. From CIMIC point of view, what needs to be done by the Mission?

An air accident in which a large number of UN personnel become casualties is a major crisis and emergency. To complicate matters there have been many civilian casualties. A village has been badly affected. The country is in the grip of civil war and in turmoil. The Immediate need is to give proper medical care to the injured. Details about casualties, both UN personnel and civilians should be ascertained. Accurate information will have to be sent to the UN HQ and in turn to the TCCs through their permanent Missions by the HQ. Correct documentation and medical procedures will be done. An investigation will be ordered to ascertain the cause of the accident and related issues. Proper arrangements will have to be done to ensure that the mortal remains are dispatched appropriately to the correct places as per instructions. It is important to ensure that these be done as per protocol and the dignity it deserves. The destruction of the village and civilian casualties would need special attention. Immediate relief to the affected villagers should be
organised. UN agencies and NGOs may be informed and requested to do the needful. Coordination with the local administration and leaders must be done. Considering the civilian casualties, CNP will have to be incorporated. Government of Carana should be taken on board by the mission HQ. Accurate and timely information will have to be given to the Media. The necessity to secure the crash area needs to be emphasised. This is essential to preserve evidence for inquiries, to retrieve maximum personnel belongings and to prevent miscreants getting involved in looting, etc. The security aspect will have to be handled in liaison with DSS and its representatives. Similarly, it is important to provide accurate and up to date information on this tragic accident to the world media. Media management will be under the supervision of Mission PIO.

**Question 2: Which agencies are likely to be involved in this crisis?**

In such emergency crisis, with so many human casualties, in all probability, a large number of agencies will be involved. Agencies involvement may not be in any particular order. Some of the agencies likely to be involved are; The UNAC Military, UN Police, CNP, CDF, Government of Carana, Civil Affairs, Head of Field Office, Public Information component of UNAC, UNDP, ICRC and organisations such as OCHA, Local Government, NGOs and UNAC Senior Leaders. The same have been tabulated as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION AGENCIES</th>
<th>EXTERNAL AGENCIES</th>
<th>NATIONAL ACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pol Affairs</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Host Govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>IO/NGOs</td>
<td>CDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>National Police?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Military</td>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>National media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC/JMAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS/ISS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 3: What needs to be done and which aspects can be coordinated by the UN CIMIC staff at all levels?**

The magnitude of the crisis, involvement of multiple agencies including civilian agencies, sensitivity related to handling such emergencies, information management and urgency will demand that UN-CIMIC be actively involved in coordination. UN-CIMIC can assist and coordinate in all the tasks mentioned below:
### Question 4: What should be done for better information management?

The following are suggested:

(a) Identify Lead Agency. E.g. OCHA in this case

(b) Close liaison with all actors involved especially external and national actors.

(c) Dedicated communication assets to the rescue effort to ensure continuous flow of info.

(d) Dedicated staff as Points of Contacts for all major agencies involved if possible.

(e) Continuous monitoring of open sources for info. (Radio, TV etc.)

(f) Collation, Assessment and Dissemination/ Sharing of relevant info to/with relevant agency.

### Question 5: What are the follow up actions in case of such accidents?

It is important to ensure that all follow actions after such accidents are taken. Aim should to ensure speedy documentation so that the entitlements are dispersed to the deserving next of kin without undue delay. Towards this end finalisation of the Investigation is an important step. The approved recommendations of the BOI need to be implemented speedily. The causes of the accident and preventive measures would need special attention. The affected village will need assistance towards rehabilitation and reconstruction. Appropriate civilian agency may provide that. Periodically, the Public Information component will have to effectively communicate about the follow up action being done by UNAC. Lessons learnt from this accident could be recorded for posterity. May a Mission level SOP could be made to handle such crisis.

### Question 6: Prepare a “Commander’s Emergency Brief on the Accident”.

**Emergency Brief on the Accident**

**Situation**
The Senior Mission Team decided to increase the UN military presence in Galasi to face the security situation. The Force Commander was asked to air lift two Infantry companies and to move another Battalion by road. It was decided to air lift two companies from Leppko province and to move a Battalion by road from Mahbek province. An infantry Battalion in Leppko province was asked to move two companies to Corma airport. The first UN flight with key officers and appointments to carry out preliminary reconnaissance and arrangements in Galasi took off from Corma at 0600 hrs.

The Accident
At 0700 hrs the air traffic control element of Movcon reported to the Mission HQ the missing UN flight which took off from Corma. The flight had 7 officers, 43 other soldiers and 4 air crew on board. The Force HQ was asked to carry out search in the area of Guthar and Fellari provinces along the general area of cleared flight path. All contingents and FPUs were ordered to carry out search. Before even the units could move out, the tragic news of the air accident reached Galasi. It was reported that at 0625 hrs a UN aircraft has crash landed in a village near Amsan town of Guthar province. The sketchy information only conveyed that the aircraft was trying an emergency landing on a short airstrip of Amsan and it has crashed on the outskirts of Amsan. The nearest military units are the Sector HQ at Folsa and a small UN Naval unit at Cereni.

The Mission HQ swung into action and had a Senior Leaders meeting to take stock of the tragedy and decide on the relief measures. The enormity of the tragedy came to light when the Cereni Naval Unit reported that they have reached the crash site. It was conveyed that the aircraft ploughed through the village, burst onto flames. The casualties are likely to be high. The civilian casualties on ground are also being assessed. The Mission HQ has ordered to launch a massive rescue and relief operation which is now under way. All key appointments of the mission are now involved in rescue and relief operations.

Rescue and Relief
The Immediate action at hand is to give proper medical care to the injured. Specific about casualties, both UN personnel and civilians are being ascertained. The next of kin will be informed appropriately. Accurate information will be sent to the UN HQ and in turn to the TCCs through their permanent Missions by the HQ. Correct documentation and medical procedures will be done. An investigation has been ordered to ascertain the cause of the accident and related issues. Proper arrangements will be done to ensure that the mortal remains are despatched appropriately to the correct places or disposed of as per instructions. It will be ensured that these be done as per protocol and the dignity it deserves. The damage to the village and civilian casualties would be given special attention. Immediate relief to the affected villagers will be organized. UN agencies and NGOs will be requested to do the needful. Coordination with the local administration and leaders will be done. Government of Carana will be taken on board by the mission HQ. Accurate and timely information will be given to the Media. The necessity to secure the crash area has been taken care. This is essential to preserve evidence for inquiries, to retrieve maximum personnel belongings and to prevent miscreants getting involved in looting, etc. The security aspects are being handled in liaison with DSS and its representatives. Accurate and up to date information on this tragic accident will be provided to the world media. These are some of the immediate activities undertaken by the mission agencies.
Guidance Notes on SBE 4 – Allegations on Quick Impact Project

The participants need to be told about the importance of projecting the correct image of the UN mission. Credibility and legitimacy of the mission should never be at stake. Perceived injustice done or alleged unfair practices can have related functional problems for the mission. Adverse media publicity can snowball into bigger challenges and hurdles for the mission. These should be nipped in the bud or settled early. From that point of view, this meeting is important. UN Peacekeeping Missions undertake QIPs as community assistance projects. UN-CIMIC is involved in the QIPs as one of the main agencies of the Force. Since it involves resources and community expectations, UN-CIMIC and other stakeholders should be fully familiar with all aspects of QIPs. This exercise is to consolidate the knowledge of all officials connected with QIPs. This is also a Public Relations and Information Campaign exercise, dealing with local leaders who are planning to tarnish the image of UNAC.

Reference Material for SBE 4
Some of the recommended reference materials for reading to attempt SBE 3 are given below:

- Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), DPKO/DFS Policy, 2013
- UN-CIMIC and Quick Impact Projects – Module 3
- Civil handbook / Chapter 12: Quick Impact Projects – a tool for confidence-building peacekeeping

Role Play for Scenario 4
The Following Appointments could be nominated (depending on the Type and level of course) for role Play:

- Sector/ Brigade PIO
- The Sector/ Brigade commander
- The Head of Office
- Battalion Commander
- Local community leader
- G9, Sector/ Brigade
- An interpreter - to drive home the aspects given in Module 3, Session 4

Question 1: Which wrong perceptions and allegations of the leaders need to be addressed? Which aspects will be emphasised during the meeting?

The wrong perceptions and allegations to be addressed are:

- Regional disparity in the allotment of QIPs and the perceived partiality of UNAC in allotting projects to areas where Falins are in majority.
- Poor quality of QIPs due to lack of procedures and supervision.
- Inadequate number of projects due to the disinterest of UNAC.
- Belief that funds for QIPs are provided by Government of Carana to UNAC.
Belief that UNAC military is misappropriating the funds for QIPs.

Aspects to be emphasised during the meeting are:-

- The existence of detailed guidelines starting from DPKO and Mission HQ.
- Existence of procedures based on SOPs on the subject of QIPs.
- Monitoring and supervision at all levels.
- Fair system of allotment of QIPs based on need, priority, availability of funds and many other reasonable factors. Not based on any discriminatory policies based on tribe or ethnicity.
- Quality control is ensured by correct and laid down procedures involving many functionaries at different levels.
- Detailed procedures exist and supervision is routine.
- Funds for QIPs are not provided by Government of Carana to UNAC. This is provided by UN.
- UNAC military is not misappropriating the funds for QIPs; in any case multiple agencies involved make sure that the funds are utilised properly.

**Question 2: What should you include in the detailed briefing on QIPs?**

It is important to highlight all aspects discussed in question one. These are the existence of detailed guidelines from DPKO, Mission HQ; existence of procedures based on SOPs on the subject of QIPs; monitoring and supervision at all levels; fair system of allotment of QIPs based on need, priority, availability of funds and many other reasonable factors, not based on any discriminatory policies based on tribe or ethnicity; quality control is ensured by correct and laid down procedures involving many functionaries at different levels; detailed procedures exist and supervision is routine; funds for QIPs are not provided by Government of Carana to UNAC, but provided by UN; UNAC military is not misappropriating the funds for QIPs and multiple agencies involved makes sure that the funds are utilised properly.

To cover all these aspects the following subject materials could be used.

The DPKO has provided adequate guidelines to all mission personnel involved in the identification, selection, approval, funding, implementation, monitoring, closure and evaluation of QIPs and the overall management of the QIPs programme. These guidelines reflect good practice and minimum standards requirements for Management of Quick Impact Projects. The UNAC in Carana follows these guidelines strictly. The Head of Mission in UNAC has established a Project Review Committee (PRC), QIPs Management Team (QMT) and dedicated QIPs officers. The Head of Mission has designated a chair of the PRC and other representatives. They include the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and representatives of relevant UN bodies with programme activities in the country. Representatives of military, police and other civilian components of the mission participate in the PRC, including a representative of the Director/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) and focal points for cross-cutting, thematic areas such as Gender.

The PRC is responsible for selecting and approving projects. The DMS/CMS has delegated authority from the UN Financial Controller for the financial aspects of the projects and acts as certifying officer for individual projects. As per the QIPs Policy Directive, the Mission Senior Management Team sets and regularly review priorities for geographic and thematic...
focus, taking into account the unique nature and mandate of the UNAC and in line with the overall mission plan and broader strategies for community outreach and indicate these to the Chair of the Project Review Committee. All QIPs follow a basic project implementation cycle that involves: Identification and Review, Selection and Approval, Implementation and Monitoring, Closure and Evaluation followed by Reporting. Projects are selected which meet the minimum requirements as under:

- One or more of the three criteria in Section 8 of the DPKO Policy Directive on QIPs.
- Proposed project has the overall characteristics of a QIP as outlined in Section 10 of the Policy Directive on QIPs.
- Proposed project is necessary and/or useful for the beneficiaries it targets.
- Implementing agency is reputable, appears capable of carrying out the project, and/or has adequately carried out previous projects supported through QIPs funding.
- Cost estimates are reasonable (advice should be sought from the relevant section, e.g., engineering, logistics, finance, procurement, etc., when these components are not represented on the QMT).
- Consultations with representatives of appropriate national and local authorities have taken place.
- Projects can realistically be implemented within a three months’ timeframe.

The QMT ensure that an initial site visit is conducted by a representative of the mission, to assist in verifying whether the project meets minimum requirements. This site visit may be conducted by the QMT or by a mission component. All proposals meeting the minimum requirements are forwarded to the PRC (or regional PRC, if appropriate) for consideration. The QMT provide written notice to applicants when minimum requirements have not been met. All proposals meeting minimum requirements are considered by the PRC within two months of initial receipt by the QMT. The Chair of the PRC should convene the committee as necessary on the advice of the QMT. Due notice is given to the PRC so that members have sufficient time to review proposals on the docket.

Project selection and approval: The PRC will select and approve projects within the overall budget available for QIPs and based on an assessment of which project proposals best meet the priorities set by the Mission Senior Management Team and best fit broader mission strategies for community outreach. The Resident coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator and representatives of relevant UN bodies with programme activities in the country advise on whether projects that have humanitarian or development elements are in line with broader strategies of UN actors or national authorities and on whether they complement rather than duplicate or undermine the activities of other actors in these fields. All PRC members shall advise as necessary on amendments to project proposals. The PRC may select a proposal in its original form or in an amended form. Projects that have been amended are accompanied by an amended budget as appropriate. Upon approval of a project, the PRC assign a component within the mission to be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the QIP. When a mission component is implementing a project, the PRC assign a different mission component to monitor. The QMT provide written notice to applicants that have not been selected by the PRC.
The PRC communicate a list of approved projects to the Mission Senior Management Team and to the QMT. The QMT prepare an MOU for each project, which is signed by the DMS/CMS and the implementing agency. Upon receipt of the signed MOU, the Finance Section raises an obligation in the entire amount of the MOU to ensure funds are reserved. The QMT prepare the request for disbursement of a preliminary instalment of up to 80% of the total funds to the implementing agency at the Mission's discretion. Mission follows a 40/40/20 disbursement plan for new implementing partners. Once the funds have been transferred, the implementing agency will have three months to complete the project. The Finance Section informs the QMT that the project has been funded, and the QMT should assign a project number and maintain records of the status of the project. The remaining funds shall be disbursed on request of the implementing agency, and after satisfactory reporting.

Project Implementation and Monitoring: Implementing agencies are monitored regularly by the relevant Mission sections for the purpose of quality control during the implementation phase of the project, including through at least one site visit. A monitoring and reporting schedule, agreed upon by the implementing partner, relevant field officer, and QMT, are set prior to the disbursement of the first payment. Release of remaining funds follows a request from the implementing agency to the DMS/CMS, accompanied by a signed list of expenditures with original receipts. A site visit to monitor progress takes place before release of any instalments of funds. A completed Project Monitoring Form is forwarded to the DMS/CMS who authorize release of remaining funds after invoices for the first instalment are accounted for by the Finance Section. The Finance Section shall then clear the first advance against the obligation raised and issue the second advance. The mission may decide in how many instalments the funds should be released. If additional funds are needed above and beyond those originally requested, the implementing agency should provide a justification and amended budget for supplemental funds to the QMT. The total cost of the project, including the supplemental funds, should not exceed $25,000, unless prior authorization has been obtained from the UN Controller. A decision on the release of further funds should be taken by the PRC. The QMT may raise any concerns or delays identified through project monitoring with the PRC for a decision on remedial action, including possible action to recover funds used inappropriately.

Project Closure and Evaluation: Upon project closure, a site-visit takes place and a Project Closure and Evaluation Form completed by the mission component responsible for follow up and submitted to the QMT for records and archiving. Any relevant handover documentation is also being provided to local authorities at this time as appropriate. A signed final list of expenditures with receipts should be submitted by the implementing agency to the DMS/CMS, who authorizes the Finance Section to clear the second advance against the implementing partner in the financial statements, charging the obligation rose. The QMT and the mission component responsible for monitoring should work with the Public Information Office to ensure that successfully completed projects are publicized appropriately. The QMT may raise any problems with individual projects with the PRC for a decision on remedial action, including possible action to recover funds used inappropriately. The DMS/CMS regularly reviews the status of the financial aspects of the QIPs and raises any concerns with the PRC for action. An annual evaluation of the overall QIPs programme is carried out by the PRC.
Reporting: In the context of the mission's financial statements as at month-end, the mission ensures monthly financial reporting on QIPs with the submission of accounts to the Director of the Accounts Division. An annual evaluation of the overall programme is carried out, as per the format suggested for Project Review Committee annual evaluation of overall QIPs programme and forwarded to the Mission Senior Management Team and to DPKO PBPS. If requesting project funds for a third year and beyond, a justification for the need beyond two years should be included in the evaluation. In this case, the evaluation is carried out in advance of the supporting budget submissions (previous to May) in order to accommodate projects.

Question 3: What other aspects should be coordinated to make this meeting a success?

The following aspects can be planned, prepared and coordinated:

- QIPs dealing Officials from the Head of Office (civil affairs), Police could be invited to attend this meeting. In case they are attending, a preliminary meeting to discuss the modalities could be arranged. This will bring synergy and common understanding.
- Interpreter needs to be arranged and briefed.
- Facts and figures pertaining to QIPs of the mission could be taken from the UNAC Mission HQ.
- A schedule of events and program can be made for the meeting.
- Adequate security arrangements to be made including contingency planning for possible disturbance.
- Basic arrangements to be catered for; including seating, audio, video, water and refreshments etc.
- The importance of conveying own viewpoints without creating turbulence need to be understood by the participant.
Guidance Notes on SBE 5 - Complex Emergency in Treppek

General Guidance Aspects
It should be mentioned to the participants that whenever an operational situation such as this comes up, efforts must be made to respond appropriately in good time to save lives and property in the defence of the mandate. Once it is identified that the local security forces cannot handle the crisis, UNAC Military should move in swiftly to bring the situation under control. Immediately the security situation is brought under control, efforts should be made to address any prevailing humanitarian crisis.

Question 1: As the UN-CIMIC officer of your Battalion, what would be your role and actions in term of:

a. Liaison and information sharing during the crisis, taking into account information requirement and information sensitivity?
b. Civil assistance (Support to the Humanitarian Actors, Community support) during the crisis and after the fighting has been stopped

The first part of this question deals with liaison and information sharing whiles the second part deals with civil assistance.

Liaison and information sharing: For the first part, participants are to set up some liaison requirements with some selected partners and talk about information sharing on the situation between the operational branch of the Battalion and the Unit UN-CIMIC section at the unit level and also between the Battalion and the Sector/Brigade HQ.

- The Unit UN-CIMIC Section/Officer should also liaise and share information with the local Civil Affairs in his Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR); particularly on the humanitarian situation generated by the crisis.
- This information should also be shared, accordingly to specific rules with regard to confidentiality, with the humanitarian agencies representatives in the AOR whose assistance would be required to address any humanitarian issues (UNHCR, WPF, CARE, MSF and Carana National Red Cross Society).
- Once there is information flow; liaison between the UN-CIMIC Officer and these humanitarian agencies would be done concurrently for delivery of any humanitarian assistance promptly and efficiently.

On the Civil Assistance requirements; the Battalion UN-CIMIC officer, would have to liaise with his operations officer to support the Humanitarian actors for the delivery of food, water, medical care and accommodation for the IDPs by creating a safe and secure environment for them to do their work.

- This could be in the form of mobile and static patrols to and from the affected villages and immediate surroundings; and in the worst case scenario; provision of armed escort if there is the risk of attack on humanitarian convoys/personnel.
- For community support, the UN-CIMIC Officer should liaise with the affected community to identify the most urgent needs.
- This should be communicated to the Sector/Brigade HQ UN-CIMIC Officer to mobilise resources for any Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). Contact should also be made with
UNHCR for the provision of temporary accommodation such as tents and possible support for the rehabilitation of their accommodations.

- Money could also be requested from QIPs Fund for the rehabilitation of the burnt church for them to be able to fulfil their religious needs and obligations.

**Question 2:** What could be your advice regarding Treppek’s protection/evacuation? If evacuation is needed, who will do it and where to accommodate the evacuees? Who should you coordinate with?

On protection issues, the company deployed in Treppek should continue to stay there until peace finally return to the village.

- After the withdrawal of the troops, there should be frequent patrols to the Treppek to ward off any possible attacks and also to assure the people of their safety and security.
- There should also be investigations by the UNAC into the human rights violations and abuse and the perpetrators brought to book.
- This incident does not seem to require any evacuation of the population from Treppek, because the Battalion can deal effectively with the situation to safe the population. However, if participants advised on evacuation, then they should be allowed to defend their position in deciding on the evacuation. The hundred who have fled already will be provided with accommodation in IDPs camp to be established by UNHCR and those whose houses have been destroyed would also be evacuated to be accommodated until situation returns to normal.
- The evacuation from the crisis area to safety or IDP camp would be done by the military. In terms of coordination, the Battalion CIMIC officer would have to coordinate with UNHCR for the establishment of IDP camp, WFP for provision of food, CARE for women and children issues, MSF and Carana National Red Cross Society for medical care as well as local government representatives.

**Question 3:** In case of a large influx of escaping villagers/internally displaced persons seeking a safe haven in your battalion’s units camps; should they be let in and why?

As part of the Mandate, UNAC is to protect civilians and assist in humanitarian assistance. The battalion should there allow any one fleeing from the ongoing crisis in Treppek access into the camp for their safety and security. It would be against the UNAC Mandate to prevent them from entering the camp. They would be exposed to grave danger and risk of being killed or their right being violated by the attackers, and if that happens to them, UNAC would have failed in achieving its mandate.
**Guidance Notes on SBE 6 – Aid for the Needy**

**Reference Material for SBE 6**
Recommended reference material for reading to attempt SBE 5 is given below:-
- Civil- Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC), October 2010;
- Negotiations and Conflict mitigation/ management- Module
- Working with Interpreters- Module 3

**Role Play for Scenario 6**
The Following Appointments could be nominated (depending on the Type and level of course) for role Play:
- WFP Local head of Galasi office
- J9. Mission chief of UN-CIMIC
- The Battalion Commander
- G9,Sector/ Brigade
- Battalion UN-CIMIC Officer

**Question 1:** What are the conditions, restrictions and roles in which the Military can be involved while providing Humanitarian Aid?

- Humanitarian activities aim to save lives, protect human dignity and alleviate suffering. This involves two main kinds of work; assistance; ensuring access to the minimum requirements to sustain life with dignity. Activities include supplies and services related to water, sanitation, food, nutrition, health care and education, protection; ensuring respect for basic human rights.

- Humanitarian services must be delivered according to the following principles: Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and independence. Those principles must be followed by agencies within the UN system. Outside the UN, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has developed a Code of Conduct which includes these principles among others. This Code has been signed by many of the largest humanitarian organizations. Sometimes, organisations will act to save lives or provide other basic service to needy populations but do not follow these principles. Many humanitarian organizations do not like to refer to such activities as “humanitarian”, and prefer terms like “relief activities” or “emergency assistance”.

- The IASC Non-binding guidelines on use of armed escort for Humanitarian convoys stated that Humanitarian convoys will not use armed or military escort”. To enable “humanitarian space”, use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys is an exception and a “Last resort”.

**Question 2:** Where local capacities are overwhelmed, a variety of international actors may become involved. UN-CIMIC may have to deal with these organisations. Which are these organisations?

**These organisations can be grouped as follows:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN humanitarian agencies</td>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration (IOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign governments &amp; donors</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International non-governmental organisations (INGOs)</td>
<td>CARE International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Save the Children International Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local non-governmental organisations (NGOs)</td>
<td>National religious charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based organisations (CBOs)</td>
<td>Farmers’ cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Village development committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each humanitarian agency has its own “mandate” and is highly autonomous. They focus on either a particular target group, or on particular types of assistance in which they have special expertise.

**Question 3:** There are three main ways of delivering humanitarian services. Which are they? Which one is likely to function in the present scenario?

The methods of delivery of humanitarian assistance could be any of the following:

1. Direct implementation – delivery of supplies or services by agency itself;
2. Through partner agencies – funding/contracting other organisations to provide services and/or distribute supplies.
3. Programme aid – funding and technical support to governments, to work through government service structures, e.g. support to the Ministry of Health to run local clinics.

Which approaches are used will depend upon the agency, and upon the situation. Many UN agencies prefer to work indirectly through the host government or use partners such as NGOs or private contractors. But they may deliver goods and services directly if no partners are available, e.g. in highly remote areas. By contrast, some organisations always prefer to deliver direct services. A good example is Médecins Sans Frontières, which uses international and local doctors to provide medical services directly. In this case it will be the second category of obtaining assistance.

**Question 4:** What will be the procedure to follow and conditions for such military assistance?

Requests for MCDA to support UN agencies must be made by the Humanitarian coordinator/Resident Coordinator, with the consent of the affected State, (Carana) and
based solely on humanitarian criteria. MCDA should be employed by UN humanitarian agencies **as a last resort**, i.e. only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required. A UN humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While MCDA may remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization, in this case WFP. Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Military organizations, to the extent possible, are not to be involved in direct assistance, in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders. Any use of MCDA should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel. Countries providing MCDA to support UN humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the UN Codes of Conduct and the humanitarian principles.

**Question 5: What are the implications for WFP in using Armed Escorts?**

Perhaps the most graphic way in which military and humanitarian actors come into contact in complex emergencies is through the use of armed escorts. In some conflict ridden countries, the security situation is so bad that aid agencies use armed escorts to protect their staff and property. There has been an alarming increase in attacks on humanitarian staff in recent years. As well as relying on state security forces and the use of private security firms, aid agencies sometimes accept armed escorts from international military forces so that they can provide assistance in insecure environments. Humanitarian organisations are, in particular, concerned about the image that is presented to beneficiaries when aid is delivered with the use of armed escorts and the impact this has on their neutrality and impartiality. Armed escorts send an implicit message that it is legitimate for weapons to determine who gets access to aid. Guidelines have been developed for the use of armed escorts.

The impact of the use of armed escorts on neutrality and impartiality, a key consideration is again the mandate of the military forces in question. From a peace building perspective, the context in which armed escorts are used is also extremely important. If the threat to aid agency security is criminal (e.g. banditry and theft) in an area where law and order has broken down, then more protective forms of security, including armed guards, may be necessary and legitimate. In situations of armed conflict, however, where the threat is inherently political and military, the source of protection favoured by aid agencies will change how they are perceived as an actor within the conflict. It is important that aid agencies begin to incorporate conflict analysis into their security policies, planning and procedures to appreciate the different impact armed escorts can have. There is a tendency to see staff security and that of local populations separately, whereas a more holistic approach is needed.

**There are many cases – the great majority – in which the use of armed or military escorts would be counter-productive.** The use of such escorts can compromise the security of humanitarian personnel and can reduce their capacity to provide assistance effectively on the basis of impartiality and independence. For example: Cooperation with an outside military force, including cooperation with a UN-mandated force, can lead local actors to
associate humanitarian organizations with the political and military objectives of that force. Dependence on support from a military or armed force, whether foreign or local, often makes it impossible to operate without such force. Cooperation with one belligerent can make it impossible or unsafe to operate in territory controlled by another belligerent, unless there is an agreement on hand-over at the boundary.

Question 6: You are a WFP official; you are required to fill the Escort Request form.

Notes

- This may be correct opportunity to remind Participants about the implications and policy guidelines of OCHA on direct, indirect and Infrastructure support by military in humanitarian operations. Direct Assistance is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services. Indirect Assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.
- Infrastructure Support involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected.

The table below can be explained to consolidate the learning.

**Impartiality of Forces and their availability to Support humanitarian Operations decrease**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military mission</th>
<th>DIRECT ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>INDIRECT ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>INFRASTRUCTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEACE TIME</td>
<td>May be</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACE KEEPING</td>
<td>May be</td>
<td>May be</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACE ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>May be</td>
<td>May be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>May be</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SAMPLE REQUEST FOR MCDA

UNITED NATIONS - NATIONS UNIES / OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS - BUREAU DE LA COORDINATION DES AFFAIRES HUMANITAIRES - Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Genève 10

FACSIMILE

- From: Chief Civil-Military Coordination Section - Emergency Services Branch
- Subject: Request for Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)
- Ref.: [emergency title] - MCDA Request No. [insert].

URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT

In connection with the emergency: [emergency title and date of emergency]. The OCHA Civil Military Coordination Section (CMCS) has received a request from [requesting organization] in [location] for:

[MCDA MODULE - X]

- Details [example]: Movement of 4 (four) snow clearing vehicles and associated snow clearing equipment from [departure location] to [destination]. Specifications as follows:

VEHICLES:
2 x Unimog, U1650 Model:
- Length - 5100 mm
- Width - 2170 mm
- Height - 2855 mm
- Weight - 6,100 kg

1 x Unimog, 400L Model:
- Length - 5620 mm
- Width - 2200 mm
- Height - 2960 mm
- Weight - 6,700 kg

ACCESSORIES
4 x Snowblades (Tarron models):
- Width - 3200 mm
- Height - 1200 mm
- Depth - 1000 mm with mounting
- Weight with mounting 1200 kg (each)

2 x Snow blowers (VF5ZL models):
- Height - 1060 mm
- Length - 3200 mm
- Weight - 1066 kg (each)

Background [example]: The delivery of critical humanitarian aid to the remote mountain villages is being delayed through impossible roads resulting from heavy snowfall. These heavy-duty vehicles are urgently needed to provide immediate snow clearing capability to ensure aid reaches these vulnerable populations.

Timing: Immediate.

Contact Information:
Please inform CMCS NLT COB [insert deadline] if your country/organization is interested in supporting this operation, entirely or partly. Please also indicate if your country is willing to provide these assets free of charge. For further information please contact the Action Officer, coordinates detailed below.

Action Officer: [name]
CMCS, ESB, OCHA - Geneva
Tel and Back-up tel. [numbers]
E-mail: cmcs@un.org

PLEASE REPLY TO THIS REQUEST NO LATER THAN CLOSE OF BUSINESS [INSERT DEADLINE].
Guidance Notes on SBE 7 – POC Challenge for UNAC

Role Play for Scenario 7
The Following Appointments could be nominated (depending on the Type and level of course) for role Play:

- SRSG
- DSRSG (political)
- Force Commander
- Police Commissioner
- DMS
- J9. Mission chief of UN-CIMIC
- Mission PIO
- The Brigade Commander

Guidelines

- Faced with a deteriorating security situation every effort clearly needed to be made to reinforce all garrisons at potential flash-points and to re-deploy troops from less urgent tasks. The UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1844 mandating UNAC clearly states that ‘the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources’. Available UNAC units of soldiers are, therefore, required to take action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, using all necessary means, within the limits of their capacity and in the areas where they are deployed, to carry out the tasks. Operational commanders in these areas should be briefed on the Mission’s Rules of Engagement regarding the use of force. Even a larger military contingent may only have been able to have a limited impact on the situation as it is clear that the CDF was planning an all-out military assault to capture Karo and it rejected both compromises that the MPC put forward (an inspection of its forces by the JLT and a demilitarization of the town). In these circumstances UNAC had three options: the use of military force to stop the CDF advance, evacuation of Karo in line with the CDF’s demands, maintaining a presence in Karo. There is not an absolute right or wrong answer to which of these options should have been chosen, but the consequences of each should be explored. Some participants may like to order their forces to withdraw, while others may have told them to stay or attempted to reinforce them. The trainer/facilitator should try to draw out the reasoning on both sides.

- In this particular scenario, the action of the UNAC office in refusing to withdraw and deploy ‘guards around the perimeter of the base to deter attacks on the civilians sheltering there’ appears to have helped save thousands of lives. These civilians might otherwise have been killed in all-out assault on the town, and would also have been vulnerable to attack in the aftermath of the fighting. It could be seen as an example of ‘protection by presence’. By staying UNAC also made them into ‘witnesses’ who were able to record what actually happened when Karo was captured. Amongst the violations of the laws of armed conflict, which appear to have occurred are the use of
‘human shields’ and the deliberate firing of military equipment from positions near to hospitals, churches and other ‘protected’ areas. A detailed investigative report should be compiled by the mission under the lead of the human rights component. It will require inputs from other mission staff including UN Military which has specific expertise on the military related aspects of the incident. The MPC’s leadership should be held accountable for these crimes. Similarly, if the CDF failed to distinguish between military and civilian objects or deliberately attacked civilian populations this would be a violation. It is also a violation to launch attacks in the knowledge that they would cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural and cultural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. Knowing that international observers were present to record evidence of such crimes may have deterred both forces from carrying them out.

- Conversely, it should be recognized that the UNAC garrison placed their own lives at risk and had they been killed; the country or countries which contributed these troops might have pulled them out of the mission. This could have done greater long-term damage to UNAC if it was facing problems obtaining sufficient numbers of peacekeepers. Since UNAC did not have sufficient peace-keeping soldiers in Karo to actually protect the civilians should the deterrence strategy fail. Had the CDF committed systematic massacres of civilians despite the presence of the UNAC soldiers then they would have been undoubtedly criticised for failing to take more forceful measures. For the above reasons, either a complete withdrawal or a strong reinforcement of the UNAC garrison would have been a more prudent course of action. However, if reinforcement was not practical than there are moral aspects to consider regarding abandoning a civilian population in such circumstances. In this scenario, the strategy was successful and there are many occasions in real-life where it has also been. Equally there have been occasions where it has failed to prevent massacres.

- There is the need to re-establish the JLTs to facilitate liaison and the coordination of humanitarian support operations with stakeholders considering the current situation. Again, there is the need to respect the KPA by both parties to the conflict. The UNCIMIC Chief working through Political Affairs and Human Rights can play a major role in respect of this. Furthermore, the leadership of both parties should be made to be responsible for the looting and Human Rights Abuses and their role in preventing them. UNAC should also verify all human right violations and report appropriate it.

- Finally, the role of the national and international media should also not be forgotten as these play an important role in shaping perceptions. The parties to the conflict may seek to divert attention from their own role by blaming the UN Mission for the breakdown. This should be forcefully rebutted and UNAC should stress its achievements in preventing a more widespread loss of life and make its report on human rights and IHL violations committed by both parties public.
Guidance Notes on SBE 8 – Miners’ Strike and POC Challenge

Role Play for Scenario 8

The Following Appointments could be nominated (depending on the Type and level of course) for role Play:

- The Head of Field Office.
- The Brigade Commander, Muka Sector
- Police Chief, Muka
- OCHA Head, Muka
- G9, Sector UN-CIMIC officer

What is your contingency plan for the protection of the union workers and other civilians?
What proactive measures could be taken to defuse the tension? What supports do you recommend to be given to the UNAC/OCHA office?

Guidelines

- Understanding the political, social and economic dynamics of the region is key to understanding its protection concerns. The spark for the conflict, which resulted in at least 52 people being killed, was the action of the Presidential Guard during a demonstration. However, the wider context of this act accounts for why the mob targeted the Tatsi area of the city for attack. The UNAC team had enough information to be able to predict that if there was an outbreak of conflict in Maldosa then the Tatsis were likely to be the most vulnerable civilians – and, therefore, if peace-keeping troops had been sent to the town, this is the area where they should have been deployed, but the facilitator should guide participants through discussing these.

- It seems that the unions had the potential to mobilise a section of the population on an ethnic basis, even if the reason for the mobilization was primarily economic. The Tatsis are excluded from this mobilization and are a potential threat to its effectiveness. The ability of the Coppers Miners Union to threaten a general strike shows the dispute has political, rather than just sectional, significance. It is important to note that the strike had significant local support and, given the importance of revenue from copper exports for the Government of Carana there was a clear potential for the dispute to escalate. Since most of the police in Maldosa were recruited locally, it can be assumed that these may have had some sympathy with the strikers' objectives. Indeed many of them may come from the same families. The government clearly understood the latter problem, which is why it deployed the Gendarmerie and Presidential Guard to the town. The fact that both security forces have a very poor human rights record, act in total impunity and are likely to be used by political leaders to crash the unions and target the Tatsi community is an additional factor of concern.

- All of these elements should have been factored into the participants’ initial contingency plan. Transport links to the region are good and so UNAC in Galasi and Muka could easily send additional personnel should they be needed. It would seem wise to despatch a political affairs officer to the region as well as a team of human rights officers. Meetings
should be held with the local authorities, the Copper Miners Union leadership and the IDP representatives. A dialogue should also be opened with the heads of Police, Gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard to make it clear that UNAC will closely monitor and document their acts and will hold them accountable for any abuse against the civilian population. As well as potentially protecting the IDPs, UNAC needs to consider the security of its own office in Maldosa and the three warehouses. It should also have a contingency plan for evacuating its own staff and other aid workers.

- Since the main threat of violence arising from this situation will probably be civil, it is vital that if UNAC deploys police and soldiers to Maldosa that they are supplied with riot control equipment – such as riot shields, protective clothing, tear gas, rubber bullets, water cannons – and trained in riot control techniques in order to enable an effective and non-lethal response. A small number of properly trained police can have a greater impact than large numbers of ordinary soldiers without proper riot control training and equipment. UNAC's Rules of Engagement permit the use of force to protect civilians, but this should be the minimum necessary for that purpose and proportionate to the threat. Violent mobs cannot be stopped with bare hands but should not be stopped with live ammunition – except as a last resort. Troops can be used in such circumstances, but it is vital that they understand that their task is to pacify civilians – most of whom will probably be unarmed – rather than to defeat an opposing military force.

- The first part of this scenario primarily relates to policing and an important discussion point should be on the distinct role of the UN Police, as opposed to military, in the protection of civilians. UN police officers support host-state police and law enforcement agencies in the execution of their functions. They also provide support to UN operations and ensuring the safety and security of its personnel and missions, primarily in public order management. Their duties are defined by the mandates that the missions are given and can range from executive to advisory functions. UN Police are not considered as law enforcement officers under the legislation of the host country and their prerogatives are consequently limited. They may, however, stop, detain and search individuals in accordance with the mandate of the mission and specific directives issued by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

- FPUs should have primacy in addressing situations of public disorder of a non-military nature – that is where there is no sustained use of firearms or military weaponry – in support of or in cooperation with host state law enforcement agencies, as applicable. The Head of the Police Components (HOPC) may request personnel of the military component and/or other security personnel of the mission to perform specific missions or tasks, but will retain tactical control and overall command. The assignment of military personnel must be coordinated with the HOMC or Sector or Battalion Commander, as applicable.

**Guidance on first development**

- The international airport closed in the first week of the strike which would have made communications with Galasi more difficult. The reports of clashes between members of the local police force and the Presidential Guard confirmed a hypothesis that should have been in the contingency plan. The escalation of the dispute in the
- second week should have provided a sufficiently clear signal for UNAC to assess the region as a high security risk area for UN personnel and so move to Security Phase Five (Evacuation). It should therefore have implemented its contingency plan to evacuate its own staff and other aid workers.
• UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1844 emphasizes that the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks and the Tatsi community in Maldosa are now clearly at risk. UNAC needed to communicate its concerns to the government and urge them to take all necessary measures to protect these civilians. It also needed to carry out an independent assessment of whether these measures are adequate through enhanced monitoring on the ground by uniformed peacekeepers or human rights officers if security allows it. For example, were regular units of the CDF and CNP deployed to guard this area and could they be relied upon to do so? UNAC could also consider issuing a news release with strong condemnation for what appears excessive use of force, a firm request that the government handling of the strike be conducted in compliance with its human rights obligations and a reminder of its mandate to protect civilians. This may have a deterrent effect and signals the mission resolve to implement its protection mandate. UNAC should also continue to engage with security forces on the ground with a similar message.

• If UNAC believed that the Government of Carana was unable or unwilling to provide the necessary protection then it should have offered to provide additional international police units and peace-keeping soldiers from its own resources, in line with the SCR. Available UNAC units of soldiers and UN Police are required to take action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, using all necessary means, within the limits of their capacity and in the areas where they are deployed, to carry out the tasks. Operational commanders in these areas should be briefed on the Mission’s Rules of Engagement regarding the use of force including against host country government forces.

**Guidance on second development**

• What will you include in an official communiqué outlining your response? This should outline the course of action that you intend to take, issues you will prioritize and assistance you need to give to the UNAC/OCHA office in Maldosa. It should also include proposals to the Government of Carana, the UN Security Council and DPKO. Even if UNAC had followed all of the steps described above there is no guarantee that the final scenario could have been avoided. The UNAC team need to stress what they actually did as events unfolded and place responsibility for the outbreak of violence where it rightly belongs on the parties themselves. It is likely that these will seek to deflect this responsibility by blaming UNAC’s actions or inactions and these claims should be firmly rebutted. An in-depth human rights investigation should be conducted into the killing of the unions’ head, the other 52 killings, some or most of which could be summary executions given that only Tatsis were targeted and other alleged human rights violations. UN Police should provide technical support to the CNP in carrying out criminal investigations, but UN human rights officers should also investigate independently. UNAC findings and recommendations should be first shared and discussed with the government and then made public. This is important to signal to Carana authorities UNAC intention to follow up on the incidents, hold those responsible accountable and deter similar violence in future.